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The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57, by Ray Takeyh. Basingstoke, London and New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. xix +159 pages. Notes to p. 188. Bibl. to p. 207. Index to p. 216. $65.
Reviewed by Jon B. Alterman
One might reasonably ask whether we need another book on the US-Egyptian relationship in the 1950s. The Suez Crisis has been studied exhaustively, and many of the principal actors from the political and intelligence worlds involved in it have written their memoirs. In his recent book, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57, Ray Takeyh makes the case convincingly that there is much more to understand about this failed relationship. While this book does not represent the final word on the subject, it nonetheless advances our understanding in some important areas.
Takeyh argues that the US-Egyptian relationship descended into animosity because of an "inherent conflict between a super-power focused on curbing Soviet moves and a local regime preoccupied with regional challenges" (p. ix). He views post-Second World War Arab nationalism as a force inherently incompatible with American global interests, and argues that it was not until 1957, with the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, that the United States came to understand this. The author concentrates mainly on the American side of this equation, and sketches out how US strategic planners thought about and ultimately gave up hope on accommodation with Jamal `Abd al-Nasir's Egypt.
One of the author's greatest contributions is the amount of new information he has uncovered about Operation Omega, a covert British-American plan to isolate and perhaps overthrow Jamal `Abd al-Nasir beginning in March 1956. As Takeyh indicates, the proximate impetus for Omega was Egypt's failure to respond positively to secret presidential envoy Robert Anderson's effort to strike...