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I. Introduction
The U.S. Constitution is widely regarded as the preeminent historical expression of philosophical liberalism, a conception of man and society that emerged in seventeenth-century England. If the fundamental assumptions and ultimate aims of liberalism were ever clear, they are no longer, for liberalism has reached a point of internal divisions at multiple levels. Some of today's self-styled liberals argue that reason can approximate objective moral truth, while others profess varieties of moral conventionalism and skepticism. Some liberals argue for a perfectionist state, a state actively concerned with the beliefs and attitudes of its people, while others insist that liberalism's essence is neutrality among conceptions of virtue and the good life. Some liberals worry about the "size" of government, while others worry about the competence of government.
One part of these debates about the nature of liberalism is the nature of rights in a liberal state--specifically whether a properly liberal understanding of government can admit a constitutional obligation to provide positive rights or, as I prefer, welfare rights, like rights to health care and education. I contend here that if the American Constitution qualifies as a liberal constitution, liberal governments can indeed be obligated to secure welfare rights. I support this contention here by reinforcing arguments I have made elsewhere for a welfarist view of the Constitution and by submitting additional arguments against limiting liberalism to protecting negative rights.
II. Welfare and the Constitution
I begin by sketching a positive view of the Constitution that fits the constitutional text and the leading argument for ratification. Here I consider questions of constitutional meaning from the perspective of citizens who accept the Constitution's authority. I assume what other writers have shown to be the metaphysical and epistemological beliefs of this perspective. I expect most readers of this essay will assume as I do here, and as I have argued elsewhere, that there are, or at least may be, better and worse understandings of what the Constitution means and what it requires in practice, as measured by something other than personal preferences and conventional beliefs. I expect also that most readers will find that my principal moral conclusions, defended at length elsewhere, require little more than deflation of textual and historical excuses for avoiding moral arguments altogether....