Sayyid Qutb's critique of fiqh

Abstract

Sayyid Qutb's views on fiqh (jurisprudence) have been the subject of significant critique. This paper seeks to understand the bases of such criticisms through a qualitative content analysis of his exegesis and other writings. We begin with a brief survey of the views of scholars who have spoken in favour of and against him, followed by a brief biographic profile of Qutb. This paper focuses on Qutb's critique of three key issues. First, the terms "Fiqh al-Awraq" (jurisprudence of papers) and "Fiqh al-harakah" (dynamic jurisprudence) as employed during his discourse on fiqh are analysed. Second, his interpretation of the concept of "Dar al-Islam" (Land of Islam) and "Dar al-harb" (Hostile Land) that led to criticisms by jurists are analysed through a comparison with the views of other jurists. Third, his discourse on the application of the concept of al-marhaliyyah (stages) in jihad, that caused misunderstandings among jurists, is analysed in the context of a response to the need for developing dynamic jurisprudence for contemporary communities. The study endeavours to dispel ambiguities and present an objective account of Qutb's discourse on fiqh.

Headnote

Abstract: Sayyid Qutb's views on fiqh (jurisprudence) have been the subject of significant critique. This paper seeks to understand the bases of such criticisms through a qualitative content analysis of his exegesis and other writings. We begin with a brief survey of the views of scholars who have spoken in favour of and against him, followed by a brief biographic profile of Qutb. This paper focuses on Qutb's critique of three key issues. First, the terms "Fiqh al-Awraq" (jurisprudence of papers) and "Fiqh al-harakah" (dynamic jurisprudence) as employed during his discourse on fiqh are analysed. Second, his interpretation of the concept of "Dar al-Islam" (Land of Islam) and "Dar al-harb" (Hostile Land) that led to criticisms by jurists are analysed through a comparison with the views of other jurists. Third, his discourse on the application of the concept of al-marhaliyyah (stages) in jihad, that caused misunderstandings among jurists, is analysed in the context of a response to the need for developing dynamic jurisprudence for contemporary communities. The study endeavours to dispel ambiguities and present an objective account of Qutb's discourse on fiqh.

Keywords: Dynamic jurisprudence; fiqlr. j ihäd: Muslim jurists; Sayyid Qutb.

Abstrak: Pandangan Sayyid Qutb mcngcnai /L//? (perundangan) telah menjadi subjek kritikan yang ketara. Kertas keija ini bertujuan untuk memahami asasasas kritikan melalui análisis isi kandungan secara kualitatif terhadap tafsiran dan penulisan-penulisan bebau. Dengan memberi ulasan ringkas terlebih dahulu terhadap pandangan-pandangan cendikiawan yang telah menyatakan pandangan mereka secara positif dan secara négatif, dan diikuti dengan profil biografi ringkas Sayyid Qutb. Kertas keija ini memberi tumpuan terhadap kritikan Sayyid Qutb dalam tiga isu utama. Pertama, perkataan "Fiqh aI-Aurai/" (perandangan kertas keija) dan "Fiqh al-HarakalF (perandangan dinamik) yang digunakan semasa perbincangannya tcrhadap /V//? telah dianalisis. Kedua, interpretasinya terhadap konsep "Dar al-Islcm" (tanah Islam) dan "Dar alHarb" (tanah peperangan) yang menuju kepada kritikan oleh alili undangundang turat dianalisis melalui satu perbandingan dengan pendapat-pendapat ahli perundangan yang lain. Ketiga, perbincangannya terhadap aplikasi konsep al-marhalivyah (gradualisme) dalam jihäd yang menyebabkan penyalah tafsiran dalam kalangan alili perandangan turat dianalisis dalam konteks untuk menjawab keperluan untuk pembentukan perandangan yang dinamik bagi komuniti sejagat. Kajian ini berasaha untuk menghilangkan kesamaran dan untuk mengutarakan perbincangan Sayyid Qutb terhadap//V//? secara objektif dan mendalam.

Kata Kunci: Perundangan dinamik, fiqh, jihäd, ahli-ahli perundangan, Sayyid Qutb.

Westerners and Easterners acknowledge Sayyid Qutb's (henceforth, Qu(b) influence on contemporary Islamic thought. Numerous titles have been bestowed upon him, including "the ideologue of the Ikhwäri" (Hussain, 1983, p. 9), "the most noted advocate of the interpretation of Islam as revolution" (Haddad, 1983, 17), "an eminent leader of the Brethren" (El-Sadat, 1978, p. 66), "one of Islam's new crusaders, a great author and scholar" (al-Nadwi, 1975, p. 66), and "matchless writer" (Hasan, 1980, p. 17). He was also regarded as "the only thinker who enjoys purity in intellectual methodology and straightforwardness in action" (Barakät, 1972, p. 3), "one of the greatest thinkers of contemporary Islamic thought" ('Abd Allah, 1972, p. 3), "the most famous personality in the Muslim world in the second half of the twentieth century" (Fadlulläh, 1979; Haim, 1982, p. 149), and "the revolutionary of contemporary Islamic thought" (Qutb. 1972, p. 23). In essence, these titles are a reflection of his many praiseworthy contributions.

Concurrently, a number of criticisms are also made against his thought. Qu(b has been accused of being the father of terrorism (Worth, 2001). Some of his interpretations of Islamic creed are criticised. His classification of Islamic and ignorant societies has drawn criticism. His rejection of secular ideologies, worldviews, and man-made systems has led some to conclude that Qutb is an adversary ofWestem political forces who fosters extremist tendencies (Irwin, 2001). Qutb is also regarded by some as a deviant in jurisprudential and creedal issues (Rashid, 1993), whose interpretations of such issues are a threat to national harmony (Rashid, 1993). Prominent among such criticisms are those pertaining to Qutb's stand on fiqh.

Fundamentally, Qutb sought to provide new insights into fiqh for sustainable development of the Muslim community. He was advocating for creativity in fiqh, to which end he appealed to jurists to evaluate the relevance of earlier interpretations of legal rulings. However, Qutb's call for creative application offiqh has been manipulated by certain groups, including the Egyptian based Jamä'at al-Takfir wa-al-Hijrah (the organisation that charged people with unbelief and called for migration) which is claimed to be the brainchild of Qutb. This organisation manipulated Qutb's teachings in his exegesis and controversial book, Ma 'ctlim fi cil-Tarlq, to suit their preconceived notions and derived strange conclusions which they unfairly attributed to Qutb.

In analysing Qutb's juristic discourses, al-Bahansâwï exposes Jama 'at al-Takfir 's misunderstanding of Qutb's views, such as marriage with polytheistic women, permitting slaughter of cattle by polytheists, calling for rejection of juristic rulings and returning to the Meccan period where there was neither legislation of laws nor their enforcement (al-Bahansâwï, 1977, pp. 220-224). Their gross misunderstanding of Qu(b led them to believe that Qutb called for the abolition offiqh and discarded the entire juristic rulings of the predecessors. In analysing these allegations, Barakät states that Qutb was severely condemned for his stand on fiqh. Among those who slammed him is Wahbat al-Zuhaylï in the Kuwait based magazine, "al-Wa'y ctl-IslctmT. In his article, "alMu 'tcidiin 'ala al-Fiqh cil-Islciml, " he accuses Qutb of undermining the credibility of fiqh (Barakät, 1972, p. 166). Given such controversies, this paper analyses Qutb's critique offiqh, following a content analysis of his writings, especially his exegesis.

A brief profile of Qutb

Hailing from a philanthropic family and having memorised the Qur'än, Qutb (1906-1966) graduated from Där al-'Ulüm in 1933, worked as a teacher in state schools, and published several articles and poems. After teaching, he moved to the Ministry of Education as an officer and worked in the Department of Inspection. He remained in this office for eight years until he was sent to America by the Ministry of Education in an attempt to separate him from Cairo and indoctrinate him with Western culture and values. It was a strategy to transform him to be an instrument for implementing Western philosophy in Egypt and as an agent of Western values like the majority of the delegates sent for higher education in Western institutions of high learning at that time (al-Khâlidï, 1985, p. 126; Husayn, 1986, p. 30).

Qu(b excelled in religious sciences, social sciences, mathematics, philosophy, biology, physics, and educational methodology, set a high academic standard, manifested intellectual excellence, and attended lessons conducted by al-Azhar scholars. His literary criticism demonstrates his critical insights and analysis of literary works, and assisted him in producing literary masterpieces. He was a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, and played a central role in the success of the 1952 revolution, which abolished the monarchy and paved the way for the establishment of democracy in Egypt. His strong ideals meant that he did not compromise with the authorities and as such was sentenced to death along with many other active members of the Muslim Brotherhood who sought a better and freer Egypt.

Qu(b's exegesis is regarded as his most significant work (al-Khâlidï, 1986, pp. 40-45) and one of his highest achievements (Mousalli, 1988, p. 23). He is considered a reformist and the founder of the "School of Dynamic Exegesis" (al-Khâlidï, 1985, p. 547). His exegesis presents the general characteristics of the Islamic worldview and explains the divine constitution for life and society (al-Khâlidï, 1991, p. 244). It is regarded as an encyclopaedia of ideas as it deals with knowledge and culture and several methods of political, economic, social, cultural, and educational reform (al-'Azam, 1980, p. 274).

Qutb's views on fiqh

According to jurisprudential literatures,^^ is classified into two: Fiqh ai- 'ibâdât and fiqh aï-mu 'âmcdât. Fiqh al- 'ibâdât refers to rulings concerning acts of devotion. Fiqh aï-mu 'âmcdât represents subjects such as inheritance, family issues, and others. In this context, it is important to note that Qutb does not limit the scope of fiqh into two micro-disciplines, rather he generalises the term fiqh to contain every methodology, statute, Islamic instruction and guideline, rites and ritual, legislation and organisation of laws, Islamic financial system, Islamic economic system, Islamic social system, Islamic criminal system, Islamic international system and others. Qutb argues that all matters crucial for governing the entire Muslim lifestyle should be included in fiqh. He calls for a comprehensive code of fiqh that regulates life in all areas, including legislation and social development. According to him, purifying one's Islamic creed, the need for authority, leadership selection, and members of the shiirct (consultation) are important aspects of an Islamic society, which should have been sufficiently incorporated in fiqh.

Many scholars believe that there is a need for evaluating the earlier interpretations to serve the needs of contemporary society. In this regard, AbuSulayman (1994) calls on the Muslim community to realise its fallacies of thinking which is based on blind following. He considers this phenomenon as a crisis of the Muslim mind, implying that Islam itself is problem free but that Muslims, particularly scholars who are unable to understand priorities, are inflicted with a crisis of the mind. Other Muslim scholars use terms like reform {islcth), renewal {tcijdid), realistic (ctl-wctqi '), and purposive (al-maqäsid), implying that there is a need for reforming Islamic thought (Ibrâhîm, 1997, p. 29). Many works have been published, emphasising the need for reforming the thought (islcth al-fikr) of contemporary Muslims. One may thus argue that the social changes Qutb desired have been implicitly advocated by others. However, Qutb uses terms that were either controversial or antagonistic to the authorities. Unlike him, other scholars were more mind&l of their terms, and pursued their objectives through teaching, research, and discourse.

Qu(b believes that with all its juristic rulings, fiqh was not the basis that developed the Muslim community but it was the dynamism that guided the ignorant society. For him, fiqh was developed with dynamism in addressing real needs (Quffi, 1977, vol. 4. p. 2010). However, attempting to ascertain Quffi's exact stance regarding^/? can be difficult in lieu of what appear to be conflicting statements. What is certain is that he advocated for the establishment of a dynamic Islamic life to which end it is difficult to imagine a rejection of Islamic law.

Fiqh al-awräq and fiqh al-harakah

Qutb employs the terms "Fiqh a I-Aw ret q" and "Fiqh ctl-Hctrctkcth" during his discourse, which has been a source of contention and confusion. He sought to discard what he believed to be an out-dated fiqh, which he called fiqh al-awräq (jurisprudence of papers), and advocated for its replacement with fiqh al-harakah (dynamic jurisprudence or jurisprudence related to the practical life). It was Qutb who first used this term in the process of discussing the need for producing dynamic jurisprudence and is thus regarded as the founder of the fiqh al-harakah movement (Ibrâhîm, 1997, p. 29).

This observation needs to be studied. The theme of fiqh which Qu(b speaks about and calls for is to postpone the discussion until the establishment of an Islamic community. Fiqh al-awräq. according to him, refers to jurisprudential issues which prepare its followers who are not dynamic in the true sense of the word to establish the law of God in all aspects of life. Therefore, he argues, they (jurists) spend their energy to conduct research theoretically and interact with only papers.

Fiqh al-harakah, as used by Qutb. refers to fiqh that prepares its followers to be active, calling people to establish the religion and directly interact with the Qur'ân and patterns of the Prophet (S.A.W.). He calls for the postponement of futile discussions on jurisprudential themes to its proper time, i.e., after the establishment of an Islamic community in the true sense and to move forward in formulating fiqh al-harakah which is more related to the practical life of the Muslim community. AlQaradâwî (n. d.) calls such jurisprudence as 'fiqh al-Awlawiyyäi" (fiqh of Priorities). The objectives of both Qutb and al-Qaradâwî are the same but their approaches are different.

Qutb differentiates between fiqh al-awräq and fiqh al-harakah. Fiqh al-awräq neglects dynamism and its necessities, while fiqh al-harakah sees this religion as dynamic and penetrates the jähiliyyah (ignorance) system, deriving laws after considering the on-going realities (Qutb, 1977, vol. 3, p. 1743). This implies examining the relevance of laws according to the needs. Qutb further remarks that fiqh al-harakah takes into consideration the events instrumental to the revelation of the texts (Qutb, 1977, vol. 4, p. 2006). He argues that fiqh does not emanate except in a dynamic Islamic atmosphere. Nor is it taken from an ineffective jurist, where dynamism is absent. Those who are addicted to books and papers to develop laws are far removed from the dynamism of fiqh, which aims at liberating people from servitude of man to the sole servitude to God. According to Qutb, the so-called jurists neither realise the nature of this religion nor intend to embellish the shaping of fiqh (Qufb, 1977, vol. 3, p. 1735). This highlights how Qutb's criticism is not directed to all jurists but to those who confine fiqh to rituals and issues concerning the lawful and the prohibited in the narrow sense of the term.

Qufb draws attention to two basic facts in relation to fiqh, its origin, and development. Fiqh did not originate in a vacuum nor was it understood in a vacuum. It gradually emerged in the community by meeting the needs of Muslims. Likewise, did not establish the Muslim community, but it was the Muslim community with its realistic dynamism in facing its needs that developed fiqh. This implies that the past communities developed fiqh and formulated laws based on their needs. Those laws and interpretations may not be relevant today, as time has changed. Qufb therefore calls on the contemporary Muslim community to develop fiqh by considering contemporary realities. These historical facts are necessary in understanding the nature offiqh and realising the dynamism of legal rulings (Qufb, 1977, vol. 4, p. 2006). Qufb has no objection for jurists to interact with papers, books and texts, on the condition that they consider the dynamism and the real situations in which fiqh originated. By doing this, they will not deviate from the realistic needs of the Muslim community. He holds that those who interpret the texts and the body of laws without referring to the circumstances in which those texts were revealed and laws originated will fail to produce dynamic fiqh.

Having highlighted the differences between the two kinds of fiqh, Qufb calls for the development of fiqh al-harakah as opposed to the purposeless action of fiqh al-awrâq. He believes that prior to the establishment of the Muslim community, the work in the field of fiqh and the development of laws is a fruitless endeavour like sowing seeds in the air. He remarks that fiqh will not grow in a vacuum, as seeds will not grow in the air (Qufb, 1977, vol. 4, pp. 2010-2012).

Qufb's vision of developing fiqh al-Harakah has arguably materialised. Muslim jurists and economists have presented blueprints for an Islamic bank. Efforts were made in the last few decades to develop financial products in compliance with Shari'ah. Contemporary jurists are ambitious in Islamising most of the existing banking, economic and finance systems. Likewise, jurists promote collaborated efforts with sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and educationists to produce what can now be called fiqh cd-harakah, focussing on the development of a comprehensive code of fiqh prescribing solutions to their problems. Economists have envisaged the contract based on mushctrakah (active partnership) and mudctrctbcth (passive partnership). Other popular variations in these modes are muzära 'cth (partnership in share cropping) and musäqät (partnership in horticulture). Other products include murctbahah (cost plus service charge), ijctrah (leasing), ijctrah wa-iqtinä ' (hire purchase), bay ' mu 'ctjjctl (sale on deferred payment), and bay ' sctlctm (forward delivery contract), and bay ' istisnci ' (contracted production). These are Shari'ah compliant products, implemented by Islamic banks which were not found in the 1960s and 1970s, let alone in the early years, nor were they explained appropriately except recently. Such developments are arguably manifestations of fiqh al-harakah as espoused by Qutb.

Dar al-Isläm and dar al-harb

In the foregoing pages, Qutb's critique offiqh has been analysed which revealed that there is a need for the review of fiqh for the benefit of Muslims. An example of his critique is the concept "Ddtr ctl-Isläm and "Dar al-Harb'\ Qutb offered a unique interpretation of the concept that drew criticism from jurists. As this is significant to understand Qutb's stand on fiqh, we study and compare his views with others in detail.

Qutb's discourse on ddtr ctl-Isläm and ddtr ctl-hctrb underlines their basic characteristics. According to him, it is the Islamic creed that distinguishes between both Lands. However, scholars differ in their interpretation of Qutb. Qutb's discourse on dctr al-Isläm and ddtr al-harb appears twice, once in Fi Ziläl cd-Our an and the other in Met 'ctlim fit alia rlq. Qutb discussed the concept in verses 27-40 of al-Mä 'ideth in Ft Ziläl. He explained some of the fundamental laws in the life of human beings which are governed by God and His laws. He also explains the laws for the defence of the public system from all sorts of deviations and the power which is established by the command of God in the shades of His SharJdh (Qutb, 1977, vol. 2, pp. 872-873).

According to Qutb. the legal rulings regarding där al-Isläm and där ctl-hctrb are not valid except in an Islamic environment. They cannot be enforced except by an Islamic community and their benefits cannot be realised except in där ctl-Isläm (al-Khâlidï, 1986, p. 250). He argues that before one penetrates the context and the Prophetic traditions which contain these rulings, it is necessary to make a general statement about the milieu that enforces these rulings and the conditions that render them effective. This implies that all legal rulings on crimes, capital punishment, reprimands, and others are effective only in the community of dctr ctl-Islctm (al-Khâlidï, 1986, p. 250). Thus, it is necessary to explain what dctr al-Islâm means in the Shari'ah (Qutb, 1977, vol. 2, p. 873).

Qufb argues that from the Islamic perspective the world is divided into two. First is dâr cd-Islâm that comprises every nation in which Shari'ah is implemented and is the only governing body, whether its people are Muslims or the population consists of Muslims and free nonMuslim subjects. It may be that all of its people are free non-Muslim subjects but its rulers are Muslims or Muslims who implement Shari'ah and govern the nation by it. It may be that all are Muslims or free nonMuslim subjects living together but their nation is populated by hostile people, yet, the people of the nation implement Shari'ah and judge according to it. In other words, wherever Shari'ah is implemented is considered dâr cd-Islâm and wherever Shari'ah is ignored is considered dâr al-harb. The Muslim community is at par with dâr cd-Islâm. It stands for the methodology of God and is governed by Shari'ah. To Qufb, such a community deserves to be protected, its wealth safeguarded, its public system defended, and its people secure. Qufb advances his views that dâr al-Islâm stands for a Muslim state that keeps an eye on God's law administered by Muslims through mutual cooperation.

Having illustrated the concept, Qufb underlines the criteria of the two Lands. He states that with this comprehensive and integrated argumentation and definite resolution, Islam came to enhance the honour of human being and liberate him from all ethnocentric and nationalistic inclinations and loyalties. He opines that there is no homeland for a Muslim except where Shari'ah is established and the bond between him and other inhabitants is developed based on an obligation to God and not nationality (Qufb, 1977, pp. 184-186).

It seems that Qufb's objective of demarcating the differences between the two Lands is to explain the ideological aspects and correct Muslim views about the homeland and nationality. Dâr cd-Islâm is the homeland for Muslims even though an individual is not bom and does not live there. Dâr cd-hctrb refers to a land in which Islam is not enforced even though it is one's homeland (Qufb, 1977, pp. 192-193). Many jurists disagree with Qutb on these conceptualisations. Some contemporary jurists believe that this cannot be enforced, given the current political and social structure. Therefore, it is possible to deduce that according to Qutb every land that fights a Muslim in his creed, dissuades him from his religion, and obstructs the activities of Shari'ah is dâr al-harb, even if one's family and clan reside there. In contrast, every land in which the Islamic creed and Shari'ah are established and promoted is dâr al-Islâm even if one has no family or clan there (Qutb, 1977, p. 195).

When comparing Qutb's view with early views, Abü Tzzah holds that the lands of Muslims are lands of Islam and it is obligatory to defend them (al-'Azam, 1980, pp. 305-307). Al-'Azam supports the views of Wahbat al-Zuhaylï in limiting the scope of dâr al-Islâm and dâr alharb, where he takes into account the historical factors and geographical locations and not the rulings, the systems and the legislation (al-'Azam. 1980, pp. 305-307). He remarks that Islamic lands are such lands where Sharl'ah is implemented. Then if such lands fall under the control of infidels or unjust rulers, where Islamic laws are not in place, they still remain dâr al-Islâm and their characteristics are not changed. According to him, Qu(b has misunderstood by considering the entire Muslim world as dâr al-harb (al-'Azam. 1980, p. 306).

'Awdah explains that jurists have divided the world into two divisions, regarding every Islamic country as dâr al-Islâm, and every other country as dâr al-harb. According to him, dâr al-Islâm comprises countries in which Islamic laws are noticeable or their people are able to enforce Islamic laws. Every country where its entire population or the majority are Muslims and every country in which Muslims dominate and rule, even though the majority of its population are non-Muslims are considered dâr al-Islâm. Every country in which non-Muslims, dominate and rule and yet Muslims are able to visualise Islam or there is no restriction for Muslims to see Islamic laws practised is also considered dâr al-Islâm ('Awdah, n. d., vol. 1, pp. 275-276). According to 'Awdah, dâr al-harb comprises every non-Islamic country that does not come under the rule of Muslims or does not establish Islamic laws, whether it is ruled as a single state or federation of states. The inhabitants of dâr alharb are of two kinds: either people on whom war is waged (harbiyylr) or people who submit to the Divine will (Muslimln) ('Awdah, n. d., vol. 1, pp. 275-276).

In this context, Qutb seems to be in conformity with the majority. Hence, it is not proper to accuse him as a deviant. Charging him as an adversary of the jurists or jurisprudence is unfair. When considering the current situations and the organic structure of laws and rulings in Muslim countries, Muslim nations are not in a position to justify that they are purely Islamic in the true sense. Likewise, some people have misunderstood Qutb's articulation of a jâhiliyyah community. Others have erred in their estimation of Muslim countries, which they have regarded from historical and geographical perspectives. They may be historically or geographically classified as Islamic, but jurists do not use this criterion and focus instead on legal structures and practices. Al-Bahansâwï remarks that if dâr al-harb in the terminology of jurists is that it is not ruled by Shari'ah, then it is not proper to rule by other than the Law of God. This is one of the fundamental and self-evident truths of Islam. Moreover, the characteristic of a community or state in dâr al-Islâm does not mean that every individual must be a Muslim. Qutb's statements regarding dâr al-harb is applicable to the community or the state that prefers structures and laws other than Shari'ah (alBahansâwï, 1977, pp. 250-251). Qutb's argument concerns theoretical principles with the aim of providing an ideational clarification and a critical revision of the worldview of Islam. It is not his intention to apply it to anyone at this age, nor its implementation by societies or countries.

Al-marhaliyyah in jihâd

Having analysed Qutb's views about the concept of dâr al-Islâm and dâr al-harb, we cite another example from his discourse onfiqh in which his perspective of applying al-marhaliyyah (stages) in jihâd is manifested. Qufb has a unique stand on jihâd. To him, jihâd refers to a struggle in the cause of God, establishment of the godhead of God on earth and dismissal of false gods against His authority. The proclamation that the Lordship of the universe is only for God means a comprehensive revolution against the sovereignty of man in any structure, form and situation, and total insubordination against any circumstance where the laws of man are dominant. This implies eliminating illegal authority vested in man and returning the sovereignty to God, removing His usurpers who rule by legislating laws made by them, establishing themselves as lords and treating people as slaves. This means demolishing the kingdom of man in order to establish the kingdom of God (Qufb, 1977, vol. 3, p.1433).

In al-marhaliyyat al-ahkäm (stages of rulings) concept as propagated by Jama 'at al-Takfir, the ruling is divided into Meccan and Medinan. By Meccan, it is meant that it is obligatory to follow now, while Medinan means it is not obligatory at present. According to them, the present circumstances are similar to Meccan situations of aggression. Jama 'at al-Takfir and some of its offshoots claim that the situation of Muslims is similar to the Meccan period. They insist on people accepting their view and attribute their interpretations to Qutb. What is important is that when Qutb discusses the concept of al-marhaliyyah, he does not speak about stages in respect to all legal rulings except on the issue of jihad. He, therefore, is not responsible for the opinion that the proponents subscribe to in invalidating a number of legal rulings under the pretence of al-marhaliyyah (Barakät, 1972, p. 221). Al-Bahansâwï responds to Jama 'at al-Takfir regarding its understanding of the concept and refutes its claim of erroneously attributing their view to Qutb. He discusses their stand with regard to marrying unbelieving women, slaughtering of the cattle by polytheists, the stages, the age of oppression and others (al-Bahansâwï, 1977, pp. 209-237).

Al-Bahansâwï remarks that he discussed with a leader of the Jama 'ah that subscribes to the concept of takfir (charging Muslims as infidels). The group believed in the notion of charging the community and its individuals as infidels and regarded their wives as polytheists, in spite of the fact that the Qur'ân declares such acts unlawful. This leader remarked that "we live in the age of oppression, i.e., similar to Meccan period where marriage with polytheistic women was permissible." AlBahansâwï asked him to provide evidence. He replied he understood it from Qutb. Al-Bahansâwï reiterated that Qutb had documented his view but not with the understanding that the person had. The person responded that the contract of marriage with their wives has been extended on the basis that they were among the People of the Scripture and marriages were permissible. Al-Bahansâwï asked the person; "Did Qutb issue this ruling"? The person replied; "No, but Qutb was saying that this issue needed proper elucidation by jurists. Thus, I reached an opinion on this issue." Al-Bahansâwï responded that "how can you attribute to Qutb an idea that he did not explain, then ask me to clarify the lawful and the prohibited on this issue?" (al-Bahansâwï, 1977, pp. 220-221). From Qufb's discourses, it can be inferred that he does not generalise the concept of al-marhaliyyah for all legal rulings but to jihad only.

Propounding stages in jihâd, Qutb provides evidence from the Prophet's (S.A.W.) biography. First, the treaty that the Prophet signed with the Jews and polytheists of Medina in order to uphold peace and maintain collective defence of the city against all forms of aggression. Second, the treaty of Hudaybiyyah signed by the Prophet with seemingly unfair conditions that reflected a loss for Muslims but was in fact in the interest of the Muslim community (Qutb, 1977, vol. 3, pp. 15471548). In analysing the wisdom behind the treaties, Qutb remarks that the dynamic methodology for the religion is that it always deals with realities. It is flexible but with solid and firm grounds (Qutb. 1977, vol. 3, pp. 1547-1548).

Elucidating verse 123 of al-Tawbah, Qutb remarks that there is a command to fight those infidels who gird Muslims. Regarding ahkâm al-marhaliyyah in jihâd, Qutb's view is that it is not abrogated. The Islamic movement faced the realities in various situations that limited the scope of absolute jihâd, i.e., the rulings were adequate or appropriate to consider according to circumstances, places, and time without forgetting the final rulings (Qutb. 1977, vol. 3, p. 1680). If contemporary Muslims do not encounter such a reality to implement these rulings, they, for the time being, are not obligated to observe the realisation of jihâd, as God says that He does not burden a soul except that which it can bear (Qur'an, 2:286). They have ahkâm al-marhaliyyah in abundance to gradually advance until they find the context appropriate for the full implementation of the final rulings on jihâd. Qutb remarks that those final rulings mentioned in Sürat al-Tawbah came at a time of serious confrontation between the Muslim and Ignorant communities. The circumstances were such that it was obligatory for them to implement those rulings. As for today, the situation is different and therefore ahkâm al-marhaliyyah should be enforced.

As soon as the Muslim community emerges, it will be dynamic thereby being in the state of implementing ahkâm al-marhaliyyah. However, it is incumbent upon the Muslim community to remember that what they implement is ahkâm al-marhaliyyah and thus it should strive to reach the final stage of implementing the final rulings, which decide the ultimate relationship between it and other communities (Qutb. 1977, vol. 3, p. 1744). At this juncture, it is appropriate to ask whether Qutb was the innovator of stages in jihâd or if others had a similar view. While discussing the theory of abrogation, scholars provide their views regarding the rulings on jihâd. The majority of them advocate that âyat al-sayf (verse related to sword) is abrogative of all earlier verses on jihâd that deal with gradual stages. Ibn Khuzaymah (n. d., p. 264) argues that God revealed âyat al-sayf which abrogated one hundred and thirteen verses. Others contend that earlier verses indicating stages were not abrogated. Al-Qaysï argues that verse 109 of al-Baqarah has been abrogated by the command of fighting. As for âyat al-sayf al-Qaysï prefers that it has abrogated other verses revealed earlier related to jihâd, patience, tolerance, and forgiveness (al-Qaysï, 1986, pp. 103-105). According to Ibn Kathïr (n. d., vol. 3, p. 365), the directives of jihâd in Siirat al-Tawbah abrogated other verses that contain the covenant with polytheists.

Scholars argue that even if we rely on al-Qaysï's view that âyat al-sayf has abrogated the previous verses related to jihâd, it does not mean that we cannot return to those abrogated verses. The amazing reflection of al-Qaysï is that he has referred to all kinds of abrogation which according to him are classified into three. First, abrogation is on religious duty. It has abrogated what has been made obligatory and it is not permissible to act upon the abrogated ruling. The example for this is the ruling prescribed by verse 15 of al-Nisâ 'that has been abrogated by the ruling of verse 2 of al-Niir. Second, abrogation is on religious duty, which has abrogated another obligatory act. Regarding this, there is an option to act upon the former. The example for this is the ruling prescribed by verse 65 of al-An jâl. that has been abrogated by the ruling of verse 66 of al-An jâl.. Third, abrogation is a command by leaving the act by the abrogated that was obligatory without any substitute. There is an option to act upon the abrogated or to leave it, but action by it is preferable and rewarded. The example for this is night worship that was made obligatory and then abrogated by the command that lightened it in al-Muzzammil.

If we consider the above classification as meaningful, then why do we not include the abrogation of verses of jihâd in the second kind of abrogation, which al-Qaysï was referring to in his discourse? In addition, if we want to testify the authenticity of the opinion of Qutb regarding stages in jihâd, then it is appropriate to study the views of early scholars. In this regard, al-Zarkashrs view is closer to Qutb's. Based on the discourse, one can conclude that some scholar's views conform to Qutb's proposition of the application of stages.

The discourse explains Qutb's view regarding the ruling on jihad. He holds that the gradual stages are not abrogated by the final stage as explained in Sürat al-Tawbah. The marhaliyyah or stages apply to jihad ruling alone and cannot be generalised to other rulings. We have demonstrated that Qutb was not the innovator of the view of enforcing the concept of stages. Assuming that he differs with the majority of scholars, at least he is a follower of the opinion of some prominent scholars. It is, therefore, possible to deduce that his statement on the issue of stages is not improper. His opinion is not a manifestation of deviation, rather an articulation of his reasoning, which may not be agreeable to many jurists.

Conclusion

Qutb's discourse was a call for dynamic jurisprudence relevant to the contemporary Muslim needs. He advocates creativity in jurisprudence for the sustainable development of the Muslim community. The spirit behind the discourse is to highlight the true situations of the Muslim world that uncritically adopts legal rulings of the jurists of different periods without realising their irrelevance to the present situation due to changing circumstances. Qutb's dynamic fiqh project resonates in contemporary Islamic banking and finance. There are attempts, especially by jurists over the past two decades, to deduce new rulings based on analogies to resolve problems in the fields of banking, economics, insurance, and finance. New visions have emerged regarding the establishment of Islamic investments and Islamic markets. Muslim states are impressed by such moves of jurists and economists. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that Qutb was futuristic in his vision so much so that he realised the needs of the Muslim community and hence presented a new theory to develop fiqh al-Harakah which would be dynamic and relevant to resolve the contemporary problems and crises of the Muslim community.

This study clarified some of the misconceptions regarding Qutb's interpretation of dctr ctl-Islctm and dctr al-harb. Those who studied his thought criticised him for urging rulers to establish dctr ctl-Islctm by resorting to violence. It is apparent that Qutb had only made attempts to clarify the juristic dimensions of the concept based on early Islamic sources. He also aimed at providing ideational clarification as well as a critical revision of the worldview of Islam to Muslims. What is important to consider is that it is not Qutb's intention to apply the concept of ciar al-Islam and dar al-harb to anyone at this contemporary era. On Qutb's discourse on application of stages in jihad, the study made it clear that he does not call for generalisation of stages to the entire legal rulings as he was accused by jurists. He was not the pioneer in advocating this concept but a follower of the opinions of prominent scholars.

Generally, Qutb has been accused of being an extremist. Those who reach this conclusion see him from a different perspective. If he is evaluated from the Islamic perspective, he may not be seen as an extremist in the way he was portrayed. The West considered him as an extremist because he criticised all Western ideologies and systems. Yes, he has been forceful in his articulations and analyses but whatever he has presented in terms of religious exhortations, they have justifications because the Muslim world that he witnessed was a different world, particularly Egypt, which was antagonistic to religious systems, especially during the time of Jamal Abdul Nasir. In Qutb's view, Muslims were becoming backward because of not following Shari'ah and therefore he focussed on reforming Muslims. He moved forward with his new approach to discussing issues, particularly the contemporary approach to solving the problems of Muslims, and finally he was appealing to Muslims to go back to the scripture and patterns of the Prophet (S.A.W.) and uncompromisingly adopt them as the only source of everything in life.

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