The myth of democratic failure: Why political institutions are efficient

The myth of democratic failure: Why political institutions are efficient. By DONALD A. WITTMAN. American Politics and Political Economy series. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. ix, 229. $29.95. ISBN -226-90422-9. JEL 96-0060

At a time when Americans are becoming increasingly disgusted with politicians and when even the Democratic president proclaims that the "era of big government is over," Donald Wittman proposes a startling thesis. Democratic political "markets" lead to wealth-maximizing outcomes, perhaps just as well as competitive economic markets. Because the author realizes that most readers will undoubtedly approach the book with a great deal of skepticism after reading the title, he eschews a direct proof of his hypothesis, and instead constructs his argument as one would a proof-by-contradiction. If the underlying assumptions of one's criticisms of the efficient political market are wrong, Wittman contends, then maybe democratic government is not so bad for economic growth after all. Preemptively striking down his readers' preconceived ideas of how politics can lead to economic inefficiency proves to be an effective rhetorical strategy in this setting. While some readers are sure to disagree, perhaps fervently, with the author's strong conclusions regarding the efficiency of government, the book makes an important step toward understanding what political factors influence economic performance, why government institutions are constructed the way they are, and why the government has grown so dramatically in the past century. Unfortunately, Wittman does not tackle the controversial issue of why the latter has taken place.

In the first part of...