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Even a cursory glance into the history of environmental law allows for two safe assumptions: environmental hanus will happen, and environmental harms will be litigated. Some litigants seek to advocate for themselves, while others seek to advocate for the environment itself-speaking for the trees, if you will. We used to think if one was lucky enough not to live downstream from a coal plant, in the Prince William Sound, or on the Gulf of Mexico, they could avoid the effects of these "environmental disasters." That dynamic is changing. Increases in carbon and methane into the atmosphere have increased the earth's temperature, causing indirect and pervasive hanus. This damage affects everyone. The connection between human living conditions and the environment has never been more apparent-or disparate in its impact. With the imperative to protect the environment more pressing than ever, litigants seeking to protect their communities are faced with a daunting obstacle: the standing doctrine. Standing-as applied in the more traditional kind of environmental hanus-is not sufficient to address novel, climate change-related hanus and the legal claims being brought to adjudicate them. This note analyzes the context of environmental standing and puts forth a climate change-specific standing doctrine far more suitable to addressing environmental claims of first impression. The first facet of the new standing is a place-based injury-in-fact. This concept, put forth first by Daniel Färber in his 2008 article, attaches the particularization and concreteness requirements to the area of land suffering the damage and is satisfied for anyone with sufficient connection to the land. Second, the court should adopt a market-share theory of liability when determining the traceability of the claim. Co-opted from product liability tort law, this would allow the court to recognize the traceability of climate changerelated damage to the major contributors to climate change via their "market share" of responsibility. Finally, looking at the prior remedial power of the judiciary, the courts should not artificially limit their power because the remedy required is "too big." Historically, when the Court has found that a constitutional right has been violated, no remedy has been too big. If the Court had addressed the remedial question in Juliana v. United States, without looking to the merits, the remedy would have been fully within...