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Abstract
A frequently invoked explanation for the sharing of false over true political information is that partisans are motivated by their reputations. In particular, it is often argued that by indiscriminately sharing news that is favorable to one's political party, regardless of whether it is true—or perhaps especially when it is not true—partisans can signal loyalty to their group, and improve their reputations in the eyes of their online networks. Across three survey studies (total N = 3,038), and an analysis of over 26,000 tweets, we explored these hypotheses by measuring the reputational benefits that people anticipate and receive from sharing different content online. In the survey studies, we showed participants actual news headlines that varied in (ⅰ) veracity, and (ⅱ) favorability to their preferred political party. Across all three studies, participants anticipated that sharing true news would bring more reputational benefits than sharing false news. Critically, while participants also expected greater reputational benefits for sharing news favorable to their party, the perceived reputation value of veracity was no smaller for more favorable headlines. We found a similar pattern when analyzing engagement on Twitter: among headlines that were politically favorable to a user's preferred party, true headlines elicited more approval than false headlines.
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1 Department of Sociology, Stanford University , Stanford, CA 94305 , USA
2 Negotiation, Organizations and Markets Unit, Harvard Business School , Boston, MA 02163 , USA
3 Management Department, University of Exeter Business School , Exeter EX4 4PU , UK
4 Department of Psychology, Cornell University , Ithaca, NY 14850 , USA
5 Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Cambridge, MA 02142 , USA