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* Department of History, Philosophy and Religion, Oxford Brookes University, [email protected]
The contribution of President Bill Clinton (1993–2001) to the Northern Irish peace process has been the subject of considerable discussion, both journalistic and scholarly. In contrast, the role of President Ronald Reagan (1981–9) and his administration in the Anglo–Irish process has received comparatively little attention. 1 As a result, scholarship relating to U.S. influence on Northern Ireland needs to be rebalanced. Earlier scholarship concerning U.S. influence on the Northern Ireland conflict was not able to draw on significant primary source material now available in American, British and Irish archives, and instead relied on other sources, such as oral history, diaries, memoirs and the press. 2 This article utilises the most recently available primary source material and seeks to develop a more nuanced understanding of Reagan’s relationship with Northern Ireland. It argues that Reagan’s involvement signalled that the conflict was already undergoing internationalisation prior to the Clinton era and that this was influenced by domestic concerns in the United States. 3 For instance, this article questions the established view that Reagan simply encouraged Margaret Thatcher (British prime minister, 1979–90) to sign the 1985 Anglo–Irish Agreement and re-examines the president’s motivations. Indeed, given the increasingly rapid release of primary source material in American and British archives, the relationship between Reagan and Thatcher is the subject of growing historical interest. However, this scholarship has focused on their dynamic as resurgent cold warriors and their shared commitment to free markets in an attempt to reverse perceived national decline, and fails to address their interactions in relation to Northern Ireland. 4 This article will examine Reagan’s attitude and approach towards the Troubles and the Anglo–Irish process. It will do so by problematising Reagan’s involvement by identifying how Irish-Americans sought to secure the president’s intervention, coupled with assessment of the debates within the Reagan administration about American policy towards the Troubles. 5 Edwin Meese, who enjoyed a long-standing, close professional relationship with the president, recalled that Reagan was proud of his Irish ancestry and would often make Irish jokes. Yet he could not recall Reagan discussing contemporary Irish affairs. 6 It could be argued, in fact, that Reagan was largely uninvolved in the Anglo–Irish process. Nevertheless, by simply invoking...