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Synthese (2014) 191:17411755
DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0362-5
Received: 22 April 2013 / Accepted: 8 October 2013 / Published online: 20 October 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract In this article I assess Alisa Bokulichs idea that explanatory model ctions can be genuinely explanatory. I draw attention to a tension in her account between the claim that model ctions are explanatorily autonomous, and the demand that model ctions be justied in order for them to be genuinely explanatory. I also explore the consequences that arise from Bokulichs use of Woodwards account of counterfactual explanation and her abandonment of Woodwards notion of an intervention. As it stands, Bokulichs account must be deemed unworkable.
Keywords Explanation Fiction Model Counterfactual Intervention
Woodward Bokulich
1 Introduction
Traditionally it has been assumed that only theories that are (approximately) true can provide genuine explanations. Aristotelian crystalline spheres or Cartesian vortices, for instance, do not explain the motion of the heavenly bodies, because they are simply too far from the truth. In a recent book and several papers Bokulich (2008a,b, 2011, 2012) has departed from this tradition and argued that at least some ctitious entities can do genuine explanatory work. She goes even further than this: some models employing ctions can be even more explanatory than theories that we consider to be approximately true.
In seeking to come to terms with explanatory ctions in science, Bokulich heavily borrows from James Woodwards counterfactual account of causal explanation which
S. Schindler (B)
Center for Science Studies, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Aarhus University, Ny Munkegade 120, Bygning 1520, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmarke-mail: [email protected]
Explanatory ctionsfor real?
Samuel Schindler
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has enjoyed great popularity in recent years. But, since Woodwards account is an account of causal explanation, it seems Bokulich cannot adopt it wholesale. In order to free herself of any causal commitments, she abandons one of the central notions of Woodwards account: the notion of an intervention.
The purpose of this paper is it to critically assess Bokulichs account of explanatory ctions. In Sect. 2, I present Bokulichs account. In Sect. 3, I point to a tension in Bokulichs account which appears to be hard to ease. In Sect. 4, I assess Bokulichs attempt to apply Woodwards counterfactual account of explanation...