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ABSTRACT: Plato's epistemology is closely related to his metaphysics and ethics. The basic reason for this is that Plato thinks that knowledge (...)-in at least one of the senses in which he uses this word-requires explanation. Fully adequate explanation must refer to what is metaphysically primary. The Form of the Good is metaphysically primary. Hence, fully adequate explanation must be teleological. This paper endeavors to clarify these fundamental points through an examination of Plato's treatment of knowledge in three dialogues: Meno, Theaetetus, and Republic.
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I. Introduction
Plato's epistemology is closely related to his metaphysics and ethics. The basic reason for this is that Plato thinks that knowledge (...)-in at least one of the senses in which he uses this word- requires explanation. Fully adequate explanation must refer to what is metaphysically primary. The Form of the Good is metaphysically primary. Hence, fully adequate explanation must be teleological. This paper endeavors to clarify these fundamental points.1
Various dialogues variously engage the question "What is knowledge?" Some do so directly, some obliquely. Some present sustained examinations; some discuss the question brief ly. Some offer positive results; some end in aporia. The following sections principally focus on Plato's treatments of knowledge in three dialogues: Meno, Theaetetus, and Republic. In each case, Plato has Socrates develop some distinction between knowledge and belief (...). The treatments in Meno and Theaetetus are closely related. I discuss their relations and suggest how the discussion in Theaetetus supersedes the discussion in Meno in certain respects, even while the Theaetetus discussion ends in aporia. Discussions in Republic, in particular in Republic 5, but also Republic 6 and 7, appear to stand in sharp contrast to the Meno and Theaetetus treatments. In Meno and Theaetetus, knowledge is explained as a kind of belief, namely, true belief with some additional component. In Republic 5, 6, and 7 knowledge and belief appear to be treated as exclusive. I will refer to the disparity between the treatments of knowledge in Meno and Theaetetus, on the one hand, and in Republic 5, 6, and 7, on the other hand, as the basic interpretive problem. The question is whether the basic interpretive problem can be resolved by showing that the treatments of...