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Kant's legal and political philosophy has in recent years enjoyed something of a renaissance. One of the latest contributions in this regard is Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka.1 In line with a growing number of scholars, the authors identify the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals as key to his position on the subject and provide a methodical and in-depth analysis of the 1797 work. Their main aim is to explain 'Kant's system of individual rights' presented here, as well as his 'idea of the state which provides the apparatus for ensuring these rights' (2) to show how and why this previously often overlooked work gives us his most coherent deliberations on law and politics. But whereas I am in full agreement with the authors on this important claim, I am--as I later will go on to argue--in some disagreement with quite a few of their interpretations.
As one would expect, the Commentary is a thorough investigation of what the authors hold to be the chief constituents of the Doctrine of Right and pays close attention to details during the span of its 300 pages. Bar extensive comparisons to Achenwall, references to past and present scholarly discussions, even to Kant's earlier texts, have been cut to a minimum. The scholar or student interested in a basic introduction to his philosophy of right might want to search elsewhere; the book does not stray far from the original sections and presupposes a fairly good knowledge of the subject beforehand. Appropriately, it demands a lot from the reader as it delves into the minutiae of the work.2
Byrd and Hruschka are at their most convincing when they go into the finer details of the Doctrine of Right to highlight its ingenuity, even as compared to Kant's earlier writings. Due emphasis is given to the discussion of private right with its new justification of property relations. This is first and only accomplished by Kant in this work and not possible to deduce from previous publications. Seeing that the very form of rightful relations between human beings stems from the concept of external freedom and its subsequent application to matters of choice addressed in...