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The authors estimate a dynamic model to assess the effects of democracy on war outcomes and how these effects vary over time. Using quantitative data drawn from interstate wars between 1816 and 1990, the authors demonstrate that the wartime advantages that accrue to democratic states are fleeting. In the short run, democracies are more likely to win than are their autocratic opponents. However, although they are at an apparent disadvantage in short wars, autocracies are far less likely to quit as time passes. This willingness to continue fighting ultimately leads to the result that after roughly 18 months have passed, the advantage passes to the autocrat. Democracies at that point become far more likely than autocratic states to quit and more willing to settle for draws or losses. The authors also find that relationships between war outcomes and a number of control variables such as military-industrial capacity and military strategy vary over time.
A democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War.
-General Georgr Marshall
Among both elites and mass publics, the popularity of interstate wars depends on costs, particularly the cost of a war in lives lost (Russett 1990). John Mueller (1973) was among the first to show with compelling data that public support for war declines monotonically with battle deaths. Recent research, notably by Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening (1997) and Gartner and Segura (1998 [this issue]), has confirmed and extended this finding. However, although this work in the public opinion literature is of interest to many who study American politics and international relations, it poses a particularly interesting challenge to recent work in international relations on war outcomes. Research on the relationship between democracy and war outcomes has demonstrated strong links between democracy and the probability of victory. In particular, Lake (1992), Stam (1996), and Reiter and Stam (1998) showed that the more democratic a state is, the more likely it is to win. These results pose an interesting puzzle when contrasted with the observation that public support for war declines over time. It would seem that declining support for war in democracies might pose a serious disadvantage compared to autocratic states, yet democracies are relatively more likely to win their confrontations with autocratic states. How do we square the findings on...