Global China and African Journalistic Agency: A Relational Perspective

Amid Europe’s decoupling and de-risking strategies, escalating tensions with the United States, and competition with India for leadership in the Global South, China has intensified its efforts to strengthen relations with the developing world, particularly with Africa. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s ambitions in Africa are not only to become a dominant financial power, but also normative and discursive ones.

Scholars note a distinct shift in China’s external messaging under Xi Jinping’s tenure (see, for instance, Brown 2021). Whereas the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao era (2002–12) focused on promoting Chinese soft power, especially Chinese culture, President Xi’s leadership emphasises the ‘China model’ and ‘Chinese modernisation’, highlighting the country’s non-Western model of development and its pathway to modernisation (see, for instance, Wang 2023). For instance, during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2024, China emphasised its own modernisation experience as an alternative to the Western approach in providing development assistance to Africa (Li and Hackenesch 2024).

China’s push to promote its development model in Africa and beyond relies heavily on its media organisations to shape the discourse and narratives. These organisations have produced a vast array of content—spanning newspapers, radio, television, and social media—on the global impacts of various initiatives announced by Xi, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, launched in 2013), the Global Development Initiative (GDI, 2021), the Global Security Initiative (GSI, 2022), and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI, 2023). Their coverage of Chinese engagement with Africa often highlights themes such as ‘win-win cooperation’, ‘infrastructure-led growth’, ‘a community with a shared future for humanity’, and, more recently, ‘high-quality growth’ (see, for instance, China Daily 2024; CGTN 2024). Through this messaging, they aim to project China as a benevolent partner committed to addressing Africa’s development needs. For example, Chinese-funded projects in Africa are frequently accompanied by high-profile ribbon-cutting ceremonies at which local leaders praise China’s ‘no-strings-attached’ approach to aid (Tian 2024). These events receive extensive coverage in Chinese media and are frequently reproduced or re-aired by African media outlets under content-sharing or partnership agreements (Li 2023). Chinese media organisations also translate many of these articles into Chinese, targeting domestic audiences to bolster their legitimacy and reinforce China’s positive image at home.

Despite the highly ‘mediated’ nature of China–Africa relations (Li 2017), much of the scholarly work and policy debate on this topic has focused on China’s economic engagement with Africa—such as mega-infrastructure development and financial investments, particularly under the BRI (see, for instance, Kopiński et al. 2023; Wang 2022; Li et al. 2022). In contrast, China–Africa media relations and interactions remain relatively underexplored, especially within development studies and the field of international relations. Media scholars have been more active in this area. Their work has primarily explored how various Chinese actors (including governments, embassies, and media outlets) engage with African media houses (Wekesa 2013; Wu and van Staden 2021), the media representation of China in African outlets compared with Western and Chinese media (Li 2021; Matanji 2022), media content produced by Africa-based Chinese organisations (Madrid-Morales 2016; Marsh 2023), their influence on African audiences (Wasserman and Madrid-Morales 2018; Xiang 2018; Madrid-Morales and Wasserman 2022), and the public diplomacy strategies employed by Chinese media as they expand their presence in Africa (Li and Wang 2023). Additionally, Umejei (2020) has explored what it is like for African journalists working in Chinese media organisations based in Africa, examining their daily aspirations and struggles, particularly how they navigate the collisions and collusions within Chinese newsrooms, while emphasising the importance of understanding their voices and experiences.

However, Chinese media engagement with Africa extends beyond establishing media houses and producing content from the continent; it also involves personal and organisation-level interactions between African newsrooms and Chinese organisations. Thus, beyond Africa-based Chinese newsrooms, a closer look at how African journalists and media organisations respond to and engage with Chinese offers and initiatives becomes increasingly important. To advance the study of China–Africa media relations, I argue that we can simultaneously engage with Franceschini and Loubere’s (2022) proposition of ‘Global China as Method’—an approach that emphasises that China cannot be examined in isolation but must be conceptualised as an integral part of the global capitalist system—and Franks and Ribet’s (2009: 135) call for a scholarly approach that ‘prioritizes and appreciates African agency’ within contemporary China–Africa media relations. I suggest that we must adopt a relational lens to examine China–Africa media interactions, while focusing on the role of African journalistic agency—particularly how China’s relational approaches are received, interpreted, negotiated, and contested by African journalists and media organisations across diverse contexts.

In the following discussion, I first provide an overview of a relational perspective to understand China–Africa media interactions and then unpack African journalistic agency across macro, meso, and micro levels. This essay draws on years of fieldwork and in-depth interviews with Chinese and African media personnel (including journalists, editors, and editors-in-chief), as well as government officials in China, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mauritius.

China–Africa Media Interactions: A Relational Perspective

When examining China–Africa media interactions, particularly among journalists, a relational perspective is often missing. While scholars have increasingly focused on China’s relationship-building and networking efforts with politicians and business elites—especially the Chinese Communist Party’s party-to-party cooperation with African political parties (Benabdallah 2020a; Hackenesch and Bader 2020)—the same level of analysis is not consistently applied to China’s expanding media networks in Africa, particularly the everyday interactions between Chinese and African journalists, both within and outside newsrooms.

Under Xi Jinping, China has actively worked to ‘expand its partnerships and build stronger networks with elites across the world’ (Benabdallah 2020b: 100). This includes efforts to expand its media and journalistic networks with African partners, particularly through media training programs. These programs, funded by Chinese institutions, aim to familiarise participants with China’s development story, governance model, and political ideology. While such exchanges are framed as ‘capacity-building’, they also promote Chinese media norms, which favour state-centric narratives and prioritise political stability over press freedom. For African journalists, these programs also serve as platforms for socialising Chinese values, norms, and expert knowledge (Benabdallah 2020b). In addition to training programs, China has initiated the China–Africa Press Center Program and the Belt and Road News Network, both of which count many African media organisations as their members. Furthermore, at the latest FOCAC, China announced plans to facilitate the development of the audiovisual industry in Africa through program exchanges, joint production, technical cooperation, mutual visits, and personnel training, as well as to support the construction of the Converged Media Center of Africa for joint production of films and TV programs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024). These programs foster the accumulation of guanxi(关系)—a term denoting personal or social connections, or social capital—between Chinese and African journalists. Such networks play a crucial and enduring role in cultivating what Benabdallah (2020b) terms ‘relational productive power’.

Furthermore, these expanded media and journalistic networks facilitate the implementation of other relational strategies that the Chinese authorities seek to establish or strengthen. As outlined in the latest FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2024–27), the Chinese Government plans to launch new network initiatives, including the Global Development Promotion Center Network, the China–Africa Knowledge for Development Network, and the China–Africa Think Tank Cooperation Network, alongside the establishment of 25 China–Africa research centres (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024).The activities of these new networks are likely to be heavily covered by the China–Africa media networks, creating a self-reinforcing system of relational influence.

In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, Chinese media organisations have intensified their efforts to forge new partnerships with leading African media organisations. These efforts have been spearheaded by top executives from leading Chinese media outlets. For example, in August 2023, the President of Xinhua News Agency visited Zambia and signed agreements with major local media outlets, including the Zambia News and Information Services and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, aiming to enhance collaboration in areas such as news exchange and journalist training (Xinhua 2023). By embedding itself within African media ecosystems through training programs, institutional partnerships, and the expansion of relational networks, China aims to advance its narratives while cultivating long-term influence. However, the extent to which African media organisations and journalists respond to and participate in these expanding networks depends heavily on African journalistic agency, as I will discuss in detail below.

African Journalistic Agency

To add nuance to the analysis of African agency in response to China’s external communication, in my earlier research, I proposed the concept of ‘African journalistic agency’, which I defined as ‘At the macro level, China–Africa media relations are characterised by stark asymmetries and structural imbalances, including significant disparities in personnel, organisations, training, resources, capital, and audience reach (Madrid-Morales 2021; Li 2023). Bilateral agreements under initiatives such as FOCAC influence the structure of media collaborations, often prioritising China’s strategic interests. In multiple interviews I conducted with African diplomats in Beijing between 2021 and 2024, I discovered that unlike negotiations over loans or development finance, media cooperation between China and Africa tends to occupy a lower priority—or is sometimes entirely absent from the discussions—on the agendas of African governments ahead of FOCAC summits. Despite these ongoing asymmetries, empirical evidence suggests that China–Africa media interactions are not purely one-sided. The extent to which African journalistic agency is exercised also depends significantly on meso and micro-level dynamics.

At the meso level, organisational structures and institutional practices shape journalistic agency and the ways in which African organisations navigate their relationships with their Chinese counterparts. Media organisations with established traditions of investigative and critical reporting, especially those operating in commercially driven and open public environments, are generally better equipped to scrutinise and challenge the influence of Chinese media. In contrast, media organisations operating in more restrictive environments and lacking the financial and human resources necessary for independent operations may find Chinese offers more appealing. In Ethiopia, for instance, media organisations face significant challenges due to stringent government control and a highly constrained economic environment. In such circumstances, the training opportunities and organisational partnerships offered by China are particularly attractive to local media organisations. As highlighted by a senior manager of the Ethiopian News Agency, media organisations in the country lack the resources and capacity to provide technical training for their journalists. As they told me in an interview in Addis Ababa in September 2019: ‘We are very glad that the Chinese come to us and are willing to offer training to our journalists, both here in Ethiopia and in Beijing.’

Meso-level dynamics are closely tied to African ‘bureaucratic agency’. Substate actors, such as bureaucrats within ministerial departments (especially each country’s Ministry of Information), often play a crucial role in facilitating negotiations or collaborations between African and Chinese media organisations. Scholars have demonstrated that in executing infrastructural or developmental projects, African bureaucrats, even in smaller states, are not merely passive agents. Instead, they often employ influence strategies so that civil servants’ minority views prevail (Soulé-Kohndou 2018). However, in the realm of media cooperation with China, African bureaucrats sometimes exhibit a lack of agency, primarily due to limited expertise or insufficient knowledge about Chinese media organisations. This lack of agency can be exacerbated by local political contexts and, at times, political reshuffles. For example, in Zambia following Hakainde Hichilema’s rise to power in 2021, several key officials in the Ministry of Information were appointed even though they had no experience in the media or communication sectors, which further hindered effective engagement in media-related initiatives. In December 2023, I interviewed an official in Zambia’s Ministry of Information who had played a key role in approving a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation and Xinhua News Agency. They were unaware of the fact that Xinhua is not a television station and mistakenly believed that the agency was China Global Television Network (CGTN).

At the micro level, the agency of individual journalists comes to the fore. Their experiences, decisions, and practices are instrumental in shaping how Chinese narratives are received, interpreted, and disseminated within African media ecosystems. On one hand, African journalists might be receptive to the narratives promoted by Chinese media—emphasising non-interference, mutual development, and alternative models to Western liberalism. On the other hand, their experiences in China can also provide them with a more nuanced understanding of China’s political system, economic opportunities and challenges, and Beijing’s engagement with their home country. To maximise the benefits of these training experiences while mitigating potential biases, African media organisations should take a stronger role in guiding journalists’ reporting practices after they receive training in China, which could involve providing clear guidelines, offering ongoing mentorship, fostering critical discussions about media ethics and independence, and ensuring that journalists are equipped to critically evaluate the information they receive.

Meso and micro-level dynamics are deeply interconnected in shaping African journalistic agency. At the meso level, whether these organisations have established and, more importantly, implemented editorial guidelines and internal training protocols for managing foreign content is significant. When it comes to allowing their journalists to participate in training programs in China, it is essential for African media organisations to consider whether guidelines or regulations are in place to govern their conduct and reporting on their return. Several of the African journalists who were sent to China for media training whom I interviewed told me that they were approached by Chinese journalists and media managers to craft positive China-related stories after their return. Some of them also served as focal points in fostering connections between Beijing and newsrooms in Africa.

Not all African newsrooms are critical of these connections and the potential influence on their editorial independence. At the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), for example, a reporter who attended media training in Beijing and was affiliated with the China–Africa Press Centre reproduced several articles favouring China at the request of counterparts from China Media Group, the main Chinese state media outlet created in 2018 through the merger of China Central Television (incorporating CGTN), China National Radio, and China Radio International. During a conversation we had in Nairobi in July 2019 as he was preparing for a trip to Somalia, he inadvertently remarked: ‘I’m going to China this weekend … Oh, sorry, Somalia. I love China so much; I’m always thinking about it.’ He later explained that his visits to various parts of China, during which his hosts showcased the country’s development achievements, had shaped his perception of China and its potential to positively inform Kenya’s development journey. He added that this was why he was willing to facilitate some China-related stories to inform Kenyan audiences. Nevertheless, Kenya’s media landscape exhibits a degree of resilience and maintains traditions of critical journalism, which empower media organisations to scrutinise foreign propaganda and influence. The Media Council of Kenya, which promotes ethical standards, publicly admonished the KBC for the reporter’s articles, including one on the Chinese Government’s success in poverty reduction in Xinjiang that did not explicitly mention the source as Chinese state media, leading the organisation to delete some of these stories (WhatsApp exchange with a staff member from Media Council of Kenya, February 2021).

Even in democratic contexts, such as in Mauritius, where press freedom is relatively strong, challenges persist. According to a veteran journalist and media trainer with extensive experience, Mauritian journalists have not demonstrated sufficient critical spirit when engaging with training opportunities offered by China. There has been a lack of meaningful discussions among editors and journalists about their specific needs and goals, let alone any attempt to influence the training agenda. As a Mauritian journalist whom I interviewed in Mauritius in October 2024 told me:

When editors-in-chief have training opportunities, there should be discussions about who is offering the training and the specific needs of the newsroom. What are the needs? What will they bring back to the table? These are the questions that should be asked, rather than just focusing on who is going. This is what we expect, but it is not happening. Journalists sent to China for training should gain a broader view of media operations and the challenges China is facing, as well as how China is addressing them. When they return, they should bring added value. However, journalists now just go, take selfies, and return. It’s simply a free ticket for them, rather than a learning opportunity. I’ve encountered journalists who tell me: ‘I’m going to China; I don’t know what I’m going there for, we’ll see when we get there.’ There’s really no roadmap for what they are going to do. It’s just a freebie opportunity to travel.

While acknowledging and appreciating the resistance, pushback, and reflections demonstrated by African media organisations when engaging with their Chinese counterparts, I argue that China–Africa media relations are not always shaped by fully informed or fully prepared decision-making. The decisions of African journalists, managers, and bureaucrats are often constrained by structural limitations and their ‘relational’ experiences, which together shape the complexities of these interactions.

Suggestions for Future Research

By examining China–Africa media relations through a relational perspective and analysing African journalistic agency across the macro, meso, and micro levels, this essay highlights the need to address structural imbalances, institutional constraints, and individual agency in understanding these interactions. While macro-level asymmetries create a significantly uneven playing field, meso and micro-level dynamics illuminate opportunities where African actors can assert agency and negotiate influence, even within the context of a highly asymmetrical relationship.

How can we unpack African journalistic agency from a relational perspective? One approach is to further examine it across the macro, meso, and micro levels. At the macro level, while many media cooperation agreements have been signed between China and African countries, the processes through which these were negotiated remain underexplored in existing research. Understanding these negotiations could provide valuable insights into the dynamics of power and influence at a structural level. At the meso level, the role of African bureaucrats in shaping African journalistic agency is also an area that warrants further investigation. The extent to which bureaucratic actors influence decision-making and facilitate—or hinder—media collaborations has not been widely studied. At the micro level, the everyday interactions between Chinese and African journalists can also be further explored, particularly through ethnographic studies. For instance, how do Africa-based Chinese journalists and managers affiliated with China’s official media organisations socialise with their African counterparts? What do these interactions look like? What logics and motivations underpin their exchanges?

Finally, as the relationships between Chinese and African journalists and media organisations continue to evolve over time, a longitudinal examination of China–Africa media relations is necessary. For example, how do training opportunities provided by Chinese media organisations shape African journalists’ world view and their perceptions of China? How do these experiences influence their reporting on China-related stories? How do organisational exchanges and cooperation impact African media’s news production over the long term? Addressing these questions will be crucial to building a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of China–Africa media relations, while failing to do so will result in fragmented and incomplete insights.

Featured Image: ‘Vice-Minister Gao Xiang from the Bureau of International Cooperation of the CAC during a China-South Africa New Media Roundtable Discussion, 23 November 2018.’ Source: GCIS (CC), Flickr.com.

Hangwei Li

Hangwei Li is a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and an Associate at the Megatrends Afrika project. She received her PhD from SOAS, University of London, and previously worked as an associate professor at China Agricultural University. Hangwei’s research lies in the fields of politics, international development, and political communication, with a particular focus on China’s multifaceted engagement with Africa.

China–Africa Media Interactions: A Relational Perspective

African Journalistic Agency

Suggestions for Future Research

References

Amid Europe’s decoupling and de-risking strategies, escalating tensions with the United States, and competition with India for leadership in the Global South, China has intensified its efforts to strengthen relations with the developing world, particularly with Africa. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s ambitions in Africa are not only to become a dominant financial power, but also normative and discursive ones.

Scholars note a distinct shift in China’s external messaging under Xi Jinping’s tenure (see, for instance, Brown 2021). Whereas the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao era (2002–12) focused on promoting Chinese soft power, especially Chinese culture, President Xi’s leadership emphasises the ‘China model’ and ‘Chinese modernisation’, highlighting the country’s non-Western model of development and its pathway to modernisation (see, for instance, Wang 2023). For instance, during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2024, China emphasised its own modernisation experience as an alternative to the Western approach in providing development assistance to Africa (Li and Hackenesch 2024).

China’s push to promote its development model in Africa and beyond relies heavily on its media organisations to shape the discourse and narratives. These organisations have produced a vast array of content—spanning newspapers, radio, television, and social media—on the global impacts of various initiatives announced by Xi, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, launched in 2013), the Global Development Initiative (GDI, 2021), the Global Security Initiative (GSI, 2022), and the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI, 2023). Their coverage of Chinese engagement with Africa often highlights themes such as ‘win-win cooperation’, ‘infrastructure-led growth’, ‘a community with a shared future for humanity’, and, more recently, ‘high-quality growth’ (see, for instance, China Daily 2024; CGTN 2024). Through this messaging, they aim to project China as a benevolent partner committed to addressing Africa’s development needs. For example, Chinese-funded projects in Africa are frequently accompanied by high-profile ribbon-cutting ceremonies at which local leaders praise China’s ‘no-strings-attached’ approach to aid (Tian 2024). These events receive extensive coverage in Chinese media and are frequently reproduced or re-aired by African media outlets under content-sharing or partnership agreements (Li 2023). Chinese media organisations also translate many of these articles into Chinese, targeting domestic audiences to bolster their legitimacy and reinforce China’s positive image at home.

Despite the highly ‘mediated’ nature of China–Africa relations (Li 2017), much of the scholarly work and policy debate on this topic has focused on China’s economic engagement with Africa—such as mega-infrastructure development and financial investments, particularly under the BRI (see, for instance, Kopiński et al. 2023; Wang 2022; Li et al. 2022). In contrast, China–Africa media relations and interactions remain relatively underexplored, especially within development studies and the field of international relations. Media scholars have been more active in this area. Their work has primarily explored how various Chinese actors (including governments, embassies, and media outlets) engage with African media houses (Wekesa 2013; Wu and van Staden 2021), the media representation of China in African outlets compared with Western and Chinese media (Li 2021; Matanji 2022), media content produced by Africa-based Chinese organisations (Madrid-Morales 2016; Marsh 2023), their influence on African audiences (Wasserman and Madrid-Morales 2018; Xiang 2018; Madrid-Morales and Wasserman 2022), and the public diplomacy strategies employed by Chinese media as they expand their presence in Africa (Li and Wang 2023). Additionally, Umejei (2020) has explored what it is like for African journalists working in Chinese media organisations based in Africa, examining their daily aspirations and struggles, particularly how they navigate the collisions and collusions within Chinese newsrooms, while emphasising the importance of understanding their voices and experiences.

However, Chinese media engagement with Africa extends beyond establishing media houses and producing content from the continent; it also involves personal and organisation-level interactions between African newsrooms and Chinese organisations. Thus, beyond Africa-based Chinese newsrooms, a closer look at how African journalists and media organisations respond to and engage with Chinese offers and initiatives becomes increasingly important. To advance the study of China–Africa media relations, I argue that we can simultaneously engage with Franceschini and Loubere’s (2022) proposition of ‘Global China as Method’—an approach that emphasises that China cannot be examined in isolation but must be conceptualised as an integral part of the global capitalist system—and Franks and Ribet’s (2009: 135) call for a scholarly approach that ‘prioritizes and appreciates African agency’ within contemporary China–Africa media relations. I suggest that we must adopt a relational lens to examine China–Africa media interactions, while focusing on the role of African journalistic agency—particularly how China’s relational approaches are received, interpreted, negotiated, and contested by African journalists and media organisations across diverse contexts.

In the following discussion, I first provide an overview of a relational perspective to understand China–Africa media interactions and then unpack African journalistic agency across macro, meso, and micro levels. This essay draws on years of fieldwork and in-depth interviews with Chinese and African media personnel (including journalists, editors, and editors-in-chief), as well as government officials in China, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mauritius.

China–Africa Media Interactions: A Relational Perspective

When examining China–Africa media interactions, particularly among journalists, a relational perspective is often missing. While scholars have increasingly focused on China’s relationship-building and networking efforts with politicians and business elites—especially the Chinese Communist Party’s party-to-party cooperation with African political parties (Benabdallah 2020a; Hackenesch and Bader 2020)—the same level of analysis is not consistently applied to China’s expanding media networks in Africa, particularly the everyday interactions between Chinese and African journalists, both within and outside newsrooms.

Under Xi Jinping, China has actively worked to ‘expand its partnerships and build stronger networks with elites across the world’ (Benabdallah 2020b: 100). This includes efforts to expand its media and journalistic networks with African partners, particularly through media training programs. These programs, funded by Chinese institutions, aim to familiarise participants with China’s development story, governance model, and political ideology. While such exchanges are framed as ‘capacity-building’, they also promote Chinese media norms, which favour state-centric narratives and prioritise political stability over press freedom. For African journalists, these programs also serve as platforms for socialising Chinese values, norms, and expert knowledge (Benabdallah 2020b). In addition to training programs, China has initiated the China–Africa Press Center Program and the Belt and Road News Network, both of which count many African media organisations as their members. Furthermore, at the latest FOCAC, China announced plans to facilitate the development of the audiovisual industry in Africa through program exchanges, joint production, technical cooperation, mutual visits, and personnel training, as well as to support the construction of the Converged Media Center of Africa for joint production of films and TV programs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024). These programs foster the accumulation of guanxi (关系)—a term denoting personal or social connections, or social capital—between Chinese and African journalists. Such networks play a crucial and enduring role in cultivating what Benabdallah (2020b) terms ‘relational productive power’.

Furthermore, these expanded media and journalistic networks facilitate the implementation of other relational strategies that the Chinese authorities seek to establish or strengthen. As outlined in the latest FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2024–27), the Chinese Government plans to launch new network initiatives, including the Global Development Promotion Center Network, the China–Africa Knowledge for Development Network, and the China–Africa Think Tank Cooperation Network, alongside the establishment of 25 China–Africa research centres (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024).The activities of these new networks are likely to be heavily covered by the China–Africa media networks, creating a self-reinforcing system of relational influence.

In addition to the initiatives mentioned above, Chinese media organisations have intensified their efforts to forge new partnerships with leading African media organisations. These efforts have been spearheaded by top executives from leading Chinese media outlets. For example, in August 2023, the President of Xinhua News Agency visited Zambia and signed agreements with major local media outlets, including the Zambia News and Information Services and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, aiming to enhance collaboration in areas such as news exchange and journalist training (Xinhua 2023). By embedding itself within African media ecosystems through training programs, institutional partnerships, and the expansion of relational networks, China aims to advance its narratives while cultivating long-term influence. However, the extent to which African media organisations and journalists respond to and participate in these expanding networks depends heavily on African journalistic agency, as I will discuss in detail below.

African Journalistic Agency

To add nuance to the analysis of African agency in response to China’s external communication, in my earlier research, I proposed the concept of ‘African journalistic agency’, which I defined as ‘At the macro level, China–Africa media relations are characterised by stark asymmetries and structural imbalances, including significant disparities in personnel, organisations, training, resources, capital, and audience reach (Madrid-Morales 2021; Li 2023). Bilateral agreements under initiatives such as FOCAC influence the structure of media collaborations, often prioritising China’s strategic interests. In multiple interviews I conducted with African diplomats in Beijing between 2021 and 2024, I discovered that unlike negotiations over loans or development finance, media cooperation between China and Africa tends to occupy a lower priority—or is sometimes entirely absent from the discussions—on the agendas of African governments ahead of FOCAC summits. Despite these ongoing asymmetries, empirical evidence suggests that China–Africa media interactions are not purely one-sided. The extent to which African journalistic agency is exercised also depends significantly on meso and micro-level dynamics.

At the meso level, organisational structures and institutional practices shape journalistic agency and the ways in which African organisations navigate their relationships with their Chinese counterparts. Media organisations with established traditions of investigative and critical reporting, especially those operating in commercially driven and open public environments, are generally better equipped to scrutinise and challenge the influence of Chinese media. In contrast, media organisations operating in more restrictive environments and lacking the financial and human resources necessary for independent operations may find Chinese offers more appealing. In Ethiopia, for instance, media organisations face significant challenges due to stringent government control and a highly constrained economic environment. In such circumstances, the training opportunities and organisational partnerships offered by China are particularly attractive to local media organisations. As highlighted by a senior manager of the Ethiopian News Agency, media organisations in the country lack the resources and capacity to provide technical training for their journalists. As they told me in an interview in Addis Ababa in September 2019: ‘We are very glad that the Chinese come to us and are willing to offer training to our journalists, both here in Ethiopia and in Beijing.’

Meso-level dynamics are closely tied to African ‘bureaucratic agency’. Substate actors, such as bureaucrats within ministerial departments (especially each country’s Ministry of Information), often play a crucial role in facilitating negotiations or collaborations between African and Chinese media organisations. Scholars have demonstrated that in executing infrastructural or developmental projects, African bureaucrats, even in smaller states, are not merely passive agents. Instead, they often employ influence strategies so that civil servants’ minority views prevail (Soulé-Kohndou 2018). However, in the realm of media cooperation with China, African bureaucrats sometimes exhibit a lack of agency, primarily due to limited expertise or insufficient knowledge about Chinese media organisations. This lack of agency can be exacerbated by local political contexts and, at times, political reshuffles. For example, in Zambia following Hakainde Hichilema’s rise to power in 2021, several key officials in the Ministry of Information were appointed even though they had no experience in the media or communication sectors, which further hindered effective engagement in media-related initiatives. In December 2023, I interviewed an official in Zambia’s Ministry of Information who had played a key role in approving a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation and Xinhua News Agency. They were unaware of the fact that Xinhua is not a television station and mistakenly believed that the agency was China Global Television Network (CGTN).

At the micro level, the agency of individual journalists comes to the fore. Their experiences, decisions, and practices are instrumental in shaping how Chinese narratives are received, interpreted, and disseminated within African media ecosystems. On one hand, African journalists might be receptive to the narratives promoted by Chinese media—emphasising non-interference, mutual development, and alternative models to Western liberalism. On the other hand, their experiences in China can also provide them with a more nuanced understanding of China’s political system, economic opportunities and challenges, and Beijing’s engagement with their home country. To maximise the benefits of these training experiences while mitigating potential biases, African media organisations should take a stronger role in guiding journalists’ reporting practices after they receive training in China, which could involve providing clear guidelines, offering ongoing mentorship, fostering critical discussions about media ethics and independence, and ensuring that journalists are equipped to critically evaluate the information they receive.

Meso and micro-level dynamics are deeply interconnected in shaping African journalistic agency. At the meso level, whether these organisations have established and, more importantly, implemented editorial guidelines and internal training protocols for managing foreign content is significant. When it comes to allowing their journalists to participate in training programs in China, it is essential for African media organisations to consider whether guidelines or regulations are in place to govern their conduct and reporting on their return. Several of the African journalists who were sent to China for media training whom I interviewed told me that they were approached by Chinese journalists and media managers to craft positive China-related stories after their return. Some of them also served as focal points in fostering connections between Beijing and newsrooms in Africa.

Not all African newsrooms are critical of these connections and the potential influence on their editorial independence. At the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), for example, a reporter who attended media training in Beijing and was affiliated with the China–Africa Press Centre reproduced several articles favouring China at the request of counterparts from China Media Group, the main Chinese state media outlet created in 2018 through the merger of China Central Television (incorporating CGTN), China National Radio, and China Radio International. During a conversation we had in Nairobi in July 2019 as he was preparing for a trip to Somalia, he inadvertently remarked: ‘I’m going to China this weekend … Oh, sorry, Somalia. I love China so much; I’m always thinking about it.’ He later explained that his visits to various parts of China, during which his hosts showcased the country’s development achievements, had shaped his perception of China and its potential to positively inform Kenya’s development journey. He added that this was why he was willing to facilitate some China-related stories to inform Kenyan audiences. Nevertheless, Kenya’s media landscape exhibits a degree of resilience and maintains traditions of critical journalism, which empower media organisations to scrutinise foreign propaganda and influence. The Media Council of Kenya, which promotes ethical standards, publicly admonished the KBC for the reporter’s articles, including one on the Chinese Government’s success in poverty reduction in Xinjiang that did not explicitly mention the source as Chinese state media, leading the organisation to delete some of these stories (WhatsApp exchange with a staff member from Media Council of Kenya, February 2021).

Even in democratic contexts, such as in Mauritius, where press freedom is relatively strong, challenges persist. According to a veteran journalist and media trainer with extensive experience, Mauritian journalists have not demonstrated sufficient critical spirit when engaging with training opportunities offered by China. There has been a lack of meaningful discussions among editors and journalists about their specific needs and goals, let alone any attempt to influence the training agenda. As a Mauritian journalist whom I interviewed in Mauritius in October 2024 told me:

When editors-in-chief have training opportunities, there should be discussions about who is offering the training and the specific needs of the newsroom. What are the needs? What will they bring back to the table? These are the questions that should be asked, rather than just focusing on who is going. This is what we expect, but it is not happening. Journalists sent to China for training should gain a broader view of media operations and the challenges China is facing, as well as how China is addressing them. When they return, they should bring added value. However, journalists now just go, take selfies, and return. It’s simply a free ticket for them, rather than a learning opportunity. I’ve encountered journalists who tell me: ‘I’m going to China; I don’t know what I’m going there for, we’ll see when we get there.’ There’s really no roadmap for what they are going to do. It’s just a freebie opportunity to travel.

While acknowledging and appreciating the resistance, pushback, and reflections demonstrated by African media organisations when engaging with their Chinese counterparts, I argue that China–Africa media relations are not always shaped by fully informed or fully prepared decision-making. The decisions of African journalists, managers, and bureaucrats are often constrained by structural limitations and their ‘relational’ experiences, which together shape the complexities of these interactions.

Suggestions for Future Research

By examining China–Africa media relations through a relational perspective and analysing African journalistic agency across the macro, meso, and micro levels, this essay highlights the need to address structural imbalances, institutional constraints, and individual agency in understanding these interactions. While macro-level asymmetries create a significantly uneven playing field, meso and micro-level dynamics illuminate opportunities where African actors can assert agency and negotiate influence, even within the context of a highly asymmetrical relationship.

How can we unpack African journalistic agency from a relational perspective? One approach is to further examine it across the macro, meso, and micro levels. At the macro level, while many media cooperation agreements have been signed between China and African countries, the processes through which these were negotiated remain underexplored in existing research. Understanding these negotiations could provide valuable insights into the dynamics of power and influence at a structural level. At the meso level, the role of African bureaucrats in shaping African journalistic agency is also an area that warrants further investigation. The extent to which bureaucratic actors influence decision-making and facilitate—or hinder—media collaborations has not been widely studied. At the micro level, the everyday interactions between Chinese and African journalists can also be further explored, particularly through ethnographic studies. For instance, how do Africa-based Chinese journalists and managers affiliated with China’s official media organisations socialise with their African counterparts? What do these interactions look like? What logics and motivations underpin their exchanges?

Finally, as the relationships between Chinese and African journalists and media organisations continue to evolve over time, a longitudinal examination of China–Africa media relations is necessary. For example, how do training opportunities provided by Chinese media organisations shape African journalists’ world view and their perceptions of China? How do these experiences influence their reporting on China-related stories? How do organisational exchanges and cooperation impact African media’s news production over the long term? Addressing these questions will be crucial to building a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of China–Africa media relations, while failing to do so will result in fragmented and incomplete insights.

Featured Image: ‘Vice-Minister Gao Xiang from the Bureau of International Cooperation of the CAC during a China-South Africa New Media Roundtable Discussion, 23 November 2018.’ Source: GCIS (CC), Flickr.com.

References

Benabdallah, Lina. 2020a. ‘Power or Influence? Making Sense of China’s Evolving Party-to-Party Diplomacy in Africa.’ African Studies Quarterly 19(3–4): 95–114.

Benabdallah, Lina. 2020b. Shaping the Future of Power: Knowledge Production and Network-Building in China–Africa Relations. Ann Harbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Brown, Kerry. 2021. ‘Getting the Message Right in Xi Jinping’s China: Propaganda, Story-Telling, and the Challenge of Reaching People’s Emotions.’ In Research Handbook on Political Propaganda, edited by Gary D. Rawnsley, Yiben Ma, and Kruakae Pothong, 98–110. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

China Daily. 2024. ‘China Helps Africa on Its Modernization Journey.’ China Daily, 20 September. www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202409/20/WS66ecd135a3103711928a8d33_2.html.

China Global Television Network (CGTN). 2024. ‘Jointly Advancing Modernization, Building High-Level China–Africa Community with Shared Future.’ CGTN, 4 September. news.cgtn.com/news/2024-09-04/China-Africa-work-for-closer-community-with-shared-future-1wC60a2YHHG/p.html.

Franceschini, Ivan, and Nicholas Loubere. 2022. Global China as Method. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Franks, Suzanne, and Kate Ribet. 2009. ‘China–Africa Media Relations.’ Global Media and Communication 5(1): 129–36.

Hackenesch, Christine, and Julia Bader. 2020. ‘The Struggle for Minds and Influence: The Chinese Communist Party’s Global Outreach.’ International Studies Quarterly 64(3): 723–33.

Kopiński, Dominik, Pádraig Carmody, and Ian Taylor, eds. 2023. The Political Economy of Chinese FDI and Spillover Effects in Africa. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Li, Hangwei. 2021. ‘Media Representation of China in the Time of Pandemic: A Comparative Study of Kenyan and Ethiopian Media.’ Journal of African Media Studies 13(3): 417–34.

Li, Hangwei. 2023. ‘Understanding African Journalistic Agency in China–Africa Media Interactions: The Case of Kenya.’ International Communication Gazette 85(1): 32–47.

Li, Hangwei. 2024. Chinese media engagement with Africa and the role of African agency: The case of Kenya and Ethiopia. Megatrends Afrika Policy Brief 26. www.megatrends-afrika.de/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB_Li_Chinese_Media.pdf.

Li, Hangwei, and Christine Hackenesch. 2024. ‘FOCAC 2024: Moving Away from Large Infrastructure Deals towards Normative Power of China.’ Megatrends Afrika Spotlight, 16 September. www.megatrends-afrika.de/en/publication/megatrends-spotlight-38-focac-2024-towards-normative-power-of-china.

Li, Hangwei, Dominik Kopiński, and Ian Taylor. 2022. ‘China and the Troubled Prospects for Africa’s Economic Take-Off: Linkage Formation and Spillover Effects in Zambia.’ Journal of Southern African Studies 48(5): 861–82.

Li, Hangwei, and Yuan Wang. 2023. African media cultures and Chinese public relations strategies in Kenya and Ethiopia. Research Paper, 27 February. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/african-media-cultures-and-chinese-public-relations-strategies-in-kenya-and-ethiopia.

Li, Shubo. 2017. Mediatized China–Africa Relations. Singapore: Springer Singapore.

Madrid-Morales, Dani. 2016. ‘Why Are Chinese Media in Africa? Evidence from Three Decades of Xinhua’s News Coverage of Africa.’ In China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions, edited by Xiaoling Zhang, Herman Wasserman, and Winston Mano, 79–92. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Madrid-Morales, Dani. 2021. ‘Sino-African Media Cooperation? An Overview of a Longstanding Asymmetric Relationship.’ In It’s About their Story: How China, Turkey and Russia Try to Influence Media in Africa. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Regional Media Programme Sub-Sahara Africa.

Madrid-Morales, Dani, and Herman Wasserman. 2022. ‘How Effective Are Chinese Media in Shaping Audiences’ Attitudes towards China? A Survey Analysis in Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.’ Online Media and Global Communication 1(4): 671–96.

Marsh, Vivien. 2023. Seeking Truth in International TV News: China, CGTN, and the BBC. London: Routledge.

Matanji, Frankline. 2022. ‘China in Africa: Representation of Chinese Investments in Africa by Western, Chinese, and African Media.’ International Journal of Communication 16: 1713–36.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2024. Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027). 5 September. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485719.html.

Soulé-Kohndou, Folashadé. 2018. ‘Bureaucratic Agency and Power Asymmetry in Benin–China Relations.’ In New Directions in Africa–China Studies, edited by Chris Alden and Daniel Large, 189–204. London: Routledge.

Tian, Dongdong. 2024. ‘(FOCAC) Feature: Xi Jinping—True Friend of Africa.’ Xinhua News, 3 September. english.news.cn/20240903/e6987f8f85a2419298e82f8fb34f8c72/c.html.

Umejei, Emeka. 2020. Chinese Media in Africa: Perception, Performance, and Paradox. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Wang, Clyde Yicheng. 2023. ‘Changing Strategies and Mixed Agendas: Contradiction and Fragmentation within China’s External Propaganda.’ Journal of Contemporary China 32(142): 586–601.

Wang, Yuan. 2022. ‘Executive Agency and State Capacity in Development: Comparing Sino-African Railways in Kenya and Ethiopia.’ Comparative Politics 54(2): 349–77.

Wasserman, Herman, and Dani Madrid-Morales. 2018. ‘How Influential Are Chinese Media in Africa? An Audience Analysis in Kenya and South Africa.’ International Journal of Communication 12: 2212–31.

Wekesa, Bob. 2013. ‘Emerging Trends and Patterns in China–Africa Media Dynamics: A Discussion from an East African Perspective.’ Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 34(3): 62–78.

Wu, Yu-Shan, and Cobus van Staden. 2021. ‘Behind the Headlines: China’s Media Engagement in South Africa.’ In South Africa–China Relations: A Partnership of Paradoxes, edited by Chris Alden and Yushan Wu, 137–57. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Xiang, Yu. 2018. ‘African Students Watching CCTV-Africa: A Structural Reception Analysis of Oppositional Decoding.’ Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 13(1): 123–42.

Xinhua. 2023. ‘Zambian Media Outlets Want Stronger Cooperation with Xinhua.’ Xinhua, 27 August. english.news.cn/africa/20230827/982fb0a6111f432f92c430a51b3e9131/c.html.