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Introduction
As outlined in the introduction to this special issue, the term 'intergovernmental relations' (IGR) captures 'the working connections that tie central governments to those constituent units that enjoy measures of independent and interdependent political power, governmental control and decision-making' (Agranoff, 2004, p. 26), with 'working connections' referring both to the institutional and formalised structures of IGR and to the actual patterns or modes of interaction. Both are expected to differ according to a more federalised logic, where constitutional categories of multilevel government are considered as important factors shaping IGR and a more multilevel governance logic, where the mode of IGR is driven by the specific interests and political capacities of the lower level governments rather than constitutional norms.
Under the comparative federalism scenario, as argued in the introduction, it is assumed that in federal states, where subnational governments have constitutional status and share sovereignty with the central level, this will also feed into the formal and informal structures and patterns of IGR leading to predominantly symmetrical multilateral rather than bilateral coordination structures. Second, given that their rights and competencies are constitutionally guaranteed and can only be altered with their consent, it is expected constitutional reforms involving a (re)allocation of competencies will have to treat subnational units equally, thus creating or perpetuating symmetry of competence allocation over time. Finally, given the shared sovereignty between the levels and the lack of a constitutional hierarchy that would allow either level to define the competencies of the other, party political incongruence between the levels or between subnational authorities is expected to have a major - disruptive - impact on the patterns of IGR.
This comparative federalism scenario is contrasted in the introduction with a multilevel governance scenario. Here, constitutionally defined resources are expected to have less of an impact on the patterns of IGR, long-term competence allocation of competencies or the impact of party incongruence than other important informational or political resources that subnational governments have at their disposal. The particular pattern of IGR is thus assumed to be driven by the specific interests and political capacities of the lower level governments. As a result, long-term constitutional developments, and the competence (re)allocation in particular, are also assumed to reflect less the constitutional position of subnational governments resources and...