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This fascinating book explains why the first President Bush's great and speedy victory over Iraq in 1991 so unexpectedly turned into an electoral defeat for him in 1992, an undermining of his sanctions regime throughout the 1990s, and an unexpectedly difficult war in Iraq launched by his son in 2003. Jerry Long argues in his book that Saddam approached this conflict in a comprehensive way, looking not only at the nuts and bolts of men and weapons but also seeking allegiance at home and among Arabs and Muslims abroad to shore up the legitimacy of his position. Thus, Saddam's war was rhetorical as much as it was material. Long's analysis parallels an underappreciated 1992 work by Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War , which follows the twists and turns of White House words and actions from the invasion of Kuwait to the U.S.-led coalition's attack on Iraq. Smith's work was easier. The U.S. president essentially made up his mind to fight Iraq the day after the invasion of Kuwait. While he avoided telling the truth about his plans, the image of the conflict he projected throughout was consistent, summed up in his often repeated phrase, "This [the seizure of Kuwait] will not stand."
Saddam's reasons for invading Kuwait were probably more complicated than Bush's reasons for opposing...