IRAN AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE ARABIC-SPEAKING WORLD: THE BEST OF ENEMIES?

Abstract

This article focuses on relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arabic-speaking Middle East. The introduction looks at the historical and ideological background to relations between the Brotherhood and Iran. The article then focuses on two examples - relations between Teheran and the Palestinian Hamas movement, and Iran's relations to the Jama'a al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese branch of the Brotherhood. Also surveyed are Iranian relations with a number of other smaller regional branches of the Brotherhood.

Headnote

This article focuses on relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arabic-speaking Middle East. The introduction looks at the historical and ideological background to relations between the Brotherhood and Iran. The article then focuses on two examples - relations between Teheran and the Palestinian Hamas movement, and Iran's relations to the Jama'a al-Islamiyya, the Lebanese branch of the Brotherhood. Also surveyed are Iranian relations with a number of other smaller regional branches of the Brotherhood.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, Iran has regarded the Muslim Brotherhood as a friendly organization. The Brotherhood, for its part, has strived to establish a regime close to the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian theocracy cherishes its image as a republic with popular representation and elections (albeit very limited and under the total control of the Supreme Leader). Iran makes skillful and manipulative use of this aspect of its theocratic Shi'i rule to subvert Arab countries.

While neither the Islamic Republic nor the Brotherhood support democracy in the Western sense of the term, an element of popular representation-and thus legitimacy-is important for both. Thus, Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood can find common ideological ground. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt supported the Iranian Islamic Revolution. This too is remembered in Tehran.

From the Iranian perspective, it is important to note that the ongoing regional sectarian conflict between Shi'a and Sunnis is not considered inevitable, or desirable.1 Nevertheless, the reality of this conflict has limited the possibility of cooperation between Teheran and the Brotherhood.

The links between Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood are long standing. The first religiously motivated terrorist movement in Iran, Fadayan-e Islam, under the leadership of Navob Safavi, was inspired by the example of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its leader Sayyid Qutb. In the past, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supported the principle of unity between Shi'a and Sunnis, which was called "rapprochement of the schools" or taqrib al-madhahib. Many Iranian Shi'i activists, such as prominent Iranian religious activist Hadi Khosrowshahi,2 maintain this view of the situation.

Iran is fully aware of the regional problems complicating the regime's cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the republic does not have a unified, clear, and coherent policy with regard to the group. Iranian calculus with respect to the Brotherhood has never been publicly discussed. One cannot say that the Iranian stance on the Brotherhood is as easily assessed as Iran's stance on Israel or Syria, for example.

When the Iranian media refers to the "Muslim Brotherhood," it means exclusively the Egyptian branch of the movement and not the European branch or the al-Islah party in Kuwait. Despite common ideology, the goals and interests of the Muslim Brotherhood branches in each of the Arab countries differ. For example, the Tunisian Ennahda and the Egyptian Hizb al-Idalah each have unique objectives. The Iranians have thus adopted a per-country approach to each MB faction.

Notwithstanding common ideology, none of the Muslim Brotherhood movements can detach themselves from regional geopolitics and local interests. There is often disagreement even within the same movement. Generation gaps are also significant.

For instance, the situation in Egypt could push the Brotherhood to further radicalization and rapprochement with jihadi groups and even total abandonment of politics. This is also true regarding the Brotherhood's vision of the Shi'a and Iran. No Muslim Brotherhood movement can overtly ignore the massacres perpetrated by the Alawi regime in Syria and its Iranian Shi'i supporters or ignore the Iranian subversion in the Gulf, as doing so would mean positioning itself in opposition to the Arab world and to its native constituency.

On the other hand, and in contrast to overtly jihadi movements, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Palestinian Hamas are not interested in the intensification of the sectarian conflict or in the demonization of Iran. While for the moment Iran cannot provide the Brotherhood with concrete help, the Brotherhood still maintains contacts with Teheran. For example, Ibrahim Mounir, Executive Bureau member of the Brotherhood's International Organization (resident of London), recently visited Tehran. He deplored the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, remarking, "Both are great countries with their own legitimate interests."3 Mounir reiterated that the MB had nothing to do with terrorism. However, he mentioned that other European countries were under pressure from the Gulf States, which consider the Brotherhood a terrorist organization.

Still, it is likely that the decision to visit Tehran was not universally applauded among the members of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Mamdouh Isma'il al-Safli, one of the leaders of the Brotherhood in Egypt, commented that the "publication of this news was a political and ideological stupidity. Finally, one should present apologies to the oppressed Muslims in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, whose blood is being shed day and night by the extremist Shi'a."4 The latter highlights internal disaccord within the Egyptian Brotherhood with regard to Iran.

CASE STUDY 1: HAMAS

Iran and Hamas: Recent Developments

Over the years, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) have been responsible for cooperation with the military wing of Hamas, including arms smuggling.5 A statement by Iranian PM Javad Karimi Quddusi from 2012 in which he compared the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades to the Basij (Iranian regime paramilitary forces under the command of the IRGC) sheds light on the nature of these ties: "The Brigades of Izz al-Din al-Qassam and Basij are under the command of Iran, not under the command of Khalid Mash'al or Isma'il Haniya. If some countries wish to bribe the leaders of Palestine, the Brigades are under the order of Iran."6

Karimi Quddusi, a representative of the conservatives (usulgerayan) in the Iranian parliament, is also a former Basij commander in Mashhad with links to the IRGC. Though several years have passed since his declaration, there is no reason to assume that the situation has changed. Iranian assistance to Hamas continues with the supply of rockets through smuggling, with the IRGC's Quds Force (QF) implicated therein. QF is a special forces unit, and military assistance to foreign allies of Iran falls within its administrative jurisdiction.

Of course, the Qassam brigades were never under the operational command of the IRGC. Still, Quddusi's statement reflects the Iranian view of the Palestinian Islamist movement and Teheran's desire and efforts to add the Sunni Hamas to its roster of clients and proxy military organizations in the region. Creation and sponsorship of such organizations forms a key element of Iranian regional policy.

Until the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the Syrian uprising, Hamas's relations with Iran appeared to be growing ever closer. The movement's leadership was based in Damascus, a key regional ally of Teheran. Hamas's military wing was the beneficiary of large-scale Iranian aid.

The Arab Spring placed Hamas in a difficult situation. As a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, it naturally sympathized with the largely Sunni Arab and increasingly Islamist rebellion against the dictatorship of Bashar Assad, but as a close ally of Iran-with its leadership based on Syrian soil-it was in de facto alliance with the non-Sunni regime crushing the revolt. Furthermore, with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt (fleetingly, as it turned out), for a moment it looked like a new, Muslim Brotherhood dominated power structure was being born in the region.

Hamas made its choice. The movement declined to organize demonstrations supporting the Assad regime in the Hamas fiefdom of Gaza. Its leaders began quietly to leave Damascus for Qatar and Turkey. Iran was angry. A drastic reduction in aid to the movement was the result.

Of course the Brotherhood ascendancy in the region was reversed when the military ousted President Mursi in Egypt on July 3, 2013. This placed Hamas in a dilemma, from which it has yet to fully emerge. Namely, whether to try to find a way back to the Iranians, or to focus on developing relations with the Sunni Gulf countries, above all Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Iran Seeks to Repair Relations with Hamas

Hamas itself suffers from internal struggle and rifts regarding the issue of Iran, for both political and ideological reasons. Iranian leaders scolded Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Khalid Mash'al for Hamas's non-alignment with the Syrian regime. Mash'al's proposal to visit Teheran was declined. Iran demanded Hamas make a choice: either Iran or the Gulf countries.

The political branch, led by Mash'al, remains in a state of strained relations with Iran. Mash'al is based in Doha. However, the conflict between Iran and Hamas is valid for the political branch of Hamas only. Mash'al is indeed constrained by geo-strategic calculi that cannot be compatible with the objectives of Iran.

Nevertheless, contacts and Iranian military supply to Hamas continue. Hamas's military wing, Izz al- Din al-Qassam, remains committed to the relationship with Iran. The Gulf Arabs cannot help Hamas make war against Israel. Iran is the only ally that can supply Hamas with arms. At the same time, Hamas cannot afford to become isolated from the Arab world-namely from the Saudis-because of its ties with Tehran.

Through its media-never through its high-ranking officials-Iran constantly underscores that Hamas must make a "difficult and strategic choice"

Now the time has come for a difficult and strategic choice for Hamas. Of course, Hamas is well aware that without Iran and Hizballah's help, it does not have the capability to endure. Neither Saudi Arabia nor any of the Islamic and Arab countries is in a state in which they should wish to give Hamas a single cartridge. Perhaps if the crisis in Syria had not flared up, Hamas would not be at this strategic crossroads. For certain, if Saudi Arabia agrees to grant financial assistance to Hamas, it will use that organization to benefit its interests in the region, and the assistance will not be free. On another note, the Resistance Front's lost trust in Hamas cannot be easily regained, and Hamas finds itself in a bad situation. Given all that, difficult times await that Palestinian organization, and they are truly walking along the edge of a sword, and any incorrect decision will endanger their political and ideological vitality. Now we must wait and see which front the leaders of Hamas will choose: Iran or Saudi Arabia?! 7

Iran Renews Aid to Hamas

Contrary to rumors of total estrangement between the two, according to Iranian media sources, Iran has recently officially renewed funding to Hamas. In August 2015, at a press conference in Teheran, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham underscored the country's continued support for the resistance front in the region, especially the Palestinian Hamas. When asked whether Iran's support for Hamas had changed, Afkham noted, "Iran's support for all resistance groups continues similar to the past."8 This was the first official Iranian statement concerning Hamas in several months from the time the conflict between Iran and Hamas was reported.

Clearly, however, the situation is more complicated and depends first and foremost on the cleavage within Hamas itself-namely between its military wing Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and its political leadership (Khalid Mash'al abroad and Isma'il Haniya in Gaza). It is most likely that Iran will continue its military support to the brigades while maintaining a complex and problematic relationship with the latter.

In addition, one must bear in mind that no branch is able to impose its domination on the other. Mash'al and Haniya cannot stop the brigades from accepting Iranian military and political aid. At the same time, Hamas's military wing cannot prevent the political branch from developing relations with Gulf countries and perhaps also maintaining unofficial channels of communication with Israel via these countries. In this regard, Hamas's behavior is no different from that of other MB-shaped parties that cannot overcome their internal divide. Iran may well have an interest in enhancing the divide within Hamas in order to allow Tehran greater room to maneuver.

On September 2, 2015, Hamas's minister of religious endowments (wazir al-awqaf) in Gaza, Isma'il Ridwan, commented in an interview to Iranian Fars News Agency that "Israel is attempting to unite Arabs against Iran."9 He referred to the Israeli government's efforts to improve ties with the Arab world against the backdrop of the Iranian threat. On the same day, Iranian Minister of Defense Hussein Dehqan declared that "a strong Iran is a factor of stability in the region."10 In addition to the usual statements of this kind, Dehqan also publicly attacked Saudi Arabia, describing support for Hamas as inseparable from support to Hizballah:

Why is the Saudi leadership trying to struggle against Iran which is an Islamic country instead of defending Palestine? [Why is it] allied with Israel and carrying out plans against the Muslims? How is it possible that Saudi Arabia has a banner of Islam and of the leadership of Islam, calls itself "khadim al-haramayn al-sharifayn" (servant of the holy places) and at the same time [it is] attacking on the ground and from air poor people of Yemen, sieging them, and prevents humanitarian aid? ....

The support of Iran to the movements of resistance is going on. Dehqan said America and "Israel" must remember that Hamas, Jihad (Islamic Jihad in Palestine), and Hizballah are able to deploy their strength and weapons themselves.11

While Iranian backing of both Hamas and Hizballah is reiterated, the depiction of their fire power as independent suggests that they don't really need Iranian assistance in terms of weaponry. At any rate, the riftwithin Hamas continues. Moreover, despite some tensions, both Iran and Hamas's military wing along with some members of Hamas's political branch will likely maintain relations. Thus, one cannot talk of a definitive "divorce" between Iran and Hamas.

CASE STUDY 2: AL-JAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA, THE LEBANESE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

While ties between the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, and Iran exist and are ongoing (with Hamas acting as the intermediary), these relations too have been strained by the Syrian civil war. Al- Jama'a al-Islamiyya officially emerged in 1964, when it opened its first offices in Beirut. Its roots date back to the 1950s, when Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Mustafa al-Siba'i took refuge in Lebanon and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi visited Lebanon.12

Former associate professor at the American University of Beirut A. Nizar Hamzeh noted in 1997 that al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was made up of 5,000 members and followed the Muslim Brotherhood doctrine.13 In 2009, the Masar Association's Kamal Shayya, Rania Sabaayon, Ghassan Makarem, Makram Kamel, and Mustafa Hazim compiled a report on Islamic movements in Lebanon. The report included a detailed outline of the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood's Lebanon branch.14 At the time of the report, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya was headed by Faysal Mawlawi, who died in 2011. As of the writing of this article, Azzam al-Ayoubi heads its political bureau, and Ibrahim Al-Masri serves as general secretary.

Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya's official line (to the pro-Iranian/pro-Assad al-Monitor) is that it opposes any intervention in Syria, claiming that the movement provides non-military assistance to the uprising.15

Ayoubi asserted that the Islamic Group is opposed to any Lebanese party joining the fighting in Syria, whether for or against the regime. This, according to him, "was due to the negative effect it would have on Lebanon, which is unable to withstand the results of such interference." He noted that, regardless, the Islamic Group has expressed media and political support for the Syrian revolution and embraced Syrian refugees. Aloush reiterated that the Islamic Group has supported the Syrian opposition via media outlets and assistance provided to refugees, but has not offered any form of armed support, such as transferring fighters or weapons into Syria. He also noted that the group has allocated the Shifaa Hospital in Tripoli to treat injured Syrian refugees in Lebanon."

In July 2015, Ayoubi was criticized by other Sunni groups for taking part in an Iftar meal with members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, as reported by Abu Dhabi's Erem News:16

Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon didn't miss the opportunity to accept an invitation to take part in an Iftar meal, which was hosted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, in Beirut's Southern suburbs. [The event was] under the umbrella of the Iranian Embassy and was attended by Sunni political leaders in Hizballah's orbit.

Al-Jama'a's participation via the head of its political bureau, Azzam al-Ayoubi, resulted in a wave of criticism from Sunni groups both within and outside Lebanon. [The critics] opposed him attending the Iftar [celebration] while Hizballah's military machine continues to fight in Syria and there is open Iranian support against the Syrian people-most of whom reject the regime led by Bashar al-Assad-and [claim] that this Iftar has "poisoned" the relationship between the al-Jama'a leadership [and Sunni groups].

It is noted that there have not been any [direct] meetings with al-Jama'a and Hizballah for two years, and [contact] has been limited to phone calls between officials in Lebanon's regions, though not reaching the top-rank [leaders].

Erem News learned that al-Jama'a's leadership recently discussed the issue of opening channels of communication with Hizballah [as well as] maintaining its position against fighters from the "Islamic Resistance" [Hizballah] taking part in the war going on in Syria.

Hamas leader Osama Hamdan was the intermediary between both sides and made progress, though both sides maintained their position on the Syrian struggle. Erem News has learned that an Iftar [meal] took place between the two sides at the beginning of Ramadan, in which 4 members of al-Jama'a's political bureau participated, as well as Hizballah leaders and [Osama] Hamdan. The discussions took place in a friendly atmosphere, with each side respecting each other's views, while disagreeing.

The anti-Hizballah Lebanese newspaper al-Nahar wrote that al-Ayoubi attended the Revolutionary Guards' Iftar celebration after al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya had made the decision by ballot.17

Al-Nahar has obtained information in which al-Jama'a's leadership stated that after a great deal of personal consideration, al-Ayoubi did not [plan to] attend the Revolutionary Guards' Iftar, but he did so after a vote by nearly all of the top-ranking leaders in both the political and general bureau, which is at the top of the al-Jama'a hierarchy. The decision to participate was also political and organizational, with the political and general bureau taking responsibility for it, not just al-Ayoubi himself. Therefore, if he himself hadn't attended, then somebody else representing him as head of the political bureau would have gone instead. What this means is that there would have been an al-Jama'a presence no matter who it was.

Thus anyone who believes al-Ayoubi went on his own under sufferance would be doing so in order to settle the score with him, nothing more.

The Gulf-based Arabi21 reported that the Iranian ambassador in Lebanon had met with al-Jama'a General Secretary Ibrahim al-Masri:

According to an official statement issued by al-Jama'a, obtained by Arabi21, al-Jama'a General Secretary Ibrahim al-Masri and the leadership on Thursday received Ambassador Fatah Ali along with a number of advisors from the embassy.

The statement pointed out that the meeting was an opportunity to get acquainted [with each other's views]. And in the meeting they examined the events and developments going on in Lebanon and the surrounding Islamic area. And there was assertion of the need for serious efforts to be made to end the crises from which the region is suffering, including stopping the bloodshed and making sure those lying in wait don't have the opportunity [to attack] the Umma.

Observers didn't view the meeting as just one of protocols but nothing was determined as a result of it. A source close to al-Jama'a told Arabi21 that they were worried that this meeting would provoke some of the Sunnis, specifically those who support the Syrian Revolution, owing to their hostile positions towards Iran and its role in the region.

Al Jama'a's Head of Media Relations Wael Najam confirmed that the visit could provoke the Sunni arena in Lebanon or [at least] part of it. This is natural and understood in light of the rejection of Iran's stances in Lebanon and Syria.

At the same time, Najam confirmed that al-Jama'a hadn't severed ties with the Iranian embassy in Beirut, knowing that the Iranian ambassador was the one who took the initiative in requesting to visit, and making clear his desire to do so. For al-Jama'a it was inconceivable to sever ties with any side, and it doesn't reject any request to meet with [any] one.18

OTHER REGIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD BRANCHES AND IRAN

Other Muslim Brotherhood branches take a less ambiguously hostile stance toward Iran. For obvious reasons, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is prominent among these. Iran reciprocates this stance. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood does not exist as such in the eyes of Iran, and it is considered an integral part of takfiris who are fighting Iran and Assad.

The Syrian Brotherhood harshly condemned Iranian political intervention in Bahrain.19 Still, it should be noted that this condemnation was formulated "politely," without any obvious insulting references to Shi'a. Nevertheless, an article claimed that Hamas attempted to mediate a truce between Iran and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in the early days of the Syrian civil war. Hamas, according to the article, was able to mediate because of its unique position of having good channels both to the Syrian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the effort failed.20

The Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain is also clearly anti-Iranian. The moderate conservative Iranian media outlet Fararu reported that the Bahraini branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Manbar al-Watani, condemned Iran after Khamane'i mentioned the oppressed people of Bahrain among other oppressed Muslims during his sermon in honor of Id al-Fitr.21

The Brotherhood in Yemen is also clearly situated in the anti-Iranian camp. Any cooperation with Tehran is ruled out. The Muslim Brotherhood there is being wooed by the Saudis in order to get it to participate in the fight against the Iranian-backed Zaydi Houthis.

Overall, Iran has no illusions about the MB with regard to the Iranian regime and the Shi'a in general. Iranian analysts are aware that though the Brotherhood is not the Islamic State, al-Qa'ida, or any other "takfiri" group, the boundaries are very murky. At the same time, as mentioned above, the Iranians remain aware of their similarities in ideology with the Muslim Brotherhood and the consequent dilemma.

As several Iranian analysts of Middle Eastern affairs summed it up, "On the one hand, we see that the Muslim Brotherhood has an ideology that is the closest to the Islamic Revolution, but on the other hand, we must face the fact that they don't have clear boundaries with the takfiri Salafis."22

CONCLUSION

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Republic of Iran have some common ideology, which is acknowledged by both sides. This has at times enabled close relations (as with the strategic relationship between Hamas and Iran) and ongoing friendly relations (as with Jama'a Islamiyya in Lebanon), in spite of the direct confrontation taking place in Syria between the two. The Iranians regard their main regional enemies as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and as such are aware that the Brotherhood has the same enemies.

Nevertheless, the reality of sectarian rivalries in the region has prevented relations from growing closer. Hamas's attempts to distance itself from Iran after the outbreak of the war in Syria exemplify this reality. Iran has experienced difficulties building strong alliances outside of Shi'i communities in the Arab world. This reality is likely to prevent a broad alliance between Muslim Brotherhood branches and Iran, though communication and occasional cooperation will likely continue.

Footnote

NOTES

1 Yusuf Qazi Zadeh, "Ties Between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Revolution," Tebyan.net, November 20, 1389 (2010), http://www.tebyan.net/newmobile.aspx?pid=155245.

2 "The Muslim Brotherhood and Iran over the History," Website of Hadi Khosrowshahi, http://www.khosroshahi.org/main/index.php?Page=definition&UID=3886353.

3 "Ibrahim Mounir, Secretary General of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: There Is No Dialogue Between the Group and the Regime, After the Coup d'état Our Popularity Increased by 70%," al-Quds al-Arabi, July 29, 2015, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=379623.

4 "Big Disgrace to the Brotherhood: Leaders of the Group Pay a Secret Visit to Iran Following 'the Decisive Storm Operation,'" al-Yawm al-Sabi, June 29, 2015, http://goo.gl/iw6RRy.

5 Following is a link to the French Radio in Persian, which cites research by the Pentagon in which the MOIS is said to be implicated in various forms of assistance to Hamas: "Pentagon's Report About MOIS of Iran," Radio France Internationale, January 4, 2013, http://goo.gl/gMeZyU.

6 "The al-Qassam Brigades Take Orders from Iran and Not from Hamas," al-Arabiya, November 29, 2012, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/29/252488.html.

7 Mehdi Khosrovi, "Iran, Hamas, or Saudi Arabia?" Mardomsalari, September 3, 2015, http://mardomsalari.com/Template1/News.aspx?NID=224700.

8 "Iran Underlines Strong Support for Palestinian Hamas," FARS News Agency, August 26, 2015, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940604001262.

9 "Hamas High-Ranking Official: Israel Attempts to Unite the Arabs Against Iran," September 2, 2015, FARS News Agency, http://arabic.farsnews.com/allstories/news/13940611001011.

10 "Brigadier-General Dehqan: Strong Iran Is a Factor of Stability in the Region," September 2, 2015, FARS News Agency, http://arabic.farsnews.com/iran/news/13940611000154.

11 "Dehqan: We Will Never Abstain from Backing the Movements That Support the Resistance," Tasnim News, August 2, 2015, http://goo.gl/NSc6ki.

12 Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyah Official Website, http://www.al-jamaa.org/pageother.php?catsmktba=15.

13 A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide to the Groups," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1997), http://www.meforum.org/362/islamism-in-lebanon-a-guide-to-the-groups.

14 Islamic Movements in Lebanon, Masar Association, August 2009, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/06882.pdf.

15 "Head of Lebanon's Islamic Group Opposes Any Intervention in Syria," Al-Monitor, April 29, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/lebanon-islamic-group-hezbollah-saudi-arabia.html#.

16 Erem News, July 7, 2015, http://www.eremnews.com/politics/arab-politics/309828.

17 Al-Nahar, July 7, 2015, http://bit.ly/1H8znLw.

18 "Iran Contacts the Muslim Brotherhood to Discuss the Syrian Crisis," Arabi21, August 6, 2015, http://bit.ly/1EipgZF.

19 "Condemnation of the Iranian Statements Concerning Our Brethren in Bahrain," Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Website, July 20, 2015, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/Portals/Content/?Name=%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%20%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%20%D8%A3%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%86%D8%A7%20%D9%81%D9%8A%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86&info=YVdROU5EWTBNRFFtYzI5MWNtTmxQVk4xWWxCaFoyVW1kSGx3WlQweEpuaHRiR2xrUFRJeU9EVXhKZz09K3U=.Syr.

20 Borzu Daragahi, "Iran's Intervention in Syria Is Bold, Unprecedented and Possibly a Disaster," August 17, 2015, http://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/inside-irans-bold-unprecedented-intervention-in-syria#.kg67yoKX1.

21 "The Bahraini MB's Position Against Iran," Fararu, August 25, 2015, http://goo.gl/0atCw7.

22 "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Supporters of the Islamic Revolution or the Closest to the SalafiTakfiris," http://www.monazereh.ir/v-994.htm.