ASYMMETRIC DECENTRALIZATION IN ROMANIA: LOST OPPORTUNITY

Abstract

This article endeavors to investigate if asymmetric decentralization should still be considered a solution for continuing and deepening the sectoral decentralization process in Romania in the context of growing inequalities and differences among various types of local administrative units. In close connection with asymmetric decentralization, the article explores the most significant challenge associated with this concept, mainly how to measure administrative capacity. This research effort is placed in the context of recent changes to the framework law on decentralization no. 195/2006 which introduced this concept. The main research questions are: a) What is the level of administrative capacity in Romania, measured using the criteria established in the methodological norms for the implementation of the framework law no. 195/2006?; b) Are there any weaknesses with respect to the measurement systems and if yes, what are some of the options for improving the assessment criteria?; c) Is asymmetric decentralization, decided based on the assessment of administrative capacity, regarded by the Romanian local authorities as a positive thing? Secondary data analysis and interviews were used as the main research methods. Based on the main findings it can be argued that the proposed criteria allow for a rather uncomplicated separation of local authorities in two categories (haves and have-nots), however additional criteria should be developed/included. As with regard to asymmetric decentralization, the majority of individuals in key administrative positions at the local level see it as a limitation of local autonomy and as a rather unnecessary innovation in the framework of the Romanian administrative system.

Headnote

Abstract

This article endeavors to investigate if asymmetric decentralization should still be considered a solution for continuing and deepening the sectoral decentralization process in Romania in the context of growing inequalities and differences among various types of local administrative units. In close connection with asymmetric decentralization, the article explores the most significant challenge associated with this concept, mainly how to measure administrative capacity. This research effort is placed in the context of recent changes to the framework law on decentralization no. 195/2006 which introduced this concept. The main research questions are: a) What is the level of administrative capacity in Romania, measured using the criteria established in the methodological norms for the implementation of the framework law no. 195/2006?; b) Are there any weaknesses with respect to the measurement systems and if yes, what are some of the options for improving the assessment criteria?; c) Is asymmetric decentralization, decided based on the assessment of administrative capacity, regarded by the Romanian local authorities as a positive thing? Secondary data analysis and interviews were used as the main research methods. Based on the main findings it can be argued that the proposed criteria allow for a rather uncomplicated separation of local authorities in two categories (haves and have-nots), however additional criteria should be developed/included. As with regard to asymmetric decentralization, the majority of individuals in key administrative positions at the local level see it as a limitation of local autonomy and as a rather unnecessary innovation in the framework of the Romanian administrative system.

Keywords: decentralization, reform, administrative capacity, Romania, subsidiarity

Introduction

Worldwide, decentralization is regarded as a key component of good governance and development (White, 2011, p. 1). In the last decades, significant efforts have been devoted both in developed and developing countries to accomplishing far-reaching decentralization of state functions to lower tier governments (Devas, 2005, p. 2). In most cases, these local governments are directly elected by local constituencies, thus adding a political dimension to the administrative and fiscal components of decentralization (Ahmad et al., 2005, p. 1). Some of the arguments for decentralization include: local governments, by being closer to the people they serve, can operate more efficiently and accountable and can be more responsive to local needs and preferences (Ahmad et al., 2005); decentralization can limit the size of the public sector (White, 2011, p. 3), thus responding to growing concerns regarding budgetary constraints and cuts and the desire to reduce the size of the government; it can be used as a strategy for supporting the anti-corruption fight (Fan, Lin and Treisman, 2008) or for fostering the rights of minorities (Yusoff, 2016), etc. In developing/transitioning countries, decentralization was implemented also: a) as a response to regional conflicts and demands of the local elites from the resource rich regions (Fealy and Aspinall, 2003); b) as a way of reconstructing states affected by ethnic conflicts, by restoring democracy and returning the power to the people (Kisakye, 1996; Steiner, 2006); in response to pressures from international donors such as World Bank (Dickovick, 2014).

In numerous developing countries, despite initial enthusiasm and reform efforts and initiatives, decentralization proved to be a failure by not being able to contribute to the envisioned and expected goals of enhanced local initiative and responsiveness, improved service delivery and development or local democracy (Mawhood, 1983; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Boone, 2003; Golooba-Mutebi, 2005; Ribot, 2002; Rondenelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984; Olowu, 1990; Cohen and Peterson, 1999). It is currently accepted that we know more about what doesn't work in terms of decentralization rather than what works. This is why a big part of the scholarly literature on the subject focuses on what has failed and why, as well as on trying to propose improved solutions for implementation (White, 2011, p. 1). Among some of the most prominent reasons for failure, one can mention: incomplete legal reforms, too much control from the center, lack of qualified personnel at local level, weak political leadership of the newly elected bodies, insufficient financial resources to cope with the new responsibilities, undeveloped civil society and limited pressure from local constituencies, persistent corruption and clientelism, etc. (Smoke, 1994; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004).

The concept of administrative capacity is often used by scholars studying decentralization policies, especially those coming from the public management field, in order to explain the real level of decentralization in a specific country. Administrative capacity, in very broad terms, can be defined as the management capabilities of local governments (Petak, 2006) and it includes policy management, resource management and program management (Gargan, 1981). In Central and Eastern Europe limited administrative capacity, which constrains implementation processes, is often to blame for the failure of various policies and reforms, including sectoral decentralization. Governments often focus on adopting a state of the art legislative framework and forget about the importance of implementation, which becomes the 'missing link' of the process (Dragos, Neamtu and Cobârzan, 2012, p. 140; Dunn, Staronova and Pushkarev, 2006). Administrative capacity also varies depending on the size of the community - administrative fragmentation seems to favor low capabilities, on whether it is urban or rural - rural communities tend to perform more poorly, with the exception of those which are located near major urban centers and/or along important transportation corridors (Dragos, Neamtu and Cobârzan, 2012). Local governments with weak administrative capacity cannot perform the decentralized tasks similarly to their better off counterparts. In this case, citizens no longer experience the expected benefits of decentralization but are rather condemned to receive fewer services and fewer investments in infrastructure.

Asymmetric decentralization is presented as a policy innovation (Shah and Thompson, 2004) that can solve the problem of unequal capabilities among local governments which should be performing similar tasks in a decentralized system. Asymmetric decentralization acknowledges that communities are different and have different capacities and therefore certain communities should not be required to perform certain tasks for which they are not prepared. Though asymmetric decentralization seems the perfect solution for countries with high differences in terms of administrative capacity among local government units, implementing it raises numerous questions: Who decides which communities receive decentralized tasks and on what criteria? How is administrative capacity being developed in those communities which initially do not have to perform decentralized tasks? Is there any resistance on the behalf of the communities with low administrative capacity in what regards the implementation of asymmetric decentralization? Do they have a voice or saying in the decision of the central government over the implementation of asymmetric decentralization?

Romania is an interesting case with regard to asymmetric decentralization. In 2006, in the context of intensified efforts targeting the imminent accession of Romania to the European Union in 2007, the government adopted several important laws regarding local public administration. The reforms incorporated in most cases suggestions and best practices emanating from the EU experts working closely with the Romanian government. One of the most praised legal regulations at that time was the framework law on decentralization no. 195/2006 (Andrei, Profiroiu and Turturean, 2006). The law introduced several innovative provisions, among which the possibility to implement asymmetric decentralization - local authorities at the lowest level (cities, towns, and rural communes) could be evaluated in order to determine their level of administrative capacity before the decentralization of additional responsibilities in the future. This provision was further detailed in 2008 through the issuance of methodological norms for the implementation of the framework law, stating how the assessment of administrative capacity should be performed. Despite these progressive and interesting regulatory provisions in place, the idea of asymmetric decentralization was subsequently abandoned. This is evident from the fact that in the years following the 2006 reforms, the decentralization of the health care system for example took place without an assessment of the local administrative capacity. In 2016, the framework law no. 195/2006 was amended, however the provisions regarding asymmetric decentralization remained in place (some changes were made, see section 3).

This article endeavors to investigate if asymmetric decentralization should still be considered a solution for continuing and deepening the sectoral decentralization process in Romania in the context of growing inequalities and differences among various types of local administrative units. In close connection with asymmetric decentralization, the article explores the most significant challenge associated with this concept, mainly how to measure administrative capacity. The empirical analysis tries to determine whether the proposed criteria for assessment from the methodological norms are specific and detailed enough as to allow us to distinguish between different classes of local communities. The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 offers a brief overview of the literature on administrative capacity and its measurement. Section 3 reviews the Romanian institutional and legal framework on decentralization, with a focus on recent trends. Section 4 details the methodology of the study. Section 5 presents the main findings. Section 6 consists of brief discussions and policy recommendations.

2. Asymmetric decentralization and administrative capacity: A literature review

Literature on asymmetric decentralization is rather scarce. This may be due to the fact that initially symmetric constitutional status for all basic territorial units was presumed to be the rule in most 'classical' federations such as Australia, Switzerland and US (Bird and Ebel, 2007, p. 11). The same argument applies more broadly for discussions on decentralization. However, there are countries where a certain degree of constitutional asymmetry was found from the very beginning: Spain, Russia, Belgium, etc. (Watts apud Bird and Ebel, 2007, p. 11). Asymmetry is usually driven by political factors - in this case asymmetric arrangements are used to diffuse ethnic or regional conflicts or to simply accommodate the aspirations and needs of ethically and culturally diverse groups of people confined within the boundaries of unitary states (Henders, 2010). It can also be implemented due to differences among regions in terms of capabilities for public administration (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2007). Based on the rationales driving asymmetric decentralization, Bird and Ebel (2007, p. 12) distinguish between political asymmetry and administrative asymmetry. They argue that while the former is based on political and cultural motivations, the latter is mainly driven by economic and efficiency concerns.

Administrative asymmetric decentralization is the result of a top-down approach to this process, where central government, either alone or in consultation with the lower units of government decides to transfer functions and/or financial resources only to certain units which meet specific pre-determined standards, usually spelled out in a law (Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998). In the literature administrative asymmetry is viewed as a contract or agreement between central and local authorities (Maksimovska Veljanovski, 2010), which should also include answers to at least the following questions: Is asymmetric decentralization temporary or permanent? If it is temporary, who decides when and if the required criteria for full decentralization are met? What types of functions are considered in relation to asymmetric decentralization?

Administrative asymmetry is closely intertwined with the concept of administrative capacity and more important with identifying indicators to measure administrative capacity. It is important to note that though administrative capacity of the state has emerged intermittently as an important concept in a range of political science literature it is not established at the center of any research field (Addison, 2009, p. 1). Administrative capacity can be broadly defined as 'the set of skills and competencies that are expected of public bureaucracies so that they can facilitate and contribute to problem-solving. They encompass the structural and procedural provisions that enable bureaucracies to perform particular functions and embrace the individuals within these bureaucracies that are capable and skillful enough to meet the expectations of their political masters and the wider public' (Hertie School of Governance, 2014).

Addison (2009, pp. 2-9) identifies five distinct applications of the concept of administrative capacity. Thus, administrative capacity is: 1) Determinant or equivalent of political development and state building; 2) Intervening factor in policy implementation; 3) Antecedent of performance; 4) Product of governance; 5) Shaper of public policy. The five categories reflect up to a certain extent the historical evolution of the concept, with the first approaches going back to the 1960s structural-functionalist literature on political development; however, the newer trends are intertwined.

In the context of the European Union, the interest in administrative capacity is driven primarily by its importance as a criterion for Candidate Countries preparing to join the EU (Cardona, 2009). The literature developed in this area is thus concerned with identifying the capacity of the executives of CEE former and current candidate countries for EU accession, especially capacity for implementing the acquis communautaire, as well as possible strategies for supporting efforts to enhance that capacity (Dimitrov, Goetz, and Wollmann, 2006, p. 251). Also, administrative capacity is well researched in the literature on Cohesion policy, where administrative capacity and absorption capacity often overlap (Smeriglio et al., 2015).

Numerous studies and policy papers by international organizations are available on indicators used for measuring administrative capacity (Verheijen, 2007; Hammerschmid et al., 2014; Bachtler, Mendez and Oraze, 2013). The dimensions included under the umbrella concept of administrative capacity are: a) Verheijen (2007) - three areas related to policy (performance management, strategic planning and policy co-ordination and formulation), people (human resource management practices such as recruitment and career management, incentive systems, politico-administrative relations), and systems (one specific aspect of public service delivery: the extent to which states had introduced eGovernance systems and used these effectively to enhance the business environment). b) COCOPS project, financed under the EU 7th Framework Programme, proposes an Administrative Management Capacity Index consisting of 6 dimensions: a) Strategic capacity (existence of formalized strategic planning practices, clarity of strategic objectives, communication of goals to staff; b) Human Resources Management - the level of HR management tools implementation, flexibility of employment in terms of individualization and decentralization of staff roles in organization; c) Organizational Culture - quality of social capital within organization and staff self-commitment to institution and its objectives; d) Performance measurement - use of quality-monitoring tools like customer surveys, benchmarking, Management by objectives (MBO); e) Leadership - the executives' commitment to achieving results and their level of political Independence; f) Coordination - quality of inter-organizational and multi-level collaboration and use of various arrangements to solve coordination problems (Smeriglio et al, 2015, p. 27). However, there are limited solutions in the literature with regard to what criteria to use in the context of asymmetric decentralization. In most cases, with asymmetric decentralization, governments only need a few indicators that will best separate those authorities which have administrative capacity from those which do not have it.

3. Decentralization reforms in Romania. Recent trends

3.1. Overview

Decentralization has represented from the very beginning a significant component of the public administration reform in Romania (Cepiku and Mititelu, 2010; Dragos and Neamtu, 2007; Bischoff and Giosan, 2007; Mincu and Horga, 2010; Ivan and Cuglesan, 2009; Hintea, 2011). Though significant progress has been made in this area, certain challenges still exist (Suciu, 2013). Throughout the years, the focus of the reform has shifted, following the general evolution of the Romanian political and administrative system and the democratization process (Profiroiu, Profiroiu and Paradeilles, 2006). In the early stages, immediately after the revolution, decentralization was focused more on the devolution of tasks and responsibilities to local governments coupled with the establishment of mechanisms for the direct election of local representatives and for public participation in local decision-making. In the following stages, as the first steps toward creating local bodies directed elected by citizens and accountable to them was accomplished, the focus shifted toward increasing efficiency in the provision of public services at the local level. Another significant development during this stage regarded the increase in the number of policy areas/fields placed under the responsibility of local governments such as healthcare, education, and local police (Popa, 2011). At this stage occurred the first concerns pertaining to weak administrative capacity and the need to increase it. Weak administrative capacity was addressed through a variety of strategies, including proposals for asymmetric decentralization, cooperation among local units/consolidation of fragmented local governments, training of public servants, as well as the creation of new positions aimed at increasing efficiency and capacity such as the city manager. More recently, decentralization reforms have targeted two different aspects: a) Territorial decentralization, with a focus on creating regions which will have elected bodies, fiscal autonomy and a broad range of competences; b) Transfer of sectoral responsibilities (in policy fields such as culture, sport, tourism, agriculture, etc.) and assets from deconcentrated county offices to the County Councils (the law, though adopted by the Parliament, had been invalidated by the Constitutional Court in 2014; the proponents of the law are still working on remedying the deficiencies identified by the Constitutional Court). While the first development is in line with recent evolutions at the European level, the latter is more difficult to justify. Not only that many European countries are merging or terminating the units similar to the Romanian counties; in addition, the Romanian government is transferring increased responsibilities to the county level in the context in which the regional reform questions the usefulness of the county level if administrative regions are to be created in the future.

3.2 Legal framework

The principle of decentralization is consecrated both in the constitution and in the subsequent legislation. Thus, article 120 of the 1991 Constitution (with subsequent changes) states that 'local administration within the administrative territorial units is based on the principles of decentralization, local autonomy, and deconcentration of public services'. A similar provision is to be found in the law no. 215/2001 (with subsequent changes) on local public administration. This law however does not focus on regulating decentralization but rather on local autonomy (Gîrlesteanu and Smarandache, 2010). The framework law on decentralization no. 195/2006 (with subsequent changes) was therefore regarded as a necessary addition to the legal regime of decentralization. Before 2006, various decentralization laws had existed but none of them had the complexity of Law no. 195/2005.

Law no. 195/2006 introduced for the first time the concept of administrative capacity and connected it with other provisions from the law. First of all, in article 3, the principle of subsidiarity was defined so as to include a reference to administrative capacity. According to the principle of subsidiarity, responsibilities and tasks should be performed by the administrative authority which is located most closely to the citizens but which possesses administrative capacity. Section three of the law (article 11 to 13) further details the provisions pertaining to administrative capacity. In the process of transferring tasks and responsibilities to the local public administration (rural communes, towns and cities) ministries and other specialized bodies pertaining to the central government can divide the local authorities into two categories: category I includes local authorities which possess administrative capacity and can start immediately to exercise the decentralize responsibilities; category II includes local authorities without administrative capacity - they need to first develop their capacities before being allowed to exercise the decentralized responsibilities. The assessment of administrative capacity is performed according to criteria detailed in the methodological norms for the implementation of law no. 195/2006 (adopted in 2008). The ministries and other specialized bodies pertaining to the central government, together with the associative structures of local governments establish how the assessment will be carried out and the manner in which the transfer of competences will be conducted.

The law also determines which authorities will temporarily exercise the responsibilities which cannot be decentralized to local authorities falling into the second category, namely those without administrative capacity. In the initial version of the law it was stated that these responsibilities will be exercised by the county authorities. The implicit assumption was that all counties had the necessary capacity, since the law was salient about a possible lack of capacity at county level as well. In the 2016 version of the law, a new provision was added, stating that if counties are found not to have the necessary capacity, then the competencies will be transferred to the line ministries. The law clearly states that the transfer of responsibilities to county or central authorities is to be limited in time, until the local units of public administration can build their own administrative capacity.

3.3. Specific criteria for the assessment of administrative capacity

The criteria for the assessment of administrative capacity were spelled out in the 2008 methodological norms for the implementation of Law no. 195/2006 (Decision no. 139/2008). Though the methodological norms were subsequently changed in 2016, these changes do not concern the provisions pertaining to the assessment of administrative capacity.

The methodological norms include five general criteria for the assessment of administrative capacity; the ministries and other specialized bodies pertaining to the central government, together with the associative structures of local governments, can however decide to add other criteria. The five general criteria are: 1) capacity of local public authorities to plan strategically; 2) capacity of local public authorities with respect to financial management; 3) capacity of local public authorities with respect to human resources management; 4) capacity of local public authorities with respect to project management; 5) whether the acts adopted/issued by local authorities are in accordance with the legal provisions. With the exception of the first criterion, all the other four criteria include two sub-criteria. Below one can find a short account of all criteria.

Criterion 1 - Local authorities are, according to the law, deemed capable to plan strategically if they have in place at the moment of the assessment, a strategic document, usually called strategy for local development or sustainable development strategy. All local authorities who have an updated local development plan receive 20 points. The assessment does not determine anything else besides the mere existence of the plan.

Criterion 2 - It assesses the administrative capacity of local public authorities in relation to their ability to collect and to generate their own revenues. The two sub-criteria are: % of collected own revenues out of the total forecasted (budgeted) own revenues (without shares of the income tax); % of own revenues out of the total revenues (without shares of the income tax). The reference year is the year prior to the assessment. For each sub-criterion 10 points were given if local authorities were able to collect 50% or more of the forecasted revenues and to generate 50% or more out of the total revenues.

Criterion 3 - It assesses the general level of training of all employees working within the local public authority as well as their performances on the job. The two sub-criteria area: % of employees out of the total number of employees who in the year prior to the assessment underwent any form of training, finalized with the award of a certificate, in accordance with the provisions from law no. 188/1999 (with subsequent changes); % of employees out of the total number of employees who in the year prior to the assessment received the qualification "good" or "very good" in the annual evaluation of professional performances. For each sub-criterion 10 points were given if 50% or more of the employees met the stipulated conditions in the law.

Criterion 4 - It assesses the ability of the local authorities to both attract financial resources in the framework of projects and to spend them according to the initial estimations. The calculation formula for the two sub-criteria is: % of attracted funds (sum) out of the total value of applications submitted for financing; % of total spending from attracted sources out of the total value of the attracted sources. For each sub-criterion 10 points are assigned if local authorities are able to attract at least 50% of the total value of the application submitted and respectively to spend more than 50% of the attracted money.

Criterion 5 - It assesses how many decisions of the Local Council as well as of the mayor have been annulled by the courts (final decision). The calculation formula for the two sub-criteria is: % of decisions out of the total number of decisions adopted by the Local Council which in the year prior to the assessment were annulled by the courts; % of administrative acts out of the total number of administrative acts issued by the mayor which in the year prior to the assessment were annulled by the courts. For each subcriterion 10 points were given if no more than 5% of decisions and acts were annulled by the courts.

Local authorities need to acquire at least 50 points in order to be considered as having administrative capacity.

4. Methodology

Our main research goal is to investigate if asymmetric decentralization represents an option in Romania and to determine what kind of assessment of the administrative capacity is needed in order to back up the decision for asymmetric decentralization. The main research questions are: a) What is the level of administrative capacity in Romania, measured using the criteria established in the methodological norms for the implementation of the framework law 195/2006?; b) Are there any weaknesses with respect to the measurement systems and if yes, what are some of the options for improving the assessment criteria?; c) Is asymmetric decentralization, decided based on the assessment of administrative capacity, regarded by the Romanian local authorities as a positive thing?

We hypothesize that: a) the proposed methodology for the assessment of administrative capacity allows to a vast majority of local administrative units to score higher than 50 points (the threshold to be declared as having administrative capacity, thus making it irrelevant; b) the majority of individuals in key administrative positions at the local level do not agree with asymmetric decentralization and see it as a limitation of local autonomy.

We used a combination of two main research methods in order to answer the stated research questions. The first stage in the research consisted in the assessment of the level of administrative capacity for a large sample of urban and rural communities from the North-Western development region of Romania. The assessment was done using the criteria and sub-criteria stated in the law. We constructed our sample based on the number of urban and rural communities in the region - there are 42 cities and towns and 398 rural communes. We included all the urban communities and for each of the six counties of the region we included 8 rural communities. In the case of the rural communities the criteria used to stratify the sample were: size (four large communes over 2,500 inhabitants and four small ones up to 1,500 inhabitants); distance from a main urban center (out of the eight communes at least one had to be in the proximity (less than 5 km) from a major urban center). Out of the 90 local authorities included in the sample we were able to obtain the necessary data for less than 50% (42). Out of the 42, 10 are cities and towns and 32 are rural communes (20 small and 12 big). In addition, twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted with different individuals from within the local public administration from the North-Western development region of Romania: elected representatives (3 vice-mayors and 3 local councilors); 2 city managers; and 4 legal secretaries. All three categories of individuals were chosen because they have the most direct contact with the issues investigated. For each category at least one individual was from rural communities or towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants.

The research was carried out in 2015 over a period of almost 11 months. Two interviews were finalized in January 2016.

5. Main findings

5.1. Assessment of administrative capacity

The first general criterion from the law simply implies that we checked the existence of a local development plan/strategy. Initially, for all communities in the sample an on-line search was conducted in order to determine whether such a development strategy/plan exists. Based on the web search, we were able to determine the existence of a development plan for approx. 50% of the communities in the sample (20 communities out of 42). In a second stage, we contacted the local authorities from the sample for which we could not determine if the plan existed and asked for the plan. 12 more development plans were provided, either in electronic format or as hard copies (in one case we were invited to the city hall to examine the plan because only one hard copy existed). In the end, 76% of the communities in the sample received the 20 points in our assessment. It was easily observable that the development plans were highly different when compared to each other: some were high quality documents, prepared by consultants, including all the information one expects to find in a strategic planning document; others were prepared in-house by the local authorities, had minimal information, mostly descriptive, and in certain cases it was difficult to say whether they are current or not (in five cases no timeframe was specified). All the urban communities with one exception had development plans prepared by consultant and up to date.

The assessment for the second general criterion was conducted mainly by using data available online for all the administrative territorial units from Romania (Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration, http://www.dpfbl.mdrap.ro/sit_ven_si_chelt_uat.html; some local authorities also post data from National Agency for Fiscal Administration - Order of the Ministry of Interior and of the Ministry of Public Finances no. 244/2651/2010). Investigating sub-criterion 1 we discovered that the local authorities in the sample are quite diverse in terms of revenue collection capacity. Thus, in the case of all urban communities, the percentage of collected revenues as compared to the forecasted ones is over 85% (it ranges from 85% to 103%). For the rural communities, this indicator ranges from 24% to 72%, with a total of 11 communities being above the 50% threshold. Thus, 21 communities received the 10 points for fulfilling this criterion. For sub-criterion 2, only 6 cities have more than 50% of the total budget composed of own revenues. The average percentage for the rest of urban communities is 31% while in the case of rural communes it ranges from 13%-23%. Thus, only the 6 cities obtained 10 points in the assessment.

The assessment for the third general criterion was conducted exclusively based on the self-reported data received from the local authorities. Information on the performances and training of civil servants is not publicly available, so we had to rely on data provided by the local authorities themselves upon request. In many cases we were initially refused, the argument being that such information, especially with regard to the assessment of individual performances, is confidential. In the end, in most cases we received aggregated data from the local authorities based on which we completed the assessment. For subcriterion 1, 22 communities reported percentages of trained personnel ranging from 50 to 78 and received 10 points. For 8 communities the data allowed us to conclude that more than 40% of all of the employees undergoing training programs paid themselves for these programs. Out of the 20 communities with percentages lower than 50%, 8 communities had no trained employee in the year previous to the assessment. All communities with low percentages of employees trained are rural or small town with a population of approx. 10,000 inhabitants. For sub-criterion 2, 40 of the communities in the sample reported that 100% of their employees received the qualification "good" or "very good". Two urban communities reported percentages ranging from 80% to 95%. Based on this information, all communities in the sample received 10 points.

For assessing administrative capacity in relation to the forth general criterion we used both the data available online with regard to the evolution of local budgets (http://www.dpfbl.mdrap.ro/sit_ven_si_chelt_uat.html) as well as data provided by the local authorities upon request. We consider the data used for assessment under the fourth criterion as the least reliable ones because: they cover a longer period of time (four years prior to the year of assessment), not all authorities report data in the same format and some data were incomplete. With regard to grant writing and application and attraction of funds huge differences exist among the local authorities from the sample. Differences exist not only between urban and rural communities but also within the two groups. Small urban communities for example had little opportunities for financing since funds from the Operational Regional Program (a significant source) were not available for communities under 10,000 inhabitants. Also, 6 rural communities had no grant application, the possible explanation being lack of financial resources for co-financing. Out of the 10 urban communities, 7 had attracted funds amounting for at least 50% of the total value of the submitted applications. 6 rural communities also met this threshold. It is worth noting that in two cases the percentage was almost 100% - the explanation was that over the last four years they applied for a very small number of project and those projects were approved. In total, 13 communities were assigned the 10 points available under this sub-criterion. For sub-criterion 2, only 34 communities were taken into consideration because the rest did not attract any grant money. With one exception, all the local authorities managed to spend at least 50% out of the attracted financial resources. The average for the entire sample, based however on incomplete data, is 78%, with a maximum of over 90% for two large cities. In total, 33 communities were assigned the 10 points available under this sub-criterion.

Data used for the assessment of administrative capacity in relation to the fifth general criterion came from two different sources: on-line search on the websites of local public authorities (certain authorities post the decisions of the Local Council online thus we were able to determine the total number of decisions adopted in one year; the administrative acts issued by the mayor are not available online but certain mayors mention the total number of such acts in their annual activity reports) and information provided by the local authorities upon request (number of decisions/acts challenged in courts and number of acts/decisions annulled by the courts). The difference among the communities from the sample in terms of the total number of Local Council decisions and acts issued by the mayors is significant, and it mostly depends on the size of the analyzed communities. Small rural communities adopt on average 40 Local Council decisions while large urban communities can adopt 500 decisions or even more per year. Despite the sheer difference in volume, almost all communities reported very few decisions (if any) challenged in courts and subsequently annulled. Out of the 42 communities, one reported having seven Local Council decisions annulled while other five communities reported each having one or two decisions annulled. In the case of the rural community with seven decisions annulled the legal secretary was on maternity leave and the replacement had no prior practical experience. 41 communities received 10 points, while one failed to meet the threshold for receiving the points. With regard to sub-criterion 2, the situation is more diverse. 30 communities had no administrative acts issued by the mayor annulled by the courts, while the rest of the communities have one up to three acts annulled. There is one notable exception - one rural community has approx. 20 acts issued by the vice-mayor annulled. The situation is complicated - the mayor, who had been under investigation for corruption acts, refused to sign any more acts and in the same time to delegate this responsibility to the vice-mayor. The vice-mayor, in order to avoid the stopping of administrative activity, took it upon himself to sign those acts. This was clearly illegal, despite his good intentions. With the exception of the latter example, none of the communities had more than 5% of the acts issued by the mayor annulled so 41 communities received the 10 points.

Based on the points obtained for each criterion, the total scores are: a) Out of the 42 local authorities in the sample, only 2 obtained scores under the 50 points threshold. One of these communities is a small commune while the other is a town under 10,000 inhabitants. b) There are 5 cities and towns which obtained the maximum score of 100 points. c) 35 communities obtained scores between 50-90 points. d) Small rural communities tend to be positioned at the bottom of the ranking but so are small towns.

5.2. Interviews with various representatives of local authorities

The first section of the interview (Q1-Q3) includes questions which endeavor to gauge the interviewees' opinion with regard to the overall success of the decentralization process in Romania. Thus, Q1 asked interviewees to rate the success of decentralization in Romania by naming some of the benefits of this process. Overall, most interviewees agree that decentralization is a feature of modern administrative systems but they regard both the process itself as well as the outcomes with skepticism. In terms of the process itself, the interviewees argued that local communities do not have a saying in the process. More recently, the associative structures formed of representatives of the local communities have been consulted by the government with regard to some changes brought to the law. However, despite these consultations, the interviewees claimed that the voice of small communities is particularly disregarded. The representatives of rural communities claimed that for them the lack of predictability of the entire process over time is challenging. In terms of outcomes of decentralization, several interviewees claimed that decentralization led to the creation of small communities, especially in the rural areas. In their opinion, administrative fragmentation was a by-product of decentralization. Others have argued that decentralization resulted in the creation of very powerful alliances at the local level among elected officials, businesses, banks, etc., which do not always act in the public interest, engaging themselves in corrupt practices. Despite some rather negative remarks with regard to decentralization, most interviewees agree that the main benefit refers to the increased accountability of the elected local authorities towards their constituencies (mentioned six time), the possibility for the public to participate in the local decision- making process (mentioned four times) and the possibility to innovate at the local level in order to become better than other local communities (mentioned three times).

Q2 explored whether the interviewees agree with the fact that significant differences exist between the local communities from Romania in terms of administrative capacity and whether administrative capacity is a determinant of performance and development at the local level. As expected, most of the interviewees mentioned that there are significant urban and rural differences in terms of the administrative capacity of local authorities. Rural communities are suffering the most from the absence of trained human resources and limited financial resources. At least three interviewees claimed that instead of decreasing over time the urban-rural gap is increasing. Cities and sometimes towns are able to take advantage of opportunities such as the EU structural funds but rural communities, especially the small ones, are lagging behind. Most representatives of the rural communities argued that in the absence of financial resources, what they can accomplish is quite limited. They downplayed the importance of leadership, innovation, and institutional arrangements and claimed that without money even the most well intended and well prepared mayor and his/her staff would not success in making a difference. With regard to the connection between administrative capacity and performance and development, one interviewee expressed a very interesting opinion. He argued that while he agrees that this connection exists in most cases, suburban communities represent an exception. He offered at least two examples of suburban communities located in the proximity of big cities which, in his opinion, developed in the absence of administrative capacity and local leadership. His argument was that these communities are benefiting from the spillover effects of development taking place in the big cities and that most residents and businesses locate themselves in these suburban communities due to shortages of land and housing in the big cities.

Q3 explored the perception of the interviewees with regard to some of the challenges/difficulties associated with decentralization which their local communities experience. As expected, all interviewees mentioned the financial constraints. While big cities and towns argued that their main challenge is to prioritize the types of investments and projects to be financed from the local budget, the small rural communities complained about having to terminate basic public services such as public lighting. Several representatives of rural communities talked about the existence of a vicious circle - local authorities are encouraged to apply for EU funds, however, besides other shortcoming, they do not have the money necessary for co-financing such projects. In the absence of cofinancing, no projects can be pursued thus deepening the state of under-development of the community. Three interviewees described the relationship with the prefect as a big challenge - their perception was that the prefect can limit the action of the local authorities by challenging certain administrative acts issued/adopted by the local authorities in court. They explained that they do not feel the prefect intends to help them but rather to punish them. The interviewees coming from rural communities argued that they would appreciate more coordination and support coming from the county government and, in one case, even from the central government. They were not referring strictly to financial support but rather to expertise and guiding especially with regard to the attraction of EU structural funds.

Questions 4-7 (section two of the interview) explore the opinion of the interviewees with regard to asymmetric decentralization. Q4 intends to explore whether or not the interviewees are familiar with the concept of asymmetric decentralization and with the main provisions regarding asymmetric decentralization from the framework law no. 195/2006. None of the interviewees was able to offer a definition of the concept or to think about the main features of a system where asymmetric decentralization is implemented. Interesting enough, after additional clues were offered by the researcher, four interviewees offered examples of administrative systems where this model is implemented. All four of them referred either to the Italian or Spanish regional systems, where some regions enjoy a larger autonomy than the rest of them. Two of the interviewees said that they became familiar with these systems in the recent years, when debates about the change in the regional organization in Romania also involved references to European regional systems to be adapted to the Romanian context. None of the interviewees was familiar with the provisions of the framework law on asymmetric decentralization and only one was able to discuss some of the new concepts introduced by this law. The interviewee mentioned as novelties introduced by the law cost standards in the provisions of public services and the use of pilot phases in the process of determining if certain competences should be decentralized and how the process should take place. These two concepts mentioned correspond to topics which have been more widely addressed in public debates and in the media.

Q5 explored whether the interviewees would agree with the implementation of asymmetric decentralization in the case of the communities they come from. With one exception, all interviewees considered that asymmetric decentralization is contrary to the administrative tradition from Romania. The main argument was that by banning certain communities from the exercise of decentralized responsibilities the government is in fact violating the principle of local autonomy. Several of them argued that once the government introduces asymmetric decentralization this will pave the way for asymmetric regionalization. The interviewees referred to the fact that it will be a bad idea to created different legal regimes for local communities based on the differences between them. It was clear that the interviewees were referring to the situation of the two Romanian counties where the Hungarian population represents the majority of the population and for which, during the debates on the change of the regional model, a special status was proposed by some politicians. Because the interviewees had limited knowledge with regard to the exact provisions of the law on asymmetric decentralization, most of the answers were vague but one could depict a negative connotation attributed to the concept by all of them.

Q6 investigated whether or not the interviewees believe that the administrative capacity of a local authority can be developed over time. All interviewees seemed to have a relatively good idea of what administrative capacity is and which its components are. Most of them expressed negative feelings regarding the utility of training, in all of its forms. Some of them claimed that higher salaries would allow them to hire better prepared people, who would not need training. The interviewees coming from rural areas claimed that the problem of limited human resources could be solved if several communities would jointly hired experts for writing grant applications, monitoring project implementation, in the area of IT, etc. Several interviewees claimed that the main component of administrative capacity is related to the financial resources available. From this perspective, administrative capacity is hard to be developed, since additional sources are scarce and some of them have already being explored with no or limited success by some communities. Interestingly enough, just one person stated that administrative capacity could be significantly changed if the leadership dimension improved. By this the interviewee meant that the mayor and the local councilors should act more responsible, putting the interests of the community at the forefront of their actions/initiatives. He also stated that individuals in leadership positions at the local level could be more pro-active in pursuing partnerships and collaborations with actors pertaining to the private sector.

Q7 explored the main fears of the interviewees with regard to the potential implementation of asymmetric decentralization in Romania. Several interviewees stated that even poor communities will feel that the government or the county administration is interfering in the management of local affairs. At least two of them acknowledged that some of these attitudes may be irrational, especially in the case of communities which do not have enough resources to offer even basic services (for example public lighting). One person described possible reactions in light of the negative reaction of population and/or local authorities when certain hospitals from small communities were closed. The interviewee argued that even if the people from these communities were not truly benefiting from any services offered by those hospitals, they were still against the idea of closing them down. Another fear, expressed especially by the representatives from rural communities, was in connection with possible limitations of local autonomy. More specifically, two interviewees argued that they would like to see in the sectoral laws clear provisions regarding the conditions and the duration of the interdiction to exercise certain competences by the communities lacking administrative capacity. In the absence of these provisions, they expressed concerns that county or central government might be tempted to reverse decentralization by stalling the re-evaluation of administrative capacities from the communities initially banned from the exercise of the decentralized responsibilities.

Section three of the interview (Q8-Q11) addresses more in-depth the assessment of administrative capacity and what criteria could be used. Q8 asked the interviewees to express their opinion on whether or not the scores obtained by the local authorities in their communities (section 4.1) accurately reflect the situation on the ground, the challenges and the assets existing in those communities. All interviewees had access to the methodology employed and to the scores obtained by the other communities in the sample. Several interviewees first observed that the differences in the scores obtained by different communities (for example a city and a big rural community) are not that significant. One interviewee argued that is impossible for the city which is the county seat to obtain a score of 80 while the rural community he came from obtained a score of 70. Along the same lines, others claimed that it seems unfair for different communities to obtain the same scores for the same sub-criterion despite clear differences in the efforts and resources employed in a certain area (for example drafting of the local development strategy took in the case of a town 6 months and the approx. cost was 25,000 Euros while some rural communities drafted in-house some very simplistic plans). Most interviewees expressed their disappointment that the score do not allow us for a more precise classification/ranking of the assessed communities based on their administrative capacity.

Q9 explored whether in the opinion of the interviewees some of the criteria are too easy to be fulfilled, thus making them ineffective in determining the administrative capacity of a certain community. The following three criteria/sub-criteria were mentioned by the most interviewee: Criterion 1 (capacity to plan strategically) (mentioned 8 times) - the interviewees argued that the mere existence of a strategic planning document does not reflect in any way the ability of the local authorities to actually implement the plan. Only one interviewee agreed that there is some value attached to the process itself, especially when the civil servants and the experts from the local authority are involved in the process. All interviewees offered examples of communities and plans where the plans were merely drafted because of legal requirements and/or in order to be able to access the structural funds from the European Union. Criterion 3, sub-criterion 2 (capacity with regard to human resources management) (mentioned 6 times) - the interviewees argued that it is highly unusual for civil servants to receive as part of their annual evaluations other qualifications than very good. Even good is unusual, according to some of the interviewees. In this context, they claimed that by introducing such a sub-criterion no real distinction could be operated in this area among the assessed local authorities. Criterion 5, both sub-criteria (capacity to comply with legal provisions) (mentioned 5 times) - especially the legal secretaries interviewed argued that it is quite rare for the acts issued/adopted by the Local Council and the mayor to be challenged in courts. The decisions of the Local Council and the acts issued by the mayor are mostly challenged by the prefect. Individuals can also do it, but it happens more rarely and mostly with respect to individual administrative acts. In most cases the prefect uses a preliminary procedure during which he/she notifies the local authority with regard to his/her intention to challenge the decision in Court. The law no longer requires the prefect to use this procedure before challenging the act in court, however this practice is maintained. In many cases, legality problems are solved at this stage. Individuals are required to go through an administrative review of the challenged decision/act before they can challenge it in court. In this case, according to the interviewees some legal disputes are finalized at this level; very often, even when the individuals are not happy with the decision of the administration from the administrative review they will not pursue the matter in court. This takes too long, people mistrust the justice system and the general opinion is that the courts will not overrule a decision made by the public authorities.

Q10 asked the interviewees to propose additional criteria for the assessment of administrative capacity. Most of the interviewed individuals argued that the five general criteria could be kept but they proposed additional sub-criteria. For criterion 1, two suggestions were made: Some interviewees argued that more strategic planning documents should be included - for example it would be relevant according to one opinion to also determine if the zoning ordinance (General Urbanistic Plan) is updated. Other argued that certain criteria should be established based on which to determine if the existing local development plan proves the capacity of the local authorities to plan strategically. These include: the plan addresses a certain number of pre-determined policy areas, it includes a description of the monitoring strategy used to assess its implementation status and make recommendations for future updates, it proposes a list of integrated programs, etc. Criterion no. 2 was regarded by most interviewees as being extremely well-developed, accurately reflecting the financial and fiscal capacity of the local communities. One interesting suggestion, coming from a vice-mayor of a rural community, was to introduce a measure which reflects even more clearly the dependency of the rural community on financial transfers from other levels. Thus, he suggested to look if the salaries at the level of the local authorities can be paid from the own revenues generated at the local level, including shares from the global income tax. His idea, which was also investigated by a Romanian NGO, is to determine if any resources can be directed towards something else than merely the pay of salaries. No suggestions were made regarding criterion 4. With regard to criterion 5, several interviewees argued that data should not be collected only with regard to the final court rulings but also with regard to the administrative review procedures initiated by both the prefect and other public bodies as well as by the citizens.

New general criteria proposed: 1) Transparency - Several interviewees argued that how transparent local authorities are should also be part of administrative capacity. Transparency included in their opinion not only what governments are required to do by law but also pro-active behavior. At a minimum, one legal secretary argued, points should be given if a number of items are available online on the websites of the local authorities (budget and fiscal information/indicators, public procurement notices and information on the execution of public contracts, etc. 2) E-government - In close connection with transparency, several interviewees mentioned giving points for certain things that fall under the umbrella concept of e-government. They include - existence of open data sets, payment of taxes online, two-ways communication strategies, etc. 3) Public procurement - One of the biggest challenges local authorities have in the implementation of large infrastructure projects (but not only) is related to public procurement, more specifically the inability to properly draft technical specifications, to determine the appropriate procurement procedure, corruption, etc. Possible indicators mentioned include: Number of procedures annulled by the review body/courts; Number of annulled award decisions; E- procurement, etc. 4) Cooperation/association - The ability of local authorities to cooperate within the framework of associations for intercommunity development was seen by several interviewees as a key component of administrative capacity and an efficient method to fight fragmentation and subsequently the problem of limited financial resources. Others have mentioned also partnerships with the business and non-profit sectors. However, no clearly and easily measurable sub-criteria were proposed with respect to associativity.

Q11 asked the interviewees to offer their opinion on whether the data required for the assessment of administrative capacity is readily available and if there is any possibility for local authorities to misreport. Most of them were unaware of the availability of fiscal and financial data. However, they agreed that though such data might be difficult to get by outsiders, such as researchers, governmental bodies would have no problem in collecting this information. At least two interviewees claimed that local authorities might be tempted to misreport, especially if certain information is difficult to check.

6.Discussions and conclusions

Based on the interviews, asymmetric decentralization is not properly understood among the representatives of local public authorities. They seem to be rather familiar with the asymmetry driven by political reasons rather than by administrative ones. Most of the examples and discussions regarding possible fears were related to the Spanish case. In addition, they also mentioned similarities between the Spanish case and the proposals for asymmetric regionalization in the case of Covasna and Harghita counties from Romania. Asymmetry based on economic/efficiency considerations was hard to understand in the absence of proper knowledge about the provisions of the framework law on decentralization from 2006. It was assumed by interviewees that symmetry should be the norm and that any innovations in this respect would equal in reality a breach of the principle of local autonomy. Such reactions are not uncommon and are described in the literature (Hataley and Leuprecht, 2014; Gjoni, Wetterberg and Dunbar, 2010; Monteux, 2006).

The criteria proposed for the assessment of administrative capacity in the legal regulations from Romania seem to be in line with other similar endeavors from the literature (see section 2). It is worth however mentioning that while empirical researches can come up with sophisticated indicators and data sets, the assessment of administrative capacity, for the purposes of asymmetric decentralization, needs to be performed by the central government, within a reasonable timeframe and with data that can be easily collected. The assessment criteria should therefore be evaluated not necessarily in light of their complexity but based on whether or not are effective in separating the local authorities in two categories, those which have administrative capacity and those which do not have it. Based on the assessment conducted we can conclude that though the general criteria are fine, the sub-criteria should be changed/modified. Under the current system most of the local authorities could obtain 50 points. The most easily to fulfill criteria are those pertaining to the existence of a strategy (general criterion 1), the qualifications obtained by employees during the annual evaluation of performances evaluation (general criterion 3, sub-criterion 2) and compliance with the legal provisions (general criterion 5).

It is not clear yet if asymmetric decentralization is ever to be implemented in Romania but recent changes in the law seem to indicate that it is still on the table. In order for the assessment to between distinguish between the two types of communities, perhaps certain mandatory criteria to be fulfilled should be set in the law. In this way, communities which do not meet, in addition to the 50 points threshold, also some mandatory requirements could not be included in the category with full administrative capacity.

The present research has clear limitations: Some of the data used for conducting the assessment of administrative capacity is incomplete and in certain cases the possibility for misreporting was a concern. In addition, the number of interviews was relatively small and did not cover all counties from the region.

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