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Abstract
The SARS-CoV-2 BA.2.86 lineage, and its sublineage JN.1 in particular, achieved widespread transmission in the US during winter 2023–24. However, this surge in infections was not accompanied by COVID-19 hospitalizations and mortality commensurate with prior waves. To understand shifts in COVID-19 epidemiology associated with JN.1 emergence, we compared characteristics and clinical outcomes of time-matched cases infected with BA.2.86 lineages (predominantly representing JN.1) versus co-circulating XBB-derived lineages in December, 2023 and January, 2024. Cases infected with BA.2.86 lineages received greater numbers of COVID-19 vaccine doses, including XBB.1.5-targeted boosters, in comparison to cases infected with XBB-derived lineages. Additionally, cases infected with BA.2.86 lineages experienced greater numbers of documented prior SARS-CoV-2 infections. Cases infected with BA.2.86 lineages also experienced lower risk of progression to severe clinical outcomes requiring emergency department consultations or hospital admission. Sensitivity analyses suggested under-ascertainment of prior infections could not explain this apparent attenuation of severity. Our findings implicate escape from immunity acquired from prior vaccination or infection in the emergence of the JN.1 lineage and suggest infections with this lineage are less likely to experience clinically-severe disease. Monitoring of immune escape and clinical severity in emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants remains a priority to inform responses.
The SARS-CoV-2 JN.1 lineage spread rapidly in winter 2023-24 with high estimated levels of transmission but limited increase in severe disease burden. Here, the authors use electronic health record data from the United States to investigate the immune history and clinical outcomes of patients infected with this strain.
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1 University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health, Berkeley, USA (GRID:grid.47840.3f) (ISNI:0000 0001 2181 7878)
2 Kaiser Permanente Southern California, Department of Research & Evaluation, Pasadena, USA (GRID:grid.280062.e) (ISNI:0000 0000 9957 7758)
3 US Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Coronavirus and Other Respiratory Viruses Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Atlanta, USA (GRID:grid.416738.f) (ISNI:0000 0001 2163 0069)
4 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Response Team, Atlanta, USA (GRID:grid.416738.f) (ISNI:0000 0001 2163 0069)
5 Kaiser Permanente Southern California, Department of Research & Evaluation, Pasadena, USA (GRID:grid.280062.e) (ISNI:0000 0000 9957 7758); Kaiser Permanente Bernard J. Tyson School of Medicine, Department of Health Systems Science, Pasadena, USA (GRID:grid.280062.e) (ISNI:0000 0000 9957 7758)