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For deterrence to work, a potential attacker needs to perceive the deterrer's threats as capable and credible for retaliation. The issue of relative capabilities has been extensively analyzed, yet the core problem concems credible intentions. The strategic literature is largely influenced by commitment theory prescribing various "manipulation of risk" strategies intended to enhance threat credibility. A few analysts, however, challenge this view and recognize the importance of "intrinsic interests" in the issues at stake (i.e., inherent credibility), which can limit the effectiveness of costly signals. These two alternative views are quantitatively tested in the cases of major-powers deterrence from 1895 to 1985. A new measure of the observable category of inherent credibility is also introduced, consisting of the regional interests of major powers in the area of dispute. The results indicate strong and significant effects of regional interests on both the onset and outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, thus suggesting relevant theoretical and policy implications.
For several decades during the cold war, the "unrestricted globalism" of containment policy left a strong imprint on U.S. strategic thought.1 The question of whether and what national interests the United States, or any other power for that matter, might have in different parts of the world was not generally raised. Instead, it was replaced by the concern that the failure to stand firm against an opponent in one region would reflect negatively on the U.S. reputation for containment of potential challenges in other parts of the world. Consequently, strategic writings were mainly preoccupied with the effective techniques of signaling the U.S. intention to use force, even when its stakes were low in the particular region. In the post-cold war era, however, the demise of a major global adversary has prompted the question of whether the U.S. national interests and goals should be uniform across all world regions. Predominant strategic theories, largely shaped in the context of superpower deterrence, do not always have well-developed and ready answers to this important policy question.
The occasional confusion about foreign policy goals seems then to be yet another legacy of the cold war era. Phrases such as "conceptual poverty," "from containment to confusion," or "paradigm lost" are consequently found as descriptors of the U.S. foreign policy in recent critical literature (e.g., Haas 1995;...