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Key Words: terrorism, psychological profile, terrorists, prevention protocol
Abstract
This article proposes a psychological framework for understanding the minds of terrorists based on scientific analysis of actuarial data, psychological analysis of multiple sources, and synthesis of existing reports from around the world. This study explores the likely psychological makeup of terrorists and their motivations based on the evidence of their actions, selection of means, selection of targets, public statements, and characteristic histories. The discussion of a psychological profile in this study is offered in the context-of its use in efforts aimed at greater security and terrorism prevention strategies. The framework is offered in conjunction with a thrust to develop a set of national terrorism prevention protocols, which will effectively address the challenges presented by the threats of domestic and international terrorism on U.S. soil and in international arenas.
The Need for Psychological Profiling of Terrorists
News media and professionals in the field continue 10 report serious problems with existing terrorism prevention efforts. Failure of police and intelligence agencies to properly use tacit knowledge routinely leads ro ineffective technology use for the task of terrorism prevention Clenner, 2001; Vaisman-Tzachor, 2005). Cross definition errors, particularly regarding the likely means for a terrorist attack, inevitably lead to unsuccessful efforts in terrorism prevention.
Existing preventive protocols have also been plagued by designers failures to understand the difference between knowledge-based, scientifically derived preventive efforts and those, that are guided by heuristics (mental short-cuts). [For a complete discussion of this concept, please read in Kahneman & Tversky (1972, 1973; 1979, 1982).] Those responsible for creating procedures for terrorism prevention are unfortunately often guided by images of horror movies and a general sense of vulnerability (Navarro, 2004). Furthermore, those assigned to implement terrorism prevention procedures often do not know what types of people to look for. Instead, they apply the same preventive efforts to different situations in a cookie-cutter style, which renders them ineffective, costly, time consuming, and easily disrupted (Ripley, 2004; Crumley, 2003).
It has been noted and widely documented (Garfinkel, 2001; Hogan, 2001; Vaisman-Tzachor, 1991; 1997; 2004) that available technologies and procedures routinely used around the world by other prevention agencies are not put to use in the United Stales where and when they should be (e.g., pre-flight...