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Rarely has a single theory had such enormous and lasting impact on a wide array of disciplines as Irving Janis' "Groupthink" model. According to Janis, members of high-status decision-making groups may develop such extreme forms of camaraderie and solidarity that they suppress dissent, valuing group membership and harmony above all else. This silencing of ideas that depart from majority thinking can have devastating results; it may lead to the distortion of reality, the adoption of risky polices, and the abandonment of ethical considerations ([17], [18], [19] Janis, 1971, 1972, 1982).
Considered among "the most influential [theories] in the behavioral sciences" ([34] Turner and Pratkanis, 1998), social psychologists, political and computer scientists, historians, and counselors have applied the implications of Janis' ideas to their work ([7] Esser, 1998; [10] t'Hart, 1991). Scholars of organizational decision-making and management ([2] Chapman, 2006; [3] Choo, 2008), as well as management history ([1] Ahlstrom and Wang, 2009; [30] Rost et al. , 2010), have also directed their attention to groupthink. Indeed, the theory has even gained prominence outside the academic and business worlds, its framework applied to current events discussed in popular print and electronic media ([8] Fell, 2011; [12] Hertan, 2008; [31] Schneider, 2011). Remarkably, the term "groupthink" began appearing in mainstream dictionaries in 1975 ([34] Turner and Pratkanis, 1998), only a few years after Janis first coined the term.
[17], [18], [19] Janis (1971, 1972, 1982) proposed that when a cohesive group of decision-makers is placed under certain antecedent conditions, groupthink may result. These conditions include structural factors, such as group insulation and the absence of impartial leadership and methodical decision-making procedures; and situational factors, including external threats leading to high stress. He also described three categories of symptoms of groupthink that lead to defective decision-making: overestimation of the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures toward uniformity. Finally, Janis suggested methods, such as appointing a "devil's advocate" and holding "second-chance meetings", to prevent groupthink from occurring.
Janis used his theory to help explain how seemingly intelligent and well-informed leaders and policy-makers, such as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their respective advisors, could have made decisions leading to historic foreign policy fiascoes. In his own words, "The US road to disaster - in Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, Korea, and Pearl...