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Abstract

As much recent scholarship points out, the American labor movement has suffered a severe decline in membership and influence over the past three decades. Various reasons are put forward to explain labor's desuetude, and a number of proposals have been suggested as a means to reinvigorate unionism. One of those proposals is advanced by Charles Morris, a well-known legal scholar. Morris contends that the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act did not mandate exclusive union representation and that unions should attempt to create a "members only" organizing strategy to gain a foothold in companies. The Wagner Act rests on three core principles which support the bargaining system. Those principles are, in order of importance, a ban on company unions, exclusive representation for all members in a work group, and union security agreements requiring all employees covered by a contract to provide financial support to the representative. Conditions for collective bargaining in the US are poor and deteriorating.

Details

Title
EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION AND THE WAGNER ACT: THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW
Author
Hogler, Raymond
Pages
157-169
Publication year
2007
Publication date
Fall 2007
Publisher
CCH Incorporated: Health & Human Resources
ISSN
00236586
Source type
Scholarly Journal
Language of publication
English
ProQuest document ID
195113551
Copyright
Copyright CCH Incorporated: Health & Human Resources Fall 2007