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1) Introduction
Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. This view is most famously defended by David Benatar (1997, 2006). There are, however, other routes to an anti-natal conclusion. In this respect, Seana Shiffrin's paper, "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm" (1999), has been rather neglected in the natal debate. Though she appears unwilling to conclude that procreation is always wrong, I believe that she in fact puts forth a case for anti-natalism no less compelling than Benatar's. My overall aim here is to demonstrate the force of her argument by defending a Shiffrin-esque route to anti-natalism from a powerful objection. This objection appeals to the common belief that because most people endorse their creation, procreation often is all-things-considered permissible. I will show how this objection fails, and why Shiffrin's rationale for anti-natalism, as I will be representing it, ought to be taken seriously.
I will proceed by briefly explaining Shiffrin's argument, pointing out some key differences between her views and Benatar's, and illustrating how her argument can be employed to construct and defend a principle of permissible harm that supports antinatalism. The key feature of this principle is that it is impermissible for one to impose serious, ongoing and inescapable (without great cost) harm upon an unconsenting individual purely for the sake of granting that individual benefits. I will test this principle against a strong objection that appeals to a view many people hold, and that David DeGrazia (2011) has recently put forward.1 This objection, which I will be referring to as the objection from "endorsement", holds that it is permissible to bring persons into existence if we have good reasons for presuming that these persons will be, without delusion, glad to have been created. On the behalf of the anti-natalist, I in turn advance four replies to this view. I conclude with a brief discussion of three other objections that could be made to Shiffrin's arguments.
2) Shiffrin's (Reluctant) "Anti-natalism"
Shiffrin is aware of Benatar's early (1997) statement of his anti-natal views, though she does not respond to them. There are, as she acknowledges,2 similarities between her views and Benatar's. To my mind, the most...