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The Supreme Court's decision in Herring v. United States authorizes police to defeat the Fourth Amendment's protections through a process we call evidence laundering. Evidence laundering occurs when one police officer makes a constitutional mistake when gathering evidence and then passes that evidence along to a second officer, who develops it further and then delivers it to prosecutors for use in a criminal case. The original constitutional taint disappears in the wash.

Courts have allowed evidence laundering in a variety of contexts, from cases involving flawed databases to cases stemming from faulty judgments and communication lapses in law enforcement teams. Courts typically zero in on individual officer behavior, or limit their review to a single incident, rather than considering the entire course of conduct. In so doing, they make visible the individualistic view of police work that is implicit in much of Fourth Amendment doctrine. This atomistic perspective, however, fails to appreciate the realities of modern policing, which depends heavily on teamwork and delegation. At the same time, the increased emphasis on police intentions and on balancing the costs and benefits of exclusion brings our courts into closer alignment with courts elsewhere in the world.

Introduction

The exclusionary rule in the United States calls on judges to sort the dirty laundry in the government's case and to exclude from criminal trials evidence that the police obtain through constitutional violations. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has grown skeptical-particularly during the Roberts Court era-about the exclusionary rule that it created over a century ago.1 As a result, the Court has crafted several doctrines to limit the relief available to defendants.2 Those limiting doctrines, taken together, amount to more than an exception here or there and result in more than just a few extra wins for the government in close cases. The long-term doctrinal trend has transformed the expectations of courts and police officers, as well as the plausible attorney arguments that form the backdrop for plea negotiations.3

In this Article, we look closely at one such limiting doctrine and explain how it reflects long-term trends for criminal procedure remedies. The cases that interest us here apply the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule in multi-officer situations.4 In these instances, one police officer makes a constitutional mistake...

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