GEOECONOMIC VS. GEOSTRATEGIC CONFLICTS. CASE STUDY: RUSSIA - WESTERN WORLD

Abstract

Among atypical conflicts, this article analyses two case studies, highlighting at the same time two types of conflicts - geoeconomic and geostrategic -, which were used by Russia as tools for managing the dynamics of the geopolitical frontier with the Western World, which got dangerously close to its borders over the last few years. Using an entire arsenal of tactics and strategies, both in the geoeconomic and in the geopolitical-geostrategic spheres, has allowed Russia, with the events in 2014 (annexation of the Crimean Peninsula) to leave the geopolitical recoil it was in after the USSR's implosion and shift from a passively-defensive strategy to an active-aggressive one. Analysing the geopolitical phenomenon from the last two decades and a half has shown that this tactical reversal had all the elements of a preemptive geostrategy.

Headnote

Among atypical conflicts, this article analyses two case studies, highlighting at the same time two types of conflicts - geoeconomic and geostrategic -, which were used by Russia as tools for managing the dynamics of the geopolitical frontier with the Western World, which got dangerously close to its borders over the last few years. Using an entire arsenal of tactics and strategies, both in the geoeconomic and in the geopolitical-geostrategic spheres, has allowed Russia, with the events in 2014 (annexation of the Crimean Peninsula) to leave the geopolitical recoil it was in after the USSR's implosion and shift from a passively-defensive strategy to an active-aggressive one. Analysing the geopolitical phenomenon from the last two decades and a half has shown that this tactical reversal had all the elements of a preemptive geostrategy.

Keywords: geoeconomy, geostrategy, geopolitics, geoeconomic conflicts, geostrategic conflicts, Russia, Western World.

Introduction and brief history of the research

The events we are now witnessing - let's say the reality of the last two decades of post-Cold War evolution of the regional and global geopolitical systems -, have established a label of "hybrid"1, applied both to the geopolitical phenomenon itself manifested in the field and to the theoretical concept as well. This label was used, on the one hand, to identify on-going events - resulted from the dynamic of the geopolitical frontier between the Western World and Russia (but also applicable to other regions) -, that "escaped" the classical analysis methods and, on the other hand, to shape the specificity of the new phenomenon: similar to the classic one, but with something extra that differentiated it (from structural aspects, actors towards evolution and effects).

From a theoretical standpoint, this hybridisation or atypicality could highlight a new approach in geopolitics - new geopolitics2 -, being enough to review the terms used in geopolitics studies over the last few years: geopolitical axes3 (vs. sphere of influence), strategic partnership (vs. military alliance), geopolitical actors (vs. states), frozen conflicts4 (vs. wars), coloured revolutions, gas wars5, gas pipeline war6, hard energy7, pre-emptive gas pipeline8, pre-emptive geostrategy9, Arab spring, Siraq, geo-eco politics10, hybrid war, atypical conflicts, "economic" refugees etc.

Even from this enumeration - a minimal and selective one, at best - we will focus on the concept of atypical conflict, which is the subject of this research, by analysing and performing two case studies: geoeconomic conflicts and geostrategic conflicts. The space-time context is also well individualised: the dynamic of the geopolitical frontier between the Western World and Russia, which, over the last few years, established itself in the perimeter of the Black Sea, became more acute as it got closer to Russia's borders and culminated with the events of 2014-2015, respectively the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula11 by the Russian Federation.

The novelty of the research is thus shaped by addressing this new concept - hybrid/atypical conflict. It is atypical because it is far from typical, common, conventional: no embassies are closed, no official declaration of war takes place, weapons are used but it is not a war, soldiers are used but not armies, "rebels", "separatists" are used but without military symbols, the logistics are insured but through "humanitarian convoys" etc. At the same time, it is also a hybrid, mixed conflict: state and non-state actors are directly involved, paramilitary structures etc.

The novelty of the research is imposed by the temporal context - the events of 2014-2015 -, respectively the Euromaidan12 and the perspective of "losing" Ukraine, which from the point of view of geopolitical consequences and meanings represented the moment of reversal for the Russian geostrategy: from a defensive and pre-emptive one (mostly geoeconomic - using natural gas as a geopolitical tool for slowing down the Eastern expansion of Euro-Atlantic structures and especially Ukraine's accession to these structures: the orange revolution in Ukraine, 2004 vs. the gas war, 2006, 2008, 2009) to an offensive-aggressive one (mostly geostrategic-military - grey area, buffer area, separatist region, frozen conflict, hybrid war, territorial annexation, the latter culminating in 2014-2015, as a reply to the Euromaidan phenomenon in 2014).

The analysis of this dynamic and phenomenon individualised the purpose of this study as follows: shaping as case studies the two types of atypical conflicts - geoeconomic conflicts and geostrategic conflicts -, different from the conventional ones and which, in both cases, marked two different but gradual types of reaction and response from Russia to the post Cold War geopolitical evolution. Moreover, we also notice the complementarity of the two geostrategic instruments used by Russia both individually and in conjunction, as the Euro-Atlantic structures kept advancing towards the Black Sea and the Federation's border.

The applicative value of this research is obvious: from a theoretical standpoint - enriching specialised literature with new concepts (gas war, gas pipeline war, hard energy or energetik, pre-emptive gas pipeline etc. from the geoeconomic sphere and separatist region, buffer area, frozen conflict, geopolitical Transnistria, pre-emptive geostrategy from the geopolitical and geostrategic spheres). From an operational standpoint, the study can represent a useful geopolitical analysis guide for any international clerk, diplomat, international relations or securities research fellow.

1. Post Cold War geopolitical evolutions in the Western World-Russia relation. Elements of new geopolitics

The end of the Cold War as a major event of the end of the 20th century (1989) implied a series of nuances and metamorphoses of classical geopolitical concepts. The international relations system itself was undergoing considerable changes: from a bipolar world (the US block vs. the USSR), which defined the structure of power during the Cold War (1945-1989), to a uni-polar world, centred on the American hegemony (Pax Americana) which continued until 2001 (the "September 11" event), followed by a short transition period until 2010 (when Hilary Clinton makes an "offer" to China to participate in managing the world), when the first signs of an intensely hybrid world appear, a multi-polar world, with several poles and networks of power.

The changes occurred on several levels: actors, players, games, concepts.

The state which had individualised itself as a geopolitical actor exclusively in the bipolar world and in the ideological Cold War is currently facing an unprecedented multiplication of the geopolitical actors, all of them eroding its sovereignty and reducing its duties. At the same time, with the process of revaluating the state's duties a series of non-state geopolitical actors gained the spotlight (trans-national corporations - TNCs, regional blocks, international bodies, NGOs, terrorist organisations, paramilitary groups etc.), some of which demonstrated an extraordinary dynamic and capacity to store power, although they were not geopolitical actors as such, their purpose wasn't exercising power, but the effects produced were geopolitical - it is the case of TNCs, which we can call without the risk of being wrong pseudo-geopolitical actors13 or of regional blocks, economical - EU or military - NATO.

Some of these actors became powerful players both regionally and globally. Moreover, they became true networks and structures of power, contributing to an ever less predictable world.

Not even the games are classical anymore: if, in the bipolar world, the zero sum games prevailed (I win, the ideological enemy loses), a shift occurred later on towards win-win types of games (we win together), while currently we are witnessing a hybridisation of these games: a combination of games and geostrategies, of geopolitics and geostrategy and geoeconomy (armed assaults vs. economic sanctions), hard power and soft power, which means a combination resulting in a smart/intelligent power14 etc.

Obviously, this evolution of geopolitical reality and phenomenon was followed by research, the academic environment as well as mass-media popularising new concepts and notions, some being entirely antithetical, but which best represented reality. Thus, the phrase "economic refugee" which is seeing much use at the moment, places on the same side of the formula two antithetical notions: "refugee" - which in classical geopolitics had a purely political connotation and made reference to a person politically persecuted from various points of view - identity, cultural etc. who "took refuge" (forced to run) to save his life/identity - and the "economic immigrant", that mostly represented a premeditated choice, a decision targeting mainly material wealth. This hybrid - "economic refugee" - is, at the same time, an immigrant but also a refugee and has both economic and political goals. Such a reality can no longer be captured with a classical analysis tool.

Coming back to this study's topic - atypical conflicts - the beginning of the 21st century highlighted two separate categories in these types of conflicts: geoeconomic conflicts and geostrategic conflicts.

Geoeconomic conflicts manifested themselves mostly in the first decade of the third millennia (the years 2000), while geostrategic conflicts in the following decade (2010). Both were triggered by the dynamic of the geopolitical frontier between the Western World and Russia, which as it advanced eastward towards the Black Sea and Russia's borders respectively ("Europe's march towards the East"15 as it was described by Oleg Serebrian), forced the latter to change focus from the geoeconomic dimension (the gas wars with Ukraine, 2006, 2008, 2009) towards the geostrategic-military one (the territorial annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, 2014).

In both cases, the "geo" prefix had a deep meaning. Geoeconomic conflicts were not only economic, since there were not involved only private corporations competing for market share, but states, governmental strategies, foreign policy instruments for achieving geopolitical objectives through the economic tools. Economy was used as a lever, a tool, while the stakes were geopolitical: the Western World used the concept of "energy security" (securing the supply of the European market with natural gas), but targeted expansion into Russia's former sphere of influence, Russia targeted slowing down and ultimately blocking altogether the EU's and NATO's expansion towards its borders. How? Initially, through preferential prices for natural gas for the countries in the "near abroad": gas versus political concessions (remaining in Moscow's sphere of influence, delaying or renouncing the objectives of joining the EU and/or NATO).

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in 2004, which only meant a tendency towards westernisation and a pro-European geopolitical route, was answered by Russia with the triggering of the gas "war" (2006, 2008, 2009) and with the termination of natural gas deliveries to Ukraine (the scenarios was also used at the beginning of the years 2000 against Georgia). Geography (closeness between Russia and Ukraine) was essential: the presence of NATO military structures at Russia's borders was intolerable. Furthermore, in 2009, Ukraine officially renounced its objective of joining NATO.

In the case of geostrategic conflicts, geography was, again, essential. The Euromaidan phenomenon from the beginning of 2014 (actually a replay under a new form of the Orange Revolution ten years ago) found Russia much better prepared. It no longer used the geoeconomic tool (termination of natural gas deliveries), but intervenes with its military and annexes Crimea - one of the three geopolitical "keys" of the Black Sea (together with the Straits and the Mouths of the Danube), Pontus Euxinus being also the "southern clip" through which Russia maintains its Eurasian dimension16.

With the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine fulfilled the role of a geopolitical pivot at the Black Sea, for Russia being vital to maintain control over Kiev and, up to a point, it seemed that the geoeconomic instrument was sufficient. Without the Crimean Peninsula Ukraine loses this function, being a country "captive" in Moscow's gravity, surrounded by Russian territories or territories within its sphere of influence, like a "rimland". Moreover, Russia took increased guarantees, triggering on Ukraine's territory a frozen conflict (Donbass and Luhansk), designed to secure from a geographical (through a terrestrial corridor) and geopolitical (by cancelling any of Ukraine's geopolitical ambitions) standpoint access to the Crimean Peninsula and through it to the Black sea which was, anyway, in a full remilitarisation process (both Russian and Western).

Thus, from a new geopolitical perspective another hybrid concept which Russia knew how to masterfully use was the one patented in Transnistria - the frozen conflict, with its intermediary phases (separatist region, buffer zone etc.) -, with which Russia could pursue its long-term geopolitical goals and, at the same, time keep at bay the Western structures. Not coincidentally, the concept used by Russia, which gained a general value as a geopolitical tool for action in the last two decades in the Black Sea perimeter could take the name of geopolitical Transnistria17.

2. Geoeconomic conflicts: the gas and gas pipelines "wars" vs. the Orange Revolution

Replacing the ideological competition with the economic one was still a goal at the beginning of the third millennium, but the closing of the Euro-Atlantic structures to Ukraine and Russia's borders gave the possibility to the latter to replace the word "power" in the concept of hard power with that of "energy", respectively hard energy18. The invasion of the Soviet tanks (attribute of hard power) was not replaced with an economic weapon with geopolitical effects just as strong: shutting down the natural gas tap. Why? The deal was off: natural gas at a preferential price for Ukraine and other ex-Soviet countries close to the Russian Federation's borders and the ex-Soviet sphere of influence (at the beginning of the years 2000 the natural gas price paid by these countries was 50 dollars/thousand cubic metres, while for the European market, it was higher than 300 dollars) vs. political concessions (not joining NATO and the EU; Ukraine's problem was a clear preoccupation in Kremlin: it had a direct border with Russia, it had Crimea and the Northern seashore at the Black Sea - which insured its pivot role and presence in the Black sea power games - and above everything else its proximity to the Mouths of the Danube). Furthermore, at least two problems needed urgent solutions: the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol (accommodation, rent and afterwards its withdrawal) and the fact that natural gas was transiting Ukraine, which under the conditions of the disagreements between Russia and Ukraine affected the European market.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) - as a tendency towards westernisation and a pro-European geopolitical evolutionary path - triggered Russia's reply with the gas "war" (with its three stages, 2006, 2008, 2009)19. The context was extremely favourable: Europe was experiencing economic growth and seemed that it just discovered the benefits of using natural gas, a resource it increasingly needed and which was imported from Russia (the EU's average dependency on natural gas imports from Gazprom was around 50%20 and many countries were fully dependent); Ukraine - as a main transit route for natural gas towards Europe - seemed to be geopolitically oriented towards the West (but it was on Russia's borders, it inherited the Crimean Peninsula and the best part of the Black Sea shoreline, which also had the Russian Federation's fleet "hooked"); Russia exited its period of indecision and seeking from the time of Boris Eltîn and entered the one in which it returned to "the big scene" of Vladimir Putin.

The main actors of the conflict are, thus, individualised: the European Union ("the demand"), Russia ("the supply") and Ukraine (the middle-man, "the transit space"). The conflict seemed to be a regional one, Eurasian, but its consequences had a much broader impact. The conflict's object: Europe's energy security (listed on the European Union's diplomatic agenda as a national security component).

"The clash" which crystallised the conflict's object was between the different visions for guaranteeing energy security as it was seen by the various actors involved: Russia wanted to play the role of sole supplier of natural gas on the European market (but it depended on the transit through Ukraine) and it resorted to an entire set of strategies that would not allow the forming of a joint energy market while the European Union was seeking to diversify its suppliers and transport routes.

Although the problem was the same - supplying the European energy market and securing it in report with the dynamic of the evolution of the geopolitical relations between Russia (supplier) and Ukraine (transit space) - the position of the two actors was radically different. Thus, on the one hand, the European position was oriented towards profit (moreover, financing the Western gas pipelines, like Nabucco, had mostly private financing), in a geoeconomic calculation (diversifying the supply sources by accessing the Caucasus and Central-Asian areas, respectively Non-Ukrainian transit), in the spirit of a "win-win" type of game (Europe is supplied with natural gas brought through pipelines which are not controlled by Gazprom and Russia remains an important supplier on the European market (but not the only one).

On the other hand, the Russian position was, in essence, geopolitical and geostrategic. From a geopolitical standpoint, it was seeking to recover its former sphere of influence, especially the ex-Soviet countries close to its borders, avoiding Ukraine's westernisation and, moreover, the removal of the danger that it would join NATO (NATO's presence at Russia's border was inconceivable. From a geostrategic point of view, Moscow used the (geo)economic instrument - preferential prices on natural gas sourced to Russia and access to the Russian market of various products on Russia's market in exchange of political concessions. Russia was not seeking mainly economic profit, but also to increase Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas, eliminate the middle-men, such as transit countries - Ukraine for example or other potential Central-Asian or Trans-Caucasian suppliers - Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

Russia's game was a zero sum one: supplying the European market only with Russian gas or with Caspian and Central-Asian natural gas but with Russia as the middle-man, through pipelines controlled... by Russia.

With regards to the conflict's stakes, these were geoeconomic for the Western world and geopolitical and geostrategic for Russia. As a result, the conflict's meaning was rather important: braking or delaying at first, followed-up by blocking the expansion tendencies towards the East of the Euro-Atlantic structures, respectively near Russia's borders.

The natural gas conflict unfolded nearly identically in 2006, 2008 and 2009. Masking the geopolitical meaning under an economic dispute: Ukraine wants to be more Western-like, Gazprom increases the fees for the natural gas supplied towards the Western neighbour, Ukraine refuses to pay and requests the payment of a higher transit tax, Gazprom stops natural gas supply, Ukraine affects the transit of natural gas towards the Western world, it results the need to find alternative solutions21.

Both Russia and the Western world were aligning in the issue of "bypassing Ukraine" as a transit area. In other words, the natural gas conflict triggered another one, more spectacular from the power games point of view, which, at that time, was going to be named in specialised literature the gas pipelines "war"22. All the coordinates of the gas conflict were maintained but interesting nuances appeared: the Western world wanted to access the hydrocarbons deposits in the Caspian area and extend the energy-diplomatic corridor, built in the 90s, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey), at both ends, both on the supply end - the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project - as well as at the exit point towards Europe, through the headlines project Nabucco. The Russian competitors were not to be outdone: Blue Stream, a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea, "small, but with a large symbolical value"23, which brought natural gas from Russia directly in Turkey (vs. the Western Trans-Caspian gas pipeline), a Peri-Caspian gas pipeline (vs. the Western Trans-Caspian one, a project resumed by the Western world in the context of supplying the new Nabucco pipeline), which carried natural gas from Turkmenistan - an important natural gas producer in Central Asia, East of the Caspian Sea, which the Western world would have wanted to connect through the Trans-Caspian corridor to the European market, South Stream (vs. Nabucco, Western, "the natural gas bridge connecting Europe to Asia", obviously without Russia vs. Nabucco West, the 2012 version of the initial gas pipeline)24.

We will not go over the games again25, as the results are more relevant here: no Western project succeeded while Russia managed to bypass Ukraine and directly connect Germany, thanks to the North Stream gas pipeline (the new "Ribbentrop-Molotov" pact as the project was denounced by the Poles)26 and through South Stream - whose role was mainly to pre-empt the Western project - managed to stop the construction of the Nabucco pipeline.

The effects of the 2008 economic crisis which resulted in a decrease of natural gas consumption in Europe, renouncing the Nabucco gas pipeline and the 2014 events in Ukraine - the Euromaidan phenomenon - have somehow of overshadowed these geopolitical conflicts and shifted the focus towards a new category of atypical conflicts, the geostrategic ones.

3. Geostrategic conflicts: geopolitical "transnistria" vs. Euromaidan

We previously mentioned that for Russia's Eurasian dimension the Black Sea and Ukraine - through the shoreline inherited from the USSR, respectively: the Crimean Peninsula, regional geopolitical key and proximity to the Mouths of the Danube -, in the context previous to the year 2014.

As a result, what is happening in the central part of Kiev in the first days of 2014 cannot leave Kremlin as a passive spectator. Euromaidan - a sort of "Ukrainian spring" and a sequel to the idea of the "Orange Revolution" ten years ago - "forced" Russia to resolve the "Ukrainian problem". For this purpose, it used an instrument patented in Transnistria, but which was generalised in the Caucasus-Black Sea area, surrounding the Black Sea with frozen conflicts.

We are framing the "frozen conflicts" in the geostrategic conflicts category, as well as atypical conflicts - actually, the concept of "hybrid warfare" was crystallised in Ukraine. But, in the case of the Crimean Peninsula (March 2014) we witnessed an evolutionary continuation of the "frozen conflict" concept, respectively military thawing and territorial annexation by the Russian Federation. Practically, the "frozen conflict" only represented a "timer", a geostrategic instrument which had the role of delaying a still unsettled situation by the Kremlin until a favourable moment appeared. It is what Oleg Serebrian called in the case of the Balkan wars of the 90s, "the war is over, the conflict continues"27, meaning a state of "neither peace, nor war".

If we follow during the whole post-Cold War period all those territories in which frozen conflicts were "installed" - Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and recently Crimea, Donbass and Luhansk - we observe a series of similarities28:

- all are marginal geographical spaces (compared with the post-Soviet state capital), relatively small in size, with an absent or complicated identity and more often than not, obscure;

- they are situated in the Black Sea or Caucasus-Black Sea geopolitical area;

- the population is usually mixed, having a certain percentage of Russian, Russified or Russophile components;

- have a past under the Soviet rule (as parts of the ex-USSR they shelter reminiscences of the Soviet Empire: troops, weapons, military equipment etc.);

- can easily escape the gravity of an emerging centre of power (Chisinau, Kiev etc.);

- all were used by Russia through, interestingly enough, Western argumentation (protecting the "small" - Russophile population - against the "large" - the capital which legally administered the territory - human rights, fight against international terrorism, Kosovo precedent etc.;

The evolutionary and functional algorithm was also perfected to a model applicable everywhere it was needed:

- Moscow's claim of some legitimate rights over the region: Soviet past or reminiscences - troops of the former Red Army (the Transnistria situation, the Caucasus space), Russia's Black Sea fleet (Crimea) etc.;

- economic dependence and political servitude: gas, energy, market vs. political concessions (the situation of Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia etc.);

- any attempt towards "westernisation" (meaning a geopolitical orientation towards the West) is interpreted by Kremlin as high treason, so the "coloured revolutions" are promptly punished (for example: the "gas war" with Belarus and Ukraine or the thawing of "frozen conflicts" such as the one in Transnistria);

- Russian intervention was carried out at a lobby level, intervention in internal affairs through financing political and media forces up to the "proxy war" (using "separatists", "secessionists", "rebels") or through direct intervention (the recent case of the Crimean Peninsula);

- if the pro-Western orientation persists, the territorial fragmentation of the respective republic is initiated, first of all through forming a separatist region, which no longer acknowledges central authority, even if it benefited of a certain degree of autonomy and which proclaims itself independent (Transnistria, Crimea, Donbass, Luhansk and so on);

- escalation of an armed conflict is catalysed or frozen by Moscow, on a case by case basis, seeking to internationalise the conflict and insure strong negotiation positions, as well as the presence in any future negotiations for a peace solution;

- using "Western" arguments and solutions - self-determination through referendum, federalisation (the trap of asymmetrical federations - see the "Kozak plan" for finding the solution to the conflict in Transnistria) -, Russia becomes involved in the conflict resolution so that it keeps at bay the Western structures;

- in extreme situations, like the "Euromaidan" and the potential loss of Ukraine and through Crimea, the strategic access to the Black Sea, Kremlin reserves the right to carry out the final step: territorial annexation.

If this entire evolutionary scheme generalises Transnistria's model to the level of a scientific concept, Crimea represents a subsequent evolution. From the definition of the geopolitical transnistria concept - "a region with a high geostrategic meaning used by a great power (Russia) either to brake [or block] ongoing geopolitical tendencies (expansion of the Euro-Atlantic structures towards Russia's current borders), or to regain influence in its former ideological space"29 - it also results the object or geopolitical stake of these geostrategic conflicts.

Similarly to geoeconomic conflicts which for Russia also had a (geopolitical and) geostrategic stake, geostrategic conflicts maintain the same meaning. At least in the case of the Crimean Peninsula, it was about regaining strategic access30 to the Black Sea - Russia's southern security anchor - with or without Ukraine. A Westernised Ukraine (member of the EU and NATO) would have meant the confinement of Russia's Eurasian geopolitical dimension.

Conclusions

This study and the comparative analysis between geoeconomic conflicts and geostrategic conflicts as types of atypical conflicts have led to a series of conclusions highlighted below.

The last two decades and a half elapsed from the end of the Cold War attest new realities. We can observe how the entire geopolitical phenomenon, both at the level of what really happens in the field, as well as conceptually has been heavily hybridised, if we were to compare it with what was happening in the Cold War. Although the geopolitical goal/objective remains the same as always - maximising power - hybridisation occurred at the level of geopolitical actors (an amazingly dynamic combination of state and non-state actors), of games (seems to be a power game with "no rules"), of concepts (these are no longer as rigid as during the Cold War, but extremely flexible and highly dynamic semantically).

Russia is no longer in a geopolitical recoil. If, during most of the time elapsed from the end of the Bipolar World, Russia was in a "geopolitical recoil" situation (observable by probing theoretical notions that tried to better explain the new realities in the international relations system - Cold Peace, New Cold War etc.), trying to minimise or counter the eastwards expansion of the Euro-Atlantic structures, towards the ex-Soviet sphere of influence and moreover, towards Russia's current borders, the 2014 events - as a cumulative result of Russia's evolution in this period - proved the fact that the "legitimate heir to the USSR" is no longer in a tactical withdrawal and minimisation of losses state, but is on the offense: it braked and afterwards blocked the eastwards expansion of the EU and NATO, regained Crimea, fractured Ukraine, remilitarised the Black Sea (as well as the Baltic Sea due to the North Stream gas pipeline) in an attempt to protect the buffer zone next to its borders.

As a result, Russia switched from a passive-defensive strategy to an active-aggressive one - pre-emptive geostrategy. In addition to the braking/blocking process of the Western structures and regaining the "near abroad" Russia, in spite of economic sanctions and the reduced oil prices (which fuel a large part of the state budget), capitalising on the Western structural and identity crisis (from the Grexit and Brexit to "economic refugees", USA's weakness) regained its capacity to intervene at a global level (active involvement in the Syrian situation).

Russia used new and hybrid geopolitical instruments which can be grouped in two categories: from the geoeconomic sphere (hard energy, natural gas "war", gas pipeline "war", energy pincer, pre-emptive gas pipeline etc.) and from the geostrategic one (separatist region, buffer zone, frozen conflict, geopolitical "transnistria") and so on. These were used with the same geopolitical goal: minimising the losses sustained when the Soviet colossus imploded ("the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century" as Vladimir Putin himself characterised it), blocking the "Eastwards march" of the Western structures and securing the "near abroad" as a buffer zone for its borders.

All these (previously mentioned) new geopolitical instruments were used in direct relationship with the Black Sea. For Russia, the Black Sea represents the Southern security anchor and is an essential component for its Eurasian dimension.

Footnote

1 See Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "Russia and the Dynamics of the Regional Security Environment", Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, (Editors Stan Anton, Iuliana Simona Tutuianu), Conference theme: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, organised by the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies (CDSSS), June 11-12 "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 7-12.

2 Idem , p. 8.

3 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Constantin Diaconescu, "Geopolitical Stakes and Games on the North-West - South-East Axis (Western World - Turkey), in Lucrarile seminarului geografic <Dimitrie Cantemir>, no 31, 2011, pp. 131-143.

4 Silviu Negut, "Conflictele înghetate. Studiu de caz: Transnistria", in Economistul, nr. 49-50, 15-31 December, 2014, p. 60.

5 Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "Gas war", in Romanian Review on Political Geography, year 11, nr. 2/2009, pp. 176-189.

6 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Silviu Negut, "Gas pipelines war", in Romanian Review on Political Geography, year 12, nr. 1/2010, pp. 29-46.

7 Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit., 2009, p. 176.

8 Idem , p. 39.

9 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit., 2015, p. 95.

10 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "Anul geoeconopolitic 2014", in Economistul, year 12, nr. 49-50 (199-200), 15-31 December, 2014, pp. 11-13.

11 Silviu Negut, "Conflictele înghetate. Studiu de caz: Crimeea", in Economistul, year 12, nr. 47-48 (197-198), 1-14 decembrie, 2014, pp. 60-62.

12 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "From the <<Euro-Maidan>> to the <<Russian-Maidan>>", in Terra, Year XLV (LXV), nr. 1-2, 2014, pp. 89-97.

13 See also Gelu Hanganu, Suportul geografic al structurilor geopolitice mondiale, University of Bucharest, PhD thesis, 2011, pp. 193-206.

14 See also Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "From <<hard power>> to <<soft power>>. Intelligent power", in vol. The International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, Bucharest, November 22-23, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing house, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 216-226.

15 Oleg Serebrian, Despre geopolitica, Editura Cartier, Chisinau, 2009, p. 172.

16 More recent studies tackled this theme: see also Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit., 2015, pp. 90-96; Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit., 2014, pp. 89-97; Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Silviu Negut, "Black Sea Area - a new <<grey area>>?", in Impact Strategic, nr. 2/ 2013, CSSAS, Editura Universitatii Nationale de Aparare "Carol I", pp. 37-47; Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Damian Florea, "Project Nabucco in the power games", in vol. International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, November 22-23, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, Bucharest, 2012, p. 473.

17 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "Conceptul de <<transnistrie geopolitica>>", in Terra, Year XLVI (LXVI), Nr. 1-2, 2015, pp. 65-70.

18 An entire series of studies tackled the concept of "hard energy" and more other notions from the same family of theories ("gas war", "gas pipeline war", "energy pincer", "energetik", "pre-emptive gas pipeline", "Blue Stream vs. the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline" "South Stream vs. Nabucco" etc.): Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Silviu Negut, op. cit., 2013, pp. 37-47; Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Damian Florea "Nabucco. Sfârsit?", in Terra, Year XLIV (LXIV), Nr. 1-2, 2013, pp. 90-95; Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Damian Florea, op. cit., 2012, pp. 426-440; Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Silviu Negut, op. cit., 2010, pp. 29-46; Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit., 2009, pp. 176-189; Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Viorel Mionel, "European Union's Dependency on Russian Energy. Geopolitical considerations", in The Romanian Economic Journal, nr. 25 bis, 2007, pp. 265-284 s.a.

19 Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit. 2009, pp. 176-189.

20 Ibidem.

21 It is incredibly relevant in this context Vladimir Putin's speech in Soci, in 2006: "If our European partners expect us to allow them to access at our most prized possession, energy, to do with it as they will, then we request concessions that would help us with our own development. (...) Access to infrastructure, production and transport? But what type of access are we talking about? Where is your production, what deposits and large pipelines are we allowed access to? If you do not have anything of the above we will have to find a replacement solution which would allow us to engage in mutual exchanges in the interest of both sides. We granted Ukraine subsidies for fifteen years. If the Western world wants an Orange Revolution they should have the kindness to pay for it. Do you think we are stupid?".

22 Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Silviu Negut (2010), op. cit., pp. 29-46.

23 Silviu Negut, Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Liviu Bogdan Vlad, "The Geopolitics of Strategic Energy Resources", in Impact Strategic, nr. 1, 2007, p. 25.

24 We summarise the main coordinates of these projects: Nabucco - Western project, capacity of 31 billion m3, length 3 300 km, diameter 1 400 mm, costs 7-8 billion Euro, private financing, supply sources: Azerbaijan (?), Turkmenistan (?), Iraq (?), Iran (?), Egypt(?), chronology: launched in 2002, resumed in 2012, failed in 2013; Nabucco West - Western project, capacity of 10 billion m3, length 1 300 km, diameter 1 200 mm, private financing, supply sources: Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz 2), chronology: launched in 2012, failed next year; South Stream - Russian project direct competitor to Nabucco, capacity of 63 billion m3, length 2 380 km, diameter 810 mm, costs 16 billion Euro, mostly state funded supply sources: Russia, chronology: launched in 2006, signing the final investment decisions and starting the off-shore part of the construction in 2012, put on hold (temporarily) in 2014 (in 2015 the Blue Stream 2 project will also be put on hold); North Stream - Russian project direct competitor to Nabucco, capacity of 55 billion m3, length 1 224 km, diameter 1 220 mm, costs 15 billion Euro, mixed financing (30% Russia, state, 70% Germany, private), supply sources: Russia, chronology: launched in 1997, first pipeline is finished in April 2011, start of deliveries in November 2011, inauguration of the second pipeline in November 2012, launch of North Stream 2 in 2015.

25 For more details see also Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Silviu Negut, op. cit., 2010, pp. 29-46.

26 An interesting friendship relation between Vladimir Putin and Gerhard Schröder, Germany's former chancellor, was behind the North Stream project - see also for details Marius-Cristian Neacsu, "Doctrina Gazputin", in Economistul, Nr. 9 (159), 17-23 March, 2014, pp. 26-30.

27 Oleg Serebrian, Geopolitica spatiului pontic, Chisinau, Ed. Cartier, 2006, p. 154.

28 To follow the geopolitical transnistria concept in Marius-Cristian Neacsu, op. cit., 2015, pp. 65-70.

29 Idem, p. 68.

30 It is not only about physical access to the Black Sea, Russia having its own piece of the shoreline, albeit lacking: it is a double barrier, physical-geographical (the Caucasus mountains) and human (Islamic population). It is about strategic access, respectively owning one of the three "keys" of the Black Sea, in the case at hand the Crimean peninsula.

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