Developing A Robust Legal System Through Scale for Youth Extremism Across Arab Cultures

Abstract

Several legislations and socio-cultural measures have been adopted to curb the problem of violent extremism. In order to consolidate these measures, this study aimed to develop a youth violent extremism scale (YVES) that takes into account the differences between and within Arab cultures. This scale could be used and tested within an Arab country or between Arab countries to identify legal, social, and educational policies and applications to curb violent extremism. A literature review and nomological network methodology was utilized to show the scale's dimensions, correlations to those dimensions, and other relevant variables (such as the LSC, LSE, and criminality scale). A sample of 6726 young students and authorities from fifteen Arab countries were selected for this study. The scale was developed in three stages: generation, refinement, and validation. It was necessary to analyze various attributes of the scale at each stage. Findings showed that six factors were obtained through principal component factor analysis using Varimax and Kaiser Normalization (29 items). A significant positive association was found (r=.651, p = 0.000), supporting the scale's validity. Using Cronbach's alpha, the scale reliability was strong and assessed at 0.98. The scale's construct validity was estimated by assessing the correlation between the Youth Violent Extremism scale and low self-control. Future research is needed to test the scale on different professions like teachers, police officers, and parents and on different age groups, settings, and cultures. The implication of this scale would provide a legal and juridical framework for understanding and preventing youth violent extremism, which would be helpful in creating a robust legal system and build a more cohesive and resilient youth society.

Headnote

Abstract

Several legislations and socio-cultural measures have been adopted to curb the problem of violent extremism. In order to consolidate these measures, this study aimed to develop a youth violent extremism scale (YVES) that takes into account the differences between and within Arab cultures. This scale could be used and tested within an Arab country or between Arab countries to identify legal, social, and educational policies and applications to curb violent extremism. A literature review and nomological network methodology was utilized to show the scale's dimensions, correlations to those dimensions, and other relevant variables (such as the LSC, LSE, and criminality scale). A sample of 6726 young students and authorities from fifteen Arab countries were selected for this study. The scale was developed in three stages: generation, refinement, and validation. It was necessary to analyze various attributes of the scale at each stage. Findings showed that six factors were obtained through principal component factor analysis using Varimax and Kaiser Normalization (29 items). A significant positive association was found (r=.651, p = 0.000), supporting the scale's validity. Using Cronbach's alpha, the scale reliability was strong and assessed at 0.98. The scale's construct validity was estimated by assessing the correlation between the Youth Violent Extremism scale and low self-control. Future research is needed to test the scale on different professions like teachers, police officers, and parents and on different age groups, settings, and cultures. The implication of this scale would provide a legal and juridical framework for understanding and preventing youth violent extremism, which would be helpful in creating a robust legal system and build a more cohesive and resilient youth society.

Keywords: Scale, youth violent extremism, Arab countries, exclusion, intolerance, rigidity, social pessimism, grievances, violence, jihad

Introduction

In almost all the Arab states, the premise exist that violent extremism is not a political issue (Sas et al., 2020) as it stems from "misguided youth" who are instilled a "perverse view of Islam." (Cordesman, 2017). It is also understood that legal or military actions alone cannot counter violent terrorism and educational initiatives and de-radicalization activities to devastate the terrorist shelter places and to reform and educate the misguided youth. The League of Arab States (LAS) has taken several initiatives applicable to all its Arab nation members including the Charter of the Arab League, Combating the threats of terrorism vide Arab Strategy to combat terrorism (1997) and the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (19981999). During the 26th Arab League Summit held in Egypt in 2015, the LAS prioritized the issue of violent extremism and created a joint Arab military force to deal with challenges posed by extremist terrorist groups (Samy, 2016).

Arab nations are also members of organizations like MENAFATF, Egmont Group, GCTF and Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing, working towards countering violent extremism. In more recent years, Jordan introduced AntiTerrorism Law in 2006, undermining the freedom of even some religious and cultural activities. Another legal instrument, Amman Letter of 2004, confronted Islamist extremism by refuting and delegitimizing certain radical interpretations of Islam (Rubio, 2022). In 2013, Saudi Arabia passed it new counterterrorism law, which declared any behavior that undermined the state or society to be characterized as terrorism. All these legislations were in response to the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which urged its member states to develop their own national and regional plans of action to curb terrorism.

In both Arab and non-Arab states, radicalism, violent extremism, and terrorism are central to current policy concerns. The terror these events have caused, their ties to larger tensions between and within faiths, and how they have shown a lack of social cohesion, have all greatly impacted communities. Youth involvement is a trait of violent extremism nowadays. Even though this is common among violent extremist groups, it is strange that these groups are mostly made up of young people and spread out geographically. Off the battlefield, young people acting as soldiers, executioners, and suicide bombers engage in even more unusual practices. Children and young people in fragile, conflict-torn, and developing countries face many risks, and these trends affect them differently. Due to the variety of roles they play, including actors in the fight, spectators, supporters, activists, or observers, people may also be exposed to extremist recruitments. Youth may also be subjected to unfair treatment by the legal system and national security threats (Harper, 2018).

Young people are particularly susceptible to violent extremism. They represent a vulnerable and marginalized group in society who experience exclusion, disenfranchisement, resentment, and alienation from the broader group (Farhadi, 2020). The academic setting is perfect for religious radicals' recruitment efforts for political parties and terrorist activities. Schools thus serve as a breeding ground for radicals (Al-Badayneh, 2012). Youth are the target of recruitment due to their environments that support extremism, such as identity crises among young people and other social crises like poverty, unemployment, inequality, and unjust treatment, as well as their marginalization and exclusion from the majority of significant aspects of life. Exclusion from political involvement, decision-making, and creating policies that serve their interests are only a few examples (AlBadayneh, Khelifa, & Alhasan, 2016).

Many declarations focusing on youth and development have been made. These include the Amman Youth Declaration from August 2015 (UN, 2015), the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security from December 2015, and UNSC Resolution 2282 on the Review of the UN Peace building Architecture from June 2016. These resolutions highlight young people's crucial role in preventing conflict and upholding peace and security despite violent extremism (Ajodo-Adebanjoko, 2022). Research measurement has significantly impacted youth involvement in extremist organizations (Wesleti, 2018). Most Arab states have adopted an anti-terrorism bill. Most Arab laws emphasize preventing youth from joining extremist groups and international efforts to counter terrorism and money laundering.

Rationale of the Study

Extremism, in particular, needs strong theoretical and conceptual frameworks and strict methods from the research and expert communities. In addition, researchers must develop reliable and valid measurements to study a complex construct of violent extremism. Public policies must be based on relevant, easy-tofind information and a national and international goal. Therefore, researchers examined the motivations of the many players and the decision-making process to understand how young people in different cultures became extremists. However, as a complex construct, violent extremism lacks a general definition. Children's right to fair treatment and a secure, nurturing environment that fosters their growth as vital members of society is threatened by violent extremism (Zogg et al., 2021).

Hence, this research aimed to construct a valid, reliable and cross-cultural youth violent extremism scale that should be comprehensive and cross-cultural to take into account cultural differences within and across Arab countries. Such a scale owing to its exhaustive nature can be tested and implemented either within one country or between two or more countries and cultures. Furthermore, conceptual construction of violent extremism can be identified utilizing scales at the abstract level. It also offers a knowledge base for formulating policies and applications for combating violent extremism among young people as well as ramifications for law and security.

The rationale behind the scale construction is to create an accurate and valid measure of a construct to evaluate a particular attribute. Scale development is challenging and time-consuming (Schmitt & Khmoski, 1991). This poses particular difficulties since it is almost impossible to observe. The non-observable constructs, such as self-report, must be indirectly evaluated as they cannot be measured directly. Furthermore, these constructs are often abstract. Finally, rather than being a single, standalone concept, these constructs are complex and may include many different components. Because of this complexity, it makes creating a measurement is a challenging task, and validation is crucial for creating scales (Tay & Jebb, 2017). Cronbach and Meehl (1955) described the complexity and difficulty of proving construct validity for such a measure. To avoid producing unclear data, researchers may develop standardized measures based on large heterogeneous samples as one of their goals. Using standardized measures would improve theory construction and testing and make it simpler to compare results (Price & Mueller, 1986). Moreover, future joint research in particular areas can also succeed in the establishment of measurements.

Literature Review

* Demographics of the Arab world

The 22-Arab League members have many linguistic, cultural, religious, and geographical connections. In addition, they have some demographic characteristics like population growth, age distribution, and marriage patterns. Around 300 million people live in Arab countries, and unlike other parts of the world, the population's age distribution is still "young." More than half (54%) are still under 25 years of age, against an estimated 48 percent in developing and 29 percent in developed countries. Such as ongoing population growth of the youth was previously unheard of (UNPY, cited in Makhlouf Obermeyer (2015)). In the Arab world, 27% of its population comprises adolescents and young adults (10 to 24 years old). Realizing this potential will require urgent and significant investments because there are now few opportunities for meaningful education, social interaction, and work. This is particularly true for adolescents and young people, including women, refugees, and persons with special needs.

There are still several issues, even at the base level of adolescent well-being. Children are the victims of violence in this area, which starts early and lasts forever. Bullying affects about 12 million children, or more than half of all 13 to 15-year-old students; in Egypt, Palestine, and Algeria, bullying is above 50%. Political unrest and conflicts have made adolescents and young people even more vulnerable, increasing their exposure to abuse, exploitation, and violence (Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 2020; No Lost Generation Initiative, 2017; World Bank, 2017).

* Violent extremist groups and role of youth

Notwithstanding youth engagement in violent extremism, it is widely recognized that youngsters may play an equal role in preventing it. Youth should be seen as a nation's asset since they represent its future and potential for leadership. On the other hand, it is problematic. It may threaten prosperity and peace since there is a growing "youth bulge" of unemployed young people striving to survive who are also susceptible to recruitment by violent extremist groups (Mlambo, 2020). Young people must be protected since they are especially susceptible to various risks and dangers, such as alcohol abuse, violence, sexual exploitation, and harmful ideas. Young people should be seen as part of the solution and as the present, not simply the future. They also have the agency and capacity to act. Due to their ability to produce, contribute, and affect change, they are also co-creators.

The Erasmus+ program, which is the European Union's program for education, training, youth, and sport, supports the European Union through SALTO centers [Cultural Diversity (SALTO CD) is one of eight resource centers in the SALTO-Youth network (Support Advanced Learning and Training Opportunities for Youth)]. This youth program aims to modernize education, training, and work across Europe by developing knowledge and skills (SALTO Cultural Diversity Resource Centre, 2017). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, global patterns show extremist groups' growth and rise. The study of these tensions has consequently brought attention to public unrest, human rights abuses, and societal instability (Dicko et al., 2018). Researchers, politicians, and the local, national, and international communities are concerned about young people's violent extremism in social, educational, and security contexts.

According to various estimates, between 2011 and 2017, more than 30,000 foreign fighters from 81 different nations joined violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, most of whom were young and adolescents (Hegghammer, 2010). Even though most of the money came from the Middle East, about 20% came from Western states. This sparked interest in work causes and conditions. Indeed, how extremist groups, and Daesh in particular, attract participants in high numbers and from such diverse demographic groups baffles scholars and experts alike (Harper, 2018). Neumann (2016) highlighted that most European foreign fighters were "fighting against an existential threat." Their accessible online content showed how Sunnis were being slain, tortured, and raped. In fact, it was believed that their choice to fight was "more an emotional reaction to injustices perpetrated by an outside group, and less about a particular interpretation of one's religious commitments" (Harper, 2018; Zachary & Masters, 2014).

However, there are various reasons for the youth to join these extremist organizations. Right at the outset, mostly financial incentives attracted extremist group membership in Jordan, unlike earlier times when youth joined extremist groups with many other reasons. According to anthropologist Atran (2003), the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda attracted youths to build a "potent extraterritorial fighting force." It was estimated that almost 75% of Daesh fighters were recruited through friendship networks. Similar patterns were also noticed by Hegghammer (2020), who looked at Afghan jihadists, and Roy (2021), who looked at European Al-Queda recruits, both concluded that the recruits were mostly young students who were mobilized to join jihadist groups. The Australian Security Policy Institute noted that a small number of Australian youth, including those below the age of 18, were radicalized to travel to join jihadist groups in the Middle East (Barracosa & March, 2022).

In their recruitment videos, militant organizations like Al Shabaab and Daesh feature their youth extremists to protect Islam and to get justice for the oppressed (Hegghammer, 2017). Al Shabaab, which was actively involved in the Somali Civil War, is a Salafi-jihadist military and political organization based in Somalia. Its extremist philosophy is inspired by Somali nationalism into the Islamist cause. It disseminates footages of police brutality against Kenyan Muslims and (unverified) images of arbitrary arrests, detentions, and extrajudicial killings and police harassment. Similarly, Daesh, the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) follows the Salafi jihadist branch, and invokes youth through its widely publicized images of racial discrimination (Harper, 2018). In UK, such Jihadi recruitment groups became active by taking advantage of the anti-establishment sentiments of young Muslim teenagers, who were provoked to be in a "state of war" with the media, the government, and the security system, to regain their rights (Harper, 2018).

The Jihadists and their recruitment attempts are also connected with factors like anger over injustice, poor leadership, and corruption. In addition, restrictions on civic freedom, widespread repression, and state-perpetrated (or sanctioned) rights abuses are also most significant factors that lead a person to identify the state itself as an enemy. Rather than being a problem unique to a particular region, minorities in Western states today perceive new security measures like "stop and search" protocols and migrant vetting as a form of deliberate marginalization (Bondokji, Agrabi, & Wilkinson, 2016).

The West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute, a non-profit policy institute based in Amman, Jordan, operating under the chairmanship of His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal, has contributed towards designing evidence-based policy to combat humanitarian challenges associated with terrorism and extremism faced by the West Asia and North Africa regions. The Institute works with ex-combatants to understand their challenges and tries to resolve issues that cause dissatisfaction, such as related to living circumstances, financial limitations, unemployment, poor earnings, and irregular employment (Lahn, Grafham, & Sparr).

* Defining the construct of Violent Extremism

In order to define the construct of violent extremism, it is important to understand its broad categorizations, distinction between militant and moderate groups, and how it ignites the sense of "we" versus "them." Extreme minds do not care about how complicated the social world is. Instead, they focus on strict categorizations and what seems true. Violent extremism is the use of violence, threats, and incitement to violence for ideological ends. The radical worldview and ideals justify the use of violence. Table 1 collects a few formal and informal definitions to understand the in-depth meaning of the construct of violent extremism.

Theoretical Framework

The discourse of violent extremism pervades all nations and builds a psychological model of violent extremism which serves a theoretical basis for three types of indicators: need, narrative, and network recently postulated in a study (Kruglanski et al., 2018). The need indicator is of personal significance, when youth turns violent to meet their dominant need of recognition; secondly, the narrative radicalizes the action of the youth justified by a collective cause; lastly, a network of people consolidates both the need and narrative indicators thus making the youth perceive violence as justifying and morally acceptable. Past studies mentioned in the previous section have tried to define the idea of a terrorist persona: one who is indulged in terrorist acts and has mental weakness or other social instability. These studies concluded this definition by using both psychological model of violent extremism as well as radicalization models under a terrorist typology. Studies have also rejected the idea that ethnicity, social class, religious ideology, family background, or socioeconomic status could explain or were responsible for participation in an extremist group. Instead, they turned to the idea that violent extremist action was the end stage of a process that started with radicalization. When used to explain the growth of Daesh and other extremist groups, none of the several explanation models were scientifically sound or accurate.

A new perspective on the connection between radicalization and extreme activity has emerged, in which the decision to join a violent extremist group is still the result of some kind of radicalization process. This new perspective is influenced by particular "push" and "pull" elements. Pull factors are the positive qualities or advantages a group provides in exchange for membership. In contrast, human factors that influence decision-making are the detrimental social, political, economic, and cultural drivers. While hypotheses connecting radicalization to violent extremist conduct or group membership came under closer examination as the Daesh issue approached its fifth year of establishment. One claim was that the often cited push-pull and drivers were too general to consistently or effectively account for particular radicalization cases. Although individual cases may have been influenced by unemployment, political marginalization, or religious belief, these events are widespread, leaving models (Harper, 2018).

People are drawn into radical and violent movements through deliberate manipulation and accompaniment (socialization) processes, which are frequently aided by psychological, emotional, or personal factors of need, narrative and network (Kruglanski et al., 2018) as well as search for identity and dignity, vengeance for past mistreatment, the breakdown of authority figures' relationships with young people. Hence, in order to prevent individuals from joining violent extremist groups, a deeper examination and consideration of the pillars of the social structure of nations in danger of violent extremism is necessary (United Nations Development Program, 2016).

A recent UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) report examined current State practices on policies and measures governing "violent extremism" (General Assembly Human Rights Council report A/HRC/33/29, 2016). The report also examined effective practices and lessons learned about how protecting and promoting human rights contributes to preventing and countering violent extremism. The phenomenon of violence is considered more widespread than terrorism, regardless of the definition. There are many different governmental and intergovernmental definitional approaches to violent extremism. Extremism is imposing beliefs, values, and ideologies on others by force to curtail civil and human rights (Schmid, 2014). Extremism may include the following two essential characteristics (Borum, 2011). Firstly, the imposition of someone's own beliefs, values, and ideologies on other human beings by force, and secondly, religious, gender, and race-based discrimination and violence to defraud the civil and human rights of minorities and others (Hassan et al., 2021).

Methodology

* Research design

This study used a mixed method research design with quantitative and qualitative approaches, aiming at developing a scale that can provide an accurate and valid measure of a construct (Schmitt & Khmoski, 1991). This is so that it can be used to evaluate the trait that is usually neither difficult to measure nor visible easily, like how you feel about yourself, need you to evaluate them indirectly. Furthermore, these constructs are often abstract. Additionally, rather than being a single idea that stands alone, these "constructs" are often complicated and may have more than one part. Due to this complexity, it isn't easy to create a measurement instrument, and validation is essential when making scales (Tay & Jebb, 2017).

* Sampling

A sample of 6726 young students was drawn from 15 Arab countries' public schools. The sample demographics included 47.9% males and 52.1% females; 79.4% identified themselves as citizens and (20.6%) as Arab expatriates. The sample was distributed according to the region as follows: Gulf countries (36.1%), the Levant (25.4%), Maghrabi Arabi (16%), Egypt (7.5%), the West Bank (15%), and Gaza (15%). Table 2 shows the participating countries.

* Instruments of Data Collection

i. Item Generation (Question Development)

Both inductive and deductive methods were used to identify appropriate questions for the scale. It is considered best practice to combine both deductive and inductive methods to define the domain and identify questions to assess it. The deductive method helped in the description of the relevant domain and item identification. This was done through a literature review and assessment of existing scales and indicators in that domain. The inductive method involved generating items from individuals' responses. Qualitative data was obtained through direct observations and exploratory research methodologies, such as focus groups and individual interviews. Qualitative techniques were used to move the domain from an abstract point to its manifest forms.

ii. Item Refinement

The violent extremism scale developed for the present study was derived from available literature on violent extremism and other relevant theories and scales, like the Aspar Extremism Scale (KSA). The scale was based on several studies and tests. In one study (El-Badayneh & Elhasan, 2017), a panel of 10 experts judged survey items from 1,401 students. A questionnaire was made based on research on the ASBAR Extremism Scale (KSA) (ASBAR center, 2010) which asked about the students' family, how they felt about justice and equality, and how proud they were of their country. Its variables were related to religiosity, force, criminality, violence, life stress events, and low self-control. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) found 23 domains and 55 items that made up the factors structure.

There are a few other similar studies that replicated the experiment to prove the validity and reliability of this scale of this scale, namely: Al-Badayneh et al. (2016) surveyed a representative sample of (1116) university students on five domains representing 51 items; Alava et al. (2017) used EFA and identified 16 of 44 domains ( like women, education, media, jihadism, others, faith, jihadi groups, takfir, use of violence, power, others, fascism, dogmatism, rigidity, and grievances); Al-Badayneh (2012) revealed six factors and 29 items and a replication of the factor structure via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and examined the validity of a related construct, violent extremist intentions (n = 4816). Items were selected with the following principles: simplicity, straightforwardness, and the avoidance of slang, jargon language, double negativity, ambiguity, or overly abstract or leading questions. The final scale questionnaire was written in Arabic. The Violent Extremism Scale (VES) consists of 29 items with six theoretical dimensions.

iii.Item Reduction

In the last stage of scale formation, the 29-item Violent Extremism Scale that was customized based on previous steps, was distributed around the following factors: Exclusion of others & intolerance; Rigidity & social pessimism; Dogmatism & forcing consensus; Violence & Jihadi Groups; Cult of power; and Grievances & mysticism.

* Data analysis

To analyze the responses of the participants, a content validity test was performed by experts and judges. Ten experts evaluated the first pool of questions and their relevance to Arab youth violent extremism. These judges were highly knowledgeable about the domain of interest and/or scale development and potential users of the scale (DeVellis, 2012). A small pilot study was conducted with a sample (N=1401), and it was found that 55 questions met the inclusion criteria. Items were identified using deductive and inductive approaches to make the instrument more comprehensive.

Results and Findings

* Nomological Network: component factor analysis

A multidimensional construct definition of violent extremism was utilized by outlining the nomological network and to present how the violent extremism construct was related to its dimensions (factors) and to other constructs (Figure 1). Since the scale utilized was empirically correlated with other recognized measures predicted by violent extremism theories and the literature review, it exhibited significant validity evidence. Hence, a nomological network was crucial to the validation process (both convergent and divergent validity) (Tay & Jebb, 2017).

The principal component factor analysis revealed six factors. The F1 factor labeled "Exclusion of others & intolerance" (9 items), the F2 factor (4 items) labeled "Rigidity & social pessimism;" the F3 factor (5 items) showed "Dogmatism & forcing consensus;" the F4 factor (4 items) presented "Violence & Jihadi Groups;" the F5 factor (3 items) represented "Cult of power;" and the F6 factor (4 items) labeled "Grievances & mysticism."

* Correlation coefficients

Correlation coefficients were calculated and found to be statistically significant when the correlation matrix and sampling size were tested. However, the determinant (t = 4.85) and the correlation matrix were not singular and statistically significant using Bartlett's test of sphericity (c = 69790.431, a = 0.000), which indicated that the correlation matrix was not an identity matrix (Table 1).

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test was used to examine sample adequacy (homogeneity of the sample), and the KMO value in this study was 0.936 (Table 1). Kaiser (1974) proposes that a value greater than zero is recommended; up to (0.5) is initial; a value between (0.7-0.8) is acceptable, a value between (0.8-0.9) is great, and a value above (0.90) is superb.

* Component Factor Analysis

A principal component factor analysis with varimax Kaiser Normalization rotation through SPSS (version 22) was used to empirically estimate the number of factors, to determine which questions are to be retained. Applying the graphical method called the Scree test, first proposed by Cattell (1966), a scree plot was examined, and eigenvalue analysis (i.e., eigenvalue > 1) suggested a 6-factor solution appropriate for the data (see Figure 2).

A scree plot determines the number of factors that are required to retain an exploratory factor analysis (FA) or components in a principal component analysis (PCA). As can be seen from the scree plot (Figure 2), the suggested number of factors is 6 which match with the factor loading analysis (components).

The factor analysis used Varimax with Maximum Likelihood Rotation with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy Stopping Rule. A factor solution was identified as a resolution of the factor analysis. The scatter plot analysis revealed that the six factors accounted for (59.724%) of the variance on the scale. A principal component factor analysis with variance correction and Kaiser Normalization produced six factors (29 items) accounting for 59.7% of the total variance of youth violent extremism. The first factor, labeled "Exclusion of others & intolerance" (9 items), accounted for 15.3% of the variance, the second factor (4 items), "Rigidity & social pessimism," was responsible for 10.2%, and the third factor (5 items) "Dogmatism & forcing consensus" contributed 9.3% of the variance. The fourth factor (4 items), "Violence & Jihadi Groups," explained 9.2% of the variance. The fifth factor (3 items), "cult of power," explained 8 % of the variance, and the sixth factor (4 items), "Grievances & mysticism," explained 7.4% of the variance.

* Reliability Analysis

Internal Reliability

The Cronbach Alpha for the 29-item Violent Extremism Scale was high (0.98), which means that the scale was very consistent within itself. Concurrent validity focuses on the accuracy of criteria for predicting a specific outcome. The scale's validity was estimated by calculating the correlation between the Youth Violent Extremism Scale (YVES) and the Low Self-Control Scale. Results showed a significant positive relationship of 0.651, a = 0.000, indicating that the scale is valid (Table 5). Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the Youth Violent Extremism Scale and constructs, a proof of internal reliability.

Convergent Validity

In order to have good construct validity, one must have a strong relationship with convergent construct validity and no relationship with discriminant construct validity. Table 6 presents the grand correlation greater than.05, indicating good convergent validity. Moreover, all Cronbach alpha coefficients are higher than 0.70, considered acceptable for validity.

Table 7 exhibits all correlation coefficient means for each item is greater than .05 and this indicates a good convergent validity.

Table 8 presents convergent and discriminant validity of scale (>.03) as measured on the scale.

Scale Validation

Table 9 presents the Conformity Factor Analysis of total variance explained for the Final Violent Extremism Youth Scale's items.

Gender Differences

Table 10 shows significant differences between males and females in violent extremism (F = 13.678, 0.000). Table 10 shows the ANOVA analysis for the differences between males and females in youth extremism (see Table 4). Descriptive results revealed, however, that females had a slightly higher mean of violent extremism than males (M =85.2 vs. 87.6), with a close variation (26 vs. 27) for males and females, respectively.

Discussion

In order to comprehend what drives young people to become violent extremists and what impact it has, a need was felt to design a valid and reliable tool for measuring violent extremism. Understanding what can be done to help young people, shield them from violent extremism, and discourage them from acting violently in the future is equally crucial. Youth policies and strategies need to be updated and approved in accordance with universal human values in order to fully compensate for the lack of policies in education and development that are based on research. This research therefore aimed to construct a cross-cultural youth violent extremism scale that should be valid, reliable, extensive, and takes into account cultural differences across Arab countries. Such a scale should be applicable within one country or between more countries and cultures. Furthermore, scales at the abstract level should be used to identify conceptual constructions of violent extremism. It should provide a knowledge base for formulating policies and applications for combating violent extremism among young people.

Findings showed that the 29-item scale was dispersed across a scale made up of six factors, which together accounted for 59.7% of the variance in youth violent extremism. The first category, "exclusion of others & intolerance," which had nine items, accounted for 15.3% of the difference. The second component, "rigidity & social pessimism," was made up of four items and accounted for 10.2% of the variation. The third component, "dogmatism & forcing consensus," which contained five items, accounted for 9.3% of the variance. The fourth factor, (violence & jihadi groups), which had four items and accounted for 9.2% of the variance. The fifth factor (cult of power), which consisted of three items, explained 8% of the variance. The sixth factor, grievances and mysticism, composed of four items and explained 7.4% of the variation. Results indicated that there were significant differences in youth violent extremism between males and females. In tight variation, females had a little greater mean of violent extremism than males. It appears that women internalize extremists' beliefs as zero-order beliefs that females take unquestionable. Moreover, women were victims of the culture of the shame and subject to stigmatized if deviant from these beliefs (True & Eddyono, 2021).

The key trait of an extremist dogmatic personality is highlighted by the results. Young extremists with a violent past are intolerant of difference and do not accept other people. Furthermore, this shows that violent extremist youth want to establish a homogeneous society. It is dangerous to only rely on counterterrorism tactics to stop violent extremism. The problems in people's lives that have made recruiting and violent extremism easier need to be addressed. When one adopts a "social determinism" approach, it becomes evident that interconnected political, economic, and cultural variables dominate personal ones. Given the connections between these elements, it is understandable why some young Arabs would be drawn to extreme ideologies and violent extremist groups and organizations.

According to Buchanan-Clarke's (2016) research, certain extremist organizations and organizations in Nigeria had their roots in racial monoliths. Kelly-Clark & KellyClark's study (2022), found that Muslim clerics and Boko Haram restricted western education even if some of its members profited from it and thought it corrupted, provided additional evidence for their argument. In Nigeria, they planned to create an Islamic empire. Extremists who restricted their interactions with the "other" generated societal rifts that are more prone to violence. This is particularly evident in Arab culture, where the political doctrine of Islam placed a higher value on justice than on peace. Victoroff (2005) research backs up the assertion that the longstanding cultural custom of seeking vengeance against an oppressor is directly tied to the continuous violence in the Middle East.

Extremist organizations profit from conflicts by disseminating false information that justifies the marginalization of Muslims and offers them a reason to call for change. Examples include pictures of deceased people from US drone attacks and detainee abuse under the extraordinary rendition regime (Harper, 2018). The narrative of willful exclusion and the idea that elite interests have been fostered at the expense of "the rest" are highlighted. A gulf between the government and its citizens has been exacerbated by how unevenly these effects are distributed, more so than by poverty, socioeconomics, or a lack of possibilities (Bondokji et al., 2016).

The findings showed that there were substantial disparities between males and girls in terms of youth violent extremism. In a narrow range, women showed a slightly higher mean of violent extremism than men Women are frequently stereotyped in violent and conflict situations as being passive, helpless, subordinate, and maternal. These presumptions promote gender biases. Women are consequently not viewed as prospective terrorists or as dangerous as their male counterparts if they were to engage in terrorism. However, it is incorrect to believe that women are more or less hazardous than men or more likely to engage in peaceful conversation, refrain from violence, and cooperate. In fact, terrorist organizations have highlighted the presence of women in their organizations to attract new members and to project an image of an innocent, nonviolent persona (OSCE, 2013).

Conclusion

The literature on youth development underlines the importance for young people to transition into adulthood by having a diversity of experiences, abilities, and assets, which is a key lesson to be learnt. Despite young people's involvement in violent extremism, it is commonly acknowledged that they can also prevent it. The issue is problematic, though. Since there is a growing "youth bulge" of unemployed young people trying to live who are also prone to be targeted and recruited by violent extremist groups, it might pose a threat to prosperity and peace (Mlambo, 2020).

Legal, conceptual, and cultural understandings of how Arab adolescents engaged in violent extreme behaviors must be adopted by Arab countries. Additionally, Arab nations must understand how to use a knowledge-based approach to stop young people from becoming violent extremists. This necessitates that Arab nations have a broad perspective on violent extremism as a social, legal, political, educational, and ideological issue. a critical necessity for cooperation with Arab states to avoid and resist violent extremism within a state party. Youth can work with adults to stop extremism. In order to socialize children toward embracing others and a tolerant and peaceful education, women can be an effective agent, empowering via sport and education preventing youth from living in poverty and marginalization

Young people support or join such violent groups and organizations in opposition to or in revolt against a particular social and political setting. They also do it because they stand to gain considerably from it. This study offered an assessment tool that can act as a knowledge base for security measures. The policies and expressions of violent extremism in the legal, social, and educational realms can be identified using the current scale. Future research is necessary to test the scale in a variety of professions, including parenting, law enforcement, and teaching. The scale also needs to be evaluated across a range of cultures, settings, and age groups. There is also a need to develop a theoretical and empirical paradigm for comprehending and countering teenage violent extremism.

This study offered a reliable scale for measuring youth violent extremism. This group is particularly susceptible to adopting ideas and attitudes that could one day inspire terrorism in the majority of nations. The scale has shown to be dependable and easy to use across numerous countries and cultures. This measure's application might enable cross-cultural comparisons. Additional empirical validation is required before the measure may be used in a population segment other than university students. They might have special qualities that younger or older subgroups do not. The need to include all Arab states with various occupations and age groups was one of the study's limitations.

Footnote

1 Police Academy. Graduate College. MOI. Qatar and IKCRSJO. Jordan. [email protected]

2 Department of Sociology. Mutah university. Al-Karak, Jordan.

3 Head of Prevention at a local government, Belgium.

References

References

Ajodo-Adebanjoko, A. (2022). The Role of Youths in Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria. ACCORD. https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-role-of-youths-in-countering-violent-extremism-in-northeast-nigeria

Al-Badayneh, D. (2012). Radicalization incubators and terrorism recruitment in the Arab world. In The use of the Internet in terrorism finance and terrorists recruitment (pp. 1-44). NAUSS, KSA. http://www.nauss.edu.sa/Ar/DigitalLibrary/Books/Pages/Books.aspx?BookId= 833

Al-Badayneh, D., Khelifa, M., & Alhasan, K. (2016). Radicalizing Arab University students: A global emerging threat. Journalism and Mass Communication, 6(2), 67-78. https://doi.org/10.17265/2160-6579/2016.02.003

Alava, S., Frau-Meigs, D., & Hassan, G. (2017). Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research. UNESCO Publishing, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000260382

ASBAR center. (2010). ASBAR scale for radicalization levels in KSA. https://asbar.com/site/?lang=en

Atran, S. (2003). Genesis of suicide terrorism. Science, 299(5612), 1534-1539. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1078854

Australian Government Measures. (2017). Update on Australian government measures to counter violent extremism: a quick guide. Research paper series, 2017-18. https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2017-08/apo-nid103081.pdf

Barker, C. (2017). Update on Australian Government measures to counter violent extremism: a quick guide. Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services. <https://www.aph.gov.au/About Parliament/Parliamentary Departments/Parlia mentary Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick Guides/CounterViolentExtremism

Barracosa, S., & March, J. (2022). Dealing with radicalised youth offenders: The development and implementation of a youth-specific framework. Frontiers in psychiatry, 2445. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2021.773545

Bondokji, N., Agrabi, L., & Wilkinson, K. (2016). Understanding Radicalization: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers. West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute, Royal Scientific Society in Amman, Jordan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321527192

Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism II: A review of conceptual models and empirical research. Journal of strategic security, 4(4), 37-62. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463911

Buchanan-Clarke, S., & Lekalake, R. (2016). PP32: Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn. Policy Paper, 32. https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/pp32-violent-extremism-africa-public-opinion-sahel-lake-chad-and-horn

Cattell, R. B. (1966). The scree test for the number of factors. Multivariate behavioral research, 1(2), 245-276. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr0102 10

Cordesman, A. H. (2017). Islam and the patterns in terrorism and violent extremism. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep23296.pdf

Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological bulletin, 52(4), 281-302. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040957

Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. (2020). World Population Prospects 2019. United Nations. https://population.un.org/wpp/publications/files/wpp2019 highlights.pdf

DeVellis, R. F. (2012). Scale development: Theory and application. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications. https://worldcat.org/en/title/697979981

Dicko, A., Mousa, I., Oumaro, I., & Issaka, M. (2018). Youth Violence and the Challenges of Violent Extremism in Zinder. International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/youth violence en.pdf

El-Badayneh, D. M., & Elhasan, K. (2017). Determinant Factors of Radicalization Among Arab University Students. Journal of Security Studies, 19(2), 89-114. https://guvenlikcalismalari.pa.edu.tr/Upload/DergiDosya/arap-universite-ogrencileri-arasinda-radikallesmeye-yol-acan-faktorler-dergidosya5e46be25-2ea2-47a5-94d4-1f46da628d74.pdf

Farhadi, A. (2020). Countering violent extremism by winning hearts and minds. Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-50057-3.pdf.83.pdf

Glazzard, A., & Zeuthen, M. (2016). Violent extremism. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. https://gsdrc.org/professional-dev/violent-extremism

Government Offices of Sweden. (2011). Sweden's action plan to safeguard democracy against violence promoting extremism. Government Communication. <https://www.government.se/49b75d/contentassets/b94f163a3c5941 aebaeb78174ea27a29/action-plan-to-safeguard-democracy-against-violence-promoting-extremism-skr.-20111244

Harper, E. (2018). Reconceptualizing the drivers of violent extremism: An agenda for child & youth resilience. WANA Institute. https://childhub.org/sites/default/files/webinars/drivers of violent extremism an agenda for child and youth resilience.pdf

Hassan, B., Khattak, A. Z., Qureshi, M. S., & Iqbal, N. (2021). Development and validation of extremism and violence risk identification scale. Pakistan journal of psychological research, 36(1), 51-70. http://dx.doi.org/10.33824/PJPR.2021.36.1.04

Hegghammer, T. (2010). The rise of Muslim foreign fighters: Islam and the globalization of Jihad. International Security, 35(3), 53-94. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC a 00023

Hegghammer, T. (2017). Jihadi culture. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139086141

Hegghammer, T. (2020). Weeping in Modern Jihadi Groups. Journal of Islamic Studies, 31(3), 358-387. https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etaa016

HM Government. (2011). Prevent Strategy. The Stationery Office Limited. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

Kaiser, H. F. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. psychometrika, 39(1), 31-36. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02291575

Kruglanski, A., Jasko, K., Webber, D., Chernikova, M., & Molinario, E. (2018). The making of violent extremists. Review of General Psychology, 22(1), 107-120. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000144

Lahn, G., Grafham, O., & Sparr, A. E. (2016). Refugees and Energy Resilience in Jordan. Chatham House. https: / /www.chathamhouse.org/sites / default/files/publications/research/2016-08-03-refugees-energy-jordan-lahn-grafham-sparr.pdf

Makhlouf Obermeyer, C. (2015). Adolescents in Arab countries: health statistics and social context. DIFI Family Research and Proceedings, 2015(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.5339/difi.2015.1

Mlambo, N. (2020). Africa: Triple Threat - Conflict, Gender-Based Violence and COVID-19. All Africa. https://allafrica.com/stories/202004240366.html

Neumann, P. R. (2016). Radicalized: new jihadists and the threat to the West. Bloomsbury Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350987692

No Lost Generation Initiative. (2017). Translating research into scaled-up action: Evidence symposium on adolescents and youth in MENA (summary report). No Lost Generation Initiative. https: //www.nolostgeneration.org/ sites / default/ files / eman/Hi ghlights/SUMMARY20REPO RT ESAY2017.compressed.pdf

Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. (2014). Action plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. Government.no. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/Action-plan-against-Radicalisation-and-Violent-Extremism/id762413

OECD. (2016). DAC High-Level Meeting, Communiqué of 19 February 2016. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. https://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf

OSCE. (2013). Women and Terrorist Radicalization Final Report. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. https://www.osce.org/flles/f/documents/4/a/99919.pdf

Price, J. L., & Mueller, C. W. (1986). Absenteeism and Turnover among Hospital Employees. JAI Press, Greenwich. https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/10024791

Public Safety Canada. (2009). Report on Plans and Priorities. Public Safety Canada. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/hj%2013.a12%20t7%202008-09%20pt.3-p-eng.pdf

Roy, O. (2021). Islamizing Radicalism. In Global Middle East (pp. 282-292). University of California Press.

Rubio, R. (2022). Preventative Plasticities: Legal Ambiguities in Jordanian Counterterrorism Legislation. Arab Law Quarterly, 1 (aop), 1-30. https://doi.org/10.1163/15730255-bja10109

SALTO Cultural Diversity Resource Centre. (2017). Young people and extremism: a resource for youth workers. The European Commission and the British Council & Erasmus. https://educationaltoolsportal.eu/educationaltoolsportal/en/tools/young-people-extremism-resource-pack-youth-workers

Samy, M. (2016). The League of Arab States. In International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism (pp. 171-176). Routledge.

Sas, M., Ponnet, K., Reniers, G., & Hardyns, W. (2020). The role of education in the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in developing countries. Sustainability, 12(6), 2320. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12062320

Schmid, A. P. (2014). Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin. ICCT Research Paper, 1, 29. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep29434.pdf

Schmitt, N. W., & Khmoski, R. J. (1991). Research methods in human resources management. Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing.

Tay, L., & Jebb, A. (2017). Scale development. In S. Rogelberg (Ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

True, J., & Eddyono, S. (2021). Preventing Violent Extremism-What Has Gender Got to Do With It? European Psychologist. https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000434

UN. (2015). Amman Youth Declaration Adopted at Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security. United Nations. https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/08/amman-youth-declaration-adopted-global-forum-youth-peace-security

UNESCO. (2017). Preventing violent extremism through education sustainable development goals. Guide for policy-makers. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris France. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000247764 eng

USAID. (2011). The development response to violent extremism and insurgency: Putting principles into practice. In. USAID Policy. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/flles/documents/1870/VEI Policy Final.pdf

Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches. Journal of Conflict resolution, 49(1), 3-42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704272040

Wesleti, O. (2018). Policy brief: the legal and judicial framework of preventing youth radicalization (ar). Maghreb Economic Forum. https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/57739/57637.pdf

World Bank. (2017). Harmonized list of fragile situations. The World Bank Group. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized -list-of-fragile-situations

Zachary, L., & Masters, J. (2014). Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria. Council on Foreign Relations. http: //www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811

Zogg, F., Kurki, A., Tuomala, V., & Haavisto, R. (2021). Save the Children, youth as a target for extremist recruitment. Save the Children Finland. https: //pelastakaalapsets3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/main/2022/02/17133213/youth-as-a-target-for-extremist-recruitment stc en.pdf