Revisiting communitarianism: neither liberal nor authoritarian

Abstract

Despite decades of scholarly debate, how communitarianism should be understood remains unresolved, often divided into two dominant interpretations: one framing it as a friendly critique from within liberalism, and the other caricaturing it as a movement leaning towards authoritarianism. In this paper, I offer an alternative, more nuanced reading of communitarianism that moves beyond these binary interpretations. By examining its core philosophical tenets—the ontological priority of community, the contextuality of knowledge, and the impersonality of goods—I argue that communitarianism can be reinterpreted as a standalone ethical-political philosophy. Subsequently, I refine this initial reading by introducing two principles: immanent critique and the fusion of horizons, which help distinguish communitarianism from authoritarianism and relativism alike. These principles demonstrate how communitarianism fosters continuous value reproduction within communities while remaining open to cross-cultural dialog and the possibility of a universal morality. This reimagined communitarianism not only protects authenticity but also provides a framework for engaging with global diversity, offering promising avenues for interaction and mutual understanding across different cultural contexts.

Introduction

Almost all scholarly work on communitarianism—understandably so—begins with an examination of A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), which has become a cornerstone of contemporary political philosophy. In this work which continues to exert considerable influence more than half a century after its publication, John Rawls sought to establish a fair and universal framework for justice through what he termed the “veil of ignorance.” This concept was designed to ensure fairness by removing individuals’ knowledge of their specific social, economic, or personal characteristics when determining the principles that would govern society. Rawls argued that this would prevent contingent factors from corrupting the process of justice, thereby allowing for the emergence of impartial and universally applicable principles. However, despite his efforts to achieve universality and objectivity, Rawls’ method of reasoning hinges on a particular conception of the moral self—one stripped of all given characteristics and defined solely by its capacity for choice.

This abstract notion of the self, which is central to Rawls’ Theory, has been critiqued by communitarian thinkers for neglecting the social and moral obligations that arise from communal life. Communitarians argue that Rawls’ approach fails to account for the social embeddedness of individuals and the moral significance of the communities to which they belong. A significant body of literature has emerged from these critiques, and Rawls himself has revised his ideas in response to such debates.1 Therefore, it could be argued that much of the initial dispute has been resolved.

Yet, as ongoing debates on communitarianism illustrate (see Chang, 2022), a central question remains unresolved: where exactly should communitarianism be situated within the broader landscape of political thought? Some scholars interpret it as a friendly critique emerging from within liberalism (see Buchanan, 1989; Frazer, 1999; Mulhall and Swift, 2003; Scruton, 2003; Chang, 20222, etc.), while others caricature it as a potentially dangerous movement with authoritarian tendencies (see Gutmann, 1985; Phillips, 1993; Kateb, 1994; Holmes, 1996; Heying, 1999, etc.). It is important to note, however, that many of these interpretations emerge from a social context already predominantly shaped by liberal values. In this article, I offer an alternative (perhaps even external), more nuanced interpretation of communitarianism that transcends these binary readings, based on the ideas of communitarian thinkers mentioned in these debates.3 I do so by first outlining the three fundamental philosophical assumptions that emerge in communitarian critiques of (deontological) liberalism, and then identifying two remedial ethical-political principles that refine these seemingly rigid assumptions.

By re-examining communitarianism’s core assumptions—the ontological priority of community, the contextuality of knowledge, and the impersonality of goods—I demonstrate that it provides a comprehensive framework capable of addressing both individual and collective dimensions of moral life. By clarifying communitarian perspectives on being, knowledge, and value—concepts that are deeply intertwined—I show why communitarianism should not be viewed merely as an internal debate within liberalism.

I then introduce two remedial principles—immanent critique and the fusion of horizons—that challenge the common interpretation of communitarianism as authoritarian. These principles refine communitarianism by equipping it to address internal communal dynamics while also facilitating cross-cultural dialog.

In doing so, I reconstruct communitarianism as a more comprehensive, independent ethical-political philosophy, one that moves beyond the conventional liberal and authoritarian labels. Ultimately, I argue that communitarianism, as reimagined here, offers a valuable framework for cultivating authentic community life while maintaining the potential for universal moral dialog. Its adaptability across diverse cultural contexts allows it to contribute meaningfully to global discussions of political and moral philosophy, without presupposing a uniform application across all societies.

The fundamental assumptions of communitarianism

Upon careful examination, I argue that communitarian thought establishes a cyclical relationship between ontology, epistemology, and axiology: The communitarian understanding of being, which prioritizes the community over the individual, leads to a conception of knowledge that emphasizes context. In turn, the idea of context provided by the community produces a value system shaped by that very context. Ultimately, it is this value system that distinguishes the community from others and gives it its unique character. Therefore, to discuss communitarianism as an ethical-political philosophical position, we must reevaluate the communitarians’ debates on being, knowledge, and value from this perspective. Based on this premise, in this section, I will scrutinize the fundamental assumptions communitarian thinkers hold regarding being, knowledge, and value, respectively. In doing so, I aim to demonstrate that, due to the fundamental philosophical divergences in these assumptions, communitarianism can be positioned as a distinct and comprehensive theory, independent of liberalism, within contemporary thought.

“Every individual is born as a member of a particular community”

Communitarian thinkers emphasize the ontological priority of the community over the individual. As they point out, individuals do not exist independently and autonomously from the community to which they belong. Such a notion has no counterpart in reality and, at best, could only be the subject of a poorly designed utopia (Walzer, 2004, p. 1; 1984, p. 326). However, despite appearing as an obvious truth at first glance, this assumption is skillfully obscured by the dominant liberal-individualist thought of today. As is evident in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, deontological liberalism assumes a concept of the self that is detached from all given conditions in life, a conception of the self that precedes both society and its purposes (Sandel, 1984, pp. 86–87). According to this view, nothing that we did not choose—nothing that was already present when we came into the world—is binding for us. Otherwise, we would not be free and independent moral agents, i.e., individuals.

Communitarians stress that this notion of the autonomous individual entered our lives alongside the dominance of liberalism, but it remains a hypothetical construct. The dominant ethical-political discourse today preaches that we are entirely isolated individuals, independent of one another, yet this claim of autonomy is a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, Alexis de Tocqueville (2011, p. 91) noted almost two centuries ago that his ancestors did not even have a word for individualism. In their time, there was no conception of an individual who could think of themselves apart from a specific belonging, alone and independent. Fundamentally, communitarian thought seeks to revive this truth, which the dominant liberal-individualist discourse has obscured. Our initial understanding of ourselves is deeply embedded in society (Taylor, 2004, p. 64). In other words, contrary to what is assumed in liberal thought, we are not first individuals who gradually become socialized. Rather, the process has unfolded in the opposite direction. Our understanding and interpretation of ourselves as free and independent individuals come historically later. This marks a break from the ancient teaching that defined humans as zoon politikon.

From this point of departure, communitarian thinkers have sought to support their claims through studies and depictions of ancient societies. For example, in his influential work After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) demonstrates that in traditional societies, recognition was directly tied to bonds of belonging. In such societies, kinship ties, such as being someone’s son, brother, or cousin, or being part of a particular family, tribe, or clan, were regarded as essential elements of individual existence. These were not attributes one could renounce at will; they played a defining and permanent role in shaping personal identity. MacIntyre argues that this “classical view of man” has its origins in heroic society and continued to exert influence throughout the Middle Ages in the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian worlds, remaining significant until the modern era. People have long been aware that they were stepping onto a stage not arranged by them upon entering the world.

MacIntyre explains this continuity through the metaphor of narrative. According to him, humans are always part of an ongoing story. At first glance, everyone might appear to be the protagonist of their own story. However, each person, while being the lead character in their own story, also plays various supporting roles in the stories where others are the protagonists. MacIntyre (1984, pp. 213–214) emphasizes that these stories are so intricately intertwined that it is impossible to separate them from one another. Therefore, the meaning of not only our social but also our individual existence must be sought within this narrative coherence. Indeed, the place we are assigned in the shared narrative of which we are a part largely determines the course of our lives, even if we are not aware of it.

That said, communitarians are not romantics nostalgically yearning for the “good old days.” Although their studies and descriptions of past societies provide valuable insights into their ontological assumptions, communitarian thinkers do not solely base their ideas about being on these historical societies. Moreover, they argue that there has been little change in our ontological status from past to present. What has changed, according to communitarians, is not our existence but our perception of it. They acknowledge that the classical understanding of humanity, which attributed purpose to individual existence, is no longer widely accepted as it once was. However, they also emphasize that the dominant notion—that we shape our lives entirely through individual choices and determine our own destinies—is equally unacceptable.

In this context, Walzer (1990, p. 15) reminds us that even in the most liberal societies today, people are still born into particular social groups. In these societies, everyone finds themselves with identities—such as being male or female, worker or employer, Catholic or Jewish, black or white, democrat or republican—that they have inherited rather than chosen. Perhaps more importantly, these identities often unconsciously influence the decisions individuals make. As Walzer points out, many things presented as voluntary individual choices are essentially the expression and manifestation of underlying identities that play a determining role in the background. This is not something people can escape. Individuals who are isolated from established social networks or only engage with them voluntarily do not exist in reality, nor can they exist in any imaginable model of sociality (Walzer, 1984, p. 324).

As a result of all these considerations, communitarians argue that the community is not an instrumental but a constitutive unity. In other words, individuals do not create the community; rather, the community creates the individuals. From the communitarian perspective, every person can be seen as a product of the community to which they belong. In this regard, Sandel (1998, p. 179) refers to certain allegiances, such as being members of a particular family, community, nation, or people, as “constitutive attachments.” Of course, this claim has both political and ethical dimensions. As Walzer (2004, p.x) points out, the cultural, religious, national, and linguistic communities we find ourselves in cultivate not only our identities but also the values we pass on to our children without their consent. Communitarians argue that turning our backs on the community to which we belong or wholly ignoring it would lead to a loss of personality, for who we are is deeply connected to “where we’re coming from” (Taylor 1994, p. 33). The place we are at cannot be abstracted from the path that led us there.

“The community we belong to determines the context in which we understand and interpret the world”

The notion that the place we occupy in the world cannot be evaluated independently of the path that brought us there arises from the natural impact of communitarian ontological assumptions on epistemology. Since individuals are always born into a particular community, even if they attempt to escape this fact, they must still experience the world through the epistemic framework provided by the community to which they belong. Unless our bodies are actually trapped in some sort of life capsule like in The Matrix, while our minds operate within a simulation, or unless the universe was created only moments ago, despite all the strong evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to think otherwise. Yet, in his famous thought experiment, Rawls proposes precisely such a zero point.

Of course, this does not mean that Rawls advocates for an epistemology ex nihilo. However, he clearly believes that such a hypothesis is necessary to reach more equitable principles of justice. According to him (and, indeed, this reflects the general tendency of the deontological approach), the thoughts and values that dominate social life can be obstacles to considering matters from a broader perspective. If we can overcome these obstacles, there will be no barriers between us and principles that can speak to all of humanity. This is because every individual has the potential, in essence, to access the universal principles of rationality. It is hoped that with their epistemological emancipation, social life will also attain a rational order in the light of universal principles. Such reasoning lies behind Rawls’ use of a “veil of ignorance” to arrive at principles of justice. To access universal principles, the particularities seen in different communities must be ignored because they are merely contingent experiences that vary from one community to another. As such, they cannot provide the firm foundation necessary for claims of universality. However, the original position, stripped of all contingencies, is not like this. There is no reason to doubt that individuals abstracted from their community will agree on certain principles that can speak to all of humanity. After all, great minds think alike!

Communitarians have pointed out that this conception of knowledge, which claims universality, is misleading. The idea of the pre-social individual and the notion of a singular rationality accessible to all may seem internally coherent in theory, but testing whether this supposedly universal knowledge is truly universal is practically impossible. According to communitarians, our perspective on understanding and interpreting the world always begins to form within the community, which is the environment in which we first open ourselves to reality. This holds true even for the most abstract philosophical deliberations. Taylor (1989, p. 37) argues that even Nietzsche, who believed he had attained a truth unseen by anyone else, does not constitute an exception: “[This truth] still must be on the basis of my reading of others’ thought and language.” Similarly, MacIntyre (2006b, pp. 8–9) points out that even the concepts Descartes used at the moment when he presumed to doubt radically had deep historical roots. Descartes’ mistake, according to MacIntyre, was in denying the language and tradition that made his thinking possible.

As these examples show, communitarians advocate for a conception of knowledge that emphasizes context, challenging claims of universality. It is common to see communitarians grounding their views on context and contextuality in discussions from the philosophy of language. The emphasis here is on humans as beings who possess language. However, since a language can never be merely my language, it only makes sense in the company of others (our) who speak it. Moreover, Taylor wrote that “The meaning of certain terms and expressions can only be made clear if we understand them as occurring in the context of these activities,” because “meaning can only be explicated by situating language in the matrix of our concerns, practices and activities, in short by relating it to our ‘form of life’” (Taylor, 1979, p. 163). In this respect, in communitarian thought, language, thought, and meaning are in a reciprocal relationship with the context provided by social life. It is the social structure to which we belong that gives context and meaning to our individual thoughts and actions by situating them on a rational foundation, while simultaneously ensuring the reproduction of that context.

In this process, as communitarians emphasize, narratives play a vital role. According to MacIntyre (1984, p. 216), our access to knowledge begins with the stories and tales told to us from childhood. We learn how our thoughts and actions will be understood and interpreted in the social life we find ourselves in through the stories we hear. These stories shape our understanding of social roles, the nature of things, and the course of the world. In other words, the stories and tales we hear provide us with an understanding. It is based on this understanding that we interpret life and our actions, rendering them meaningful and predictable. A similar approach can be found in Taylor’s (2004) concept of “social imaginary,” which suggests that an epistemic atmosphere enables people to make sense of their existence, learn how things work, and harmonize with others. Both MacIntyre (1984, p. 216) and Taylor (2004, p. 23) emphasize that different communities learn and pass on their unique contexts through images, stories, and myths. In this sense, our entire epistemic experience consists of the construction and reconstruction of these narratives (MacIntyre, 2006b, p. 7).

Ultimately, the conclusion communitarians reach is that it is entirely natural for children raised with different stories to have radically different perspectives on life. In other words, communitarianism opens up space for multiple rationalities.4 A thought that seems entirely unreasonable to us is not necessarily irrational by nature. On the contrary, it may be widely accepted in another community. That community may even find our perspective strange and incomprehensible. If meaning or meaninglessness is determined by context, there is nothing surprising about a thought being incomprehensible when removed from its context. When framed this way, it may seem that liberals have little reason to object to communitarians. However, the emphasis on context has serious practical implications that go beyond abstract epistemological discussions. For instance, in Spheres of Justice, Walzer argues that even a pursuit as ancient as justice must be understood as a contextual phenomenon, offering this as a response to Rawls. According to Walzer (1983, pp. 313–314), what is considered just or unjust in a community is determined by the thought and meaning world of that community. If hierarchy is integral to a community’s world of meaning, even the caste system may be considered just. The concepts and ideas that shape social life must be evaluated within their respective contexts.

“Context provides impersonal standards that shape our moral choices”

The emphasis on context in communitarian thought extends far beyond a philosophical discussion of our relationship with knowledge. According to communitarians, context also provides the foundation upon which we ground our moral values. MacIntyre (1984, p. 2) expresses this clearly: “What we possess (…) are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.” He describes this moral situation as something akin to a post-apocalyptic state, attributing it to the Enlightenment’s failure to replace the teleological and theological legacy it sought to reject with new values. With all rule-making authorities gone, there is no longer any transcendent authority to legitimize values. As a result, the task of creating values is left to “liberated” individuals. However, the concept of values no longer implies the binding good for broad human communities as it once did. On the contrary, it is now believed that public life should be stripped of as many values as possible, as they could become tools of oppression. At the same time, every individual is free to pursue their own conception of the good life, as long as they do not interfere with the lives of others. Morality is thus understood as a matter of individual, voluntary choice. In this new context, where no option is inherently more desirable than another, choice itself is seen as valuable. Therefore, individuals’ choices must be respected. However, the autonomous agent, on the path toward universality, has arrived at nothing more than moral relativism.

Communitarians have developed two fundamental critiques of this liberal-individualist approach that reduces morality to individual choices. The first critique is that the liberal tolerance and freedom of choice, which encourage everyone to follow their own individual conception of the good life, are not in fact value-transcendent universal principles, but rather particular values belonging to a specific worldview. Sandel (2006, pp. 147–148; 1996, p. 8) has noted that despite the dominant discourse of moral relativism, which makes these values seem like meta-principles above values, there is no justification for why these moral principles should be regarded as superior to others. After all, if we can ask “Who is to judge?” in every moral issue, we should be able to direct the same question to liberal tolerance and freedom of choice. However, when we ask this question, we are faced with a significant moral dilemma. Reducing morality to individual choice makes it impossible to morally justify any position. The reduction of morality to individual preferences necessarily means that no good can be defended against another. Therefore, according to communitarians, it must first be acknowledged that today’s relativist tendencies in the realm of morality do not stem from the impossibility of universal morality but from liberalism’s imposition of its own concepts and values under the guise of universality.

The second communitarian critique of the liberal understanding of morality concerns the idea that the act of choosing itself is inherently valuable. Communitarians argue that something does not become good simply because it has been chosen. Furthermore, for a genuine choice to occur, there must be qualities that make one option more preferable than another. Without the criteria on which to base our choices, the situation becomes one of randomness. Therefore, in order for a choice to be meaningful, certain conceptions of good and bad must already exist. Once we accept that certain conceptions of good and bad are pre-given, it becomes clear that what makes them good or bad is not the fact that they were chosen. From this, communitarian thinkers highlight that our moral repertoire has already been shaped within the context of our attachments. In other words, the moral map upon which our actions are based has already been formed by the community and the context that surrounds us, even if we are unaware of it. Each of us encounters particular conceptions of good (and consequently bad) that we find pre-existing in social life. Taylor refers to these as “strong evaluations” inherent in our social existence. He argues that it is the presence of these criteria that enables us to make choices and become moral agents (Taylor, 1985a, pp. 34–35). Without these criteria, (moral) choice, and therefore moral agency, would not be possible. Consequently, liberal morality can be seen as one of the main causes of the current barren state of moral philosophy. Because not only is it not universal, as it claims to be, but it is also not conceptually well-designed.

MacIntyre (1984, pp. 126–127) argues that escaping this desperate situation in contemporary moral philosophy requires learning two lessons from the ancients: (1) “All morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular, and that the aspirations of the morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion.” (2) “There is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors in which series heroic societies hold first place.” In other words, MacIntyre suggests that both the existence of morality itself and the practice of moral action must be understood as contextual. He finds significance in Aristotle’s question in the Nicomachean Ethics, one of the fundamental works of classical moral philosophy, which asks not “What do I say?” but “What do we say?” (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 147–148). This, he argues, is proof that Aristotle was not claiming to create morality from scratch but was concerned with revealing the morality that was already implicitly present in the context of Athens. Taylor’s ethical approach similarly emphasizes the pre-existing. He contrasts Kant’s Moralität, which imposes obligations regarding something that is not yet present, with Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, which, as Taylor (1999, p. 376; 1979, pp. 82–84) puts it, “enjoins us to bring about what already is.” In other words, Taylor’s approach highlights the importance of uncovering what is already there, rather than imposing external obligations.

Despite drawing on different references, communitarians ultimately all emphasize the importance of religion, tradition, customs, and conventions in regulating social life when it comes to moral matters. Sandel (1996, p. 23), for example, refers to such institutions, which the liberal understanding of morality seeks to confine to the individual realm, as the most important sources of our shared goods that regulate our social life. According to communitarians, denying these impersonal moral standards impoverishes ethical life. In this context, the reason moral debates on issues such as just war, abortion, and affirmative action have reached a deadlock today is the disregard of affiliation and context, with the autonomous agent being recognized as the sole moral authority. As Sandel (1996, pp. 20–24) points out, for instance, religious views in the abortion debate could be seen as a key interpretation to resolve the conflict between a woman’s right over her body and the right to life of another being.5 Therefore, the task today is to uncover and revitalize the inherent values in each community’s context. For communitarians, these are the only impersonal standards that enable us to become moral agents capable of making choices.

Two remedial principles

The assumptions identified in the previous section should be sufficient to demonstrate why communitarianism cannot be understood merely as an attempt to correct liberalism. As has been clearly demonstrated, communitarians’ prioritization of community/sociality over the individualist ontology of liberalism, their emphasis on context/contextuality rather than the claims of epistemic universalism, and their advocacy for conventional moral maps over liberalism’s ethics of choice and tolerance could be seen as significant divergences between the two philosophies at their most fundamental levels. Moreover, the comprehensive philosophical claims that emerge here are not confined to liberal societies. In this regard, its emphasis on identity construction (or perhaps discovery) through belonging and shared values presents a compelling contrast to individualist rhetoric and demands. Accordingly, certain communitarian principles may offer promising avenues for engaging with diverse cultural and political contexts around the world—particularly in ways that remain sensitive to local meanings and practices—without presupposing a uniform application or a universal solution.

On the other hand, an interpretation of communitarianism that relies solely on these basic assumptions risks appearing overly rigid and inflexible. Moreover, the further communitarian thought moves from liberalism, the closer it seems to move to authoritarianism. However, it is possible to soften these rough edges and refine communitarian philosophy in a more nuanced direction. In this section, I address the criticisms of heteronomy that often give rise to accusations of authoritarianism in communitarianism. By elaborating on the core assumptions I outlined in the previous section with two remedial communitarian principles, I aim to distance communitarian thought from authoritarianism as well.

“Immanent/connected critique is a moral duty”

The most serious critiques directed at the communitarian concepts of community and context can be categorized under the term “heteronomy.” The critiques centered around heteronomy are multi-layered and complex. The main concern of critics is the potential for communitarianism’s emphasis on social context to lead to an overly restrictive understanding of the framework within which individuals make sense of their thoughts and practices. In this regard, critics scrutinize communitarian concepts such as narrative coherence (Sandel), radical givenness (Walzer), context-dependence (MacIntyre), embeddedness, social matrix, and social imaginary (Taylor), which all reinforce the notion of contextuality. From this point of view, Rainer Forst (2002, p. 3) suggests that communitarians, who criticize liberals for being “forgetful of context,” could themselves be accused of being “obsessed with context.” Will Kymlicka (1988, p. 202) takes a similar stance, arguing that communitarianism’s emphasis on community and shared values limits the boundaries of practical reason. According to this view, individuals in communitarian thought are seen as incapable of stepping outside the epistemic framework provided by their society. They always think and act within this context.

Moreover, the critiques of heteronomy are not confined to an epistemological level. Many critics argue that this emphasis on context invites authoritarianism (and even totalitarianism) (Avineri and de-Shalit 2011, pp. 9–10). In their view, this is the natural result of prioritizing givenness over individual choice in social life. Cochran (1989, pp. 431–432) attributes this possibility to the lack of a universal concept, such as “human rights,” that could protect those who disagree with the majority in communitarian thought. Once again, the communitarian emphasis on context is the target. When we look at critiques of this kind, we see that the contextuality identified by communitarians as an inherent part of the human condition is ironically interpreted as a form of conservatism. The accusations against communitarianism range from simple intolerance to malevolent ideology, depending on the perspective of the interpreter. Indeed, Holmes (1996, pp. xiii–xiv) goes so far as to claim, rather hyperbolically, that communitarians have made no effort to distinguish themselves from fascists, which is a highly caricatured interpretation.6 However, many of these criticisms are ultimately based on arbitrary readings.

First and foremost, communitarians have not made any comments suggesting an alignment with conservatism or authoritarianism, nor have they called for absolute obedience to the community. Sandel (1998, p.x) writes, “Insofar as ‘communitarianism’ is another name for majoritarianism, or for the idea that rights should rest on the values that predominate in any given community at any given time, it is not a view I would defend.” Social values and practices must be justified and placed on reasonable grounds. Even MacIntyre, who is perhaps the most distant from liberal thought among communitarians, adopts a careful stance in this regard. Yes, MacIntyre has argued that practical reason requires a shared social ground. However, the existence of this shared ground does not automatically make the community rational (and therefore worthy of adherence). According to him, the rationality of a community depends on whether its mode of reasoning represents the best theory developed up to that point. The best theory here is the one that most effectively explains the inconsistencies in previous theories and shows a way forward. In this sense, rationality is constituted by these successive theories in social life. And to be a rational agent is to participate in social life (MacIntyre 1983a, p.591). As this demonstrates, communitarians do not advocate passive and unquestioning obedience, but rather encourage active participation that contributes to social context.

Walzer’s thoughts on interpretation and social criticism deserve special mention here, as they represent the communitarian approach to this issue. In his discussion, Walzer (1993, p. 21) argues that the values given in a society must be accepted as authoritative, because—as I detailed in the previous section—we owe our very existence as moral beings to this given context. Furthermore, as I also explained earlier, we cannot speak of universal criteria for correct thought and values that are valid everywhere (Walzer 1993, pp. 313–314). Different goods may hold different meanings in different communities. Therefore, we must work with what we have at hand. However, this does not necessarily imply stasis. Walzer (1993, p. 23) points out that we begin interpreting the given values from the very beginning. In this sense, members of a community are also interpreters of the shared values they hold. These interpreters, drawing on the principles that make them moral agents, renovate and revive these values according to the needs of the day, much like inhabitants renovating a house. The same applies when it comes to principles that regulate social life, such as justice. The continuity of this interpretive process legitimizes the given values.7

Of course, this does not mean that communitarians expect enduring consensus on every issue in social life. Walzer also acknowledges that social life will not always be harmonious. It is entirely normal for differing, competing, and even conflicting views to arise within a society. What is important for communitarianism is that solutions to such situations are sought not from external sources, but from within the community’s own meaning world. This brings us to Walzer’s views on social criticism. He acknowledges that social criticism requires critical distance (Walzer, 1993, p. 49). He discusses this concept through figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre during France’s occupation of Algeria and Vladimir Lenin during the Bolshevik Revolution. In his view, neither Sartre, who positioned himself as an enemy of his own people due to conflict with “universal principles,” nor Lenin, who sought to forcefully “awaken” his people by adopting a cultural experience disconnected from their own roots, can be considered social critics. Neither recognizing the enemy as a sincere critic nor valuing the perspective of someone who views their own society from a great distance are behaviors to be expected from a community. The critical distance, as Walzer puts it, must be measured in inches (Walzer 1993, pp. 57–64).

In this context, Walzer distinguishes between immanent (connected) criticism and disconnected criticism, arguing that the best criticism is one that draws upon local values. The aim here is to preserve the authentic structure of the community against external interference while simultaneously ensuring that it is continuously reconstructed through internal critique. In this sense, immanent/connected critique is almost considered a moral duty in communitarian thought. Indeed, as MacIntyre (1984, p. 222; cf. 1988, p. 353) points out, a thought system (tradition) that begins to become conservative is always either dying or already dead. If we accept that communitarians value elements such as community, tradition, and authenticity as sources of context, we must not ignore the solutions they propose for preserving these elements. When this is understood, it becomes clear that communitarians do not advocate absolute, unquestioning obedience in social life, but rather encourage critical participation.

“The effort to fuse horizons must not be abandoned”

However, the critical stance toward communitarianism’s emphasis on community and context is not limited to accusations of authoritarianism. Many critics argue that the communitarian understanding of different communities, each with its own authentic rationality derived from its distinct knowledge and value systems, inevitably leads to moral relativism. While it is true that in communitarianism, values, which are reduced to individual preferences in liberalism, gain a collective status, resolving the problem of relativism within the notion of individual goods, this raises the issue of value conflicts between different communities. Since there is no universal community to deliver final judgments on values, this creates potential clashes. Bobby Jindal (1997, pp. 1274–1275) highlights this point, claiming that communitarianism’s community-based moral understanding prevents either the acceptance or rejection of values from other communities. In such a situation, where only “inner judgments” are assumed to be valid, introducing “outer judgments” becomes meaningless. Moreover, Jindal suggests that communitarians are likely to dismiss any external intervention in a community’s values as an “imperialist” imposition.

In this context, Jindal argues that communitarian thought makes comparison across different communities impossible. The idea that communities are the sole source of values leads to moral relativism. Furthermore, if correct moral principles are considered merely reflections of the values shared within a community, as Simon Caney (1992, pp. 286–287) points out, the question “Is ours a moral society?” becomes meaningless. Ultimately, every society could claim its own morality. From this, many critics—just as Jindal suggested—have argued that such relativism renders it nonsensical for a Westerner to criticize the caste system in India or “human rights violations” in Iran, since the debate would inevitably end in a stalemate (Avineri and de-Shalit 2011, pp. 4–5). Indeed, in a situation where each community has its own notion of the good, who would determine which is better? Daniel Shapiro (1995, p. 153), posing this question, emphasizes that critics worry that communitarianism leads to “an unacceptable form of relativism with severely conservative implications.” Such a situation, as noted by Jeffrey Paul and Fred D. Miller (1990, p.816), would be fatal for a theory that seeks objectivity.

However, the communitarian approach to this issue is far more nuanced than critics tend to understand. No communitarian thinker readily accepts the charge of relativism. Even Walzer, who sees moral values as varying according to the history and culture of the human community being governed, adds a caveat to his “relativism.” While he acknowledges that defending moral choices based on local principles rather than universal ones might seem relativistic, he insists that he is not advocating an “unconstrained relativism” (Walzer 1997, pp. 5–6). In fact, Walzer does not entirely reject the possibility of certain norms binding all societies. For such a possibility to be realized, however, societies must be open to dialog. Walzer (1994, pp. 9–10) argues that any morality that does not allow for dialog is deficient. Nevertheless, even if inter-societal dialog succeeds in establishing certain principles, Walzer (1994, p. 11) emphasizes that these principles would hold only a temporary status. For him, it is the process of moral deliberation itself that is enduring. As long as human life persists, debates over moral issues will continue. Furthermore, this approach is not unique to Walzer. Similar ideas can be found in the thoughts of MacIntyre and Taylor. Since I believe their views directly address the critiques of relativism, I will try to delve deeper into this discussion by examining the arguments of these specific figures individually.

MacIntyre (1984, p. 221) also clearly states that finding our moral identity within the community does not mean we must stop there. The moral characteristics we gain from our community are the necessary starting points for us. We need them to search for the good and the universal. In other words, moral competence requires us to begin with what is here and now. However, the existence of certain constants does not imply a lack of movement. As MacIntyre (1984, p. 219) notes, “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man.” There is no ultimate end to be achieved when it comes to the good. Thus, he suggests that what makes a life morally perfect is the desire not only to move toward the known goods but also to go beyond them (MacIntyre, 2006a, p. 346). Taylor, in turn, shows how this can be possible. He draws on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of “fusion of horizons” (Taylor, 1994, p. 67). Indeed, different systems of values may not fully comprehend each other when they first encounter one another. At this stage, they will likely only have a “foggy” understanding of each other. However, Taylor believes that cultures in contact can develop a vocabulary to articulate the differences between them. This effort to fuse horizons is what allows them to go beyond what is given. If horizons can be fused, it may become possible to establish criteria by which cultures can interact with one another.8 However, Taylor (1994, p. 73) also adds, “we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident.”

Communitarians’ accusations of relativism essentially stem from this cautious stance. It is true that they emphasize community and context over current claims of universality. However, they do not absolutize this position. What they do is challenge liberalism’s self-attributed claim to universality, shifting the ground of discussion to a more reasonable place. Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1998) is almost entirely dedicated to this debate. Thus, as I have tried to demonstrate here, communitarians do not entirely reject the idea of universality. It may be a universality to come, but there remains an open door for the possibility of some fundamental moral principles. At this point, considering the theological background that motivates communitarian thinkers might provide us with a more reasonable understanding. While I cannot delve into this topic in detail here, as it is worthy of an entire article in itself, it may be useful to briefly mention the theological references within communitarian thought before concluding this section.

In an eye-opening lecture later published as Are There Any Natural Rights?, MacIntyre (1983b, p. 21) argues, “since we have the best reasons for believing that there are no natural rights, then either the condemnation of slavery as such can be justified theologically or it cannot be justified [in any way].” Similarly, in The Sources of the Self (1989), Taylor traces the moral foundations of Western society to a form of Judeo-Christian theism. Likewise, Walzer (1993, pp. 6–7) places the discovery of revelation at the origins of moral philosophy. These theological hints and references suggest that communitarian thought’s connection to theology deserves serious and nuanced examination. Indeed, these theological implications and interpretations could serve as responses to accusations of relativism and indicate that communitarianism need not necessarily be accused of authoritarianism. The theological tones in communitarian thought seem less about establishing the authority of an institutionalized religion and more about seeking a universal starting point that could help fuse horizons. What can be said with certainty is this: communitarians have made sufficient intellectual efforts to counter accusations of relativism. In communitarianism, the effort to fuse horizons, like immanent critique, appears as a moral duty that stands before humanity.

Concluding remarks

Communitarianism has predominantly been understood and debated within the context of the societies already shaped by liberal thought and experience. Indeed, the social life that communitarians seek to revive is, to a large extent, influenced by liberal assumptions. Perhaps this is why Walzer (1990) himself described communitarianism, with its emphasis on sociality, as a necessary “correction” for the future of liberalism. However, not every experience of sociality around the globe necessarily nourished by liberalism. There are societies that remain fundamentally averse to liberal thought. Therefore, the fact that communitarians themselves belong to liberal societies should not lead to an intellectual blindness regarding communitarianism. It is entirely possible to abstract communitarianism from its immediate context and read it as a more inclusive ethical-political philosophy. After all, communitarian thinkers have built their arguments on certain “universal” principles.

Building on this, I have achieved two main objectives in this paper. First, I identified the three foundational pillars of communitarian thought: the ontological priority of community, the contextuality of knowledge, and the impersonality of goods. By demonstrating how these elements stand in radical contrast to the notions of individualism, universality, and personal conceptions of the good in liberalism, I positioned communitarianism as a distinct ethical-political stance. I then refined this somewhat rigid initial depiction by introducing two key principles: immanent critique and the fusion of horizons, which allowed me to soften the boundaries and distance communitarianism from authoritarian tendencies.

This nuanced interpretation challenges the reductive view of communitarianism as either a critique from within liberalism or its caricaturization as a philosophy leaning towards authoritarianism. Instead, I reframe communitarianism as an independent and inclusive ethical-political philosophy. In doing so, I demonstrated that the communitarian approach to the being, knowledge and value form a cyclical process of mutual reproduction. Values and communities are co-constitutive; individuals are shaped by the community while also contributing to the continuous reconstruction of the community’s values. The moral duty of immanent critique ensures that this process remains dynamic and prevents it from devolving into a vicious cycle.

However, this process is not restricted to a closed loop. Through the ideal of the fusion of horizons, communitarianism opens itself to dialog between different communities and points towards the possibility of a universality to come. This approach, while acknowledging the persistence of cultural differences, seeks a more genuine universality through the interaction and exchange of values across communities. Whether such universality can truly be achieved remains an open question, but the communitarian framework provides a promising avenue for exploring this possibility.

Ultimately, by centering the community as the primary subject of the moral-political realm, communitarianism offers a vision of collective life that is both distinctive and non-authoritarian. It provides a legitimate philosophical grounding for diverse cultural settings to uphold their unique ways of life, challenging the deontological liberal tendency to label societies that reject its self-ascribed universal values as outdated or illegitimate. This understanding legitimizes diversity on the global stage and provides a path for cross-cultural engagement, highlighting its relevance for various cultural contexts. Moreover, by encouraging interaction between communities, communitarianism continues to explore the potential for universal moral principles without sacrificing the authenticity of local traditions. If understood in this way, communitarianism can serve as both a defender of authenticity and a crucial step towards a more genuine form of universality, offering significant potential for addressing contemporary ethical and political challenges across different societies.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on the author’s PhD dissertation titled “The Political Ontology of Communitarianism”, prepared under the supervision of Assoc. Prof. Muhammed Ali Ağcan at Istanbul University.

Author contributions

The author is solely responsible for the conceptualization, writing, and revision of the manuscript.

Data availability

No datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

Competing interests

The author declares no competing interests.

Ethical approval

Not applicable.

Informed consent

Not applicable.

1

Indeed, Rawls himself recognized this situation, and in his subsequent work Political Liberalism (1993), he revised his theory of justice, limiting it to liberal democratic societies by abandoning the claim to universality. By the time we examine The Law of Peoples (1999), it becomes evident that Rawls had begun to advocate for a position that is almost relativistic. This evolution in Rawls’s thought itself underscores the broader diversity within liberal philosophy (see also Dworkin, 1986; Kymlicka, 1989; Buchanan, 1991; Tamir, 1993, etc.), yet A Theory of Justice remains a foundational reference for deontological liberalism. The reason for selecting Rawlsian liberalism as the primary reference point in this article is its emblematic representation of deontological liberalism—a strand of liberal thought that emphasizes individual autonomy and universal justice through abstraction from social ties. While liberal philosophy encompasses a wide range of perspectives, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has remained foundational for contemporary debates on communitarianism. Indeed, it constitutes a suitable point of contrast with the communitarian emphasis on community and contextual knowledge. Therefore, by focusing on this well-established model, the article aims to clarify—or at least shed light on—the philosophical divergences that define communitarianism’s ethical-political stance.

2

I found it appropriate to include the author of the article that claims to interpret communitarianism “properly understood” here. The author seems to be aware of this potential critique, as they acknowledge that their interpretation of communitarianism may be seen as “essentially a repackaging of liberalism.” However, in responding to this criticism by reiterating that communitarianism is a “correction of liberalism” (Chang, 2022, p.138), the author inadvertently demonstrates that the potential critiques directed at them are not entirely unfounded.

3

The prominent figures in these debates include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael J. Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Charles Taylor. Although it has been noted that these thinkers are reluctant to be associated with communitarianism due to its perceived connection with authoritarian regimes (Etzioni, 2014: 245), this inference is not entirely accurate. For instance, Taylor has explicitly stated that he is a communitarian “at the ontological level” (Abbey and Taylor, 1996, p. 3).

4

MacIntyre’s decision to title his follow-up to After Virtue (1984) as Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) serves as evidence of this very point.

5

In the same passage, Sandel reminds us that in early forms of liberalism, where the Kantian conception of the person had not yet emerged, slavery was viewed as a right, while those opposing the institution of slavery framed their arguments around the concept of sin. As this example demonstrates, religious arguments in moral matters do not necessarily equate to fanaticism.

6

Of course, this claim is the product of a biased interpretation. MacIntyre’s article, Toleration and the Goods of Conflict (2006a: 205–223), would be sufficient on its own to refute this assertion.

7

This process is similar to what Taylor (1985b, p. 26) refers to as the hermeneutic circle. Describing humans as “self-interpreting animals,” Taylor emphasizes that they are embedded within the very world of meaning through which they acquire their interpretative abilities. Thus, the interpretation made by individuals is not separate from what is being interpreted; rather, it is an interpretation of “experiential meaning” that contributes to the formation of meaning itself. This is to say that the very thing we are trying to find coherence in is, in part, constituted by interpretation.

8

Just as in Walzer’s thought, this convergence in Taylor’s view will also be temporary. Cultural differences will persist, and indeed, the core issue is essentially understanding the significance of these differences. As Taylor (2004, p. 196) writes elsewhere, “With the realization that these differences matter comes the humbling insight that there is a lot that we don’t understand, that we lack even the adequate language to describe these differences.”

Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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