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The Moltke Myth: Prussian War Planning, 1857-1871. By Terence Zuber. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2008. ISBN 978-0-7618-4161-6. Maps. Figures. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. via, 330. $45.00.
Terrence Zuber, best known for his critique of the Schlieffen Plan, takes on another sacred cow in this analysis of Prussian military planning during the Wars of German Unification. This time his target is Helmuth Von Moltke. Zuber proposes to challenge "the orthodox opinion that Moltke was a military genius" (p. vii). He describes a "Moltke myth" based on the idea that "Great Men make military history" (p. 3). He credits its genesis to the Second Empire's need for a hero, and to the General Staff's self-referencing solipsism.
All of these hypotheses are reasonable per se. No less reasonable are Zuber's presentations of Moltke's specific shortcomings. Overlooking the importance of intelligence; predicating his operational plans on rapid mobilization and concentration, thereby forcing a diplomatically aggressive state policy; failing to control and coordinate subordinate formations in the field. These strictures are more familiar than Zuber concedes. Nor is his argument that in 1866 and 1870-71 Moltke was favored by obliging enemies exactly...