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we can head off the possibility that synthesized genes could be used to cause harm. We do not find any value in resorting to science fiction fantasies to foment fear about the process of gene synthesis. In our view, this endangersthe very industry that will generate important solutions for our present problems while obscuring the true threats to our security.
COMPETING INTERESTS STATEMENT
The authors declare competing financial interests: details accompany the full-text HTML version of the paper at http://www.nature.com/naturebiotechnology/.
Jeremy Minshull1 & Ralf Wagner2
1DNA2.0, Inc, Menlo Park, California, USA.
2GENEART, Regensburg, Germany. e-mail:mailto:[email protected]
Web End = [email protected]
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objections but did not find them sufficient to mean that nothing should be done.
What is striking is that, despite their rhetoric, Minshull and Wagner obviously agree with us on this. They themselves summarize the controls that their companies, and others, have placed on gene synthesis, based on the select agent lists. They require official permits for certain genes to be produced or shipped. Moreover, they call upon governments in the United States and Europe to require all makers of synthetic genes to screen synthesis orders. So, in fact, there is no disagreement in principle between their viewpoint and ours; the difference exists in the specifics of its application.
There is no silver bullet that will somehow solve the security challenge of dual-use biotech. Rather, we must implement a web of measures, carefully calibrated so as not to impede legitimate and lifesaving research, that will make it more challengingnot render impossiblethe casual or even dedicated misuse of...