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Introduction
Much research has suggested that anxiety is best understood by conceptually and empirically distinguishing its trait and state facets (e.g. Endler and Kocovski, 2001; Kocovski, Endler, Cox, and Swinson, 2004; Rapee and Medro, 1994; Reiss, 1997; Spielberger, 1985a, b). Spielberger (e.g. Spielberger and Sydeman, 1994) defines state anxiety as a transient response to stress that consists of subjective feelings of tension, apprehension, nervousness, worry, and arousal of the autonomic nervous system. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, is conceptualized as a stable tendency to perceive threat and become state anxious. Spielberger's model of state and trait anxiety is embodied in the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI: Spielberger, 1983), with the trait scale of the STAI requiring respondents to indicate how frequently they generally experience various anxiety symptoms, and the state scale requiring them to report how much they are experiencing various anxiety symptoms at the moment of completing the questionnaire.
A separate body of research has suggested that anxiety may comprise distinct symptom dimensions and that their inclusion in the assessment of anxiety is important (e.g. Clark and Watson, 1991; Himadi, Boice, and Barlow, 1985; Koksal and Power, 1990; Koksal, Power and Sharp, 1991). Much attention has been focused upon the distinction between cognitive and somatic dimensions of anxiety. The somatic dimension includes self-reported symptoms such as hyperventilation, sweating, trembling, and palpitations. Symptoms of muscle tension and stiffness also fall on this dimension. In contrast, the cognitive dimension reflects symptoms that are associated more directly with thought processes, including worry, intrusive thoughts, and lack of concentration. This distinction has been regarded as an important one by researchers working to determine the experiential components of anxiety (e.g. Endler and Kockovski, 2001; Koksal and Power, 1990; Schwartz, Davidson and Guleman, 1978). For example, two individuals with the same global anxiety score may display quite different profiles of cognitive and somatic anxiety symptoms, which could have implications for their subjective experiences of anxiety, and for their responses to therapeutic interventions (Koksal et al., 1991; Scholing and Emmelkamp, 1992).
There has, however, been a common tendency to neglect consideration of the state-trait distinction when endeavoring to differentiate cognitive and somatic dimensions of anxiety (Endler, Cox, Parker and Bagby, 1992: Endler and Kockovski, 2001). Recognition of the state-trait distinction is...