The harm argument against surrogacy revisited: two versions not to forget

Med Health Care and Philos (2014) 17:357363 DOI 10.1007/s11019-014-9557-x

SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION

The harm argument against surrogacy revisited: two versions not to forget

Marcus Agnafors

Published online: 25 March 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract It has been a common claim that surrogacy is morally problematic since it involves harm to the child or the surrogatethe harm argument. Due to a growing body of empirical research, the harm argument has seen a decrease in popularity, as there seems to be little evidence of harmful consequences of surrogacy. In this article, two revised versions of the harm argument are developed. It is argued that the two suggested versions of the harm argument survive the current criticism against the standard harm argument. The rst version argues that the child is harmed by being separated from the gestational mother. The second version directs attention to the fact that surrogacy involves great incentives to keep the gestational mothers level of maternal-fetal attachment low, which tend to increase the risk of harm to the child. While neither of the two arguments is conclusive regarding the moral status of surrogacy, both constitute important considerations that are often ignored.

Keywords Attachment Ethics of motherhood Harm

argument Maternal-fetal attachment Reproductive

ethics Surrogacy

Introduction

Surrogacy has always been surrounded by controversy. While the controversy has perhaps diminished slightly in recent years, many of the ethical issues associated with surrogacy remain unsolved. In this article I will discuss and

develop the harm argument against surrogacy. According to the harm argument, surrogacy is morally problematic because it causes harm, or increases the risk of harm. In recent years it has come under attack due to what is often deemed to be accumulating empirical evidence showing that there are no substantial harms resulting from the practice. Against this development, I will argue that the harm argument cannot be dismissed that easily. I present two different and novel versions of the harm argument that deserve careful consideration, and I argue that they escape the criticism leveled against the standard version and hence warrant our continued attention. The rst version takes as its starting point the emerging evidence showing that the gestational mother and the child are connected prenatally, and argues that to severe that bond constitutes harm...