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Abstract
Neuroethics is a burgeoning field of scientific-philosophical investigation that is becoming a genuine interdisciplinary area of study. This is because neuroscience offers a unique window into what it means to be human, explaining, at least to some extent, the important difference between the brain and the mind. Among the many fascinating topics in neuroethics is the neuroscience of free will and the nature of moral responsibility. Many contemporary philosophers are considered compatibilists, arguing that human beings are not truly free because their actions are completely determined by the material processes of the brain. However, if conscious willing is illusory or simply an epiphenomenon, both compatibilist and incompatibilist accounts of free will are erroneous. A great deal of scientific evidence and philosophical reflection suggest that, despite all the difficulties we experience in explaining free will, we do not unconsciously cause our actions.
Key words: neuroethics, free will, quantum mechanics, mental causation
Introduction
One of the more fascinating areas of study in neuroethics concerns the neurobiology of free will. Several neuroscientists claim that the experience of free will is just an epiphenomenal illusion, with underlying neural processes causally sufficient to explain the mental states that correspond with volitional action. Others contend that consciousness is simply the state neurons are in when a person is alert, with any temporal gap during the decision-making process reflecting the accompanying molecular activity located at lower levels of the brain. Personal experience suggests, however, that our states of mind are not completely determined by neural events. Indeed, material determinism fails to acknowledge the numinous qualities of the mind and thus threatens to change what it means to be human.
Here I speculate on the significance of the temporal gap separating pre-action neural activity from the conscious awareness of decisions to act, reviewing and critiquing Benjamin Libet's seminal studies in this area. Then I comment on the feasibility of recourse to quantum mechanics to explain the indeterminacy of free will, arguing that mental causation cannot be explained in exclusively physical terms. While external evidence provides ample proof of regularities or patterns in natural events, as well as predictability among the succession of events in nature, the causality associated with free will is unique. Since the top-down causation of free volitional activity...