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In 1997 India and Pakistan agreed to have a "Composite Dialogue" instead of issue-specific negotiations. This new format met with a series of failures, though it also has a few significant achievements to its credit.
Unless these states can learn from past failures, commit to moving forward, improvise negotiation processes, and prepare to make some bold decisions, their disputes will remain unresolved.
This paper is an attempt to look into the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. It will survey the status of progress made on issues under the composite dialogue. The current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has a different policy toward Pakistan than its predecessor. Since Modi assumed power, both countries have brought their forces to high alert on their borders. Provocative statements by Modi and his ministers have increased tensions in South Asia and have created a war-like situation on the borders.
INTRODUCTION
India-Pakistan relations are passing through testing times. Since 1947 these two neighboring nuclear states have failed to resolve issues that are obstacles to normalizing relations. Both India and Pakistan have long lasting unresolved issues. During decades of political engagement, they have tried various formats of negotiations: structured and non-structured, and people-to-people. However, they have failed to resolve even a single bilateral dispute. In the past there were moments, like in 1963, 1992, and 2007 when, after successful rounds of talks, the two countries were on the brink of sealing a deal over Kashmir valley.1 However, unwilling to accept a changed reality, both sides continue to blame each other for the failure of talks. In a decision to move beyond their conventional forms of negotiation in 1997 India and Pakistan agreed to have a "Composite Dialogue" instead of issue-specific negotiations. This new format also met with a series of failures, though it also has a few significant achievements to its credit.
Instead of learning from past failures and improvising, these states try to "move on." Yet, instead of actually moving on, their dialogue continually concludes with a sour note and bitter memories. Whether they do not want to learn from past or resolve their bilateral disputes is a complex question; unless they learn from past failures, improvise negotiation processes, and prepare to make some bold decisions, their disputes...