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Soc Choice Welfare (2004) 22: 6181DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0277-zIan CarterDepartment of Political and Social Studies, University of Pavia, Strada Nuova 65
27100 Pavia, Italy (e-mail: [email protected])Abstract. This paper argues in favour of a distinction between freedom
and freedom of choice a distinction that economists and political philosophers have so far either ignored or drawn wrongly. Drawing the distinction correctly may help to resolve a number of disputes in contemporary
political philosophy and non-welfarist normative economics regarding the
so-called preference-based account of freedom and the relevance, to
judgements about freedom, of degrees of similarity between agents options.
The paper begins by setting out three much discussed axioms for the
measurement of freedom (of choice?) originally put forward by Pattanaik
and Xu. It is suggested that the problems these axioms give rise to can be
solved by distinguishing correctly between freedom and freedom of
choice. The paper then sets out denitions of freedom, choice and
freedom of choice, justifying these in philosophical terms and arguing their
superiority to alternative denitions. Finally, on the basis of these denitions and with reference to Pattanaik and Xus axioms, it is shown that an
agent can enjoy freedom without enjoying freedom of choice, and that she
can enjoy an increase in one of these without enjoying an increase in the
other.For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I should like to thank Keith
Dowding, Martin van Hees, Matthew Kramer, Marco Negri, Serena Olsaretti, Olof
Page, Mario Ricciardi, Alan Ritter, Hillel Steiner, Kotaro Suzumura and audiences at
seminars in Manchester, Palermo, Pavia and Oxford. I am grateful to the Italian
Ministry for Higher Education (MURST) and the Italian National Research Council
(CNR) for funding that facilitated the completion of the paper.Choice, freedom, and freedom of choice62 I. Carter1 IntroductionNormative economists and social choice theorists often fail to distinguish
between freedom and freedom of choice, tending rather to see the former term as simply short for the latter. Political and social philosophers do
often distinguish between freedom and freedom of choice, but have paid
little attention to the latter concept, their main concern being to warn us
that freedom of choice is not to be confused with freedom simpliciter,
or with social freedom, or in any case with the kind of freedom...