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How and to what extent mayoral power affects local fiscal policy remains unclear among urban scholars. Recent research indicates that mayors can exercise considerable influence in shaping policy decisions, even within council-manager communities (Wikstrom, 1979; Sparrow, 1984; Svara, 1987; Newland, 1989). Elected leaders and administrative professionals who must struggle with complex and often controversial issues increasingly have called upon mayors for help in formulating solutions. Ceremonial duties aside, mayors often have opportunities to develop political influence through both formal structures (e.g., direct election, veto power, agenda setting) as well as informal mechanisms (e.g., facilitating or brokering agreements). Yet, research to date has focused primarily on identifying the nature or types of authority exercised by mayors within different political structures. Much less is known about how mayoral power actually affects public policy choices.
The expectation of this study is that mayors who exercise eater formal and informal authority will be in a better position to control the budgetary process, and thus to quell interest group demands for increased public expenditures. Although the reform literature embraces the opposite premise--that unreformed cities will tax and spend more than their reformed counterparts--recent research suggests no significant difference in expenditure behavior between mayor-council and council-manager communities (Deno & Mehay, 1987). In an era of fiscal austerity, voters are likely to pressure mayors to hold the line on municipal spending. From a practical standpoint, mayors must retain discretion in fiscal policy decisions to keep personnel, service delivery, and program costs at a minimum, to be prepared for reductions in the city's resource base (Fuchs, 1992, p. 278). However, the extent to which mayors are able to control the budget depends on their ability to garner and use political authority effectively. Mayors with fewer powers and less political clout will not be in a position to restrict public demands for greater resource allocation.
This research will test the fiscal effects of the office of mayor in several ways. A measure of mayoral strength will be included in a multiple regression analysis along with several socioeconomic and demographic variables often confounded with mayoral influence. Then, we will separate cities by government form, to determine whether mayoral power operates more prominently in mayor-council cities than in council manager communities. Finally, we offer a test...