Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-5733-0Public Choice (2005) 122: 333354Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, U.S.A.IN 4790 7urveys. I then examine the extent to which suchC

Springer 2005Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in

legislatures GLENN R. PARKERAccepted 17 November 2003Abstract. This paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the House of Representatives. I create a

measure of reputational trustworthiness, based upon pooled samples of constituency opinionreputational good will among constituents deters lame-duck foreign travel by exiting House

incumbents within the context of a quasi-experimental research design. The analysis suggests

that legislators may be self-policed by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to

the point of discouraging unethical activity.1. IntroductionProblems of cheating cover a wide range of economic and political behavior.

Problems of shirking, for example, arise among managers who pursue their

own private interests rather than those of stockholders (Jensen and Meckling,

1976), and among legislators who vote their own ideological preferences

rather than those of their constituents (Kalt and Zupan, 1984). The costs of

monitoring enable managers to exercise discretion (Alchian and Demsetz,

1972), and bureaucrats to escape detection for doing the same (Niskanen,

1971). Businesses engage in post-contractual reneging (Klein, Crawford, and

Alchian, 1978) as do legislators (Weingast and Marshall, 1988). Businesses

cheat on quality by selling a low-quality product at the price reserved for

high-quality products (Klein and Leffler, 1981). Politicians cheat voters

by pursuing their own private interests rather than giving a faithful effort to

advancing the interests of their constituents (Kau and Rubin, 1979).Consequently, a particularly common (and troublesome) issue in both

economic and political markets is one of assuring honesty and restraining

opportunism (see, for example, Becker and Stigler, 1974; Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Akerlof 1970, Lott, 1990; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shepsle and

Weingast, 1987; Telser, 1980; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Crain, Leavans, An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American

Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA., 2003.derived from the National Election Studiess334

and Tollison, 1986; Dougan and Munger, 1989; Parker and Parker, 1998a;

Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1981). This is the question addressed by this

inquiry: how can we assure that politicians behave faithfully, dedicated to

their legislative responsibilities, eschewing unethical gain, and warranting