Speaking truth to power: political advisers’ and civil servants’ responses to perceived harmful policy proposals

Introduction

In 2010, a political scandal raged in Denmark. A politically appointed ministerial adviser was alleged to have asked a civil servant to delete an incriminating email as part of a cover-up. The email was relevant to an ongoing public debate on public overpayment for services provided by private hospitals. The civil servant did not comply but went to his superior, who supported him. Someone then leaked the information about the cover-up attempt to the press, probably a civil servant who found the request alarming (Frederiksen and Nielsen 2010).

Leaking information to outsiders is risky and unusual, however. Civil servants are therefore likely to consider other options first, such as voicing their concerns internally to colleagues or superiors, or staying silent and loyally obeying orders (Hirschman 1970; Kingston 2002; Niemann 2013, 193). They may even start neglecting their duties, or sabotaging the work of the organisation in secret, whereas others may prefer to leave the organisation entirely (Hirschman 1970; Golden 1992; Dowding et al. 2000).

Most studies focus on these responses as reactions to civil servants’ working conditions, e.g. dissatisfaction with salaries, benefits, training, promotion and physical work environment (Whitford and Lee 2014). This research largely replicates findings from the private sector and ignores the nature of public employment (John 2017). For instance, public employees may be more motivated by a will to serve the public good than private employees. We have little knowledge of civil servants’ preferred responses to the kind of situation described in the Danish case above. When government organisations move in the “wrong direction” (Hirschman 1970, 78) or make what bureaucrats perceive to be poor or even harmful policy decisions, what do civil servants do? Do they look away and carry on as usual, or do they stand up to their political principals?

This article sheds light on what factors influence civil servants’ behaviour in these situations. Our interest is the study of voice in politically steered organisations, or more precisely in ministries. Since ministries can employ merit-recruited and tenured civil servants as well as politically recruited advisers (here referred to as political advisers), we compare how these groups respond in two systems that are politicised in different ways.

We speak of two forms of politicisation depending on how ministerial employees...