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ON V-E Day, 8 May 1945, the Western Allies declared an end to World War II in Europe and halted their drives across Germany and Central Europe at the Line of Demarcation, which had been determined by agreement between General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) and the Soviet Army high command. During the preceding days, an intense drama took place over the cessation of hostilities in Czechoslovakia, involving Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and Eisenhower. The dispute mainly concerned which force-American or Soviet-would liberate Czechoslovakia, particularly the city of Prague, located on the Vltava (Moldau) River. Some of the principals did not want a cease-fire until American soldiers had made further territorial gains in the country, while others wanted the armies to stop at the line then being negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, which gave the Soviets the responsibility for liberating most of Czechoslovakia, including Prague.
Disagreements about the pursuit of U.S. military operations in Czechoslovakia reflected basic policy differences among the Western Allies. Truman and Marshall focused increasingly on Pacific operations as the hostilities in Europe were winding down. Eisenhower was concerned primarily with ending the war in Europe as quickly as possible. However, the British military and civilian hierarchies, especially Churchill, strongly urged that U.S. forces advance to Prague. The U.S. State Department and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) leaned toward the British viewpoint.
Secretary of State Stettinius advised Truman on 23 April 1945 of the British Foreign Office position that it would be "most desirable politically for Prague to be liberated by the United States Army."1 On 28 April, Marshall forwarded to Eisenhower the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, which emphasized the political advantages of Prague being liberated by Western rather than Soviet troops. Marshall added that, aside from the military implications, he would be "loathe to hazard American lives for purely political purposes." The next day Eisenhower replied to Marshall that he would not make any militarily unwise move merely to gain political objectives unless he received "specific orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff."2 Acting Secretary of State Joseph...