Abstract

Artificial Amnion and Placenta Technology (AAPT)—sometimes referred to as ‘Artificial Womb Technology’—could provide an extracorporeal alternative to bodily gestations, allowing a fetus delivered prematurely from the human uterus to continue development while maintaining fetal physiology. As AAPT moves nearer to being used in humans, important ethical and legal questions remain unanswered. In this paper, we explore how the death of the entity sustained by AAPT would be characterized in law. This question matters, as legal ambiguity in this area has the potential to compound uncertainty and the suffering of newly bereaved parent(s). We first identify the existing criteria used to delineate the legal characterization of death, which occurs before birth or during the immediate neonatal period in England and Wales. We then demonstrate that attempting to apply these in the context of AAPT gives rise to a number of challenges, which make it impossible to reach a definitive conclusion as to the nature of death in AAPT using the current legal framework. In doing so, we demonstrate that the current legal framework in England and Wales may be unable to adequately capture the situation of an entity being sustained by AAPT.

Details

Title
Death and the artificial placenta
Author
Nelson, Anna 1 ; Romanis, Elizabeth Chloe 2 ; Adkins, Victoria 3 ; Weis, Christina 4 ; Kuberska, Karolina 5 

 School of Law, University of Sheffield , Sheffield, S3 7ND, UK 
 Durham Law School, Durham University, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK 
 School of Law and Criminology, University of Greenwich, London, SE10 9LS, UK 
 School of Allied Health Sciences, De Montfort University, Leicester, LE1 9BH, UK 
 Department of Public Health and Primary Care, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 0SR, UK 
Publication year
2024
Publication date
Jul-Dec 2024
Publisher
Oxford University Press
e-ISSN
20539711
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
ProQuest document ID
3170520746
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law, Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This work is published under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.