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Abstract
In this paper I seek to understand if G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument succeeds in refuting every sort of ethical naturalism; namely, I intend to see if there is any version of the argument that can be used to refute a non-reductionist view, such as Cornell realism. For that purpose, I shall evaluate the argument either in its original formulation, either in a reformulation with a broader scope presented by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in different articles.
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