How to Perceive National Governance Networks in the Global Commons of the Earth’s Surface: A Case Study of the Antarctic

Abstract

The destiny of mankind is closely intertwined, and exploring new paths for the governance of the global commons of the earth’s surface (GCES) has become a worldwide topic. Thus, this paper attempts to carry out the following work by taking the Antarctic as an example: (1) Identify the characteristics of the governance subjects by using a literature review and the inductive analysis method. (2) Construct a network of responsive relationships among the governance subjects based on the evolutionary game approach. This study found the following: (1) A multi-subject participation in governance, i.e., with the Antarctic Treaty parties as the core, the seven major organizations as the main force, the United Nations as the support, enterprises as the emerging force, and other countries as the potential subjects. (2) Response-relational networks have high clustering coefficients and characteristic path lengths close to those of random networks, with significant small-world features of relational networks. (3) As important components of the benefit function, long-term benefits and benefit intensities together influence cooperative strategies for governance in the Antarctic. In the future, we should actively focus on long-term interests based on the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind, improve the governance structure at the right time, and strive to build a robust globalization.

1. Introduction

The global commons of the earth’s surface (GCES) are the public space and resources that are outside the jurisdiction of national sovereignty and involve the common interests of all mankind, covering the Antarctic, the high seas and the global seabed area, with an area of about 2.65 × 10⁸ km² [1]. It accounts for nearly 52% of the earth’s surface and is an important space for realizing sustainable development now and in the foreseeable future. Due to the common nature, openness, and competitiveness of the GCES, there are various issues at the level of global governance, such as the difficult coordination of public and private needs, an unequal distribution of interests, vague governance mechanisms, and cross-functional conflicts [2]. It also faces more severe challenges such as the over-exploitation of resources, a more fragile ecology, increasingly serious pollution, and increasing security risks [3,4].

The collaborative relationship and response behavior among the governance subjects (GSs) of the GCES run through the entire process of planning, protecting, developing, and utilizing public spaces and resources [5]. Currently, there are many gaps in the research about the GSs of the GCES. First, the scope of subjects is still controversial. The interests of each subject are different, making it difficult to achieve a win–win situation [6]. The Antarctic region is the common wealth of all mankind, and the overall interests are to be realized within the framework of limiting the sovereignty of states [7,8,9]. Second, subjects have different perceptions. The thinking logic of each subject is not completely consistent, lacking common value guidance [10,11]. But the governance of the global commons usually requires that all subjects adhere to common norms and act collectively in the face of threats [12]. Third, governance norms are vague. This means that existing governance models are neither adaptable to multiple contexts nor resilient to external risks, ultimately leading to fragmented governance [13]. For example, the governance of Antarctic living resources still lacks clear definitions and harmonized norms, which leads to the overfishing of krill by states [14]. This ambiguity in governance norms has also been referred to as “Antarctic exceptionalism” [15,16]. Fourth, governance strategies are limited. Decision makers still lack practical and flexible solutions [17]. While the Antarctic Treaty system (ATS) is a success story of international governance [18], there is a clear need for a more comprehensive regulatory framework in the face of the growing number of Antarctic tourists and cruise ships [19].

In summary, the research objectives of this paper are as follows: (1) Clarify the types of GSs of the GCES, and compare the characteristics and roles of different subjects. (2) Focusing on the relationship network of national GSs, the social network analysis model is used to reveal the operational mechanisms of the evolutionary game. (3) Design feasible solutions to optimize the national governance network and form a community with a shared future for mankind. The rest of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 is a literature review. Section 3 covers the materials and methods used in this study. Section 4 analyzes the characteristics of the GSs of the Antarctic region and carries out the evolutionary game simulation of the response relationship network of governance subjects. Section 5 discusses relevant research on Antarctic governance and future research directions. Section 6 presents the research conclusions.

2. Literature Review

The theory of the tragedy of the commons is the theoretical origin of the governance of the GCES [20]. As a public resource, the commons are non-exclusive; everyone has the right to use them but has no right to prevent others from using them, which ultimately leads to an overuse or even depletion of the resource. The biggest difference between the governance of the GCES and the general governance of the commons explored in the theory of the tragedy of the commons lies in the accessibility of the object of governance. The objects of general governance of the commons are relatively clear, the resource carrying capacity and resource value are relatively easy to visualize, and the subjects of governance are mostly individuals and local governments. However, the objects of the GCES are relatively complex, and the value of resources is huge. Relying only on the theory of the tragedy of the commons cannot comprehensively guide the study of the governance of the GCES, as this also requires the framework guidance of the global governance theory. Global governance means that sovereign states, intergovernmental international organizations, and non-governmental organizations adopt cooperative approaches such as mutual participation, negotiation, and coordination to jointly address the challenges of global issues arising from globalization and ultimately achieve global governance [21].

Current research on the governance of the GCES, especially in Antarctica, is characterized by two “extremes”. On the one hand, it is based on basic research in the natural sciences. For instance, some scholars predict that the concentration and thickness of Antarctic landfast sea ice (fast ice) will rapidly decrease by 2100, based on the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), Phase 6 [22]. For a climatological study, it has been confirmed that the Antarctic Slope Current brings relatively warm water, which increases the rate of ice-shelf melting and is detrimental to the stability of the Antarctic ice sheet [23]. On the other hand, this is based on research in the social sciences. To give an example, some scholars have used ethnographic methods to describe the practical activities of youth scientific expeditions in the Antarctic, further affirming the important role of Antarctic expeditions in promoting cultural exchanges and improving geopolitics [24].

Meanwhile, existing studies have assessed the legitimacy of the ATS in terms of minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, institutional integrity, and accountability, thus providing a basis for reforming the Antarctic legal system [25]. Nowadays, some of the literature attempts to integrate knowledge and methods from the natural and social sciences to explore Antarctic governance strategies. For example, in response to the potential impact of tourism on Antarctica, some scholars have used cruise ship statistics for the past 20 years and have found that the number of Antarctic tourists is closely related to national economic activities. Ultimately, management programs are proposed to control the number of tourists to protect the Antarctic environment [26]. To understand human psychological activities in closed environments, some studies have found that expedition members living in Antarctica have four different psychological characteristics: seasonal, situational, social, and salutogenic. This provides new ideas for maintaining the psychological health of Antarctic researchers [27]. Following the trend of convergence between the natural and social sciences, this study aims to organically combine natural characteristics, such as geographic locations and social attributes, such as the status of a party to the Antarctic Treaty, to establish a matrix of relationships between governance actors and to further evolve the game study.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Study Area

The Antarctic region is located at the southernmost point of the earth, with a total area of 0.34 × 10⁸ km². It covers most of the area south of 60° S, including the Antarctic continent and its surrounding islands (0.14 × 10⁸ km²) and the Southern Ocean (0.20 × 10⁸ km²). Among them, the Antarctic continent has a diameter of about 4500 km, a roughly circular coastline, two deep bays, the Weddell Sea at 40° W, and the Ross Sea at 170° W. The S-shaped Antarctic Peninsula extends for a distance of about 1400 km, and the Southern Ocean encircles the Antarctic continent [28].

The Antarctic region was chosen as the core research area for the GCES. The Antarctic region is characterized by both specificity and generality. Specificity is manifested in the Antarctic continent, which is the only land in the international commons of the earth’s surface and is the world’s only continent without human settlement. The Antarctic continent is covered by a huge ice cap, and important resources such as the ice cap are often neglected in existing studies, directly assigning their ecological service value to zero [29]. The generality lies in the fact that the Southern Ocean within the scope of the Antarctic region is generally connected to other oceans, and the Antarctic region is characterized by the commonality, openness, and competition of the global commons. Therefore, the study of the governance of the Antarctic region is not only of great significance for the governance of the GCES, but it is also of great significance for the governance of global resources, the governance of space, and even the governance of the universe.

3.2. Data Sources and Processing

Two types of data are applied in this paper, including textual information and geographic information. The former is used to determine the attributes and relevance of GSs and is derived from the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty (https://www.ats.aq/index_e.html, accessed on 9 March 2023). The latter is used to identify the possible geographic proximity between GSs and was obtained from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (https://data.apps.fao.org/?lang=en, accessed on 9 March 2023). Relationships between GSs can be perceived in terms of geographic location, treaty conclusion, scientific cooperation, and protected area co-construction [30]. In this study, the following steps were taken to establish a relationship matrix of governance actors in the Antarctic region:

• (1). Identify the geographic proximity of land between countries. Geographic proximity is assigned a value of 1. For instance, if Argentina shares borders with three countries, including Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, Argentina is assigned a value of 1. Geographic non-proximity is assigned a value of 0. For example, if Australia has no land neighbors, it is assigned a value of 0 for all other countries.

• (2). Clarify the status of the original parties to the Antarctic Treaty. The signing of the Antarctic Treaty demonstrates the existence of a governance collaboration mechanism between the parties (https://www.ats.aq/e/antarctictreaty.html, accessed on 9 March 2023). Therefore, this study considers that the 12 countries involved in the original treaty making are interconnected, i.e., a value of 1 is assigned between the 12 countries of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

• (3). Visualize governance cooperation in the Antarctic. The joint establishment of Antarctic research stations, Antarctic Specially Protected Area (ASPA) cooperation, and Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCASs) cooperation among countries are assigned a value of 1 (https://www.ats.aq/devph/en/apa-database/search#apa-results, accessed on 9 March 2023). For example, Australia, China, India, Romania, and Russia jointly established the Antarctic Special Management Area (ASMA) in the East Antarctic Rathman Hills, and the above five countries assigned a value of 1 to each other.

• (4). After performing the above operation for each country, the countries that still have no relational connection are assigned a value of 0. Eventually, this study obtains the Antarctic region’s relational network adjacency matrix of GSs (Figure 1).

3.3. Research Methods

The Anthropocene has made a deep mark on Antarctic governance [31]. As a model of international governance, the Antarctic Treaty membership has dramatically increased nearly fourfold from 12 states [32]. This implies an increasingly complex network of Antarctic governance [33]. With the significant advantage of a quantitative analysis of the structure of relational networks, the social network analysis (SNA) has been widely used in different fields such as economics, management, and sociology [34,35]. Therefore, adopting this network analysis to analyze the hierarchical structure among Antarctic governance subjects has gradually become a new research trend [36,37].

3.3.1. SNA

SNA is the application of the complex network perspective to the analysis of social relationship systems. This method is able to graphically characterize the structure of complex interaction networks between different subjects [38]. Watts and Strogatz first proposed a small-world characterization of SNA [39]. On this basis, Barabási and Albert further revealed the scale-free nature of SNA [40]. Since then, this quantitative approach has been used to specialize in the study of various large and complex systems in the real world [41,42].

The basic idea of SNA is to consider the elements as nodes and to define the relations between the elements as lines. Further, the number of nodes is the order of the relational network, while the number of lines represents the size of the relational network. An adjacency matrix consisting of a value of 0 and a value of 1 is usually used to reflect the node relationships [43]. This paper uses SNA, mainly including the following: network density, network reciprocity, and small world [44].

• (1). Network Density

Network density is the ratio of the number of relationships that actually exist in the relationship network to the theoretical maximum number of relationships. The higher this value, the stronger the connection between the nodes. The formula is as follows:

(1)$D=\frac{E}{V(V-1)}$

where D is the network density, E is the number of relationships between the nodes of the network, and V means the number of all nodes in the network.

• (2). Network Reciprocity

Network reciprocity indicates the level of liaison between individual nodes in the network to each other, where the more pathways between nodes, the higher the level of relatedness of the point. If for each node, there are more pathways to liaise with each other, this is reflected in a high level of cohesion of the whole network. Network density and network reciprocity reflect the associated pathways and nodes of the network structure; for example, an increase in the number of core nodes increases the network density but not the network reciprocity, and an increase in the number of pathways of connections between established nodes increases the network reciprocity. The formula is as follows:

(2)$R=1-\left(\frac{2U}{V-1}\right)$

where R is the network reciprocity, and$U$ is the number of unreachable pairs of points in the network structure (the number of pairs of points that cannot be connected to each other). $V$ is consistent with the meaning of Equation (1).

• (3). Small World

Small-world features are a characterization of the connectivity of a relational network, which mainly includes three indicators: the clustering coefficient, feature path length, and small-world feature quotient.

① The clustering coefficient reflects the average degree of aggregation of the relational network structure. The larger the clustering coefficient is, the more compact and aggregated the network space is, and if vice versa, then it is dispersed, and the formulas are expressed, respectively, as follows:

(3)$G_i=\frac{2E_i}{K_i\times \left(K_i-1\right)}$

(4)$G=\frac{1}{V}\times {\sum }_{i=1}^V{G}_i$

where $G_i$ denotes the clustering coefficient of the relational network node i, $E_i$ denotes the actual number of edges of node i$, K_i$ denotes the number of nodes connected to node i, and $G$ denotes the overall clustering coefficient of the relationship network. $V$ is consistent with the meaning of Formula (1).

② The characteristic path length, reflecting the connectivity and accessibility between nodes, is used to measure the degree of discreteness between the network nodes, whereby the shorter the characteristic path length, which indicates a shorter path of contact between nodes, the stronger the agglomeration between nodes and the higher the connectivity, which is calculated by the average of the shortest path length from each node of the relational network to all the other nodes, with the following formula:

(5)$L=\frac{2}{V\left(V-1\right)}{\sum }_{i\ge j}{d}_{ij}$

where $L$ denotes the characteristic path length, $d_{ij}$ is the length of the node $i$, and $j$ is the number of shortest connecting lines between them. $V$ is consistent with the meaning of Equation (1).

③ The small-world feature quotient is the actual relational network, and, to compare, it is the same size of the random relational network. So as to determine the small-world characteristics of the network, the actual relational network clustering coefficient is greater than the same size of the random network clustering data. At the same time, the closer the ratio of the characteristic path length of 1, the more significant the small-world characteristics of the relational network are. The formula is as follows:

(6)$Q=\frac{G/G_R}{L/L_R}$

where Q denotes the small-world characteristic quotient; $G$ and $G_R$ denote the actual relationship network clustering coefficient and the equally sized random network clustering coefficient, respectively; and $L$ and $L_R$ denote the actual relationship network feature path length and the equivalent scale random network feature path length, respectively.

3.3.2. Simulation of GS Response Relationships Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Game theory is useful in guiding collective actions on the global commons [45]. In the 1940s, von Neumann and Morgenstern formally introduced game theory to analyze the problem of strategic choices of players to obtain gains under specific environmental constraints [46]. At this time, the form of the game is called a normal-form game, featuring the possibility of forming a mandatory binding agreement between the players. In 1951, Nash proposed a new form of the game, i.e., a non-cooperative game, based on the assumption of complete rationality and with the goal of maximizing the benefits of individual pursuit [47]. Considering the limitations of the Nash equilibrium (complete rationality, complete information, and static stability), evolutionary game theory has become a new trend. It originates from the study of animal competitive behavior [48] and has significant advantages, such as group thinking [49] and limited rationality [50]. There is a game of convergence in the response process of Antarctic governance, and the Antarctic governance subjects gradually form a relationship network and trigger the dynamic evolution of the game of interests to activate the key. Combining the relational network and the evolutionary game, we study the dynamic evolutionary game process that promotes the cooperation of the relational network of Antarctic governance stakeholders.

• (1). Model assumptions and parameter settings

In the game of the evolution of the Antarctic-region-governance subjects’ relationship network of M (M = 29), the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCP) (node i) needs to participate in a total of (H_i + 1) issues related to the governance of the Antarctic region, and H_i is the degree of node i of the Antarctic-region-governance subjects’ relationship network. The ATCPs (node i) participate in the following games: ① Type I small-group game: participate in the Antarctic-region-governance subject responses’ game centered on i, with i’s neighboring nodes as the participants; ② Type II small-group game: participate in the Antarctic-region-governance subjects’ network game centered on i’s neighboring nodes, with i as a participant.

The ATCPs (node i) have two choices of strategies for each game: cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. A valid game is recorded when the state tends to stabilize after the governing body participates in the full small-group game. In this study, t represents the number of effective games, and $X_i^t$ denotes the game strategy chosen by the ATCPs (node i) in the t round of the game.$X_i^t$ is a 0,1 decision variable. When $X_i^t=1$, this represents that node i adopts a cooperative approach in the t round of the game, and when $X_i^t=0$, this represents that node i adopts a non-cooperative approach in round t of the game. The Antarctic Treaty negotiating country (node i) participates in (H_i + 1) small groups in each round of the effective game and uses a stable strategy.

It should be noted that the ATCPs (node i) only play with other ATCPs (neighboring nodes of node i) that have a direct link with their country. The matrix in this study $A_{i,j}$ represents the adjacency matrix of the Antarctic governance relationship network when there is an edge association between node I and its neighbor node j, the corresponding element of the subject’s adjacency matrix $a_{i,j}$. In each round of the effective game of the ATCPs (node i), if it adopts the cooperative strategy, it needs to pay the capital cost C. The total capital cost of the ATCPs (node i) after completing an effective game is (H_i + 1)C, while the cost of the ATCPs (node i) adopting the non-cooperative strategy is 0. Each of the games of the Antarctic governance relationship network evolution of the subjects’ participating governance subjects chooses the next strategy that is favorable to it based on the current payoff results of its own game strategy and compares them with the payoffs of other governance subjects. The final network is characterized by a significant increase in the number of strategies chosen by subjects with better than average returns, and a decrease in the size of strategies with lower-than-average returns. The benefits of a governed Antarctic region are indistinguishable for any of the governing subjects. Considering that benefit acquisition in the Antarctic region has a long-term payoff and time lag, this paper sets p to be the long-term benefit that can be obtained by the collaborators of the network evolution game of governance subjects in the Antarctic region.

• (2). Gaming Interests of Governance Subjects

Each governance agent in the network game model of Antarctic governance agents is rational, and the consulting states have a clear and unique objective: to maximize the average benefit of the state’s participation in the Antarctic governance policy game.

In the Type I small-group game, the average return to the game for ATCP i is formulated as follows:

(7)$f_i^{\prime }\left(t\right)={\sum }_{j=1}^M{A}_{ij}\frac{r\left(\sum _{i=1}^N{A}_{il}{X}_l^t{C}_l+X_j^t{C}_j\right)}{H_j+1}-H_i{X}_i^t{C}_i$

where $f_i^{\prime }\left(t\right)$ denotes the average payoff after t rounds of effective games, in which ATCP i participates in the Type I subgroup; M denotes the number of nodes in the network of governance relationships in the Antarctic region, i.e., the total number of governance subjects in the evolutionary game;${ A}_{ij}$ and $A_{il}$ denote whether there is a direct link between ATCP i and ATCP j and ATCP j and ATCP l in the governance of the Antarctic region, respectively, and take the value of 1 if there is such a link and take the value of 0 otherwise; r is the gain coefficient of the invested funds;${ H}_i{, H}_j$ denotes the degree of ATCP i and ATCP j, respectively; $H_j+1$ denotes the full number of subgroups of ATCP i participating in the game in the network game of the Antarctic area’s governance subjects; $X_i^t$,${ X}_j^t$, and $X_l^t$ denote the cooperation of Consultative State i, Consultative State j, and Consultative State l in the t round of the game, respectively, and take the value of 1 if they participate in cooperation and 0 otherwise; and $C_i$, $C_j$, and $C_l$ denote the capital cost inputs of consulting countries i, j, and l, respectively.

In the Type II small-group game, the average return to the game for ATCP i is formulated as follows:

(8)$f_i^{″}\left(t\right)=\frac{r\left(\sum _{j=1}^N{A}_{ij}{X}_j^t{C}_j+X_i^t{C}_i\right)}{H_i+1}-X_i^t{C}_i$

where $f_i^{″}\left(t\right)$ denotes the average return after t rounds of effective gaming for ATCP i’s participation in the Class II subgroup; other implications are the same as in Equation (7).

Combining the two types of games in which node i participates, the average total return of node i after t rounds of games is calculated as follows:

(9)$f_i\left(t\right)={\sum }_{j=1}^M{A}_{ij}\frac{r\left(\sum _{i=1}^N{A}_{il}{X}_l^t{C}_l+X_j^t{C}_j\right)}{H_j+1}-H_i{X}_i^t{C}_i+\frac{r\left(\sum _{j=1}^N{A}_{ij}{X}_j^t{C}_j+X_i^t{C}_i\right)}{H_i+1}-X_i^t{C}_i+X_i^{t}p$

where $f_i\left(t\right)$ denotes the average return of node i after t rounds of the game; p is the long-term benefit that can be obtained by the cooperators of the Antarctic-region-governance policy game; and other meanings are the same as Equations (7) and (8).

• (3). Algorithm design for evolutionary game of relational networks

Based on the above analysis, the algorithm of the game of evolution of the relationship network of governance subjects in the Antarctic region (Figure 2) was finally designed to determine the optimal state of stable cooperation in the game of evolution of the relationship network of governance subjects in the Antarctic region [51]:

Step 1: Establish a network of relationships for governance in the Antarctic region by entering the number of initial governance subject collaborators $M_0$, investment cost C, long-term benefits p, and benefit intensity r;

Step 2: Initially t = 0, and randomly select the ATCPs in the network of governance subjects of the $M_0$ countries for the initial game cooperation strategy selection;

Step 3: Let the number of games t = t + 1, and measure the average gain of each Antarctic Treaty Consultative State in the subject network separately;

Step 4: Compare and analyze the benefits of each negotiating country with other negotiating countries, choose the next round of the game strategy, and visualize the number and size of negotiating countries choosing the cooperative strategy in the game;

Step 5: Judge whether the number of cooperative subjects of the game is stable or not. If the final number of cooperation is stable, then it is the end, and if the scale of the number of countries choosing the cooperation strategy does not converge, then return to Step3.

4. Results

4.1. Characteristics of GS

A pluralistic participation in the governance of the Antarctic region was formed, with the states parties to the Antarctic Treaty as the core [52], the seven major organizations as the main force, the United Nations (UN) as the support, enterprises as the emerging force, and other countries as the potential governance subjects (Figure 3). In other words, there are four types of actors involved in the governance of the GCES: states, inter-268 governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and businesses.

However, it should be pointed out that the current governance of the Antarctic region is, to a large extent, only a formal pluralistic subject, failing to achieve the essential pluralistic subject’s participation in governance. In other words, there are barriers between governance actors in the Antarctic region, and cooperation is very limited. The existing multi-actor governance mechanism has ensured the effective development of Antarctic governance, but the role of each subject is still insufficient, and the interconnections between them need to be further improved.

First, the top-level design of the ATCPs for Antarctic governance needs to be strengthened. As the core force of Antarctic governance, ATCPs have much room for improvement in integrating global resources and creating a participatory governance environment for other governance subjects and potential governance subjects. Due to the extremely high threshold for becoming an ATCP, governance matters have long been monopolized by the original contracting parties and, thus, are often criticized by countries and organizations outside the ATS. Since the beginning of the 21st century, only Ukraine (1 April 2014) and Czechia (4 June 2004) have achieved the status of Consultative Parties (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, “List of Parties” https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e, accessed on 28 January 2024). It can be seen that for quite a long time, there has not been any substantial breakthrough in the number of parties to the Antarctic Treaty, especially in the number of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, and the Consultative Parties are mainly European and American developed countries. The decision making of the Antarctic Treaty’s Consultative Parties represents the interests of only a small number of countries with the capacity to conduct Antarctic activities, and, in essence, it cannot truly represent the common Antarctic interests of all humankind in the same way as the United Nations does, and the openness and inclusiveness of Antarctica is more at the conceptual level than at the practical level.

Second, the seven governance platforms receive more limited support and lack communication with each other [53]. On the one hand, the seven organizations have a high degree of uniformity in their membership, leading to funding constraints. On the other hand, there is a lack of communication not only among the organizations on overlapping governance issues but also within the organizations. For example, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), both of which are involved in ecological and environmental protection in the Antarctic region, have a high degree of overlap in governance issues and have not integrated their issues to form governance synergies, and even non-consultative countries in the ATCPs do not have the right to sit in on the voting of major issues in consultative meetings.

Again, the UN has gradually moved away from Antarctic governance. Unlike the high seas and the international seabed area, the governance of the Antarctic region is not under the management of the UN, which is due to the absolute dominance of the ATCPs in the governance of the Antarctic region. Historically, countries that have been supporting and actively proposing that the UN lead the governance of the Antarctic region have joined the ATS out of a comprehensive consideration of their own national Antarctic interests and in the spirit of the pragmatism of “joining if you cannot win”, the most representative of which is India, one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, which, after many years of unsuccessful challenges to the ATS, has finally transformed itself into the ATS. After years of unsuccessful challenges to the ATS, India eventually transformed itself into one of the most loyal supporters of the ATS and was the only country other than the original parties to become a Consultative Party in the same year it joined the ATS. In addition, the UN has not been able to participate substantially in the ATS and, thus, has drifted away from the center of Antarctic governance, but there is no question that the UN remains a strong supporter of Antarctic governance.

Finally, the incentive and guarantee mechanism for enterprises and other potential governance subjects to participate in the governance of the Antarctic region needs to be upgraded. On the one hand, although the Antarctic region is rich in resources and has broad prospects for development, the special natural environment has resulted in the “three highs”—high-cost investments, a high technological threshold, and high requirements for ecological environmental protection—and many restrictions have made many enterprises more than willing to do so, and there is no effective guarantee for the maintenance of the interests of the global commons of the earth’s surface. Policies that have been introduced require enterprises to bear the risks on their own, which inevitably makes many powerful enterprises worry and delays their entry into this piece of “precious land” in the Antarctic region. On the other hand, as of January 2024, there are only 56, 16, 30, and 42 parties to the Antarctic Treaty (ATCM, 1959), the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCASs, 1972), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLRs, 1980), and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), respectively. This does not match the impact of Antarctic ecosystem protection on the global environment and global humanity. Countries outside the ATS, as potential subjects of governance, deserve to be given the opportunity to participate in the governance of the Antarctic region in the future, and the effective guarantee of the due voice of potential subjects of governance in matters of Antarctic governance requires the ATCPs to build more bridges of communication, and India’s thinking and work in this regard are worthy of reference (Table 1).

Predictably, the state is the central and absolute governing body in terms of governance in the Antarctic. The seven major governance organizations, as effective governance platforms, are the main forces that play a fundamental role in scientific research as well as the concrete implementation of governance. The United Nations, on the other hand, from a higher level of maintaining international peace and security, will be more of an observer of governance actions in the Antarctic region and will have less and less influence on the actual governance behavior in the Antarctic region and may gradually evolve into a supervisor of governance in the Antarctic region, which would be the most desirable outcome. Enterprises and other potential emerging subjects of governance still need to be continuously cultivated and developed, which cannot be separated from the creation of a good governance environment by ATCPs and the awakening of self-Antarctic awareness by enterprises and potential countries. In summary, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of the cooperative behavior of relationship networks based on ATCPs [22].

4.2. Response Relationships of GSs

Based on the Antarctic-region-governance relationship network’s subject neighborhood matrix, obtain the Antarctic region governance subject responses’ relationship network (Figure 4). The nodes of the Antarctic-governance relationship network represent the countries of Antarctic governance, with a total of 29 nodes, and the connecting lines between the nodes represent the game relationship between the governance subjects’ responses to the Antarctic governance subjects. According to the assumption of “economic man” [54], each governance subject tries to maximize its own interests, and the process of the above governance subject countries deciding to participate in the response process of the Antarctic governance subject is essentially a game process with other countries in the relationship network. The degree calculation results of each node of the Antarctic-region-governance subject responses’ relationship network show the following (Figure 5): Belgium, France, and Italy, the degree of 21, is the group of countries with the highest number of edges connected to other nodes. The degree of the original parties to the Antarctic Treaty are higher in 15 and above, China’s degree of 14, and other countries connected to the network, is at a medium level, and, in the future, there is still a large space for further cooperation, Ukraine. The smallest degrees of Ukraine, South Korea, Uruguay, and India also indicate that the network connections of the governing bodies are lower. Moreover, this paper argues that, in view of the current differences in the contributions of various countries in Antarctic ecological and environmental governance, a transnational ecological compensation transfer mechanism should be established, so as to form a virtuous cycle chain of public resource governance.

The density of the Antarctic governance’s subject responses’ relational network D is 0.4557, the relational network relevance R is 100%, the clustering coefficient G is 0.805, and the characteristic path length L is 1.599. The characteristics of the random relational network of the same size are as follows: a D of 0.4963, an R of 100%,${ G}_R$ is 0.495, and $L_R$is 1. 504. The ratio of clustering coefficient is 1.64, the ratio of the characteristic path length is 1.06, and the quotient of small-world characteristics Q is 1.55. Overall, the Antarctic governance’s subject responses’ relational network has a high clustering coefficient and a characteristic path length close to a stochastic network, and it has significant small-world characteristics of a relational network.

4.3. Simulation of the Game of Evolution of the Network of Responsive Relationships of GSs

The size of the benefits is the most central factor affecting the choice of the cooperation strategy in the game and the size of the cooperation network of the ATCPs. Different long-term interests p and the revenue intensity r have the most direct impact on the governance revenue of the Antarctic region, and this study analyses the cooperation of the Antarctic-region-governance subjects based on different long-term interests p and different revenue intensities r in response to the game. In order to more realistically simulate the process of the evolutionary game of the relationship network, this study sets the initial number of cooperators in the response game of the relationship network of the Antarctic-region-governance subjects $M_0$ = 12, i.e., the size of the initial 12 countries that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty, and the maximum number of games is set to 20.

4.3.1. Impact of Long-Term Interests on the Number of GSs

Set the number of collaborators in the initial relationship network, $M_0$ = 12, and the cost to countries involved in Antarctic governance, C = 2.0 and $r$ = 12, corresponding to different long-term benefits p (p = 16, p = 20, p = 24, p = 40, and p = 60). Each governance subject randomly selects any of its neighbors for a benefit-gain comparison and ultimately chooses the strategy of the neighboring governance subject that has greater benefits than its own, and the simulation results of the game of evolution of the network of governance relationships in the Antarctic region are shown in Figure 6 when the long-term benefits p are at different values.

The results show that the larger the long-term interest p is, the more countries are willing to cooperate. In other words, long-term interests help to promote cooperation among countries. Specifically, when p = 16, p = 20, and p = 24, the number of the Antarctic-region-governance cooperators decreases as the evolutionary game proceeds, and no country chooses to govern the Antarctic region when t = 5 and p = 16, which is the fifth game. When p = 40 and p = 60, the number of countries cooperating in governance in the Antarctic region increases rapidly and the willingness to cooperate increases significantly, and when t = 15, there is a full cooperation network. This can be obtained: in the Antarctic-region-governance subject responses’ relationship network, the cooperative governance behavior of the governance subject countries is influenced by the long-term interest p. As the long-term interest p increases, the number of the Antarctic-governance subjects’ cooperative countries in the relationship network also increases gradually, and when p increases to p = 40 and p = 60, all node countries in the relationship network are willing to cooperate, and a higher long-term interest p will promote long-term networked cooperation, and all countries are willing to join in Antarctic governance.

4.3.2. Impact of Earnings’ Intensity on the Number of GSs

Set the number of collaborators in the initial relationship network, $M_0$ = 12, the cost of the countries involved in Antarctic governance C = 3.0 and p = 10, respectively, and take different gain intensities r (r = 6, r = 12, r = 24, r = 36, and r = 45). Each governance subject randomly selects any of its neighbors to gain benefit comparisons and ultimately selects the strategy of the neighboring governance subject that has greater benefits than itself, and the simulation results of the game of the evolution of the network of governance relationships in the Antarctic region are shown in Figure 7 when the benefit intensity r is taken at different values.

The results show that the larger the gain intensity r is, the more countries are willing to cooperate. The gain intensity r is positively correlated with the number of Antarctic-region-governance collaborators, and the gain intensity r positively affects the Antarctic region’s cooperative governance. Specifically, when r = 6 and r = 12, the number of the Antarctic region’s governance cooperators gradually decreases as the evolutionary game proceeds, and no country chooses to govern the Antarctic region when t = 4 and r = 6, that is, in the fourth game, and no country chooses to govern the Antarctic region when t = 14 and r = 12, that is, in the thirteenth game. When r = 24 and r = 36, the number of countries cooperating in the governance of the Antarctic region has experienced minor fluctuations, but the number of cooperating countries in the final convergence is basically the same as the initial state, and, compared with r = 6 and r = 12, it is out of the dilemma of non-cooperation between the governing bodies. When r = 45, the number of countries cooperating in governance in the Antarctic region increases rapidly and the willingness to cooperate increases significantly, and the full cooperation network emerges when t = 8.

5. Discussion

5.1. Quantitative Expression of Antarctic Governance

Past research has noted that values are at the heart of most, if not all, conflicts in the Antarctic [11]. The future of Antarctica will be fraught with uncertainty when the values of the national subjects involved in Antarctic governance shift. Unfortunately, despite describing four future scenarios for Antarctica from a long-term perspective [14], some scholars have failed to provide credible predictions. Unlike existing qualitative studies, this paper combines evolutionary game theory and SNA to quantitatively model the role relationships of GSs. This paper finds that as an important component of the revenue function, long-term benefits p and the revenue intensity r jointly affect the cooperative strategy of governance in the Antarctic region. When both p and r are small, GSs will perceive that vested interests outweigh long-term interests and thus do not cooperate with other subjects. This is consistent with the current governance situation in the Antarctic.

5.2. Limitations and Future Research Directions

Firstly, the geographic location of the Antarctic region and the contracting parties are not depicted by means of maps. Considering that maps have strong political attributes, the co-presentation of the Antarctic region and the world map, no matter how rigorous, will result in an ambiguity of understanding. We believe that in the near future, the number of countries joining the Antarctic Treaty will increase, and human beings all over the world are one family. The map depiction of the study area and the governing body is downplayed in this study, and future consideration should be given to presenting it by means of a schematic map.

Secondly, this study focuses on the 29 Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. These countries are an important component of the optimization of Antarctic governance, but this does not mean that the other 27 state parties should be ignored and that future accessions to the Treaty are not important. Scientific research has boundaries, but the Antarctic community of destiny does not have boundaries. On the one hand, the ATS is recognized as a model of global-scale legal creativity and cooperation among subjects [55]. The ATS, founded upon the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, has proved to be one of the successes of international law and diplomacy in the 20th century [56]. The Antarctic Treaty has preserved the Antarctic continent as a zone of peace and cooperative scientific research and has provided an effective model for the management of regions beyond the limits of national jurisdiction according to common values [57]. On the other hand, discussions on the Antarctic Treaty system have become increasingly profound as we enter the 21st century. Thinking about Antarctic governance has moved beyond the traditional military realm. Antarctic governance has expanded to include economic, environmental and biosecurity aspects, including the impacts of climate change, as well as issues arising from the increased flow of scientists, tourists, and seafarers to Antarctica [58]. Our study explores governance cooperation in the Antarctic region at the level of governance concepts. Whether facing military, economic, environmental, biosecurity, or possible future governance issues, the logical starting point of governance is the realization of cooperation by the governance network, and the programs implemented are all beneficial to the subjects of the governance network.

Finally, the theory underlying the research in this paper is the economic-man assumption. The economic-man assumption is the foundation of Western economics [59]. It is also the basic premise for game theory to exist as an analytical method, and the theoretical edifice of Western economics is built on the basis of the economic-man assumption [60]. The meaning of the economic-man assumption includes three elements: (1) the governing body is selfish and pursues the maximization of its own interests; (2) the governing body is able to fully understand and master the external environment and has full cognitive abilities; and (3) the governing body is completely rational, able to select the optimal solution from all the options. And the limitation of the economic-man hypothesis is that it cannot fully portray the real world. (1) Governance subjects are pluralistic, pursuing economic and non-economic interests, including altruism, ideology, and voluntary-burden constraints. (2) Incomplete information and opportunism: since governance subjects cannot have complete information, resulting in information asymmetry, they can adopt opportunistic means to maximize benefits for themselves in the game process. (3) The governance subject has limited rationality: new institutional economics extends the governance subject’s demand function [61]; in further deepening this research, one can consider the pluralistic economic-man hypothesis.

This study presents the cooperation of Antarctic governance actors. In the future, it is equally important to study the historical changes of Antarctic-governance patterns and the manifestation of the value of Antarctic natural resources, which is also research being promoted by the authors of this paper. One strategy is to continue to track the dynamics of Antarctic scientific research, e.g., China is conducting its 40th Antarctic scientific expedition, the other is to comprehensively sort out the historical changes of Antarctic governance, and the third is to try to measure the natural resource value of the Antarctic region and the international commons on the surface of the earth. We look forward to working with more scientists with rich research wisdom.

6. Conclusions and Policy Implications

6.1. Conclusions

The GCES is related to global sustainable development, and it is also the focus of the game of various countries. On the basis of identifying the characteristics of the GSs of the GCES, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the network of GSs, which provides useful insights for optimizing Antarctic governance. The main conclusions are as follows:

• (1). In the case of Antarctica, the 54 state parties to the Antarctic Treaty are the decisive force in Antarctic governance. Secondly, the 7 organizations of Antarctic governance (3 international organizations and 4 NGO) provide a variety of channels for governmental contacts and civil society exchanges for Antarctic governance. It is worth mentioning that, as the world’s largest intergovernmental organization with the broadest mandate and the most universal character, the UN and its affiliated agencies also play a constructive role in Antarctic governance. Finally, various international enterprises in the fields of tourism, fisheries, energy, science, and technology are also playing an increasingly important role in Antarctic governance.

• (2). The nodes of the Antarctic Governance Network, totaling 29 nodes, are composed of sovereign states that are parties to the Antarctic Treaty and have decision-making power over the governance of the Antarctic. It is found that the response-relational networks have high clustering coefficients and characteristic path lengths close to those of random networks, with significant small-world features of relational networks. Overall, the 29 governance subjects form a relatively close cooperative relationship, and the association between some of the subjects is characterized by their own characteristics. For example, under the assumption of maximizing self-interests, the node degree of the 12 original parties to the Antarctic Treaty is generally high, e.g., France and Belgium. The intensity of response is also increasing for some of the Consultative Parties, such as Italy, which interacts frequently with other countries. For China, the intensity of interaction with other countries is still at a medium level, with more room for future development.

• (3). There is a positive correlation between long-term interests, the benefit intensity, and the number of GSs. When long-term interests are pursued, the willingness of GS to cooperate increases significantly, and a “common governance network” will be formed in which all actors cooperate comprehensively. Similarly, when the intensity of benefits is high, all the nodes in the relationship network will adopt cooperative strategies. In short, long-term interests and benefit intensity jointly affect the benefit function of GSs in the Antarctic region, which ultimately influences their behavior.

6.2. Policy Implications

• (1). Developing new concepts and focusing on long-term interests: Antarctica is the common wealth of all mankind and is not exclusive to any one country. In other words, all countries equally enjoy the right to utilize Antarctica and equally bear the obligation to protect it. First, the new concept of a community with a shared future for mankind should be established as soon as possible, advocating the equality of all countries. This transcends differences in values and ideologies, thus providing new ideas for optimizing Antarctic governance. Second, it urges a focus on long-term interests and emphasizes lasting practical benefits. This provides a new value orientation for realizing the overall interests of the Antarctic.

• (2). Improve governance structures and legal gaps: Nowadays, the CEP exercises mainly supervisory and recommendatory powers. Strictly speaking, this organization is not legally binding. It is suggested to add binding provisions on Antarctic ecological and environmental governance on the basis of the existing Antarctic Treaty.

• (3). An adherence to robust globalization and greater inclusiveness: The sustainable development of Antarctica is related to the whole earth’s environment and the common future of mankind. As the core force of Antarctic governance, the Antarctic Treaty parties should comply with the future development trend, take the initiative to respond to the general demands of the international community, and promote international cooperation with a more open and inclusive attitude [62]. For example, in terms of ecological and environmental governance, the Antarctic Treaty parties can take the lead in expanding the field and scope of cooperation in Antarctica and promoting the long-term and stable development of cooperative relations.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, C.L.; methodology, C.L.; software, C.L.; validation, W.S.; formal analysis, C.L.; data curation, C.L.; writing—original draft preparation, C.L.; writing—review and editing, W.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Data Availability Statement

Data are contained within the article.

Acknowledgments

We thank the editors and anonymous reviewers who provided comments and suggestions for further improvement, as well as to Yumeng Yang, who belongs to the State Information Center, the Department of Big Data Development, for her support of this paper. In addition, Chu Li would specifically like to highlight the ongoing and unwavering support of Ze Xu.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Abbreviations

ASMA	Antarctic Special Management Area
ASOC	Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition
ASPA	Antarctic Specially Protected Area
ATCP	Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party
ATS	Antarctic Treaty system
CCAMLRs	Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
CCASs	Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals
CEP	Committee for Environmental Protection
COMNAPs	Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GCES	Global commons of the earth’s surface
GSs	Governance subjects
IAATOs	International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators
IOC-UNESCO	Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
SCAR	Scientific Committee in Antarctic Research
SNA	Social network analysis
UN	United Nations
UNCOLS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Footnotes

Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Figures and Table

Figure 1. Neighborhood matrix of subjects in the network of governance relationships in the Antarctic region.

Figure 2. Flowchart of the game algorithm for the evolution of the network of response relationships of governance actors in the Antarctic region.

Figure 3. Multiple subjects in Antarctic governance.

Figure 4. Network of response relationships of governance actors in the Antarctic region.

Figure 5. Degree of the network of responsive relationships of governance actors in the Antarctic region.

Figure 6. Impact of long-term interest p on the number of cooperating actors in governance in the Antarctic region.

Figure 7. Impact of revenue intensity r on the number of cooperating Antarctic-governance actors.

Table 1

Classification of Antarctic governance subjects.

Form	Main Part
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty	Twenty-nine consultative countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Czechia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea (ROK), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.Twenty-seven non-consultative countries: Austria, Belarus, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Korea (DPRK), Malaysia, Monaco, Mongolia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovkia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Türkey, and Venezuela.
Antarctic Governance Platform	Antarctic Treaty Consulative Meeting (ATCM), Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLRs), Scientific Committee in Antarctic Research (SCAR), Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAPs), Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), and International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATOs).
United Nations	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC-UNESCO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCOLS).
Antarctica-Related Companies	Enterprises involved in tourism, fisheries, energy, science, and technology, etc.
Potential Governance Subjects	Sovereign states that are not parties to the ATS.

Sources: Official website of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat (https://www.ats.aq/index_e.html, accessed on 9 November 2023); official website of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (https://www.ccamlr.org/, accessed on 9 November 2023); official website of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (https://scar.org/, accessed on 9 November 2023); official website of the Council of Directors of National Antarctic Authorities (https://www.comnap.aq/, accessed on 9 November 2023); official website of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (https://www.asoc.org/, accessed on 9 November 2023); and the International Antarctic Tourism Association (https://iaato.org/, accessed on 9 November 2023).

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