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© 2023. This work is published under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ (the "License"). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.

Abstract

The emergence of the shared energy storage mode provides a solution for promoting renewable energy utilization. However, how establishing a multi‐agent optimal operation model in dealing with benefit distribution under the shared energy storage is still a challenge. Considering the multi‐agent integrated virtual power plant (VPP) taking part in the electricity market, an energy trading model based on the sharing mechanism is proposed to explore the effect of the shared energy storage on multiple virtual power plants (MVPPs). To analyse the relationship among MVPPs in the shared energy storage system (SESS), a game‐theoretic method is introduced to simulate the bidding behaviour of VPP. Furthermore, the benefit distribution problem of the virtual power plant operator (VPPO) is formulated based on the Nash bargaining theory. In the case study, the proposed method is conducted in four VPPs with different resource endowments in terms of techno‐economic and operation efficiency. Results verify that the multiple virtual power plants with a shared energy storage system interconnection system based on the sharing mechanism not only can achieve a win‐win situation between the VPPO and the SESS on an operation cost but also obtain the optimal allocation scheme and improves the operation efficiency of the VPPs.

Details

Title
Optimal operation of virtual power plants with shared energy storage
Author
Chen, Wenxule 1 ; Xiang, Yue 1   VIAFID ORCID Logo  ; Liu, Junyong 1 

 College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China 
Pages
147-157
Section
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Publication year
2023
Publication date
Apr 1, 2023
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
e-ISSN
25152947
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
ProQuest document ID
3092322572
Copyright
© 2023. This work is published under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ (the "License"). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.