THE QUALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA S ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1994-2014: FREEDOM, FLAWS AND FOOD PARCELS

Abstract

South Africa has consolidated its democracy with five national and provincial elections, all of which have been labelled by international and domestic observers as 'free and fair'. However, this label does not reveal the quality of electoral accountability in South Africa over its twenty years as a democracy. Therefore, this article examines the quality of electoral accountability through examining two criteria: the extent to which elections are free and fair and the democratic role of political parties. Findings reveal that while logistical and other problems continue to persist, the election process is well managed and violence relatively minimal. The real challenges seem to exist around the continued dominance of the ANC party, the lack of disclosure of private party funding and the lack of accountability that results from the closed list aspect of the proportionality system.

Headnote

South Africa has consolidated its democracy with five national and provincial elections, all of which have been labelled by international and domestic observers as 'free and fair'. However, this label does not reveal the quality of electoral accountability in South Africa over its twenty years as a democracy. Therefore, this article examines the quality of electoral accountability through examining two criteria: the extent to which elections are free and fair and the democratic role of political parties. Findings reveal that while logistical and other problems continue to persist, the election process is well managed and violence relatively minimal. The real challenges seem to exist around the continued dominance of the ANC party, the lack of disclosure of private party funding and the lack of accountability that results from the closed list aspect of the proportionality system.

Key words: free and fair elections, electoral accountability, democracy, political parties, Independent Electoral Commission.

i Introduction

In April 1994 South Africa's first non-racial multiparty election took place. It marked an official end to the country's segregationist and authoritarian past and ushered in a new democracy, delivering not only the universal franchise but also formal equality before the law, avenues for citizen participation in governance and statutory institutions buttressing democracy (Muthien, Khosa and Magubane 2000). Twenty years later, on the 7th May 2014, South Africa fully consolidated its status as a young democracy when it witnessed its fifth national and provincial elections. All elections thus far have been declared 'free and fair' by a host of international and national election observers,2 but does this label necessarily reflect substantive electoral accountability in the country? In other words, to what degree have elections been free and fair and to what extent has the electoral system supported the deepening of democracy in South Africa over the past twenty years?

Electoral accountability, expressed through the act of free and fair elections and the contribution of political parties to the electoral process, is innate in a representative democracy.* * 3 So important are elections that, as Lindberg (2006, 1) notes, "Every modern definition of representative democracy includes participatory and contested elections perceived as the legitimate procedure for translation of rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power." After all, "it is through the ability of citizens, at regular elections, to retain or dismiss their elected representatives ... that the principle of popular control is made flesh" (Beetham, Byrne, Ngan and Weir 2002, 85). Through elections, citizens can make demands on their leaders which in turn implies the obligation that elected political leaders have to behave properly and lawfully or answer to the voters for their political decisions (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Political parties simplify the choices the public has to make by offering broad policies and different sets of politicians to choose between and in this way strengthen electoral accountability (Beetham et al. 2002).

However, it has also been noted that the holding of elections does not necessarily translate into good quality democracy. That is, while electoral democracies might be classified as democratic by virtue of the existence of elections, this does not guarantee that all traditional attributes of democracy are being adhered to (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). They may, in truth, be lacking in respect of a number of societal freedoms, such as poor civil liberties regimes, limited societal toleration, corruption, crime and violence.

In light of this scholars have increasingly turned their attention to ascertaining how well countries are sustaining their democracies by assessing the quality of their democracy (see, for example, Altman and Perez-Linan 2002, 85-100; Morlino 2011). Questions of degree are asked as to the various strengths and weaknesses that exist with the goal of determining how democracies can be improved and deepened (Beetham 2004; Beetham, Carvalho, Landman and Weir 2008). That is, to what degree are state democratic procedures experienced and the essential democratic principles realised? (Baker 1999, 273-274). For example, to what degree is the government committed to democratic values or to what extent do women and minorities participate in the politics of the state? This element of 'degree' helps to capture the overall quality of democracy within a state.

2 The quality of south Africa's electoral accountability

In examining the quality of South Africa's electoral accountability, this article examines the extent to which elections are held in a regular, universal, free and fair manner as well as the extent to which the existing party system is able to assist in the working of democracy. The criteria for assessment are derived from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's State of Democracy Framework (International IDEA 2010) and Leonardo Morlino's Tool for Empirical Research on Democratic Qualities (Morlino 2011). In pursuit of the first consideration the following indicators are examined: A comprehensive and constitutional legal framework as a foundation for free and fair elections; the efficiency, accountability, transparency and impartiality of the electoral management body (EMB); the degree to which the electoral climate is free from political violence and intimidation; electoral participation and the transparency and timeliness of registration and voting procedures; voting day issues; the degree of acceptance of the result by the government and the electorate; and media coverage of elections throughout the election phase. With regard to the second consideration, the democratic role of political parties, three aspects are discussed: the transparency of party financing and regulations that govern such financing; the prevalence of a stable and competitive multiparty system and the degree of alternation in government; and the proportionality of the electoral system.

2.1 A comprehensive and constitutional legal framework as a foundation for free and fair elections

Over the decades few have been able to agree on what constitutes standardised assessment criteria for a 'free and fair' election for several reasons not least of which is the difficulty of distinguishing between the concepts 'freedom' and 'fairness' (see Elklit and Reynolds 2005, 147-162). Nevertheless, this label is still used widely as an overall description and/or evaluation of elections to determine whether the playing field is level (Fakir and Holland 2010). Moreover, to address this 'vagueness' the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and Observation (PEMMO) in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region were introduced in 2003 as guidelines for election observers (EISA 2004).

As a member of the SADC, South Africa is committed to upholding these electoral principles as well as those of the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF), African Union (AU), the EISA, the SADC Electoral Support Network, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum, namely:

* The need for a comprehensive and constitutional legal framework;

* The importance of transparent and accessible pre-election procedures (including the delimitation process, voter registration and candidate nomination);

* The equitable use of the media and public resources and issues of political party finance;

* The organisation and management of the election phase, including the location of polling stations, their layout, and access to them; the secrecy of the ballot, and the counting process;

* The post-election phase, including the settlement of election disputes and ways of ensuring that results are acceptable; and

* The requirements for unhindered, credible, professional and impartial monitoring and observation of the electoral process.

As per the guidelines, it is essential that the necessary legal and institutional frameworks are in place to serve as the "basis for the conduct and delivery of free, fair, credible and legitimate elections" (EISA 2004, 7). In South Africa, three Acts came into being prior to the first elections to govern the conduct and implementation of the national and provincial elections: the 1993 Electoral Act (amended in the Electoral Act No. 73 of 1998), the 1993 Independent Electoral Commission Act and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act of 1993. In accordance with the Constitution, elections are held every five years using the proportional representation electoral model. The Municipal Electoral Act No. 27 of 2000 defines the legal framework for local or municipal government elections.

2.2 The efficiency, accountability, transparency and impartiality of the electoral management body

The Electoral Commission, more commonly known as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), was established through the aforementioned IEC Act of 1993. The IEC is South Africa's EMB responsible for facilitating and overseeing the entire voting process and ensuring that the elections are free and fair. Mandated to be "impartial" and to "exercise its powers and perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice" in Chapter 2 of the Electoral Commission Act No. 51 of 1996, the IEC is accountable to the National Assembly and must report on its activities and performance annually (section 181(5) of the Constitution). Apart from the duties prescribed in the Constitution and noted above, section 5(1) of the Electoral Commission Act lists numerous additional responsibilities for the IEC including the compilation and maintenance of a voters' roll, the promotion of voter education and the adjudication of administrative disputes that may arise from the organisation, administration or conducting of elections.

The IEC only came into being in December 1993, giving it just four months to confront the extremely challenging task of establishing itself and organising the April 1994 national and provincial elections (Commonwealth Observer Group 1994). The tight time limit, together with the lack of experienced staff, none of which had ever run an election for the whole country before, meant that the IEC was ill prepared for the 1994 elections (Friedman 1994). Since then, however, the IEC has become widely regarded as independent, impartial, consultative and transparent in its decision-making processed (see, for example, SADC Parliamentary Forum 2009). Moreover, since the 1994 elections, it has been consistently very well respected in for its efficiency, professionalism and perceived integrity (AU Observer Mission 2009). A survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 2011 found that 73% of respondents 'trusted' or 'strongly trusted' the IEC,4 although 56% indicated that their amount of knowledge about the IEC remained limited and 17% responded that they did not know about the IEC at all (HSRC 2011).

A few months prior to the 2014 election, the integrity of the IEC came under intense pressure when a report published by the Public Protector found that the IEC's chairperson, Pansy Tlakula, had acted unfairly and in a non-transparent way over the procurement of an IEC office building. Four opposition parties took her to the Electoral Court calling for her resignation and contending that "the level of integrity and ethics in the IEC had evaporated, placing oversight of the elections at risk, and calling the whole organisation into doubt" (City Press, March 27, 2014).5 The Court postponed the matter citing a lack of time to make a recommendation before the elections were held. It is yet to be seen whether or not this event has damaged the public's trust in the IEC. In the 2014 election the IEC received an unprecedented 400 complaints from opposition parties about alleged irregularities on or before election day, including an accusation of IEC officials "looking the other way" when African National Congress (ANC) members allegedly breached electoral rules forbidding campaigning near voting stations. Most of the complaints, however, were explained quickly away and international observer missions commended the IEC for its handling of a credible, fair, free and transparent election (African Union 2014). AU mission leader and former Ghana president John Kufuor was quoted as saying that the IEC deserved a B++ for the "overall professionalism and efficiency" of its 218000 staffers deployed in its 22 000 polling stations (Mbanjwa 2014).

2.3 The degree to which the electoral climate is free from political violence and intimidation

Since the first democratic elections in 1994, there have been four national and provincial elections (in 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) and four local or municipal elections (1995, 2000, 2006, and 2011). During these election times violence has cast a shadow over their success. Historically, the KwaZulu-Natal region has been the most volatile related to election violence particularly in 1994. During the six months prior to the 1994 elections, an average of 300 people died per month in Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)-ANC clashes in this province contributing to a voting environment characterised by intimidation and fear (Daniel and Southall 2009).

Although incidents of violence in this and other provinces have marred every election since, it is nevertheless also evident that the levels of violence have declined with each consecutive election. According to official IEC statistics, conflict cases in the national and provincial elections in 1994 (in which over 1000 people were killed) dropped from 3 594 in 1994 to 1114 in 1999 (with the number of people killed less than 100) to 2536 in 2004 (Piper 2005). Importantly, no election-related deaths were reported in the 2004 elections with only 34 of the 253 cases related to harassment, violence or intimidation.7 Relatively few cases of violence were recorded in the 2009 election period and 2011 municipal elections. Although several incidents of intolerance8 and violent clashes between the IFP and ANC in KwaZulu-Natal were reported in the 2009 elections, these were at times exaggerated (most likely for political gain) and were, in fact, isolated incidents that did not "amount to a crisis" when compared to the region's previous historical record.9 In the 2014 election two people in Kwazulu Natal were involved in shooting incidents related to election violence and one of the two was killed. On the night before the elections, voting tents were set on fire in Bekkersdal township (South-West Johannesburg) as disillusioned residents protested over the ANC's inability to provide enough employment One person was killed and more than 100 arrested when EFF and IFP supporters took to the streets of Alexandra township (North Gauteng) demanding a re-vote, with some claiming that the poll was rigged. IEC offices were also set alight (Chauke 2014). The tensions in Alexandra could be attributed to antagonism between the EFF, IFP and the ANC.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned township protests in the 2014 elections, the consistent reduction in election violence generally has been significant enough to prompt some political academics to refer to a change in the nation's political culture as "shift[ing] away from the bullet to the ballot as the preferred and accepted means of settling disputes" (Daniel and Southall 2009, 242). It is attributed largely to the IEC's conflict management programmes which have developed with each consecutive election and through which the IEC attempts to resolve any disputes between parties using mediation and delivering rulings. Central to the programmes are the conflict management panels; the Multiparty Liaison Committees and Electoral Court all created to promote conflict-free elections (Fakir, Ngidi and Letsholo 2009).

In the interest of ensuring non-violence, all registered parties are required by the IEC to sign the Electoral Code of Conduct, which, inter alia, prohibits them (as well as their candidates, representatives, members and supporters) from using violence, intimidation and defamation in their campaigning and other election activities. Moreover, a 2003 amendment10 to the Electoral Act No. 73 of 1998 gave the IEC formal and legal rights to enforce the Code, thus, contravention carries serious legal penalties and sanctions including the barring of a political party's candidate from participating in an election.* 11

2.4 Electoral participation and the transparency and timeliness of registration and voting procedures

The election procedure during the first election period in 1994 was considered shambolic in many ways. There was no voters' roll and areas that had been particularly neglected by apartheid proved almost inaccessible with no infrastructure to facilitate the carrying out of elections (Friedman 2014). Officials had to guess the number of people that would turn up to vote, often miscalculating and falling far short of required election materials. A voters' roll has been used in all subsequent elections. The Electoral Commission Act sets out the relevant provisions for voter registration. In terms of this legislation, the IEC is wholly responsible for compiling and maintaining voters' rolls. The IEC is also mandated to promote voter education (section 5(l)(k)).

Every adult citizen over the age of 18 has the right to vote, in secret, as guaranteed by section 19(3) of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Noncitizens and people who have been declared by the High Court to be of unsound mind or mentally disordered are not allowed to register as voters (section 8 of the Electoral Act No. 73 of 1998). Also, prior to the 2004 elections, only those prisoners with an option of a fine were allowed to register and vote in terms of the Electoral Act. This has since changed with the result that all prisoners can now register to vote. In the 1994 and 1999 elections, South Africans living abroad were able to vote, however the Electoral Laws Amendment Act, passed before the 2004 elections, disenfranchised these South Africans. Following a Constitutional Court ruling just prior to the 2009 national elections, the right to vote was returned to all South Africans living overseas. In 2014, over 18 000 overseas voters cast their vote a week prior the election.

Section 33 of the Electoral Act provides an opportunity for certain categories of voters, including pregnant women and people with physical infirmities or disabilities, to cast 'special votes' typically two days prior to the election date. In its 2009 Observer Mission report, the SADC Parliamentary Forum highly commended these measures for intending to ensure that "all persons who are qualified and willing to vote are afforded the opportunity" (SADC Parliamentary Forum 2009, 6).

Despite not being very highly publicised,12 voter registration is a continuous process (that is, registration takes place throughout the year not just during election periods) and has resulted in a regularly updated, more accurate and comprehensive register. The IEC has provincial electoral offices in each of South Africa's provinces and 237 municipal electoral offices in municipalities across the country with the result that there is considerable access for citizens to register.

In the months preceding each election the IEC holds 'registration drives' over weekends to enable new registrations or amendments to existing registrations (Wall 2010). As part of these drives, the IEC undertakes special 'targeted' campaigns, which are put in place to motivate certain groups in society to register, such as the youth and indigenous communities. Historically, there has been a disparity between the youth population and those registered to vote. However the bulk of new registrations in 2008 and 2009 came from the youth (aged 20-29) with 78% of newly registered voters under the age of 30 (February 2009). This prominent increase in young voters was attributed mainly to party drives by the participating political parties; a vigorous advertising campaign by the IEC urging people to vote; and, with the inclusion of the break-away party - Congress of the People (COPE), a generally more dynamic election landscape than in the 2004 elections (Ajulu 2010). Additionally, it is possible that it could be an indication of a newly aware youth population or it could be as a result of the IEC's use of technology to reach potential young voters who tend to use this means of communication the most. For example, in the 2009 national elections, voters could check their registration status via short message service (sms) and helpful registration and voting information was readily available online (February 2009, 60). Prior to the 2014 elections, only 32% of the two million so-called 'born-free' generation (the first group of 18-19 year olds born into democracy in 1994) registered to vote (IEC 2014b). This was despite IEC efforts to run television and radio campaigns featuring musicians and other celebrities in a bid to appeal to young voters (Du Plessis 2014).

The IEC's efforts to increase registration over the years has proved successful, with numbers increasing for each consecutive election and a total of over 25 million for the 2014 election (see Table 1). However, despite the fact that South Africa's voting age population (VAP)13 has grown by approximately seven million people since 1994; the number of actual registered voters has declined. Therefore, while 73.5% of all eligible voters who were registered in 2014 cast their vote at the polls (a favourable turnout in international terms), this also meant that 7 million potential voters (of the VAP) remained unregistered.

In South Africa, voter turnout (the percentages of the registered VAP that turned out to vote in elections] for national and provincial elections traditionally has been quite high (see Table 1] with 86.7% in 1994, 89% in 1999, 76.7% in 2004, 77% in 2009 and a slightly lower 73.5% in 2014. Conversely, voter turnout in local government elections has been traditionally quite poor; although lower rates of participation in local government elections is a global phenomenon. In any event, voter turnout increased considerably in the 2011 (57.6%] local elections from 48.5% in 2000 and 48.4% in 2006 (Stolley and Marrian 2011].

As noted above, voter education is one of the duties assigned to the IEC. Mostly, however, voter education is regarded as a collaborative effort between the IEC, government departments, the SABC and civil society (Wall 2010]. The IEC undertakes civic education 'interventions' leading up to elections in the form of presentations, workshops, seminars, conferences, roundtables, symposiums and preparatory briefings. It also works with the SABC to produce television advertising and to incorporate election themes in popular television dramas and sitcoms in South Africa's major languages (often with subtitles]. In addition, the IEC uses SABC radio and community radio to a certain extent although the IEC acknowledges that more effective use could be made of this local information delivery opportunity. An HSRC survey in 2011 found similar results with 96% of respondents expressing very high satisfaction with the content of television and radio voter education programmes (HSRC 2011].

Other strategies for education the people on voting include the use of the print media, where newspapers provide full-page diagrams on voting procedure, as well as electronic resources. For example, the IEC (2014a] website contains significant information about the process of voter registration and voting procedures themselves, including mobile apps, cartoon booklets, guides on election procedures in the country's 11 official languages and a specially devised online game where the public is invited to test their election knowledge against others. This website, together with a text messaging service, provides uncomplicated facilities for people to check their registration, although this facility is in English only (Wall 2010]. Some information booklets have also been made available in Braille and sign language is also used in voter education programmes to accommodate those with hearing impairments.

2.5 Voting day issues

As noted above, every adult citizen has a right to vote in secret. Since 1999 most citizens surveyed about election processes have indicated that they believe their vote is done in secret,14 which appears to indicate that the IEC has been successful in ensuring this right for the most part. A minor issue surrounding secrecy has emerged in that the majority of ballot boxes are not transparent It has been recommended that translucent and colour-coded ballot boxes to match the different ballot sheets (for example, national and provincial) be introduced to make the process user-friendlier and to guide voters in the casting of their ballots (SADC Parliamentary Forum 2009). This can also prevent a possible mix-up of ballots, which further prolongs the process of sorting the ballots during the counting process (Chauke 2014).

Generally, the management of elections by the IEC, especially on voting day, has been of a very high standard across the elections. By 2014 there were 22 000 polling stations clearly marked and situated in neutral and accessible areas situated throughout South Africa, although, EISA observed that this number was insufficient to cater for the increasing number of voters (as a result of the 9.5% increase in registered voters) (Chauke 2014). A number of logistical problems have arisen in past elections (notably those in 2009 and 2014) including a shortage of ballot papers and ballot boxes in some areas, long queues and lengthy waiting times, late delivery of voting materials leading to delays in the opening of some polling stations, and some election personnel seeming to lack training in the counting of the ballots (Chauke 2014). Additional problems have included the display of party political material within the perimeters of polling stations on voting day. This practice has been criticised by election observers because although it is not against electoral law, it "runs counter to international standards for credible elections as it is tantamount to campaigning" (see the AU Observer Mission 2009; EISA Observer Mission 2009). On a positive note, there has been little evidence of electoral fraud over the years with only one election officer being convicted of such an act (Tlukula 2009).

The counting of the ballots takes place at each polling station in the presence of party agents and observers, which is consistent with regional norms and standards. Moreover, the transparency of the counting process has been enhanced by the establishment of a well-equipped National Results Centre in Pretoria where access is granted to representatives from political parties, the media, and election observers (EISA Observer Mission 2009). Notably the IEC's use of information communication technologies to expedite the public broadcasting of election results, particularly in the 2009 and 2014 elections, has also been commended (SADC Parliamentary Forum 2009), as has the high level of inclusion of women deployed as presiding officers in the electoral process (Bothma 2014).

2.6 The degree of acceptance of the result by the government and the electorate

Processes do exist for the public to challenge electoral outcomes (Section 55 of the Electoral Act makes provision for objections). However, the extremely low number of objections to election results over the years15 would appear to suggest that the overwhelming majority of South Africans consistently have accepted the results of the elections.

In terms of the 1998 Electoral Act, all political parties are responsible for ensuring that their candidates and supporters abide by the Electoral Code of Conduct by "accepting] the result of an election or challenging] the result in a court" (schedule 2(4)(2)). A few incidences of IFP related post-election violence have been recorded, especially in Kwa-Zulu Natal (a traditional IFP stronghold). In addition, the IFP leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has consistently claimed electoral fraud and IEC bias after every election except the 2014 election (in which the IFP received only 2.4% of the total vote, down from 4.5% in the previous election), but these claims have never threatened public acceptance of the results (see, for example Mdletshe 2008). Following the 2011 municipal elections, 63 objections were raised by various political parties, but these were all resolved by the IEC. Moreover, all parties accepted the outcome of the elections (Stolley and Marrian 2011).

2.7 Media coverage of elections throughout the election phase

How the way the media constitutes part of the 'level playing field' in South African elections - especially with regard to state media perhaps favouring one party over another is of particular importance. The state-owned SABC has come under particular scrutiny for its election coverage since démocratisation. The SABC is regulated by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)16 to ensure that broadcasting is in the public interest, is fair and represents a diversity of views broadly reflecting South African society (section 192 of the Constitution). However, over the years, complaints have arisen from opposition parties regarding the disproportionate amounts of time the SABC has dedicated to the coverage of the ANC during both national and municipal elections over the years and to the ANC and COPE especially during the 2009 national elections (Schreiner and Mattes 2011).17 In another example, in 2014 the SABC was accused of being biased toward the ANC when it refused to air two opposition party adverts from the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The broadcaster stood by its decisions arguing that the adverts promoted a potential incitement to violence. It was supported by ICASA (Morkel 2014).18

During the 1999 and 2004 elections, Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) found that election coverage by the media was mostly fair but that the media had tended to report on events rather than issues leaving voters without sufficient information on party policies (Media Monitoring Project 1999; Bird 2010). Again, during the 2009 election cycle, the media's coverage was found to be predominantly balanced with no party received substantially more or less positive or negative reporting (Schreiner and Mattes 2011). In 2014, the MMA found 85% of all election coverage pertained to five top parties only (ANC, DA, EFF, Agang SA and COPE) leaving the other 22 registered parties to share the remaining 15% (Media Monitoring Africa 2014). Of the coverage though, 85% was found to be fair and only 15% biased.

While balance in terms of media coverage has improved, what has been consistently lacking is depth of coverage with the media largely failing to cover issues of concern to the electorate. For example, in the 2009 and 2014 campaigns most of the coverage focused on party campaigning and party politics (electioneering) (see Figure 1). This is unsurprising given that they were election periods, however, in both years the media did not adopt a citizen's agenda. Issues of poverty, service delivery, health, race, education, child abuse, HIV/AIDS, crime and women all fared poorly with less than 2% of the overall coverage (Media Monitoring Africa 2009). Therefore, it seems apparent that election coverage in South Africa remains largely not about public policy, but rather about people and personality (Schreiner and Mattes 2011). Moreover, during the 2004 and 2009 election periods, the media did not pay sufficient attention to how well political parties kept their electoral promises. Given that monitoring a party's delivery record is essential to developing a truly responsible democracy, this lack of oversight by the media has not helped voters to evaluate political parties or hold them accountable.

Television advertising was prohibited in South Africa during the 1994 and 1999 elections. However, prior to the 2004 elections, new ICASA regulations allotted airtime [de facto very short public election broadcasts) on the basis of the number of elected MPs that parties had in the national and provincial Parliaments. Predictably, this benefitted the larger parties with significant parliamentary representation while other much smaller parties, which also did not have the financial means to sustain their advertising campaigns on radio or in print either, were virtually lost (Duncan 2009, 224). Although new regulations issued by ICASA in late 2008 required television networks to provide parties with free airtime19 allocated proportionally based on the current number of candidates fielded by a party (as opposed to the number of elected legislative representatives as noted above), this potential was not fully realised. According to the SABC, only 46 of the 84 allocated free two minute spots were used, possibly because most of the smaller parties "were either unfamiliar with the process of finding adequately skilled people to produce these spots and, or were unable to afford them" (Schreiner and Mattes 2011, 15). As noted by Booysen and Masterson, this new opportunity merely acted to "[widen] the gulf between the party-political haves and have riots" (Booysen and Masterson 2009, 414).

2.8 The transparency of party financing and regulations that govern such financing

In order to carry out their many responsibilities, including the need to set up and maintain party offices, parties need funding. Parties wishing to contest the national and provincial elections are also required to pay a deposit For the 2014 elections, parties had to pay R200 000 to compete nationally and R45 000 more per province. During the 1994 elections, a state electoral fund (amounting to about R69 million) was established to provide equitable financial assistance to parties campaigning in the election (Sadie 2006,11). For the 1999 elections, and all elections since then, new regulations were formulated including Section 236 of the 1996 Constitution which provided that: "to enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis". Provision is also made through the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act No. 103 of 1997.

South Africa is one of the few African countries in which political parties receive binding from government (EISA 2011). In South Africa this funding is based on proportionality and is administered by the IEC. More specifically, 90% of funds are distributed proportionally to each party based on its share of seats in the National Assembly. The remaining 10% is shared equally among the parties in each provincial legislature. Smaller parties have complained that the formula used is unfair given that the largest portions of the funding are given to the large parties and nothing is given to those that are not represented in Parliament (Steytler 2004, 59-66).

Section 5(3) of the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act sets out several prohibitions for the use of this public money including a ban on paying any direct or indirect remuneration or other benefit of any kind to any elected representative of the party or to any public servant at any level of government The use of government resources for political campaigns is also prohibited, specifically under schedule 2, 9(2e) of the Electoral Act No. 73 of 1998 which prevents the "abuse of a position of power, privilege or influence, including ... employment authority to influence the conduct or outcome of an election".

The amount of public money that parties currently receive is not enough to finance the many activities that are required of them. This, coupled with the truism that the more money a party has the better able they are to convey their message to potential voters, means that political parties in South Africa, as in many other countries, must obtain private funds from other sources such as local and foreign business (Tshitereke 2002). Essentially, therefore, the majority of election funding comes from private funders; however, there is no way to know exactly how much is funded this way as no law exists to regulate the flow or disclosure of private funding of political parties (Körte and Weissenbach 2010,149).

The lack of regulation on private funding has several implications for the quality of electoral accountability in South Africa. Firstly, it can be assumed that since private individuals or groups (other than the electorate) are able to influence the political process through funding to parties and politicians, then this means that "decisions are taken not in response to the will of the electorate but to the wishes of the wealth/' (Friedman 2010, 162). As such, February argues that "secret donations ... have the potential to exert undue influence on the political system, secretly drowning out the voices of the poor and further excluding the marginalised from political influence" (February 2012). Secondly private donations can have a corrupting effect on government in that parties are expected to provide, in return, special favours. The lack of transparency has contributed to allegations of corruption reinforced by reports of donations having influenced government action in the awarding of contract and development permits. One such example includes testimony of David Malatsi, a former Provincial Planning Minister, having pushed through approval for a golf estate after donating, in secret, a series of sizeable donations to the New National Party (February and Calland 2005).

Thirdly, another example of potentially "insidious" uses of party funding, argues Friedman, is encapsulated in the possibility of better-resourced parties using money to literally buy votes (Friedman 2010, 161). For example, in the 2009 national elections particularly, the ANC was accused of attempting to 'buy votes' through the dissemination of food parcels (EMN 2009). Two days prior to the 2009 election, the Electoral Monitoring Network reported receiving complaints from people that food parcels were being used to persuade the poor to vote for those who provided the parcels and that voters were told that they would only receive social grants and public services to which they were entitled if they voted for particular parties (EMN 2009; Naidoo 2009). This issue rose again in 2013 when food parcels were handed out two days before crucial by-elections. The ANC was accused of using the food distribution to sweeten voters in their favour in municipalities in which they were in danger of losing support Du Plessis and Groenewald 2014). Also, in early April 2014 (one month prior to the national elections) the Kwazul-Natal MEC Meshack Radebe stated that those who received social welfare grants but voted for opposition political parties were "stealing from government" (TimesLive, April 9, 2014). The ANC was accused of spreading misinformation about South Africa's social grant policy and generating fear in order to prevent people from voting for opposition parties.

Finally, if public policy decisions are perceived to be made on the basis of political contributions, then not only are the policies suspect but government will also not be seen to be accountable to the people. Therefore, undisclosed funding has wider implications for trust in the principles of legitimacy, participation and democracy (IDASA 2003). It appears that the South African people agree. In a survey conducted by IDASA in 2004, an overwhelming majority of respondents (87%) demanded transparency in private donations to political parties, whereas 81% supported the regulation of private funding to political parties (Ashiagbor 2004).

At the heart of the private funding debate is that as political parties strive to protect the identity of their benefactors, they are "nurturing the danger posed to South Africa's democracy by the corrupting influence of undisclosed funding" (Robinson 2007). IDASA, the IEC, EISA and several other NGOs are in favour of some form of disclosure or registration of private funding (Friedman 2010, 157). However, despite several attempts by civil society to urge reform in this regard, these have largely failed. For example, an attempt by the civil society organisation, Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), to lodge an application in the Cape High Court in 2005 demanding that the four major political parties (ANC, DA, IFP and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)) open their books to public scrutiny was dismissed after political parties agreed to legislate on the matter (February and Calland 2005). In spite of this declaration as well as a 2007 ANC resolution committing itself to promoting transparency in party funding (ANC 2007), to date, no progress had been made in developing legislation to regulate private funding (February 2014).

2.9 The prevalence of a stable and competitive multi-party system and the degree of alternation in government

Since 1994, 26 parties, on average, have contested the general elections.20 Despite this extensive number, there has been no alternation in government since 1994. The ANC has remained the dominant party following every election, winning 63% of the votes in 1994, 66.35% in 1999; 69.68% in 2004; 65.90% in 2009, and 62.1% in 2014 (see Table 2). Because of the system of proportional representation, these votes have translated into the highest number of seats in Parliament (IEC 2004; IEC 2009). Given the above, there is little doubt that South Africa's party system is characterised by single-party dominance.

Some scholars who have reservations about the dominance of one party over others argue that the continuous return to power of the same political party following consecutive elections is not good for accountability and that democracy is better served through alternations of power.21 Proponents of this view argue that "the existence of political opposition within a competitive party system presents alternatives to the governing party and, therefore, stimulates debate within society over ideas and policies; and allows society to question the actions and choices of government" (Brooks 2004, 2).

Opponents of the dominant party system further argue that it is inimical to democracy for several reasons, including the following:

* Without rotation in office, a blurring of the boundaries between party interests and state interests is inevitable (Giliomee and Simkins 1999);

* Dominant parties may be tempted to concentrate political power in the executive and their own party structures (Welsh 1994, 203). This growing preponderance of political power may lead to "arbitrary decision-making that undermines the integrity of democratic institutions, particularly that of the legislature and its ability to check the executive" (Giliomee and Simkins 1999, 340);

* Without the key threat of being voted out of power, this may engender complacency and arrogance in the dominant party and lead to abuses of office and corruption (Giliomee and Simkins 1999). By the same token, predictable re-election may result in increased political apathy and resulting potential deterioration of responsive and accountable government.

The ANC's dominance, coupled with the fact that it is unlikely to lose an election in the near future, has raised concerns that democracy and governance are more likely to be compromised (see Jeffery 2010; Gilliomee and Simkins 2005; and Southall 2005). However, in its first ten years of dominance there was very little if any evidence to suggest that the ANC had deployed this dominance towards undermining democratic institutions (Ajulu 2010,13). Despite this, the potentially negative effects of continued dominance have been the subject of widespread debate over the years. Moreover, the ANC's deployment of party functionaries to state office, evident through its cadre programme has been criticised by civil society and monitoring groups as "blur[ring] an essential separation between party and state", undermining institutions, contradicting core principles in the Constitution and compromising governance (Jeffery 2010, 404).

An attempt by the opposition and smaller parties to erode the dominance of the ANC through floor-crossing22 (legalised by Acts 18, 20, 21 and 22 of 200223), had the reverse effect. The ANC benefitted the most by attaining a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly thereby further undermining the representation of the already smaller parties and weakening the opposition (Ajulu 2010). Floor-crossing was later abolished in January 2009.24

Despite the disappointment of this mechanism to impact ANC dominance, there have been other elements of dynamism within the party system which have served to revitalise opposition politics. The two significant of these was the establishment of COPE in 2008 and the EFF in 2013. In the absence of a strong group of opposition parties that could act as agents of restraint to the ANC's dominance, COPE was seen as the first potentially viable black alternative to the ANC. However, despite the hype, COPE did not become the official opposition following the 2009 elections, garnering only 7.42% of the votes as opposed to the DA's 16.66%. Moreover, in the years prior to the 2014 election, party infighting resulted in a massive loss of support for COPE so that it received only 0.7% of the total vote. The EFF was formed and headed by former ANC Youth League President Julius Malema who had been expelled from the ANC due to indiscipline. Campaigning for nationalisation of land and mines and appealing to the majority poor disillusioned by the perceived lack of service delivery under the ANC government paid off. The EFF became the second biggest opposition behind the DA with 6.4% of the vote.

2.10 The proportionality of the electoral system

The main benefit of the closed list proportional model is that it allows all votes cast to have equal weight and every vote counts so that even smaller parties can find their way into Parliament Moreover, the positioning of people on the closed party lists - ranked according to preference as a result of internal party politics, means that parties are able to engineer their lists to take into consideration issues such as gender, ethnicity, geography, and economic expertise (Sylvester and Eshetu 2010, 172). As a result, if the parties wish it, this system promotes inclusivity, which, in turn, contributes to the credibility, and representative nature, of the legislature. This has been most successful with regards to enhancing gender representation. Through the ANC's implementation of a 'zebra stripe' system on its party lists (every male candidate is followed by a female candidate) and with the ANC consistently securing a large majority of votes, women's representation has concurrently "rocketed up" as a result (Hicks 2012).

However, this system has also been criticised for its lack of accountability. As it is a 'closed' system, voters do not have direct influence over the compilation and ranking of lists, although party members have some say through the process of internal party selection.25 Considering that the Constitution insists on accountability by representatives to the voters, this lack of full transparency is problematic. Because the electoral system does not provide for constituencies, a gap is created in that MPs are not elected by a particular constituency. Therefore the voters do not have explicit knowledge of whom they are voting into power. This closed party list system has been criticised heavily with several practicing politicians and leading academics arguing that it entrenches fealty by MPs to political parties and not to voters, thereby minimising the link between the electorate and public representatives and weakening accountability (see Chiroro 2008; APRM Monitoring Project 2011). The system has been the subject of several investigations and reports, all of which have recommended reforms that would ensure greater accountability between constituents and their representatives.26 However, as yet nothing has transpired from these suggestions and it seems that with the results of the 2014 elections assuring this continued dominant status, the status quo will prevail for the foreseeable future.

3 Conclusion

In assessing the quality of South Africa's electoral accountability, two criteria were examined: the extent to which elections are held in a regular, universal, free and fair manner as well as the extent to which the existing party system is able to assist in the working of democracy.

The Constitution provides for the existence of the IEC, which despite experiencing some problems during elections over the years is a trustworthy and publicly respected institution, which has administered elections efficiently, responsibly and transparently. While the presence of violence and intimidation during election phases since 1994 has been a matter of concern in the past, the prevalence and intensity of election-related violence has declined substantially over the years. Moreover, in terms of electoral participation and the transparency and timeliness of registration and voting procedures, South Africa also fares well. Voter registration is a continuous and transparent process; a constitutionally protected right and is legislated for in the Electoral Act. While the number of actual registered voters relative to the voting age population has declined, voter participation at national level is consistently high and although traditionally low at local level increased in the last local government elections. Voter education is extensive and caters to all official languages. The secrecy of the ballot is constitutionally guaranteed and backed by legislation.

A few Voting day* logistical problems remain which need to be addressed in future elections. However, these incidents are isolated. Procedures are in place to contest election results. The degree of acceptance of election results by the government and the electorate is almost total barring a few complaints recorded over the years. In terms of media coverage of elections throughout the election phase, South Africa has performed less well in the past but is improving. Both the Constitution and legislation provides that public broadcasting be fair and representative, although, in practice this has not always been the case - notably with regard to the public broadcaster. Generally, however, the media's provision of an equitable level playing field has improved although it is also evident that thus far the media has failed in its duty to adopt a comprehensive citizen's agenda in its shallow policy coverage in the run up to elections. Finally, South Africa adheres to most, if not all, of the SADC, AU and PEMMO electoral guidelines.

The democratic role of political parties was the focus of the second dimension. Public funding of political parties is prescribed by the Constitution and legislation, however private funding is not regulated at all, raising concerns over the lack of transparency. There has not been alternation in government since démocratisation with the ANC maintaining dominance. While the party has not used its dominance to enact legislation that undermines the state's constitutionality, concerns persist over threats to the continued competitiveness of the party system and the potential undermining of the constitutional order in South Africa. Cadre deployment has also been criticized. In terms of the electoral system, the Constitution prescribes proportional representation and much has been achieved through this system especially for women's representation in government. The closed party list system has been criticised for minimising the link between the electorate and public representatives and thereby compromising accountability.

From the above a case can be made that with regard to free and fair elections in particular there is a high degree of substantive application of procedural frameworks, suggesting good quality electoral accountability. Where there are challenges to electoral accountability, these centre on the democratic role of political parties in the young democracy, specifically with regard to private party funding, the closed list proportional system and continued ANC dominance - something that the 2014 elections results suggest is unlikely to change any time soon.

Footnote

2 The Commonwealth; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA); the African Union (AU); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum; the SADC Electoral Commission; the SADC Electoral Support Network; the African Alliance for Peace; the Association of African Electoral Authorities; the National Democratic Institute; the European Union; the South African Civil Society Election Coalition; and the Election Monitoring Network. See, for example, the EISA Election Observer Mission Report (2004); the South African Civil Society Election Coalition (2009), Business Unity South Africa (2009) and the AU Observer Mission (2009).

Footnote

3 See O'Donnell (2005); Diamond and Morlino (2005); and Diamond and Gunther (2001).

Footnote

4 This is a 19% improvement from the 54% who said they trusted the IEC in 1999.

5 See also Venter [2014).

Footnote

6 Of these, 31 needed conflict management panellists to intervene directly (24 related to interparty disputes and seven to disputes with the IEC) (Booysen and Masterson 2009, 420).

7 The majority of complaints concerned posters, faulty station procedures and alleged IEC bias (Booysen and Masterson 2009,420).

8 Examples of such incidences included disruptions of party meetings, the removal or defacing of election posters and supporters denied access to venues by members of other contesting parties.

9 Examples of 'crises' of politically motivated violent clashes between the IFP and ANC occurred in KwaZulu-Natal between the late 1970s and early 1990s, when more than 25 000 people died (South African Institute of Race Relations, quoted in Mbanjwa, 2009).

Footnote

10 Section 103A states that the IEC may "attempt to resolve through conciliation any electoral dispute or complaint about an infringement of the Code brought to its notice by anyone involved in a dispute or complaint" (section 103A of the Electoral Laws Amendment Act No. 34 of 2003).

11 Tlukula, Pansy (IEC Chairperson). 2009. "Parties Commit to Electoral Code of Conduct," Mail & Guardian Online, March 11. Available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03-ll-partiescommit-to-electoral-code-of-conduct

Footnote

12 Barring an actual visit to the IEC website to be made aware of their continuous voter registration procedure, this fact is not generally well publicised.

13 The VAP refers to those citizens who are 18 years and older who are eligible to vote.

Footnote

14 For example, in a survey on the 1999 elections 85% of respondents believed their vote was secret (O'Donovan 1999).

Footnote

15 Following the 2004 national elections, the IEC received, considered and decided eight formal objections. In 2009, a total of 25 formal objections were received all of which were resolved (IEC 2004; IEC 2009).

Footnote

16 Section 58(1) of the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act No. 153 of 1993 lays down the rules for election coverage by the electronic media in order to ensure the freedom and fairness of the process. It also establishes ICASA to enforce the legislation.

17 In the 2009 election coverage, Media Tenor found that the ANC did receive a substantially larger share of all coverage (52%) followed by COPE (18%), DA (12%) and IFP (6%).

18 In its advert, the EFF openly encouraged its followers to destroy the gantries in place on Gauteng highways as part of the new and much despised tolling system, while the DA's advert accused the police of "killing our people".

Footnote

19 New ICASA regulations required that "television and radio broadcasting license holders make available four two-minute time slots every day for election broadcasts during the designated campaign period" (Schreinerand Mattes 2011,15).

Footnote

20 In 1994 27 parties contested the election, 26 in 1999, 21 in 2004, 28 in 2009 and 33 in 2014.

21 See, for example, Huntington (1991); Welsh (1994); Przeworski and Limongi (1997, 155-183), and Giliomee and Simkins (1999).

Footnote

22 Floor-crossing is the ability of public representatives to 'cross' the floor to join another party or to form a new party without losing their seats.

23 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 18 of 2002; the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act 20 of 2002; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 21 of 2002 and the Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act 22 of 2002.

24 Floor-crossing was originally forbidden by an anti-defection clause embedded in the 1996 Constitution, on the basis that permitting representatives to change parties would disturb the electoral balance chosen by the electorate.

Footnote

25 For example, within the ANC, its 3000 branches countrywide nominate candidates and following a lengthy selection and compilation process candidates are voted on at national level after which the NEC composes the final list.

26 The 2003 Van Zyl Slabbert Commission Report by the government appointed Electoral Task Team recommended that "a larger measure of constituency representation ... be built into the system" Electoral Task Team, Report of the Electoral Task Team (Electoral Task Team 2003,12). A report by the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament in 2009 also advised, that "the current electoral system ... be replaced by a mixed system which attempts to capture the benefits of both the constituency-based and proportional representation electoral systems" (Report of the Independent Panel of Assessment of Parliament 2009, 37).

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