HYBRID WARFARE: FROM "WAR DURING PEACE" TO "NEO-IMPERIALIST AMBITIONS". THE CASE OF RUSSIA

Abstract

The term "hybrid warfare" has been used to refer to the combined usage of unconventional military tactics such as conventional warfare with irregular warfare and cyberwarfare, as well as the employment of other instruments and tactics (subversive elements), to achieve a double goal: first to avoid responsibility and retribution, and second to weaken and destabilize the enemy without direct involvement. The rigidity of the current international system pertaining to the usage of non-peaceful methods of solving an international dispute and/or furthering state interests, have made it increasing difficulty, without the support of the international community (humanitarian interventions and UN-sanctioned interventions) to employ the 'classical methods' which pre-date the provisions of the UN Charter, relevant to what we now consider as "acts of aggression". Discussing the resurgence of the Russian Federation as a great power, we argue that because of the innate historical and traditional factors of Russian geopolitics, it was only a matter of time until the Kremlin 's military doctrine pivoted from the defensive phase it entered after the fall of the Soviet Union, to the pro-active involvement at the limit of international law: Georgia in 2008, East Ukraine in 2013, Crimea in 2014, and Syria in 2015. Therefore, in this article we will contend, firstly, by discussing the example of the perception of the so-called Russian "Gerasimov doctrine", that hybrid war can have two different connotations: "war during peace" and "neo-imperial ambitions". Secondly, we will try to argue that the NATO military doctrine of deterrence has become obsolete, still envisaging the possible threats posed by a future Russian involvement in the Baltic and Eastern Europe in cold-war terms and not in terms relevant to the shifting international security environment.

Headnote

Abstract

The term "hybrid warfare" has been used to refer to the combined usage of unconventional military tactics such as conventional warfare with irregular warfare and cyberwarfare, as well as the employment of other instruments and tactics (subversive elements), to achieve a double goal: first to avoid responsibility and retribution, and second to weaken and destabilize the enemy without direct involvement. The rigidity of the current international system pertaining to the usage of non-peaceful methods of solving an international dispute and/or furthering state interests, have made it increasing difficulty, without the support of the international community (humanitarian interventions and UN-sanctioned interventions) to employ the 'classical methods' which pre-date the provisions of the UN Charter, relevant to what we now consider as "acts of aggression". Discussing the resurgence of the Russian Federation as a great power, we argue that because of the innate historical and traditional factors of Russian geopolitics, it was only a matter of time until the Kremlin 's military doctrine pivoted from the defensive phase it entered after the fall of the Soviet Union, to the pro-active involvement at the limit of international law: Georgia in 2008, East Ukraine in 2013, Crimea in 2014, and Syria in 2015. Therefore, in this article we will contend, firstly, by discussing the example of the perception of the so-called Russian "Gerasimov doctrine", that hybrid war can have two different connotations: "war during peace" and "neo-imperial ambitions". Secondly, we will try to argue that the NATO military doctrine of deterrence has become obsolete, still envisaging the possible threats posed by a future Russian involvement in the Baltic and Eastern Europe in cold-war terms and not in terms relevant to the shifting international security environment.

Keywords: Russia; Hybrid warfare; Crimea; NATO; Neo-imperialism.

Introduction

Following the involvement of Russia in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, an event which literally took the world by surprise and the follow-up in Eastern Ukraine 2014-present, western military analysts and NATO enthusiasts rushed to announce the new threat posed by "Russia's hybrid warfare against Ukraine" (Umland, 2016). This new 'Russian invention' could very well be used in the future against NATO member states in the Baltic region or Eastern Europe. However, the frequency with which the term is employed alongside Russia's military involvements in the former Soviet space or furthering Russian interests abroad seems, we believe, somewhat suspicious. If we simply analyse the phases of which a "hybrid war" is composed (conventional and unconventional military tactics and operations, direct foreign involvement such as the support of political protests, economic warfare, cyberwarfare and (dis) informational and propaganda campaigns), we can reach the conclusion that it is not a novelty.

Hybrid war, in its "classical interpretation" (i.e. the methods employed) is not strictly limited to neither Russia (the US, some European member states, even some Asian states have used it/are using it41), nor to nation-states or state-like entities (Daesh in Syria and Iraq, other insurgent groups worldwide). Yet, according to Puyvelde, "the term 'hybrid warfare' appeared at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe the strategy used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War", adding that since then, "it has dominated much of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and promoted as a basis for modern military strategies" (Puyvelde, 2015).

In addition, in one opinion (Wither, 2016), the emergence of "hybrid warfare" poses a series of interesting yet potentially dangerous consequences. First, he discusses the superfluous usage of the term to address the "complexity of twenty-first-century warfare", which is difficult to understand by the traditional monochrome approach divided into 'war and peace'. Second, "hybrid warfare entered the public domain" arriving in the centre of attention after the Russians 'pulled one' on the West with Crimea, thus becoming politically infused and a major concern for Western governments" (Wither, 2016, p. 74).

Therefore, we pose the question "how has 'hybrid warfare' become the designated denomination of Russia's involvement in the former Soviet Union's zone of control"? Firstly, there is no legitimate proof that the Russian Federation switched from its former Soviet "vital-space" geopolitical doctrine to the "Velikiy limitrofnyy doctrine"42 and then towards the so-called "Gerasimov doctrine"43 in just a decade. Secondly, military doctrine-wise and from Putin's standpoint, hybrid warfare is considered simply as the means by which Russia can reclaim the lost title of "great power", and by judging the string of actions (from the 2008 war in Georgia to its 2015 involvement in Syria), simply as a military instrument devoid of any higher political meaning above the one which the Kremlin has given it, of re-assessing its former spheres of influence. Thirdly, on the international level, the importance of hybrid warfare is that of either avoidance of responsibility, as it is very difficult in the current Geneva system44 and UN Charter definition of aggression45, to pursue a state which is suspected of breaking international law and the laws of war if the methods used add-up to those which can be part of a hybrid warfare; or as a clear signal given to contesters and allies alike by the use of intimidation (in the form of muscle-flexing and aggressive stance) and also by taking some insurance (in the form of an example of what will happen) against the prospective perfidy of allies.

As such, we consider that "hybrid warfare" cannot be totally equated or considered as Russia's definitive replacement doctrine or as a purposely novel military theory or particularly, a new type of Russian threat towards NATO's borders. Taking into consideration the "hybrid" character of hybrid warfare, it seems very difficult to us to assume that any military doctrine involving the hybridisation and combination of Cold War era tactics with modern ones will become an original concept employed only by the Kremlin. It seems, from the perspective of NATO and the US, that labelling Russian involvement in Ukraine and the Crimea is a reactionary and tardive response to a rapid upscaling, military investment and political muscle-flexing on the part of the Russian Federation which has surprised everyone, even though nobody seemed to think the same in 2008 as Putin invaded Georgia. However NATO and the EU felt seriously threatened by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass. Consequently, a plethora of military analysts have rushed to classify the 'new Russian threat of hybrid warfare' in an effort to understand why all except the Russians have been caught off-guard in the shifting realm of modern warfare46. But, continuing to envisage the Kremlin's actions in Cold War terms poses in our opinion two significant draw-backs. First, from NATO's perspective, is shows the complacency and the strategic imbalance in which it finds itself as its military doctrine of deterrence has become obsolete, being severely limited by the Article 5 provisions, and by the fact the NATO cannot respond fast enough to the non-linear threats of today's challenging security environment. Second, from the European perspective, Russia, still being viewed as a possible aggressor, is theoretically capable of launching an attack with great chances of success47, because the mainstay of NATO's military hardware is deployed in the Western part of Europe, and not the Eastern part, in which countries like Poland and the Baltic states, perceive the threat of a Russian aggression much more higher than Italy, Germany or France.

Defining "Hybrid warfare", a heuristically flawed concept?

The usage of the term "hybrid warfare" is not a new choice of words48, neither from the syntax nor from the rhetoric aspects. War has never been a static field, it changed alongside the development of human society and in fact, all wars were more or less hybrid, in the sense that they combined different tactics, aspects, instruments and methods to insure the victor's advantage. However, the recent decades saw war change rapidly. This happened not particularly in the sense of a positive shift towards modern military technology and increased capabilities, but in the sense of a limitation of traditional operations. This is characterized by a change from the classic land-air-sea based warfare, theorized in the Cold War period, towards a more subtle deployment of forces (Special Forces, Black Ops etc.) such as surgical strikes, drone warfare, cyberwarfare and non-peaceful methods of settling disputes49. If we consider the heavily criticised conceptualisations of Smith's "modern wars" and Kaldor's "new wars" (as cited by Erol and Oguz, 2015, p. 262), the scene was set for hybrid warfare as a novel area for discussion in academic circles. Yet despite the fact that "both use of the term and the study of hybrid warfare are new compared to the long history of warfare" (Erol and Oguz, 2015, p. 262), this changed because in the aftermath of the 9/11 and with the War and Terror and other non-linear conflicts (the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, and the 2008 RussoGeorgian War), the asymmetric element became the defamatory characteristic of hybrid warfare. In line with the above, Wither (Wither, 2016, p. 75-76) remarks on the inflection point, the year 2014, as a defining point from which hybrid warfare changed. Before 2014, the most cited example of hybrid warfare was the Israeli-Lebanese conflict (2006). After 2014 (Crimea and East Ukraine) the focus on Russia's perceived success was at an all-time high, with the former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen affirming that the Russian involvement was a hybrid warfare.

Owning there is no clear or universally-accepted definition, in particularly when it is being used either as a catch-all term for all non-linear threats (the US usage of the term "hybrid threats"50) or as abstract term referring to irregular methods of countering a conventionally superior force (the case of modern guerrilla and insurgent warfare, adding also the threat posed by Daesh), "hybrid warfare" can be interpreted differently, relevant to the source of the hybrid actions: a state or a non-state actor51. This is important if we desire to discern if the current Russian "Gerasimov doctrine", which makes use heavily of hybrid warfare (in certain situations), can be considered as being either a new type of "hybrid warfare ", or has completely switched to "hybrid warfare " as their main military doctrine.

A definition of "hybrid warfare" could be formulated only by taking into account certain elements and characteristics (Johnson and McCulloh, 2013, pp. 1-17). The first is the existence of a non-standard, complex and fluid (hybrid) adversary52. The second implies that the hybrid adversary uses a combination of conventional and irregular methods (hence the hybridisation phase). Third, said adversary is flexible and adapts quickly (hence the term fluid). Fourth, said adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies (this could imply the involvement of a stately and/or terrorist entity). Fifth, said adversary employs mass communication for propaganda purposes (again, a more subtle usage of hybridisation, albeit on a non-military level). Finally, according to one opinion (Pindják, 2014), hybrid warfare takes place on three distinct battlefields: (a) the conventional battlefield (operation theatres), (b) the indigenous population in the conflict zone (if we consider insurgency and/or terrorist aspects53), and (c) at the level of the international community.

Other interpretations take into account different elements or conditions. One of these is represented by a clear political purpose: hybrid warfare is any action of the enemy which instantly and coherently uses a complex combination of authorized weapons, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and criminal behaviour on the battlefield, to achieve political goals (Hoffman, 2009a, pp. 35-36). Another is the employment of all types of war, conventional, irregular or terrorist, including even criminal behaviour (Hoffman, 2009b, p. 5)54. Also, relative to tactical and military variations, hybrid war "erases the differences between conventional and irregular wars" (Isherwood, 2009, p. 3), or as Johnson (2015, p. 11) puts it, "blurring the line between peace and war".

From an operational perspective (Balan, 2016, pp. 319-321), hybrid war can be explained via the existence of several conditions: (1) the employment of a "combination of state and non-state actors" in conducting the hybrid actions; (2) the "attribution of the conflict" or "the absence of assumption" by the actors involved in the action; (3) the use of "intermediaries" in conjecture with "informational warfare". This interpretation shows that strictly from the standpoint of the military, hybrid warfare is a relatively widespread tactic, not at all limited to only a handful of actors.

Therefore, keeping in mind the abovementioned aspects, we would define "hybrid warfare" as follows: a situation in which a non-standard, complex and fluid adversary is using a combination of conventional and irregular methods, employing advanced weapons systems and other disruptive technologies, whilst also employing means of mass communication for propaganda purposes, in a mixed theatre of operations (conventional, local, international) with the intent (overt or covert) of furthering the general interests of, including but not limited to, a known emerging, established, political or stately entity.

However, the ambiguity and the complexity of the proposed definition is accentuated by the fact that if some scholars prefer the term "hybrid warfare", the military prefers the term "hybrid threat'. As such, we can assume that in an in extenso interpretation, "hybrid threats", which are perceived as emanating from a stately entity or are conducted and/or benefit a certain state, are transformed via the infusion of political interests ("political warfare"55) in "hybrid warfare". As a result, they become immoral and barely-legitimated (from the perspective of international law) methods of eluding international responsibility for acts which, in normal circumstances, would attract the culpability of the state in question. Thus we can assume that the definition of "political warfare" proposed by Kennan56 can very well overlap with the one of "hybrid warfare", though in the sense of a hybridisation between complex political interests and compound military tactics.

With regard to the roots of "hybrid threats", Fleming considers that the contemporary usage of mixed tactics correspond and operate "from the same principles the Soviets envisaged for conventional war" adding that using a multidimensional matrix, "they aggregate a combination of simultaneous and sequential military actions to attain political and military objectives" (Fleming, 2011, p. 30). Interestingly, Fleming also speaks about the "sine qua non condition of hybrid threats" (Fleming, 2011, p. 29), which he calls "unrestricted form of operational art", also citing the definition of the concept of "operational art" given by US Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Application of creative imagination by commanders and staff supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.. .without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements". 57

This vision makes sense since the military and the political spheres are highly dependent one from the other, almost becoming a single entity. This is largely due to the extreme difficulty in dissociating politics from the military, especially in states without a clear separation of powers, and where the society is more or less familiarised with authoritarian regimes.

The different perspectives of "hybrid warfare" as the "new Russian military doctrine" and as a "deterrence factor" against perceived Russian "hybrid threats"

Discussing the perception of the recent Russian involvements in East Ukraine and Syria, it is important to understand how the Russian Federation's military doctrine has evolved and how it was integrated into the larger geopolitical context of the time. Starting from the classic military doctrine of the Soviet Union (the vital space, buffer-zones), deeply influenced by defensive realism as the USSR was considered as a "one-dimensional superpower" (Odom, 1988). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin opted towards a doctrine characterized by revolutionary expansionism and initiative-taking actions as to insure its defence and interests abroad. A good example of this are the BRICS initiative and the pivot towards Asia as "coexistence and soft-power policy" envisaged as "complex threestage strategy: soft power helps to build up normative power which in turn helps to shape the future world order in Russia's and BRICS' image" (Sergunin, 2015). Though it can be considered that the current conflict in Ukraine has challenged the classical concepts of warfare (divided into irregular and conventional) "the current crisis [...] does not fit neat Western categories of 'war', in one sense it's a civil war, or perhaps a proxy war that pits Ukraine against Russia" (Hoffman, 2014). This is largely due to the complexity of the actors involved: the national government, the separatist forces, the ultra-nationalists, foreign volunteers and Russian military personnel.

From NATO's perspective, the situation in Ukraine is a convincing argument that hybrid warfare has two main purposes. At ground level, hybrid conflicts involve complex multidimensional efforts (clandestine actions) designed to "destabilise a functioning state and polarize its society", and as a direct consequence "unlike conventional warfare, the 'centre of gravity' is [...] a target population". At the international level, it tries to "influence influential policy-makers and key decision makers by combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts", with the goal of "avoiding attribution or retribution" (Pindják, 2014). The end-result will be difficult to interpret, as NATO cannot initiate any retaliatory actions outside the provisions of Article 5, being limited only to deterrence measures. This is particularly so in the Baltic region, though the deployment costs of a deterrence force and the difficult decision-taking process at NATO's level are, in absolute terms, a significant drawback to any re-deployment plans. Though, some argue (Shlapak and Johnson, 2016) that: "it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable, especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO's most exposed and vulnerable allies".

Yet it is also true that the so-called "red line" has never been crossed (Michel, 2015), because Putin does not have the desire to provoke a conflict between NATO and Russia. On this account, the whole bellicose posture in which NATO finds itself now, is not actually needed, with the exception as a badly needed reassurance factor for the Baltic and Eastern Europe NATO member states. However, we believe that it's very difficult from the perspective of abovementioned states to 'trust' Russia with not attacking them. If we take for example, the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia (Kozlowski, 2014, p. 238), Georgia in 2008 (Bachmann, 2011, p. 16), the coup de main in Crimea58 and the protracted conflict in East Ukraine, all of these attest to the reluctance of the Eastern NATO Member states in their relationship with Russia. Also, there are some who voice the threats posed by the "fifth columns": "groups of individuals, usually acting covertly, embedded within a much larger population that they seek to undermine" (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 179) as the casus belli to intervene. This tactic, which has been used in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (the Russianspeaking minority), brought into discussion the Russian minority in the Baltic States (Estonia in particular) (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 187) as a possible vulnerability for a Russian involvement.

In addition, to complicate the situation, deterrence59 has always been seen as the best option. NATO is vaguely trying to keep-up to Moscow's muscle-flexing reminiscent of Cold War days, as a response to their large military exercises in the Baltic and Arctic regions60, some of them involving the deployment of strategic ballistic missiles (Michel, 2015). This was seen as crucial after the independence of Kosovo in 2008 and the so-called "five-day" war in Georgia in the same year. However, this was the case until recently (2014), when Russia decided to destabilise Ukraine and annex Crimea. Furthermore in 2015, Russia decided to simultaneously involve itself into both the Syrian Civil War and the fight against Daesh, taking the world by surprise once more.

Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term "hybrid warfare", Russia's actions can be, therefore, interpreted in various ways, giving rise to the fear of a suspicious overextension of its sphere of influence. In one opinion, "there can be no credible defence, and therefore deterrence, without an effective joint defence plan that unifies military capabilities [...] maritime, land, air, cyber, and space domains" (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 12). Yet if we analyse the phrase we can clearly see that is points towards elements of "hybrid warfare" and therefore, NATO's response towards the Russian threat of "hybrid warfare" would be a "hybrid warfare" of its own, to ensure that the deterrence factor is being implemented. Yet what is most concerning is fact that the Russians have the advantage in using a relatively flexible decision-taking system (due to the concentration of powers61), as compared with NATO's system characterized by the fact that it uses complicated and timeconsuming consensus and consultation procedures. Thus, NATO is forced to act as a defensive alliance and at the same time invest in deterrence moves to counter the "hybrid threat" posed by Russia to reassure its Eastern members. However, the decrease in capabilities during the last decades, in particular that of the Land Forces personnel, "were significant" (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 9). They were replaced by light counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency units which were better suited to counter the problems posed by today's security threats and which were shaped by the expeditionary tactics used in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, NATO which abandoned "standard tactics" finds itself in a difficult position to mount a defence against a possible traditional threat from Russia, threat which would involve, in its majority, conventional weapons and not elements of hybrid war. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force of approx. 5000 troops, even if they manage to mobilize quickly, may still be too late to "deter Russian adventurism" (Wither, 2016, p. 85). In addition, one of the biggest problems we see when countering Russian hybrid tactics is their flexibility and adaptability. If we take the example of Ukraine, in late 2014, the Russian switched from hybrid tactics to a series of surgical strikes, meant to crush the Ukrainian army. It will be very problematic we believe, if NATO troops, trained to counter hybrid treats, will meet conventional enemy troops on the battlefield.

The Russian perspective on "hybrid warfare" mirrors the Western one. This is done by assuming that it, more precisely the highly controversial Russian-style of "hybrid warfare", is in fact legitimate or gains legitimacy as a valid countermeasure. In this light, Russia will continue to view the US run NATO as the main antagonist and as its principal security threat. As such, the relationship between Russia and the West will always be marred by fears of conflict, in spite of any actions undertaken to stabilize the situation. Discussing this theory, Samuel Charap writes that:

"[...] both perspectives are equally misguided; Russian strategists use the term 'hybrid war' to refer to alleged US efforts to weaken and ultimately overthrow unfriendly governments, particularly, but not exclusively, the Russian government, using a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic means" (Charap, 2015, p. 51).

He also writes that, in the case in Ukraine, the Kremlin considered that is was in fact the US which launched a 'successful operation' (or "hybrid war") to replace the former President Yanukovych with a puppet government, so as to forcefully rip Ukraine from the sphere of influence of Russia. Also, it was done as a military exercise for a future similar operation in Russia (Charap, 2015, pp. 51-52). Discussing the so-called "Gerasimov doctrine", McDermott (2016, pp. 101-102) writes that General Gerasimov, learning from the experience of the Syrian Civil War, "examines hybrid warfare in connection with hightechnology weaponry", and that he interprets hybrid war "as a foreign rather than a Russian", connecting what he considers a negative Western influence in Syria (Arab Spring) with the threats posed by a similar intervention into Russia (the Colour revolutions). McDermott's argues that in essence, what Gerasimov postulates is the paradoxical idea that if Russia's adversaries possess "hybrid capabilities" and may seek to destabilize Russia through colourtype revolutions, "Moscow then needs its own form of hybrid capability to counteract this threat" (McDermott, 2016, p. 101 and Kofman, 2016).

Approaching the so-called "Gerasimov doctrine", Michael Kofman argues that:

"it seems unlikely that after barely a few months on the job Gerasimov wrote the Rosetta Stone for Russian military thinking, [...] and that within a year the Russian General Staff had moved this collection of observations [.] into a brilliant hybrid warfare campaign in Ukraine" (Kofman, 2016).

In support of this view, Charles Bartles writes: "[...] it is important to keep in mind that Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine" (Bartles, 2016, pp. 30-37).

In our opinion, McDermott, Hoffman and Bartles have some credit, in the sense that if we look at Russia's post-Soviet period, in particular towards the Caucasus, we can clearly observe that their involvement in the area (The Chechen Wars) have made them more open to what Gerasimov calls "non-linear war" (Gerasimov, 2013). In essence, this represents the adaptation of traditional warfare tactics to modern guerrilla warfare, and the combined support from other instruments controlled by the state (media, cyber-security, economy, etc.) As such, "the purpose of using non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown" and, in many cases, "have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness" (Gerasimov, as cited by Charap, p. 53). Therefore, the result of this was to use the past experiences for consolidating Russia's defences against all possible threats. Charap continues with the fact that this is not actually a new military doctrine, but in fact, an analysis of the ways and methods used by the United States in their military involvements abroad, again for defensive purposes. Therefore, the Russian perspective on "hybrid warfare" seems almost the same as the Western one, with the big difference that the source of "hybrid warfare" is each other, and with the fact that the Russians have taken a more pro-active stance involving threats which they perceive as "vital".

The Russian involvement in Ukraine - a classic case of "hybrid warfare" or the "new war" in practice?

After the Euromaidan protests which led to the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 and the flight of the deposed president Viktor Yanukovych, Russian soldiers without insignias (the "little green men"62) took control of strategic positions and infrastructure within Crimea. This lead to the Annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 and the subsequent tensions in Eastern Ukraine (the Donbass regions of Luhansk and Donetsk) which erupted into an allout civil war. In the first phase of the conflict (from March-July until September 2014) Russian military personnel contributed to the defeat of the Ukrainian army. In November 2014, by using humanitarian aid convoys, Russia supplied the separatists with a variety of military hardware and ammunition. These events, which repeated in August 2015, were observed by the OSCE, which reported a number of special transit zones alongside the Donbass-Russian porous border, controlled by mixed separatist-Russian security forces.

If we return to the example of Crimea, some consider this as a clear sign of "new war", (Galeotti, 2016, p. 285) with emphasis on the "the distinctiveness [which] appears not so much in essence, but in degree" (Galeotti, 2016, p. 285), which is interpreted as referring to the Western perception of Russian counterinsurgency tactics in Crimea as a 'traditional war' between two stately entities (Russia vs. Ukraine) but enacted using 'hybrid tactics'. Other authors, though, contest this interpretation, accentuating a supportive (adjacent) presence, dismissing the primary role given to the presence of Russian Special Forces' elements in Crimea:

"in the annexation of Crimea, which was a classic covert operation to enable a conventional invasion - the lead element was Russia's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, already based in Crimea as part of the Black Sea Fleet [...] there were some irregular aspects, like an information warfare element and a circus of inconsequential auxiliaries, but what measurable significance did they have in relation to Russia's deployment of special forces, elite infantry, and conventional capability?" (Kofman, 2016).

Furthermore, we must take into consideration the fact that "hybrid tactics are neither new, nor exclusively (or primarily) a Russian invention, [...] Western states have often used elements of it quite effectively, at least on a tactical level" (Popescu, 2015). In the early 2015, the Kremlin decided to abandon the 'hybrid tactics' it has used up until then and concentrate on 'traditional tactics' (Charap, 2015, p. 55) such as shelling Ukrainian Army positions from over the border (Borger and Higgins, 2015) and using "volunteers" to boost the ranks of the separatist forces. Also, some evidence (provided by NATO) has surfaced which positively identifies elements of Russian armour used by separatist forces. Most importantly, NATO experts pointed out that the tanks in question did not have any military markings (a previously used tactic from Crimea and subsequently used in the Donbass) and that the camouflage paint used on the vehicles was not like any used by the Ukrainian army, thus "voiding the argument that all tanks were simply captured from Ukrainian military stockpiles or from attacks on military bases" (Abbot, 2016, pp. 12-13).

In addition, we can view Ukraine not as a "hybrid warfare in the experimental phase", but rather as "the only hybrid warfare" which Russia can fully support (for now). By analysing the underlying causes of the Russian intervention in the East of Ukraine, we can discern that the relative success which the Russian enjoyed is not at all due to their "new type of war" or the greatness of the "Gerasimov doctrine" but rather due to the special characteristics of Ukraine and the very special circumstances in which it finds itself.

First, the nature of the intervention was to prevent an 'illegal' government to seize control of strategic zones previously under Russian influence (the port of Sevastopol, home to Russia's Black Sea Fleet and the industrial hub of Donbass). Second. the relative ease with which Russia annexed Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine are mostly due to the pre-existing connections and interests in the region which pre-date the Soviet era altogether. As Charap (2015, p. 54) writes: "the region is the most permissive environment outside Russia's borders for this kind of operation [...] eastern Ukraine is perhaps the only place beyond Russia's borders where Moscow can sustain an insurgency".

Consequently, the Russian involvement in Ukraine was certainly full of "hybrid warfare" elements but it did not constitute the sort of operation envisaged by the West, since it merely "stopped Ukraine from completely pivoting towards the West" (DSC 2015 General Report, NATO-PA, p. 5). While Russia did intend to 'convince' the leaders from Kiev to take a step back from their pro-Western journey, they clearly failed, as Ukraine is pursuing a closer integration with NATO and the EU. Though we cannot ignore that the costs for Ukraine are, at worst, a protracted civil war which will severely affect its economy and stability (FDI's typically avoid conflict areas) and at its best, a staple post-Soviet "frozen conflict".

The bi-dimensional characteristic of Russia's "hybrid warfare" - "war during peace" and "neo-imperialist" tendencies

The first dimension, or "war during peace", refers to the confusion and the elusive behaviour of a state actor by employing hybrid warfare (or elements associated to it) so as to escape international responsibility for actions which, under 'normal circumstances', would be punishable. Though the Russian Federation did receive sanctions after the Annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, they did little damage, as it made Moscow aware of the reactionary politics embraced by the West, and it gave a reason to strengthen the cooperation with the rest of the BRICS countries. Needless to say that the EU suffered more because of the sanctions imposed, as it had to find different economic partners to whom to sell their goods which were banned from Russian markets. Also, "war during peace"63 can also refer to the actions of Moscow with regard to the situation in the East of Ukraine. Since Russia is involved in a unilateral proxy war, with the assumed objective to weaken and break the country by supporting the separatist pro-Russian elements in the Donbass region, its main goal is to re-adjust Ukraine as a satellite-state in its orbit, much like Belorussia, Kazakhstan or other former Soviet republics. Geopolitically speaking, Ukraine presents two serious problems. First, it represents a potential threat to the regional hegemony of Russia in the post-Soviet space, Russia must never allow that. Second, in the case in which the now Western-supported Ukraine will be forced to yield before the might of Russia, it will show that the West is weak and reactionary. This must also not be allowed to happen, since it will produce a double-victory for the Kremlin: (a) as a lesson to other Eastern European states, not to interfere with the geopolitical goals of Russia; and (b) as a show of force, that the neoimperial ambitions of Russia have been finally met, the weak Russia of the Yeltsin years is no more. If we take a closer look at what the Russians have been doing in Ukraine, we can clearly observe a trend in Western media to ridicule and to "caricaturise how Moscow uses its instruments of national power" (Kofman, 2016). This is because we have long been accustomed to see an enemy in Russia and even if we are all aware of the changes which the world suffered after the fall of the USSR, we cannot avoid the feeling that Russia is reenacting previous scenarios. To cut a long story short, we understand that times have changed, yet we still use pre-Cold War instruments to analyse and predict Russian foreign policy.

Depending on the economic ties and proximity (more or less) it is still not a viable solution to choose not to invest in real technologies and strengthen the cooperation between NATO member states, steps which could prove critical in the future. Though we do not agree with what the Russians have been doing in Ukraine, we cannot say that Putin's Russia is not doing what some Western countries have been doing for a long time, irrespective of the reasons or rationale behind their actions. If the Kremlin has been using "war during peace", it is because the West first pioneered its use, since Russia is not capable to sustain a veritable hybrid conflict outside its area of control, in which sadly, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic States are located.

The second dimension, is the neo-imperialist dimension of "hybrid warfare" seen from the perspective of Russia's resurgence as a great power. Starting from 2008 (Georgia), Russia has systematically targeted weak and vulnerable former-Soviet republics in an effort to re-establish itself as the successor of the Soviet Union, in fact and not in name only. Van Harpen (2014, p. 5) argues that "Russia is both a post-imperial state and a pre-imperial state", giving the examples of certain moves64 (soft power and influence 'building') that the Kremlin made to insure its interests in the adjacent regions are respected. Van Harpen (2014, p. 248) also cites the former the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, who said that "if the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West". Subsequently, he added that if Ukraine does not tread carefully, Russia could provoke tensions in Eastern Ukraine (where a considerable Russian minority lives) and this could lead to a repeat of the Georgian scenario of 2008, where the Kremlin invoked the protection of Russian nationals as an excuse to intervene in South Ossetia (Harpen, 2014, p. 248).

Kushnir (2016, p. 3) writes that the involvement of Russia in Ukraine is a violent yet 'understandable' reaction towards a very serious threat posed by the loss of influence in a country which has a very important role to play from multiple angles: geopolitical, as a buffer-zone, energetic, as the transit-zone for Russia's gas pipelines, economic as a market and source of labour, etc. Also, one must not underestimate the "historical, political, economic, cultural, and other ties between states provide the explicit rationale for them to intervene in Ukraine's affairs". He also discusses that the political philosophy of Russia has changed little from the Soviet era. For example, he talks about Aleksandr Dughin (Putin's favourite ideologist) who "continued to perceive Russian expansionism - especially in its Eurasian dimension - as something natural and inescapable, contributing to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome [...] Russia finds itself in an eternal struggle with the global maritime Carthage, which is the US" (Kushnir, 2016, p. 5).

The motivations behind the Kremlin's actions are difficult to discover, due to the sheer number of scholars and analysts which still consider Russia as the direct descendant of the Soviet Union. As such, Russia's goals are the same as they were in the past: the restoration of the Kremlin's rule over former Soviet lands (Bernd, 2016), and the defeat of the American archenemy. Alternatively, we can also look at the aggressive stance of Russia from the point of view of domestic politics, as a means to distract the populace 's attention from the difficult situation which gripped Russia after the Financial Crisis and the drop in oil and gas prices.

Conclusions

Trying to make sense of "hybrid warfare" has become a new trend in the scholarly field concerned with the subject of military and operational tactics. If hybrid warfare has been something used from Antiquity, why does it still cause such debates? The answer to this comes when hybrid warfare is mixed with power politics and ruthlessness in pursuing national interests. To complicate things, today's world (particularly in the West) is constructed in a monochrome fashion: the public always knows who the hero is and who the enemy is. Hybrid warfare changes all that. It uses any other means short of war to achieve its purpose. It blurs the lines between opposites and creates a grey space where nuances are more important than the relative truths. Hybrid warfare has multiple dimensions, each specifically connected to a set of objectives and precise purposes. From the Russian perspective we believe that they are, as we stated in this article, eliminating the limitations of the current international system and eluding international responsibility ("war during peace") and a resurgence of Russia as the successor of both the Tsarist and Soviet Empires ("neoimperialist ambitions").

On Russia's intervention in Ukraine and the claims that it is using the concerted attacks as a rehearsal for a future involvement in Eastern Europe, the chances of a repeat of so-called Crimea or a Donbass scenarios elsewhere are, in our opinion, fortunately low. However, we do not believe that "hybrid warfare" is a weak concept, only that its current interpretation is somewhat lacking. Simply equating "hybrid warfare" with a Russian plan for world domination is just not feasible. Yet we do believe that Russia is using certain elements which some authors consider as being sine qua non conditions for the existence of "hybrid warfare/threats". In this respect, Russia's intervention in Ukraine should be interpreted using a different set of optics, that of the coordinated employment of certain instruments (military, economic, diplomatic, informational and cyber) in its perceived sphere of influence so as to ensure that its vested, national or vital interests are protected.

Though not a new invention, in the past decade, "hybrid warfare" has become the "catchall phrase" for a number of highly controversial actions undertaken by the Kremlin. In our opinion, the rhetoric used in Western circles, or more correctly, the over-emphasis on trying to discern the ulterior motives in all of Putin's moves, has made the West blind to the real problems as terrorism has clearly become the major threat for Europe's well-being. On the Asian theatre, the cooperation between the BRICS countries (half of them having nuclear capabilities), the increasingly cordial relations between Turkey (a key-NATO member state) and Russia, the economic and financial partnership between Russia and China which is heralding a 'golden age' of Eurasian economic ties and the words of President-Elect Donald Trump who no longer considers Russia an existential threat, are clear signs that an important change will come to pass.

Therefore, we will see more of this "hybrid warfare" in the future, but not between the old powerful actors (the US, Russia, Europe) but rather between the regional powers such as China, Japan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Also, between state actors and non-state actors, revealing once more the threat posed by terrorism. As we saw in 2015 and 2016, Europe is not threatened by Russia, the menace posed by Daesh is the primary concern in Western Europe. Comparatively, in Eastern Europe, where the terrorist threat is minimal, the major concern remains Russian aggression. This dichotomy is important because it shows the differences in the approach and interpretations on the foreign policy moves made by the Kremlin.

Vis-à-vis Russian interests in Europe, we can distinguish, on one side, the Western EU and NATO Member States, on the other, the former satellite states in Eastern Europe. This dual approach is not to be taken lightly, the West has always taken advantage of the fear and complex historical relationship between Russia and Eastern Europe. One example is NATO's enlargement process (2004, 2007), the other, the missile defence systems in states like Poland and Romania, originally 'planted' by the US, now under NATO control (Deveselu, Romania). On the opposite side, the close relationship between Russia and countries like France, Germany, and even Italy, constitutes the argument behind the idea that maybe the West has always used the East as a bargaining chip in its dealings with Russia. As such, blaming the Kremlin of 'inventing' and 'deploying' hybrid warfare or hybrid tactics against NATO and the EU are, in our opinion, speculations and machinations in the grand scheme of legitimating NATO's ever fledgling purpose in a changed world.

Addressing the problem from the perspective of international law, Russia does not have many options. Due to the impediments within the UN Security Council, a repeat of the United Sates' endeavours in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) are no longer possible, let alone achievable by Russia. Consequently, born from the desire to circumvent an impossible vote on a resolution approving intervention, the usage of hybrid warfare is, in our opinion, a feasible bargain. Blurring the lines between war and peace and the usage of "war during peace" may be the only way to achieve the compromise between vital state interests and the current rigid international framework. Yet, if we accept this rationale, then hybrid warfare will not be associated with Russian interests, but with the interests of all important international actors. It comes as no surprise why the US and NATO are insisting so much on the 'Russian' element in "hybrid warfare".

Russia's 'political war' is interpreted by the West as a 'hybrid war'. To be blunt, Russia is doing exactly what other powerful states have done before, ruthlessly following their national interests, though with a certain aura reminiscent of Soviet times (maskirovka). In a similar optic, we see that NATO has (finally) taken the 'initiative' of switching from its characteristically defensive posture of deterrence. Though a step forward in itself, it seems like a timid effort to keep-up to the changing times. The façade which NATO has put up until now rested on the image of Russia as the everlasting enemy of Europe. Unfortunately for NATO, this is not the case anymore. The weak Russia of the 90s exists only in history books and biased interpretations. To keep-up the façade in order to continue to give NATO a raison d'être seems unwise, if not foolish. In NATO's terms, interpreting hybrid warfare" as the new military doctrine of Russia, or putting 'Russia' and 'hybrid warfare' in the same sentence for propagandistic purposes can rebound with serious consequences. If we take the positive aspect, it will encourage cooperation at the national level, giving NATO the muchneeded breath of fresh air. However, if it will backfire, it will, paradoxically, make Europe and NATO weak by over-investing in countering the so-called hybrid threats from state actors, a threat which may never come. The danger is that, whilst investing in defences against a clear source, it will also mean ignoring the serious threats posed by hybrid threats originating non-state actors.

Footnote

41In this respect, the Southeast Asia theatre (South China Sea) is comprised by a multitude of various small states (compared to China's might), insurgent/irredentist political entities, which are "ideologically or culturally opaque for Chinese hybrid warfare actors", therefore the finality or end-game envisaged by Beijing is not territorial and/or political control (as we saw with Georgia, Crimea and the Donbass region) but rather economic and regional dominance. Another factor is the limited interest of the region, considered as a de facto sphere of influence of China, again, as compared to Ukraine and the Black Sea region which are very close to the political and military borders of NATO and the EU, particularly if we invest in the interpretation of the political dimension of US-NATO's Aegis BMDS in Eastern Europe as a political rather than military claim in the area (Miani, 2016).

42 The post-Soviet Russian concept of "Velikiy limitrofnyy" ("Great Limitrophe" or Island Russia,) was a reinterpretation of early pre-Soviet buffer-zones and satellite-states theory (creation of the Little USSR in Eastern and Southern Europe), as to 'shield' and 'protect' the vulnerable Russian territory from the influence of the West (Khatuntsev, 2008). While some argue that this type of geopolitical thinking is outdated, we disagree, as we believe that this concept is very much in line with the main strategic advantage that Russia possesses - its huge territory and large uninhabited hostile environment. Because of this, one cannot possibly conquer Russia without first surrounding it, therefore, the control of the regions adjacent to it is of paramount importance (Wilson, 2014).

43 *Discussing the "Gerasimov doctrine", Douglas Farrah writes: "General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation's military, developed The Gerasimov Doctrine in recent years. The doctrine posits that the rules of war have changed, that there is a "blurring of the lines between [the states of] war and peace" (Farrah, 2016) and that "non-military means of achieving military and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness." Gerasimov argues for asymmetrical actions that combine the use of Special Forces and information warfare that create "a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state" (Galeotti, 2014).

**Valery Gerasimov also writes, in the context of the Syrian civil war, of the existence of "non-linear conflicts" and he elaborates some on the usage of integrating military tactic into a broader and larger principal direction. He formulates that: "the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures-applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces - often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation - is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict" (Gerasimov, 2013, p. 476).

44 Referring to the employment of unofficially recognized armed forces, in particular those without distinctive signs or military insignia, their usage is condemned as a breach of the Laws of war. (Pfanner, 2004, pp. 103118).

45 "This definition makes a distinction between aggression (which "gives rise to international responsibility") and war of aggression (which is "a crime against international peace"). Acts of aggression are defined as armed invasions or attacks, bombardments, blockades, armed violations of territory, permitting other states to use one's own territory to perpetrate acts of aggression and the employment of armed irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts of aggression. A war of aggression is a series of acts committed with a sustained intent. The definition's distinction between an act of aggression and a war of aggression make it clear that not every act of aggression would constitute a crime against peace; only war of aggression does. States would nonetheless be held responsible for acts of aggression" (Dinstein, 2003, p. 118); Definition of Aggression, General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 14 December 1974.

46 Though we do not support this view, it is interesting to see a very wide debate over the real nature of hybrid warfare, which many consider it as being a tool of the Kremlin, as some authors write: "For now, Russia seems to hold the edge in the Hybrid War in Ukraine: it has successfully annexed Crimea and effectively turned Ukraine in a state on the brink of wider failure" (Bachmann and Gunneriusson, 2015, p. 207).

47 There are fears, particularly in the Baltic region, that Russia is developing capabilities so as to disrupt, if not fully control, the maritime lines of communication between the Baltic States, Poland and NATO. In respect to the A2/AD ("anti-access/area denial") Russia has developed a multitude of weapons systems, complex areal defence systems, and coastal defence systems, as well as land- and sea-based as well as air-launched cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missile platforms. This poses a threat that these capabilities can be used by Russia in a complex joint-arms attack by coordinating its naval surface and submarine forces, electronic and cyber warfare, and other capabilities, targeting special areas, designated as "bubbles". (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 2).

48Bertina Renz (2016, p. 287) cites that the term "hybrid warfare" was first coined by Frank Hoffman (2007) as a response to the mutations in the post-Cold war environment which he observed in the conflict areas of interest to the US, in the sense of trying to define "the success achieved by comparatively weak opponents - non-state actors such as the Taliban, Al Qaeda or Hezbollah - against the vastly technologically and numerically superior militaries of the US coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq and Israeli forces in the 2006 Lebanon war" and "the coordinated and combined use of different modes of warfare, both military (use of force) and non-military (irregular tactics, criminal disorder, terrorist acts, and so on), to achieve 'synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict' within the main battlespace".

49 Non-peaceful methods imply any accepted customary/codified institutions in public international law (Lawrence, 1910), such as: reprisals, embargo, armed reprisals (not to be confused with military aggression or simple reprisals, Hans Kelsen (as cited by Bernstorff, 2010), writes that: "armed reprisals are a limited (decentralized) intervention into the sphere of state interests").

50 In 2008, the US Army Chief of Staff defined a "hybrid threat" as "an adversary that incorporates diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities". Also, the US Joint Forces Command defines the concept as being "any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and non-state actors". In 2011, the US Army came up with another definition, as "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects". NATO's definition is somewhat similar, using the term to describe "adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives" (Fleming, 2011, pp. 1-3, 22-24).

51 For example, it is argued that both Russia and Daesh have used hybrid warfare, though we do not agree with this opinion, that irrespective of the source (actors) hybrid warfare is the use of different tactics with either similar or with the same results: "what characterizes the hybrid approach is the fact that all the means at a state or non-state actor's disposal [...] are combined to achieve a political goal" (Lasconjarias and Larsen, 2015, pp. 3-4).

52 For example, the case of the 2006 Lebanon War, between Hezbollah and Israel (Grant, 2008).

53 For example, Daesh has been viewed as a "hybrid threat" because of its mixed usage of hybrid tactics, fluid formations, cruel use of terror for propaganda purposes and recruitment tactics, all integrated within its transnational aspirations, (Jasper and Moreland, 2014).

54Hoffman gives the example of Hezbollah, which has evolved from a non-state actor towards a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troops, by "studying and deconstructing the capabilities employed by Western forces".

55 The concept of "political warfare" could be explained as a means to limit the effects of a conflict or any other possible threat to national security, whilst keeping the state's interests abroad well supported. In the words of Michael Noonan, "while the publics' mood for involvement in further overseas adventures is less than sanguine, it still remains important for the United States to at least try to be able to shape events on the ground overseas with as little force as possible or else live with the consequences of outcomes that may call for the use of more force down the road" (Noonan as cited by Hoffman, 2014).

56 George Kennan defined political warfare as "the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives" (Kennan, 1948).

57Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication (5-0, IV-1), (Fleming, 2011, p. 29).

58Renz (2016, p. 298) writes that "the description of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the West as 'hybrid warfare' unnecessarily militarizes the language of international politics in an already tense situation. The reason why 'hybrid warfare' is considered 'hybrid' in the first place is because it uses a mixture of both military and non-military approaches".

59 Discussing about deterrence, it is important to add that this concept (alongside containment) were devised to deal with the threats posed by the former Soviet Union and not the Russian Federation. In today's terms, NATO's defensive stance is not sufficiently aggressive to achieve the deterrence result. This is due to the fact that NATO, as comprised by its 28 member states, requires a complicated system of prior approvals integrated in a slow decision-making process, which cannot hope (as it has been envisaged) to compete with the swiftness of Kremlin's small group of decedents. This clearly shows that NATO was designed not as a pro-active and offensive military alliance, but rather as a passive-defensive emanation of a political consensus in the military sphere. A good example of NATO's intrinsic weakness is the self-limitation imposed as not to antagonize Russia while investing in defensive cyber capabilities (i.e. refraining from using offensive cyber operations) and helping Ukraine with its similar project which is equal with limiting the field options and giving your enemy the advantage of initiating first contact (El Fertasi and de Vivo, 2016).

60 For example the "Zapad" ("West") military exercise in 2013 held jointly with Belorussia (Druzhinin, 2013), which followed an established pattern by rehearsing offensive operations towards the West (the Baltic States). The main purpose of the exercise was strengthening the cooperation between the various branches and sectors of the military, the use of joint actions, usage of modern technologies, "with emphasis on the experimental use of automated command and control, and combining civilian agencies and the military in a mobilized format". (Shirreff and Olex-Szczytowski, 2016, p. 6).

61Or as Johnson (2015, p. 10) sees it, as a modern STAVKA, as he argues that Putin has placed the entire Russian military and its population "at or near war footing", by centralizing and restructuring the entire decision-making system.

62Multiple sources cite that the "little green men" (in Western media) or ("polite people" - "Be^anBbie arngn, vezhlivye lyudi" in Russian-oriented media (Oliphant, 2014)) were in fact members of Russian Spetsnaz Special Forces: the 45th Detached Guards Regiment, 3rd Brigade, as well as elements of the 16th Brigade (Galeotti, 2016, p. 284 and Bukkvoll, 2016, pp. 15-17)

63We use the collocation "war during peace" from the perspective of international law (relative to the provisions of the UN Charter and the current system of UN Security Council's approval). For an opinion (with which we do not agree with) outside of the "operational perspective" (the theoretical model of 'kinetic' hybrid warfare) see (Dayspring, 2015) which writes that hybrid warfare: "begins by establishing strategic objectives and employing means that violate another state's sovereignty during a time of peace [...] when coercive violence is timed to minimize the chances of international military response".

64For example, the suggestion made by Putin to Lukashenko that Belorussia should join the Russian Federation (2003), or the historical claims on the Crimea (now redundant), the 'gift' of Russian citizenship en masse to nationals living in the Eastern Ukraine, the suggestion for the Federalization of Ukraine (2004)

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