TREBA NAM PROMJENA: Ideje rasta i razvoja u doba krize fosilne energije i kapitalizma/KOMENTARI/OSVRT NA KOMENTARE

Vladimir Cvijanovic

Grupa 22, Zagreb, Hrvatska

http: / /www.grupa22.hr

vladim ir (fl) d aad-alum ni.de

Danijela Dolenec

Grupa 22, Zagreb, Hrvatska

http: / /www.grupa22.hr

[email protected] fpzg.hr

Mladen Domazet

Grupa 22, Zagreb, Hrvatska

http: / /www.grupa22.hr

domazet(fl)idi.hr

Karin Doolan

Grupa 22, Zagreb, Hrvatska

http: / /www.grupa22.hr

kdoolan(S)unizd.hr

Tomislav Tomasevic

Grupa 22, Zagreb

http:/ /www.grupa22.hr

ttomislav(S)gmail.com

Mislav Zitko

Odsjek za filozofiju

Filozofski fakultet

Sveuciliste u Zagrebu

Ivana Luci"a 3

10000 Zagreb

Hrvatska

mislav zitko (3>gmaiLcom

Jeremy F. Walton

CETREN Transregional Research Network

Georg August University of Göttingen

Wilhelmsplatz 1

37073 Göttingen

Germany

jeremyf\valton(5)gmail.com

Mladen Domazet

Grupa 22, Zagreb

Cilj ovoga rada jest postaviti temelje za holisticko poimanje ekonomskih nada i geofizickih pokretaca u pozadini zelene ekonomije i od-rasta (eng. degrowth) te potaknuti druge da ih iskopaju. Rad ponajprije nastoji oblikovati okvir koji bi ujedinio upozorenja o slomu globalne civilizacije, njegovim fizickim i povijesnim pokretacima i iskustvenim otjelotvorenjima. Baveci se idejom da globalnoj civilizaciji kakvu poznajemo prijeti slom ljudskih drustava i praksi koje ih odrzavaju, rad donosi pregled stavova znanstvenika iz podrucja znanosti o okolisu, biologije, povijesti, ljevicarske drustvene teorije i ekonomije.1 Iako postoje historijski narativi koji pobu&uju nadu u tehnologiju kao sredstvo prevladavanja ovoga problema, u ovome cu tekstu nastojati pokazati da se ta vrsta rizika temelji na ontoloskoj zabuni oko temeljnih elemenata suvremenog razvojnog uspjeha. Rad pojasnjava da kljucni model za ublazavanje sloma ne pociva na malim promjenama u zivotnom stilu koje, pak, ovise o tehnoloskom nadilazenju fizickih ogranicenja, vec na ozbiljnom drustvenom restrukturiranju koje bi zamijenilo tehnolosko rjesenje koje nedostaje. No da bi takvo sto postalo demokratski prihvatljivo, drustva moraju iznova otvoriti pitanje indikatora i definicija komponenata blagos tanja; na covjecanstvu je, pak, da napusti nadu u cudo zelene ekonomije i umjesto toga propita u cemu lezi njegova odrzivost.

Kljucne rijeci: razvoj, politicka ekonomija, klimatske promjene, priroda, civihzacija, kapitalizam

Protekle godine biljeze odlu"an pokusaj ponovnog ispisivanja povijesti sa stajalista ekonomije. Medutim, takavpristup ne zadire dovoljno duboko. Misli i drustveni zivot "ovjeka izgradeni su na njegovom ekonomskom zivotu, koji pak po"iva na bioloskim temeljima. Klima i geologija medu sobom odlu"uju gdje ce biti nalazista sirovina potrebnih ljudskoj industriji, gdje ce biti moguce pokrenuti proizvodnju; o klimi, pak, ovisi gdje ce se osloboditi izvori ljudske energije. Promjene klime uzrokuju migracije, a migracije dovode ne samo do rato va, vec i do plodnog mijesanja ideja nuznog za ubrzan napredak civilizacije.

(Huxley 1953: 61)

[Svoje nadahnuce kriti"ki racionalizam duguje] cjelokupnoj ambiciji Prosvjetiteljstva da stvori povijesno utemeljenu ljudsku znanost koja ce jednoga dana dovesti do stvaranja univerzalne civilizacije koja ce sve pojedince u"initi neovisnima, autonomnima, oslobod ma i odozgo i odozdo, sposobnima spoznati same sebe, koji za opstanak ovise isklju"ivo jedni o drugima. [... ] Velikdio postignuca suvremene civilizacije o"ito dugujemo brojnim faktorima, od uvecanja znanja na polju medicine, preko informacijskih tehnologija, do bitno uznapredovalih transportnih sredstava; iako predstavljaju neizravno naslijede Prosvjetiteljstva i revolucija u znanosti i tehnologiji koje mu i prethode i slijede ga, spomenuti faktori nemaju neposrednu ili izravnu vezu s njegovim idealima. No nasa sposobnost da vlastito poimanje svijeta smjestimo u kontekst ne"ega sto je vece od naseg vlastitog malog komadica zemlje, nase vlastite kulture, obitelji ili religije, o"ito ima.

(Pagden 2013: 315, 350-351)

Ubod

Iznalazenje vlastitog glasa u tekstu ove vrste nije samo problem akademske apstraktnosti, vec i dijagramska ilustracija prirode prepreka s kojima su suocene analiza i strategije posvecene problemu sloma globalne civilizacije uslijed prekoracivanja granica rasta. I dok je istrazivanje i medusobno povezivanje spomenutih tema nerijetko osamljenicki pothvat, uglavnom uslijed nedostatka sluzbene discipline unutar koje bi se mogla formulirati diskurzivna poigravanja rijecima i pronaci zajednica, analiza uzroka i istrazivanje strategija oslabljivanja i prilagodbe nuzno se tice "nas" u "razvijenim" drustvima, pa i "itavoj ljudskoj populaciji. Velicanstvo "nas" nuzno je obiljezeno unutarnjim podjelama na one koji raspravljaju, one koji zagaduju, one koji imaju koristi, one koji pate, one kojice patiti, one koji ovo "itaju itd. Svemu tome dodajte sloj promjenjivih vremenskih raspona, od jedinica vremena geoloskih sila do raspona pojedinacnih zivota u odnosu na koje analize i strategije dobivaju znacenje.

Da bismo objasnili zasto bi ovo moglo biti posebno doba za "itavu ljudsku populaciju i kulturno zdanje koje je nagomilala, moramo sagledati siru razinu geoloske i bioloske evolucije i povijesti razvoja, kao i svakodnevnu razinu politickih i ekonomskih napora u zivotima autora i "itatelja (mene i vas). Ako smatrate da se unutar istoga teksta nista znacajno ne moze reci o ""aju" u smislu napitka koji sam jutros popio i robe vazne za predindustrijsku trgovinu, nemojte "itati dalje. Jer ovo je tekst koji sebi postavlja upravo takav zadatak: pokazati da i pojedina"no iskustvo i veliki povijesni narativi tvore vaznu smislenu cjelinu, sve u svrhu boljeg razumijevanja nase zajedni"ke buducnosti (i opet, moje i vase). Ovaj odulji uvod za cilj ima upozoriti na ograni"enja jezika, tradicionalno raspodijeljenog medu pojedina"nim disciplinama, naro"ito u akademskom svijetu, koja otezavaju raspravu o stvarnoj i neposrednoj opasnosti. Oslanjajuci se na optimisti"nu nadu u jezi"nu prilagodljivost i postizanje razumijevanja medu ljudima, istovremeno odbacuje simplicisti"ku nadu u "ozelenjavanje" ekonomskog rasta i "tehnoloska rjesenja" za ' zi"ka ograni"enja kapitalisti"kog modela rasta. Ako jos uvijek "itate, zna"i da ste razumjeli sve sto je dosad re"eno; i tako dalje...

U tom duhu ostatak teksta ponuditce upozorenja o kombiniranim drustvenim i prirodnim pokreta"ima sloma proizvodnje dobrobiti kroz medij civilizacije (zajedni"ko dobro "ovje"anstva u cjelini), te pregled struktura unutar razvojnog procesa komplementarnih civilizaciji i neutemeljenih obecanja o tehnoloskom nadilazenju ' zi"kih ograni"enja i neograni "enom rastu bez posljedica. Razlog ovoj tastoj ambiciji jest "injenica da me transdisciplinarni pregled uvjerio da opseg i "opakost" problema iziskuju da se ambicioznim pokusajima rjesenja dade prednost nad prokusanim alatima raznih akademskih i tehnoloskih disciplina koje razdvajaju pojedina"na i kolektivna iskustva, smanjujuci ih na razine kojima je lakse baratati. Takoder, bez daljnjeg propitkivanja, ovaj tekst pisem iz pozicije da civilizaciju vrijedi sa"uvati. Polazeci od toga, nastojatcu pokazati: (a) da nam je potrebna nova vrsta organizacije znanja kojace omoguciti tuma"enje slozenosti razli"itih omjera pokreta"a sloma, (b) da je potrebno de' nirati globalni subjekt ("mi") tih tuma"enja, i (c) da valja ozbiljno porazmisliti o konceptu sloma kao posljedici, mogucnosti i buducnosti koju treba izbjegavati na svakom koraku.

Razvoj, napredak, povijest i nade ljudskih bica

Dugovje"na uzre"ica "Zivimo u izvanrednim vremenima" uglavnom se koristi za izricanje zabrinutosti zbog drustvenih mijena, golemih i dramati"nih dogadaja ili izazova s kojima je suo"ena svakodnevna egzistencija. Iako mozda zvu"i kao izvikivanje rije"i "Vukc" u trenutku kada (globalno) selo vise ne obraca paznju, spomenuta uzre"ica ovoga puta zaista zna"i upravo ono sto izri"e. U prvom redu, "Mi" se odnosi na cjelokupno "ovje"anstvo koje danas postoji, svih sedam milijardi, sto je najveci broj ljudi koji istovremeno prezivljavaju na Zemljinim resursima u povijesti. No, sto je jos vaznije, "mi" se odnosi na omanju skupinu gradana u samo 47 od nesto manje od 200 zemalja s vrlo visokim Indeksom ljudskog razvoja (eng. Human Development Index, skrac. HDI) (UNDP 2013). U tom kontekstu, "mi" (s malim po"etnim slovom) obuhvaca manje od petine ljudske populacije, stanovnistvo zemalja koje su odgovorne za priblizno polovicu ukupnog godisnjeg zagadenja stakleni"kim plinovima i ekonomske aktivnosti, i kojima pripada vecina vojne i politi"ke moci (UNDP 2013).

Istrazivanje drugih nejednakosti na planeti, izmedu i unutar pojedinih zemalja, otkrilo bi jos vise zapanjujuce omjere bogatstva, hrane, zastite od meteoroloskih prilika i sli"no. Vecina tih podataka dobro poznati su memi koji kruze internetom i drugim medijima, prikazani u umjetni"kim djelima,2 itd. Ono sto je naro"ito zanimljivo ukontekstu ove rasprave jest cinjenica da je, gledano iz povijesne Perspektive, usporedo s dramati"nim porastom nadzora nad materijalima i pretvorbama energije na razini cjelokupne ljudske vrste, rasla i nejednakost u pristupu i kontroli tih istih materijala i pretvorbi energije unutar vrste. A ipak, sami sebe i dalje vidimo kao dio iste potencijalne, ako ne i stvarne, zajednice. Ovo nije samo ideoloska dimna zavjesa: gotovo svi ljudi koji danas zive ne samo da (iz Perspektive biologije) dijele isti genetski materijal, vec su i dio jezi"ne zajednice, u smislu Wittgensteinovih (1967) jezi"nih igara koje mozemo igrati jedni s drugima. Bez obzira na visok stupanj srodnosti koju neki ljudi osjecaju prema svojim kucnim ljubimcima, postoje odredeni kolektivni pothvati u koje se "ovjek upusta samo s drugim voljnim ljudskim bicima, ne i pripadnicima drugih vrsta. No vecini ljudi tu o"itu "injenicu ionako nije potrebno posebno isticati: ona je dio pretpostavljenog moralnog kodeksa vecine. Ovdje je ipakponavljamo za slu"aj da netko, gledajuci iz posebne povijesne pozicije, dode do zaklju"ka da smo dosegli evolucijsku fazu u kojoj su oni koji imaju na neki na"in fundamentalno razli"iti i otudeni od onih koji nemaju. Nisu: i dalje zive na istom planetu i crpe iste oskudne resurse. Oni samo, iz odredenih povijesnih i kulturnih razloga, uzimaju mnogo, mnogo veci dio tih resursa nego ikada prije.

Prije svega, valja priznati da su, s obzirom na broj ljudi na planeti, vremena u kojima zivimo doista izvanredna. No buduci da spomenuti broj posljednjih stoljeca eksponencijalno raste, i to gladima, epidemijama, ratovima i geofizickim kataklizmama usprkos, izvanredna su (u nesto manjoj mjeri nego danas) vec barem sto pedeset godina. Postoji nesto drugo sto ih "ini zaista izvanrednim. To je drugi poseban uvjet. Paul Crutzen iskovao je termin "antropocen"3 kao naziv za novu geolosku epohu u zivotu planeta uzrokovanu ljudskom djelatnos (za pregled, vidi Zalasiewicz, Crutzen i Steffen 2012). Naziv "antropocen" sugerira da zivimo u izvanrednom dobu u kojem nasa vrsta, nasa drustva i kulture djeluju snagom ge-o ofizicke sile (Archer 2010; Sager 2011). Geofizicke sile uglavnom uklju"uju fizicke procese koji uzrokuju pomicanje tektonskih plo"a, snazne erupcije vulkana koje mijenjaju koncentraciju razli"itih sastojakau zraku, vodii tlu, iliudare izvanzemaljskih tijela (poput asteroida) o povrsinu planeta. Sve nabrojano vec je samo po sebi prili"no izvanredno, no zivot u cjelini (naro"ito neke vrste i ekosustavi) uproslostije odigrao kljucnuuloguu oblikovanjubio-fizickih uvjeta na planeti (primjerice, slu"aj porasta udjela visoko korozivnog kisika u atmosferi) (Catling2005).Medutim, takvepojave smatramo nenamjernimposljedicama nerefleksivnih "initelja, koje su se protegle kroz dulja vremenska razdoblja.

Vratimo se na trenutak Wittgensteinovim jezi"nim igrama: "mi" smo skloni vlastitu refleksivnu vrstu smatrati barem djelomice kolektivno svjesnom suvremenog potencijala za narusavanje svakodnevne stvarnosti. A najo"itiji primjer tog narusavanja jest prekid slozene interakcije izmedu biofizickog okolisa i "ovje"anstva koja podupire svakidasnje zdanje civilizacije. Iako je gotovo svaka civilizacija u zabiljezenoj povijesti u nekom trenutku dozivjela slom, "esto materijalno uzrokovan pretjeranim iskoristavanjem okolisa (Diamond 2005; Morris 2011; Montgomery 2012), uproslostise uvijekradilo o lokalnimi regionalnimfenomenima. U danasnjem gusto premrezenom tehnoloskom drustvu, prijetnja sloma civilizacije je globalna - i u smislu posljedica, i u smislu uzroka (Ehrlich i Ehrlich 2012). Globalizirani karakter suvremenog drustva sam po sebi predstavlja povijesno speci'"nu situaciju (Burke III 2009): danas gotovo i ne postoji skupina ljudi koja se moze smatrati uistinu neovisnom od civilizacije, ma koliko oni isticali da u njoj nevoljko participiraju. Globalno rasprseno covjecanstvo medusobno je povezano u civilizacijsku mrezu u kojoj lokalna previranja imaju globalne posljedice (Goldin 2013). Medutim, problemati"na situacija s kojom smo sada su-o oceni vise je od posljedice domino efekta visokog stupnja ekonomske i kulturne medupovezanosti. Globalno "Mi" koje efektivno, ako ne i politi"ki, tvori civilizaciju, u cjelini mijenja materijalne uvjete na planeti snagom geofizicke sile, iako je njegova unutarnja struktura obiljezena golemim nejednakostima u fizickom utjecaju i politi"koj moci.

Jedna od prednosti refleksivnosti koju nam pruza jezik jest mogucnost osmisljavanja i istrazivanjaprotucinjenicnih (proslih, buducih, nevidljivih ili apstraktnih) situacija te ocjene njihove pozeljnosti na temelju sadasnjih iskustava. Iako takav model nikada nije savrseni nadomjestak za stvarna iskustva, on je upravo ono sto bi, iz evolucijske Perspektive, trebalo "initi razliku izmedu ljudi i brzomnozecih bakterija koje izdisu plinove. Potpomognuti matematickom racionalizacijom i snagom ra"unala, ovakvi pojednostavljeni modeli vec desetljecima upozoravaju na posljedice povecanja potrosnje od strane civilizacije preko granice sposobnosti regeneracije biofizicke raznolikosti na planetu iz sun"eve energije. Ono sto je naro"ito zanimljivo kod recentnijih modela (Motesharrei, Rivas i Kalnay 2014) jest cinjenica da, u usporedbi sa zasebnim djelovanjem pojedina"nih pokreta"a sloma, kombinacija osiromasenja resursa i neumjerene nejednakosti radikalno ubrzava potpuni slom civilizacije. Nadalje, "ini se da socio-tehnoloska struktura, u kojoj je osiromasivanje resursa posredovano kroz siromasne, no kojime upravljaju i od kojega korist imaju izuzetno bogati, djeluje kao veo koji onima koji su najbolje pozicionirani da nesto poduzmu zakriva pogled na upozorenja o ubrzanom slomu. Kroz skodljiv spoj neumjerenog osiromasivanja resursa i neumjerene nejednakosti, kao vrsta gubimo nas refleksivni potencijal, sto nas "ini vise nalik bakterijama proizvoda"ima kisika iz geoloski daleke proslosti. To je razlog zasto ovoga puta moramo iskreno povikati "Vukc" i u potpunosti prihvatiti da zivimo u zaista izvanrednim vremenima.

"Ocajno, ali ne i ozbiljno" - akademska ekspozicija

Koristeci svakodnevni jezik, odmaknut od apstraktnih matemati"kih modela interakcija medu i prirode, moramo razgovarati o materijalnim i pogodnostima povezanim s radomkoje suvremena civilizacija nudivecinipopulacija na razvijenom Sjeveru i Zapadu. To uklju"uje kuce, automobile i ra"unala pomocu kojih se razmjenjuju tekstovi poput ovoga, pi- pi- smenosti posveceno vrijeme njihove razmjene. Dostupnost obilne jeftine energije dobivene iz fosilnih goriva oslobodila je moderna drustva obimnog fizickog rada nuznog za odrzavanje civilizacije, omogucila nam davodimo produktivnije zivote iproporcionalno smanjila razinu tjelesnog nasilja stetnog za pojedinca (Wills 2013). Istodobno, ona nemjerljivo doprinosi ireverzibilnim globalnim promjenama Mime, ubrzavajuci na taj na"in potencijalni slom suvremenih ljudskih civilizacijasirom svijeta (Ehrlich i Ehrlich 2013). Bez obzira na taj temeljni paradoks energije i kulture, ni "razvijena" ljudska drustva ne odustaju od ideje da njihovo sveopce blagostanje ovisi o njihovoj sposobnosti da globalnu proizvodnju dobara i usluga godisnje uvecavaju za barem 5c, unato" jasnim znacima da spomenuta praksa vodi u propast (Graeber 2011). Nuznost obecavanja povecanja dobara i usluga kao preduvjet nade u blagostanje populacijapolitickih jedinica (drzava, manjeiliviselabavihfederacijaislicno) stogase namece kao vazno pitanje razvoja u dvadeset prvom stoljecu.

Najvjerojatniji odgovor na ovo pitanje glasi da u ovom trenutku svi "lanovi drustva, jednakih potencijala i nominalno jednakih prava, nemaju jednak pristup dobrobitima koje se dobivaju iz resursa i energije te pretvaraju u dobra i usluge. Dobrobiti su trenutno oskudne, no kako se s vremenom budu povecavale, pretpostavlja se da ce ih biti vise za sve. Medutim, drustvene strukture zaduzene za raspodjelu spomenutih dobrobiti ne samo da ne smanjuju nejednakost na globalnoj razini, vec je dodatno pogorsavaju, poja"avajuci time osjecaj onih koji nemaju da je potrebno stvarati jos vise kako bi i oni mogli dobiti svoj dio kola"a. Valja naglasiti da se, gledano iz globalne Perspektive, posljednja re"enica ne odnosi toliko na osobe lisene hrane, sMonista ili lijekova, koliko na one kojima je uskracen siroki spektar druge trosne Dugovima pokretan put uvijek rastuce proizvodnje potrosne robe vec bi sam po sebibio problemati"an (Graeber 2011), no sadaje uparen s nadolazecom kriti"nom to"kom ireverzibilnih Mimatskih promjena.

Vise akademski nastrojen odgovor takoder bi ukazao na to da struktura financiranja proizvodnje u kapitalizmu, koja ovisi o posudivanju s kamatama i istovremenoj proizvodnji dobara u neprestanom nadmetanju s drugim proizvoda"ima, iz nuzde forsira rast BDP-a i potrosnje resursa, kako bi bila u stanju financirati izvorni dug na koji placa kamate. Je li moguce osmisliti dovoljno velika i stoga odrziva drustva "ije blagostanje nece ovisiti o redovnom povecanju proizvodnje dobara i usluga?

Meta-procjene istrazivanja u fizickim i drustvenim znanostima, poput onih koje su objavile radne skupine Meduvladinog panela o Mimatskim promjenama (eng. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, skrac. IPCC; http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/index.shtml), upozoravaju na ozbiljne ireverzibilne materijalne promjene kojima se nismo u stanju prilagoditi, a koje ce nastati u slu"aju porasta prosje"ne povrsinske temperature vise od 4°C iznad temperature u predindustrijskom razdoblju (upravo nas u tom smjeru vodi aktualni model razvoja). Drugim rije"ima, ukoliko ne ublazimo uzroke globalnih Mimatskih promjena, nasa civilizacija vjerojatno se nece moci prilagoditi Mimatskim i bio fizickim promjenama koje ce uslijediti. Sudeci prema znanstvenom i kulturnom razvoju u posljednjih nekoliko tisucljeca, mogli bismo ustvrditi da ce na"in na koji svijet funkcionira danas dovesti do toga da u nekoj blizoj buducnosti "svijet" vise nece postojati. To ne zna"i da "ovje"anstvo nece postojati, vec da ce civilizacija koju su ljudi proteklih tisucljeca razvijali i kojom tuma"imo vlastito blagostanje i okolis, odumrijeti uslijed iznenadnog nestanka njenih biofizickih temelja (usjevi, resursi i meteoroloski obrasci). Ne samo da se baza fizickih resursa trosi brzinom koju inovativni nadomjesci za resurse ne mogu pratiti, vec su i ekosustavi u kojima se odvija kruzenje hranjivih tvari i o kojima ovisi ljudska vrsta takoder pred slomom. slomom.

Dobar primjer sposobnosti prilagodbe i ishoda sloma nalazimo u moru, primarnom stanistu planeta koji kao ljudi nastanjujemo samo periferno (i stoga smo ga u manjoj mjeri svjesni), no spremno ga iskoristavamo za hranu i bioloske resurse. Posljednjih desetljeca mnoge regije postupno gube riblje resurse i bivaju preplavljene drevnim iucinkovitim, "esto zarecim i neprijatnim meduzama. Dok nas porast ljudske populacije i vlastiti tehnoloski podvizi navode na neumjereno iskoristavanje ribljih zaliha, drevni i otporni organizmi poput neprijatne meduze (u smislu zrele faze u zivotnom ciklusu meduza) napreduju i stvaraju eutrofikacijske mrtve zone nepogodne zaljudsko iskoristavanje. Neki organizmi, poput meduza, savrseno su sposobni napredovati u zonama u kojima ekosustavi koji su se razvijali usporedo s "ovjekom postaju nepostojani i propadaju; medutim, u tim (pro)palim zonama nema mjesta za ljude kakvi smo mi danas.

Ipak, zahvaljujuci njihovoj sposobnosti da u slu"ajevima oskudne podrske unutar ekosustava u kojima zive "od-rastaju" cakipojedinacna tijela (Gershwin 2013), ti nas organizmi mogu stosta nau"iti. Podnoseci samonametnuta ograni"enja rasta, na razini vrste oni, u osnovi, prezivljavaju u nepromijenjenom obliku. Primjer meduze pokazuje kako zivot opcenito moze prevladati iznenadne poremecaje unutar ekosustava koji su se postupno razvijali (jer meduze su ujedno Uve), ali i koliko negostoljubivi prema ljudskom napretku ti osiromaseni ekosustavi mogu biti. Ne samo da meduza (u smislu zrele faze u zivotnom ciklusu vrste) moze opeci: meduze kao vrsta istiskuju druge oblike zivota i za"epljuju tehnolosku opremu koja se koristi u morskoj vodi. Izuzetno su otporne na sredstva kojima se "ovjek protiv njih i vecinu vremena ponasaju se poput bilo koje druge slijepe geofizicke sile: jednostavno plutaju nosene strujama.

Pojednostavljeno re"eno, "ovje"anstvo moze nastaviti po starom i nadati se najboljem dok istraziva"i u pojedinim disciplinama znaju da srljamo u propast, ili napraviti korjeniti zaokret prema odrzivosti, oslanjajuci se na nase kolektivno znanje i nastojeci povratiti i odrzati "zelenu ravnotezu" (Wills 2013) o kojoj ovisi nase individualno blagostanje, koliko i o zraku ili drustvenoj suradnji (Wilson 2012). Lekcija koju mozemo nau"iti iz ovog bioloskog koncepta jest ta da stabilni, zivotni, obilni, raznoliki i otporni ekosustavi nastajuuslijed siroke palete okolisnih pritisaka i bioloskih komponenata: pretvorbe sun"eve energije u bioloske strukture, grabezljivaca iplijena, parazita, geofizickih dogadaja. Niti jedno stanje "zelene ravnoteze" nije trajno. Usporedo s promjenom pritisaka koji utje"u na relativnu u"estalost populacija pojedine vrste unutar ekosustava mijenjaju se i njihove ekoloske strukture i genetske ravnoteze.

Medutim, brojne vrste unutar ekosustava koje su (u evolucijskom smislu) imale dovoljno vremena da dosegnu uravnotezujucu ulogu naj"esce su obiljezene visokim stupnjem ekoloske raznolikosti, kao i genetske raznolikosti unutar vrste. Kao vrsta i kao djelic slagalice "zelene ravnoteze" u pri"uvi imaju mnostvo rezervnih opcija za razdoblja mijena. Rje"nikom biologije, za vrijeme promjena u fizickom okolisu bioloske vrste koje ga nastanjuju mogu se osloniti na spomenute raznolikosti kako bi povecale izglede da ce neki od "lanova ekosustava prezivjeti promjene. Raznolikost pridonosi opcoj otpornosti sustava. No ljudske sile antropocena narusile su mnoge od postupno razvijenih "zelenih sustava ravnoteze", smanjujuci pritom raznolikost ekosustava iz kojih crpimo resurse. Buduci da nisu razvijeni do te mjere da bi se mogli nositi s pritiscima svojstvenim vrlo recentnom antropocenu, ti ekosustavi nakon odredene to"ke vise ne mogu koristiti vlastite zalihe rezervnih opcija kako bi povratili stabilnost sustava u cjelini.

Kao istraziva"i, edukatori i inovatori (bilo drustveni ili tehnoloski), moramo biti svjesni "injenice da nasa vrsta sudjeluje u procesima na bitno razli"itim razinama koje su u pravilu u oblastima odvojenih diskurzivnih disciplina: dinamika nezivih Zemljinih sustava, povijest zivota i ljudske evolucije, povijest globalizirane industrijske civilizacije i kolektivna intelektualna kreativnost "ovjeka "ija svakodnevna egzistencija vise ne ovisi o tjelesnim naporima (McNeill i McNeill 2003). Nas je zadatakpronaci glas koji dopire iz Perspektive opkora"enja tih razli"itih razina. Nakon sto je sva literatura prou"ena, a tekstovi napisani i pro"itani, jasno je da "ovje"anstvo kao vrsta od sedam milijardi jednakih jedinki vise nema mogucnost povratka u "prirodno stanje" obiljezeno sretnim i blazenim neznanjem. Povijesno stanje u kojem nas sedam milijardi istovremeno egzistira na ograni"enom planetu ili vodi u bolan slomilipredstavlja civilizaciju - nuzno mnogostruku, dinami"nu islozenu (Pagden 2013). I nekada i sada, civilizacija podrazumijeva neki oblikkoordinacije i pod"injavanja. Ona je spoj svijesti o fizickim i drustvenim granicama razvoja, i tehnoloskih ipolitickih instrumenatakoji upravljaju razvojem unutar tih granica. To se doima prili"no o"itim, no kako na prihvatljiv na"in smanjiti nesigurnosti i promovirati emancipaciju?

Povijest komponenti razvoja: nedostaci tehnoloskog rjesenja

Kao obrazovane osobe, nau"eni smo ponositi se "injenicom da pripadamo vrsti koja ne samo da je stvorila civilizaciju, vec je, zahvaljujuci ingenioznosti tehnoloskog otkrica, u tome uspjela pomocu rastuce u"inkovite uporabe prirodnih resursa. Ova vrsta narativa zanemaruje druge nuzne komponente izgradnje civilizacije koje se razvijaju usporedo s tehnologijom, te predstavlja osnovu za uzaludnu nadu u to da ce tehnoloska ingenioznost (u"inkovit i "ist izvor energije) rijesiti i nase sadasnje probleme.

Vecina onoga sto je proizvelo civilizaciju kakva postoji danas rezultat je "razvojnog projekta": izgradnje drzava, sedentarizacije ipojacanog iskoristavanja dostupnih resursa (Pomeranz2009) - mnogostrukosti nakojoj pocivajublagodati civilizacije. To je dovelo do porasta prosje"ne o"ekivane zivotne dobi i poboljsanja opceg fizickog zdravlja, kao i porasta broja stanovnika, ali ne i do automatski pravedne raspodjele spomenutih blagodati. Opsezni povijesni narativi navode sljedece osnovne ontoloske kategorije razvojnog projekta: 1) tehnoloski mehanizmi pretvorbe energije, 2) drustvene strukture koje koriste spomenutu energiju i odrzavaju tehnoloske mehanizme, te 3) upravlja"ki mehanizmi koji nadgledaju i odrzavaju uporabu energije drustvene strukture.

Spomenute strukture opisuju dugotrajne procese ostvarenja razvojnog projekta, a ne konkretna drustva i civilizacije koje utjelovljuju suvremene ishode tog projekta u danom trenutku. Ipak, takvo modeliranje u stilu seta za gradnju "Meccano" ovdje je vazno samo kako bi nam skrenulo paznju na "injenicu da potencijal za ponovnu uspostavu cjelokupne globalne ravnoteze ne lezi u modifikaciji samo jedne od spomenutih komponenata ( 1-3), jer postojeci se problem razvijao kroz kontingentne promjene u svakoj od triju komponenata. Porast broja stanovnika i materijalnog blagostanja doveo je resurse do krajnjih granica, sto je rezultiralo time da su svugdje postupno postavljena ograni"enja na koli"ine energije dostupne za pretvaranje i koristenje za ljudske potrebe. U ne tako davnoj proslosti (ujedno i najvaznija razvojna lekcija za suvremena drustva), rizi"no oslanjanje na tehnoloske promjene (komponenta 1), te imperativi rasta i centralizirane drzavne moci (komponente 1 i 3) dominirale su kako bi neprijatnu korjenitu promjenu drustvene strukture (komponenta 2) u"inile nepotrebnom, "ak i unutar nominalno socijalisti"kih drustava (Weiner 2009).

Raskorak izmedu dugoro"ne stabilnosti ekosustava i ljudske populacije, uzrokovan manjkom biomase kao energetskog i gradevinskog resursa te iscrpljivanjem plodnosti tla, nalazimo vec u ranom modernom dobu, u dominantnim civilizacijama Istoka i Zapada (Pomeranz 2000). ,esto se odvec pojednostavljeno pretpostavlja da je parni stroj "udesno otkrice koje je (zapadnja"kim) drustvima rane moderne Europe omogucilo da se intelektualnom ingenioznoscu izbave iz ekoloski problemati"ne nejednakosti na relaciji stanovnistvo- gija-hrana. Primijenivsi Razum, poduzetni je "ovjek otkrio tajne namjerno skrivene u fizickim procesima sto mu je omogucilo da iz naizgled osiromasene fizicke podloge izvu"e mnogo vise koristi. Medutim, opseznije analize (npr. De Vries 1993; Pomeranz 2000; Arrighi et al. 2003) otkrivaju da se zapadnja"ki razvojni projekt odrzao i razvijao u smjeru koji vodi u opasnu i problemati"nu situaciju u kojoj se trenutno nalazimo, slijedeci pritom vrlo kontingentan put teritorijalnog sirenja i manje ili vise namjernih transformacija drustvenih struktura i upravlja"kih mehanizama koji teku paralelno s, a katkad i prethode, tehnoloskim otkricima. Razvojni put Isto"ne Azije (s vremenom istisnut ili inkorporiran u ranije spomenuti konkurentni zapadnja"ki razvojni put) nije bio nista manje u"inkovit po pitanju pretvorbe energije (1) kao ni njenog rebalansiranja unutar ukupnih ograni"enja populacije i hrane. U dominantnim ranim modernim civilizacijama Istoka na snazi su bile druga"ije kombinacije drustva (2), tehnologije (1) iuprave (3), sto je dovelo do drugacijegrjesavanjaneravnoteze na relaciji ekosustav-populacija, sve do globalnog sirenja fosilnim gorivima pokretanog zapadnjackog oblika razvoja.

Od industrijskog doba, razvojna se paradigma na Zapadu oslanjala na sirenje kapitalistickog oblika proizvodnje, tvoreci pritom vecinu materijalnih temelja onoga sto ljudi danas nazivaju civilizacijom. ,ak su i eksperimenti dvadesetog stoljeca s alternativnim oblicima ekonomske organizacije u vidu drzavnog socijalizma takoder nepokolebljivo jurili za ekonomskim rastom i tehnoloskom intenzifikacijom pretvorbe energije kao pokreta"ima nade ublagostanje (Weiner 2009). Sli"no spomenutimpretjerano pojednostavljenimpretpostavkama o revoluciji mehanizama pretvorbe energije (1) potaknutoj tehnoloskom uporabom ugljena kao fosilnog goriva, i danas postoji nada u tehnolosko rjesenje. Medutim, povijesni dokazi o uspjesnom smanjenju emisije stakleni"kih plinova koji uzrokuju klimatske promjene na razini "itave drzave ne postoje, uz izuzetak povijesnog sloma industrijskog drustva Ruske Federacije od devedestih godina prosloga stoljeca. To zasigurno nije bio tehnoloski napredak, vec tehnoloska regresija popracena drasti"nim promjenama u drustvenim turama 2011).

Povijesno gledano, takoder svjedo"imo golemom povratnom efektu tamo gdje je ostvareno povecanje u"inkovitosti resursa ("energija vise nije prljava sto nam daje pravo dakoristimo vece koli"ine energije"), te vrlo malom ili nikakvom smanjenju okolisnog utjecaja po jediniciproizvedene energije duz "itavog lanca tehnoloskih zaliha pretvorbe energije. Jednom kad je uspostavljen, odredeni tehnoloski mehanizam moze proizvoditi "cistu energiju", no to ne zna"i da je do te faze stigao u obliku dovoljno "istom da opravda nadu u tehnolosku revoluciju koja samostalno uklanja ograni"enja klimatske promjene. Novi mehanizam pretvorbe energije, osloboden ograni"enja klimatske promjene, drustvo nece nuzno opskrbljivati energijom na na"in na koji to trenutno "ine fosilna goriva. Raspodjela energije kroz drustvene strukture u razvojnom procesu mijenjat ce se usporedo s njim, kao sto je to slu"aj s postojecim obnovljivim izvorima solarne i energije vjetra koje ovise o vremenu i geogra'ji te ih nije moguce transportirati na isti na"in kao i fosilna goriva.

Naposljetku, pretpostavimo da je pronaden novi mehanizam pretvorbe energije: da bi postigao zeljeni u"inak na klimatske promjene, valjalo bi ga vrlo brzo distribuirati diljem go- go- leme i rastuce ljudske populacije (Hoffman 2011). Tesko je reci bi li takva vrsta distribucije bila moguca bez zna"ajnih modifikacija postojecih upravlja"kih mehanizama i drustvenih struktura raspodjele energije. Iako smo tehnoloski razvijeniji ipoliticki medupovezaniji nego ikada prije, jesmo li u stanju spustiti uglji"ni intenzitet ljudske populacije ispod predindustrijskih razina, istovremeno odrzavajuci broj stanovnika deset puta veci od populacije u predindustrijskom dobu, mijenjajuci pritom jedino dominantne tehnoloske mehanizme pretvorbe energije, i to unutarpolovice prosjecnogzivotnogvijeka (trideset do "etrdeset godina)?

[Tehnologije] razvijene u svrhu rjesavanja jednog problema na kraju nerijetko stvaraju niz novih, "esto nepredvidenih problema. [... Sve predlozene] vrste "rjesenja" utemeljenih na tehnologiji izuzetno su kontroverzne i rizi"ne, a sa sobom nose i opasnost ozbiljne stete za okolis. Pretjerana usredoto"enost na tehnologiju takoder "esto zamjenjuje jednostavna ali u"inkovita rjesenja problema i potvrduje uvjerenje da [druge strukturne promjene] nisu nuzne za smanjenje ljudskog utjecaja na planet. (Tienhaara 2009: 18)

Sve dok je dostupne energije u fizickoj okolini planete Zemlje, i dok tu energiju treba pretvarati u korisne oblike i potom tehnoloskom ingenioznoscu transportirati, uzalud se nadamo "otkricu" dovoljno rasirenog i u"inkovitog mehanizma do kojega ce doci na vrijeme da se sprije"i kolaps. Postojanost civilizacija - mnogostrukih, dinami"nih i slozenih - iziskuje pravovremene i domisljate prilagodbe drustvenih struktura i upravlja"kih mehanizama kako bi se nadoknadili propusti mehanizama pretvorbe energije za kojima se posegnulo zbog njihovog potencijala odrzivosti. Kako bi to moglo izgledati u praksi? Pri planiranju krenimo od spoznaje da drasti"ne pretvorbe energije fosilnih goriva treba ograni"iti: trebamo globalno ograni"enje emisije stakleni"kih plinova.

Kapitalizam kao drustvena struktura u razvoju?

Neravnotezom izmedu ekosustava i populacija na Istoku u ranom novovjekovnom razdoblju bavili su se radno intenzivni razvojni projekti koji nisu bili fokusirani na teritorijalnu ekspanziju potpomognutu tehnoloskim prevladavanjem ograni"enja pretvorbe energije (Wood 2002; Pomeranz 2000), sto je bio slu"aj u "radisnom" razvoju Istoka (Sugihara 2003). Dok se povjesni"ari trude objasniti kontingencije koje dovode do razdvajanja razvojnih putova izmedu Istoka i Zapada od ranog novog vijeka naovamo, za potrebe ove rasprave dovoljno je istaknuti da "razlog tome ne lezi u "injenici da je progresivni Zapad otkrio kapitalizam, a moderna drzava i Kina nisu" (Rowe 1990: 262). Postoje i primjeri okolisnih resursa kojima se upravlja putem zajedni"kih dobara (eng. commons) koja zadovoljavaju ekonomske potrebe ljudske populacije bez da ih se prekomjerno iskoristava ili da stvaraju neproporcionalnu akumulaciju medu njihovim korisnicima. Iako te alternative ne dovode do maksimalnog uvec vanja dobiti i "esto se namjerno ostvaruju na lokalnoj, a ne globalnoj razini, one kombiniraju materijalnu korist s odrzivoscu okolisa te kao takve mogu imati smisla i u "zapadnja"kom" kontekstu (Pomeranz 2009). Treba o"ekivati da tehnoloske (1), drustvene (2), ali i upravljacke (3) inovacije mogu prosiriti razinu proslih zajedni"kih praksi. Mozemo li, oslanjajuci se na opsezno znanje o prirodnim i drustveno povijesnim procesima, postici da globalna populacija ima koristi od ranije lokaliziranih alternativa?

Kapitalizam, kao kontingentan ishod specificnih povijesnih uvjeta, po"iva na imperativu neprestane samoekspanzije ukorijenjenom u sveobuhvatnoj transformaciji metaboli"ke razmjene s ostatkom biosfere i raspodjelom nasusnih zivotnih potreba unutar ljudskih drustava (Wood 2002). Njegov imperativ rasta dobro se povezao s lokaliziranim nadilazenjem bio-fizickih ograni"enja putem inovacija fosilnih goriva u tehnoloskim mehanizmima pretvorbe energije (Rundgren 2013). Drugim rije"ima, parni stroj i teritorijalna ekspanzija s ciljem pronalazenja klju"nih resursa podupirali su jedno drugo. No dvojbeno "pobjedni"ku" formulu omogucilo je izostanak "neprijateljstva prema bilo kojem pojedincu koji postaje abnormalno' bogat" (Braudel 1982: 589) od strane upravlja"kih tijela. Nadalje, karakteriziraju je i pravilni trendovi stagnacije i opadanja, s pripadajucim smanjenjem okolisnog utjecaja i povecanjem egzistencijalnog jada "ovje"anstva (iako ta veza nije uvijek bila linearna, djelomi"no zbog one vrste "izvan-ekonomskih" uplitanja kakvu bi drustvene i upravlja"ke promjene mogle nametnuti i u sadasnjoj situaciji (Wood 2002: 93). Sada kad se sirenje u teritorijalnom i materijalnom smislu ne moze nastaviti, "udotvoran tehnoloski proboj na polju pretvorbe energije jos uvijek se ne nazire, a velik dio tehnologije koja poti"e slom je vec ugraden u svakodnevicu, demokratizacija i strateski od-rast (eng. degrowth) ekonomija te promjene u raspodjeli dohotka ostaju jedine dostupne opcije zarazvojniprojekt na kojem temeljimo civilizaciju.

Uz kreativno-destruktivne u"inke kapitalizma na drustvene strukture, rasireno izvlasc vanje, intenzivnu eksploataciju i nemoralni nemar prema ljudskom zivotu u interesu profita, upravo se proizvodnost orijentirana na profit, a ne strukturna novina tehnoloskih mehanizama, inicijalno manifestirala u vidu neodgovorne uporabe zemljista i smanjenja regenerativnog kapaciteta biosfere (Woods 2002). Proizvodnost orijentirana na profit, a ne siroka raspodjela dobrobiti, pokrenula je postojeci trend neodrzivosti, imperativ rasta zaodjenut u obecanje emancipacije. To je samo po sebi bila nasilna, ne tek evolucijska, promjena drustvenih struktura, koja se morala nametnuti odozgo, od strane onih "lanova drustva koji su od nje imali najvise koristi (Hobsbawm 1952). Umjesto da se jednostavno pojavi nakon sto su parni stroj i financijski kapital postali dostupni, za nj su se aktivno morali boriti "lanovi drustva koji su u njoj prepoznali vlastite neposredne interese. I to nisu bili tek gradani zeljni raznolikije ponude pamu"nih tkanina i zemljanog posuda, vec mnogo opakiji pojedinci (Rundgren 2013). Njegovo nametanje ne-zapadnja"kim, "nerazvijenim" drustvima i dalje izaziva otpor. ,ak je i "razvijenim" demokratskim populacijama cilj oduprijeti se tehnoloski riskantnim strategijama ekonomskog rasta, apovecanje placa iznad odredene granice nije im poticaj da rade vise (Barry 2012). Globalno gledajuci, kapitalisti"ki imperativ rasta stetan je mehanizam koji se hrani rastucim nejednakostima i skriva iza obecanja o rastu na poljima obrazovanja, zdravlja, komunikacije i proizvodnje hrane za one kojima je to najpotrebnije.

Daleko od toga da zagovaramo povratak predmodernim poljoprivrednim drustvenim strukturama, koje same po sebi takoder predstavljaju ishod razvojnih projekata, a ne dobrohotno "prirodno stanje"; pretpostavimo radije da odgovor na trenutnu prijetnju sloma lezi u svrhovitoj reorganizaciji (2) drustvenih struktura i (3) upravlja"kih mehanizama. Te dvije komponente civilizacije trebale bi se usredoto"iti na odrzavanje njenih dobrobiti u kombinaciji s mnogostranim transformacijama tehnologije pretvorbe energije koje su postojece, jednostavne iucinkovite (Tienhaara 2009). Iako smislenau kontekstu zajednica i politi"kih jedinica, to je promjena koju valjaprimijeniti na globalnoj razini. Ovaj opci uvjet proizlazi iz globalne prirode klimatskih promjena, globalnih mehanizama koji realiziraju ranije opisani slom civilizacije prema formuli: "osiromasivanje resursa + nejednakosti" (Motesharrei, Rivas i Kalnay 2014) te "injenice da je razvojni projekt sada globalno vezan uz jedinstveno, globalno, kapitalisti"ko drustvo ovisno o fosilnim gorivima (Arrighi et al. 2003).

Mozda najvaznija lekcija povijesne procjene kapitalizma kao kontingentnog ishoda razvojnogprojekta (Wood 2002; Pomeranz 2000; Sugihara2003) jest dakada se kapitalisti"ki mehanizmi za drustvenu reprodukciju i razvoj jednom uspostave na odredenoj lokaciji, oni neizbjezno transformiraju sve ostale. Kapitalizmu svojstvena logika ekspanzije s vremenom prisiljava druga ljudska drustva s kojima dolazi u kontakt da se i sama okrenu eksploataciji ljudi i o ko lisa, sto dodatno govori u prilog potrebiprepoznavanja globalnog karaktera suvremene krize. Osim toga, iz toga proizlazi da bi preobrazba drustvene strukture i upravlja"kih mehanizama trebala bili sadrzajnija od ublazavanja etike profita pomocu "socijalnog trzista" ili "trzisnog socijalizma" (Wood 2002: 195). Imperativ rasta siri se brze "ak i od ideologija kojima se opravdava, a nada u "zeleni rast" donosi mnogo lazne nade i isprika za nedjelovanje u kriti"nim trenucima izvanrednih vremena (Hoffman 2011).

Kakvaje vrsta transformacije potrebna da bi se izbjegao slom?

Iako ne postoji univerzalan i siroko dostupan izvor energije ili otkrice na polju tehnoloske u"inkovitosti koje bi trenutni rast populacije i profita zadrzali unutar granica ravnoteze Hirne i ekosustava (Li 2008; Ehrlich i Ehrlich 2103), ipak postoji niz tehnoloskih mehanizama manjeg opsega pogodnih za odrzivije crpljenje energije. Iako ne sugeriraju povratak u predmoderno doba, ove strategije uHjucuju transformacije drustvene strukture i upravlja"kih mehanizama kao i temeljitu reevaluaciju sastavnica koje tvore nase poimanje ljudskog stanja. ekonomskih praksi, promjene u drustvenoj raspodjeli dohodakakao simbolapristupapretvorbama energije te kulturakoja civilizacijskapostignuca ne povezuje s potrosa"kim ponasanjem, transformativne su smjernice za teoriju razvoja u dvadeset prvom stoljecu.

Smjesten na kraju dugog niza analiza pitanja sto je neodrzivo u nasoj trenutnoj egzisten-ciji i odakle su (povijesno gledano) te karakteristike ponikle, ovaj tekst i njegova uloga u ca-sopisu ne mogu biti drugo doli poziv na intelektualnu mobilizaciju povezanu s predvidenom buducnoscu u koju tek trebamo zakora"iti. Povijesne analize u kombinaciji s apstraktnim modelima interakcije izmedu osnovnih ontoloskih kategorija na relaciji drustvo-ekosusta-vi-resursi, otvaraju prostor za predvidanja kojima bi se slom mogao izbjegavati u nedogled, a ljudska populacija dovesti u stanje stabilne ravnoteze s ostatkom globalnog ekosustava, pod uvjetom da stopa crpljenja resursa za pretvorbu energije po glavi stanovnika ostane na prirodno obnovljivoj razini, a dobrobiti dobivene tim crpljenjem budu distribuirane na re-lativno pravedan na"in (Motesharrei, Rivas i Kalnay 2014). S druge strane, ta predvidanja istodobno sugeriraju dapretjerano crpljenje ipovecanje nejednakosti vrlo vjerojatno vode do relativno brzog sloma (Meadows, Meadows i Randers 1972; Motesharrei, Rivas i Kalnay 2014), sto je isprva nevidljivo vrhovnim krugovima zasticenima vlastitim bogatstvom, sve dok kolaps ekosustava ne uzrokuje vidljivi kolaps primarnih proizvoda"a (Motesharrei, Rivas i Kalnay 2014). U tom ce trenutku biti prekasno za promjene.

Iako bi kolaps postojece globalne civilizacije razvojni projekt - zajedno s njegovim po okolis stetnim, ali i za ljude oslobadajucim ishodima - zaustavio na mjestu, "ovjekovo intelektualno opkora"enje procesa bitno razli"itih redova veli"ine dopusta nam da osmislimo projekt odrzivog od-rasta (Kallis 2011). Razvojni projekt do sada nije djelovao u stanju ravnoteze, no na"elno ne postoji nista stobigaprijecilo da to stanje i postigne, bas kao sto inove vrste s vremenom postizu novo stanje "zelene ravnoteze" sa stabilnim ekosustavima. To je je povijesni zaokret na razvojnom putu, politi"ki projekt transformacije globalnih upravlja"kih mehanizama i reevaluacije blagostanja pojedinca. To je vizija civiliziranog drustva u kojem su produkti pretvorbe energije skromniji i stabilniji, a blagostanje po"iva na jednakosti, meduljudskim odnosima i jednostavnosti. Kao tvorci narativa, akademski gradani i istraziva"i pozo most "ovje"anstva moraju skrenuti na procese kojise odvijaju na ne-ljudskim razinama, i ovoga puta pokusati to u"initi na emancipirajuci na"in kako bi omogucili civlizacijski odrast bezunistavanja dosadasnjih (tehnoloskih i drustvenih) postignuca.

Iz svega re"enog valja upamtiti tri vazne stvari. Prvo, vazno je samoga sebe pripremiti za usvajanje stajalista iz kojega je moguce prihvatiti mogucnost dramati"nog poremecaja toka povijesti (kolaps). Drugo: trebamo shvatitidajeputkojivodiuto stanjestvarkontingentnih povijesnih odabira, bez obzira na to sto je utjecaj koji su pojedinci imali i jos uvijek imaju na njih malen. Naposljetku, vazno je shvatiti da su materijalna ograni"enja promjene klime i osiromasivanja resursa, te drustvena ograni"enja nejednakosti inherentna idealu neograni" nog ekonomskograsta, "liceinalicjeistognovcica" (Beck2010: 257). Kad bismo se ozbiljno postavili u poziciju buduceg sloma kao da ga vec dozivljavamo, sa znanjem o povijesnim kontingencijama i nuznoj interakciji izmedu tehnoloskih i drustvenih komponenata doprinosa razvojnog projekta izgradnji civilizacije, mogli bismo, svjesno i s afektivnom hitnoscu, razmatratiprosle protu"injeni"ne opcije: "Da smo napravili ovo ili ono, nikada ne bi doslo do katastrofeukojoj se trenutno nalazimoc" (Zizek2008: 461). Iz takve vizije proizlazi istinska snaga potrebna za kidanje spona pojedina"ne bezna"ajnosti: pokrenite se i djelujte danas kako bismo izbjegli slom. Dobrodosli u razmisljanje za dvadeset drugo stoljecec

Komentari

Danijela Dolenec

Grupa 22, Zagreb

Hvatanje u kostac s opakim problemom: promicanje alternativnih poimanja blagostanja na putu ka odrzivom od-rastu

Kada su Rittel i Webber prvi put de'nirali "opaki problem" (1973), na pameti im nisu bila nasa trenutna nastojanja da pronademo drustveno odrziva rjesenja za probleme globalnog o ko lisa. Oni su gradili opci argument o granicama strateskih reakcija na vazne drustvene probleme, a cilj im je bio skrenuti pozornost na "injenicu da klasi"na znanstvena paradigma koja "ini temelje modernog poimanja razvoja nije primjenjiva na drustvene probleme. Za razliku od problema unutar prirodnih znanosti koje je "moguce definirati i razdvojiti, i koji mogu imati rjesenja koja mozemo otkriti", glavni drustveni izazovi danasnjice nisu nista od navedenog. Klju"na razlika medu njima vjerojatno lezi u "injenici da drustveni problemi nemaju rjesenja: s obzirom na to da ovise o ishodima politi"kih borbi, u najboljem slu"aju moze ih se uvijekiznovarjesavati (ibid.).

Taj koncept opakog problema nedavno je primijenjen na promjenu klime (Levin et al. 2012) kojoj su pritom pripisana "etiri klju"na obiljezja: vrijeme istje"e; oni koji stvaraju problem ujedno nastoje pronaci rjesenje; sredisnji autoritet koji bi se trebao uhvatiti u kostac s problemom je slab ili nepostojeci; iracionalno negiranje problema odgada pronalazenje rjesenja za neka buduca vremena. Navedena obiljezja rezultiraju najnovijom verzijom dobre stare tragedije zajedni"kog dobra (eng. tragedy of the commons): unato" tome sto je jasno da je nuzno odmah djelovati kako bi se izbjegle katastrofalne posljedice u buducnosti, vlade ne reagiraju. Najnoviji izvjestaji IPCC-a (2014) jasno navode da bez brzih i ozbiljnih napora usmjerenih ka ublazavanju postojece situacije, ljudska drustva nece biti u stanju prilagoditi se nadolazecim klimatskih i biofizickim izazovima.

Opisivanje klimatskih promjena kao opakog problema jedna je od po"etnih tvrdnji kojima Domazet nastoji usmjeriti nasu pozornost na hitnost zadatka koji je pred nama, polazeci od pretpostavke da dijelimo njegovo uvjerenje da ljudsku civilizaciju, u njenom trenutnom obliku, vrijedi sa"uvati. I sama polazim od te pretpostavke, iako priznajem paradoksalnu cinjenicu da je unato" tome sto refleksivnost smatramo jednim od obiljezja koje nas razlikuje od ostalih vrsta na Zemlji, nas utjecaj na planet postao nalik onome geofizickih sila poput pomicanja tektonskih plo"a ili vulkanskih erupcija (Archer 2010). Buduci da je nas fizicki utjecaj na planet dosegao to"ku u kojoj vise nismo u mogucnosti nastaviti vlastitu teritorijalnu i materijalnu ekspanziju, trebali bismo napustiti naivnu nadu u tehnolosko rjesenje i priznati da opakost tog problema iziskuje nadilazenje tehnokratskog prtljanja rascjepkanog na tradicionalne akademske discipline, i prihvacanje dubinski ambicioznog politi"kog projekta korjenitog zaokretaprema odrzivosti (Wills 2013).

Drugim rije"ima, valja priznati da je zaokret prema odrzivosti u svojoj biti drustveni izazov, koji u prvom redu uklju"uje promjene drustvenih praksi, institucija i upravlja"kih meha- nizama, primjenom na"ela demokratizacije, egalitarne preraspodjele i od-rasta. Nas zadatak kao "tvoraca narativa" (usp. Domazet) stoga je apsurdno ambiciozan: sastoji se, ni manje ni vise, nego od ponovnog osmisljavanja razvojnog projekta koji bi blagostanje "ovje"anstva uskladio s praksamakoje jam"e nasu materijalnu odrzivost naplaneti. Kao prvikoraku rjesavanju zadatka tako divovskih razmjera vidim jedino kombiniranje velikih ideja sa skromnim prakticnimprijedlozima. Levin et al. (2012) predlazu osmisljavanje strategijakoje ce "ograniciti nasa buduca kolektivna jastva", sto podrazumijeva interveniranje u nase drustvene i politi"ke prakse na na"ine koji su trajni tako da s vremenom postanu ukorijenjeni i sve "vrsce se primaju. Kako zapo"eti?

Slon u sobi koji povezuje nas fizicki utjecaj na planet s drustvenim ograni"enjima nejednakosti jest kapitalizam, neraskidivo povezan s principom bezgrani"nog ekonomskog rasta (Wood 2002). S obzirom na to da je imperativ rasta strukturno obiljezje kapitalizma u svim njegovim varijantama (Harvey 2007), u principu ne postoji na"in da se kapitalisti"ki modus proizvodnje pomiri sa stvarnim zaokretom prema odrzivom od-rastu (Kallis 2011). Ono sto nas "eka stoga je niz dubinskih promjena unutar nasih temeljnih institucija koje upravljaju zemljistem, radom i novcem, usmjerenih ka ekonomskom sustavu kojeg vise nece biti moguce okarakterizirati kao kapitalizam (ibid.). Medutim, s obzirom na trenutnu konstelaciju moci, stjecanje javne podrske za tranziciju tih razmjera u najmanju je ruku malo vjerojatno. Umjesto toga, u potrazi smo za rupama u sustavu u koje mozemo umetnuti strateske prijedloge s potencijalno transformativnim u"incima. Jedan takav prijedlog jest odvajanje (eng. decoupling) koncepta blagostanja od potrosa"kog ponasanja, poglavito kroz zamjenu BDP-a kao mjere napretka alternativnim indikatorima blagostanja.

Iako je zamisljen isklju"ivo kao mjera "iste trzisne ekonomske aktivnosti (Kubiszewski et al. 2013), BDP smo s vremenom prihvatili kao mjeru blagostanja. Nadalje, BDP svakitrosak tuma"i upozitivnom svjetlu, ne praveci razliku izmedu aktivnosti koje pridonose blagostanju od onih koje ga umanjuju (Talberth et al. 2007): tako naftni izljev posljedi"nim troskovima "iscenja uvecava BDP, dok uzgoj povrca i priprema obroka u domacinstvu ne ulaze u BDP jedne drzave. Nadalje, BDP ne otkriva nista o raspodjeli dohodaka unutar drustva, iako je to jedan od odlu"ujucih faktora za odredivanje individualnog blagostanja (Wilkinson i Picke& 2009).

Od objavljivanja izvjestaja Stiglitza, Sena i Fitoussia o ekonomskoj u"inkovitosti i drustvenom napretku (2009), osmisljavanje alternativnih indikatora blagostanja i napretka koji bi bolje integrirali ekonomsku dimenziju s drustvenom i okolisnom (Costanza et al. 2004) dobiva sve vise zamaha. Posljednjih godina svjedo"imo razvoju niza alternativnih mjerila kojima je cilj obuhvatiti aspekte ljudskog blagostanja, sigurnosti i kvalitete zivota, primjerice Indeks sretnog planeta4 (eng. Happy Planet Index), Indikator pravog napretka5 (eng. Genuine Progress Indicator) i Inicijativa za bolji zivot6 (eng. Better Life Initiative) Organizacije za gospodarsku suradnju i razvoj (eng. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, skrac. OECD). U domacem kontekstu, Grupa 22 oblikovala je analize7 koje, koristeci UNov Indeks ljudskog razvoja, Indeks ekoloskih otisaka (eng. Ecological Footprint Index), te niz indikatora razine nejednakostiuprihodima (GINI, rizik od siromastva, materijalna oskudica itd.), rasvjetljavaju razvojni put i buduce Perspektive Hrvatske. Pokazali smo da su drustva na europskoj poluperiferiji siromasnija, sto bi, prema teorijskim o"ekivanjima (Franzen i Mayer 2010), trebalo zna"iti manjuvjerojatnost njihova djelovanjau smjeru zadovoljavanja okolisnih preduvjeta za zaokret prema odrzivosti (Domazet, Dolenec i An"ic 2012). Medutim, usprkos manjoj spremnosti na individualne materijalne zrtve, briga za okolis i globalna empatija u takvim je drustvima visa nego sto njihova razina razvoja (mjerena BDP-om) daje naslutiti. Valja dodati i da je ovdje rije" o drustvima s bitno nizim utjecajem na okolis na globalnoj, "esto "ak i na lokalnoj razini, drustvima u kojima je povijesni imperativ poticanja globalnog zaokreta prema odrzivosti relativno manji.

S obzirom na neravnomjernu raspodjelu blagodati ekonomskog rasta i razvoja u proteklih dvadeset godina, nejednakost predstavlja klju"nu prepreku obuhvatnijem djelovanju. Smanjivanje nejednakosti, kao preduvjet za razvoj drustvenih odnosa povjerenja i suradnje, stoga postaje prioritet. Ne mozemo o"ekivati kolektivno djelovanje kada su materijalni zivotni uvjeti i zivotne prilike koje iz njih proizlaze toliko medusobno razli"iti da gradane medusobno razdvajaju i guraju u razli"ite socio-materijalne stvarnosti (Sandel 2012). Bez temeljnog osjecaja zajedni"ke ljudskosti nema ni demokratske debate o odlikama pravednog i odrzivog drustva (Wright 2011).

Iako uvodenje alternativnih mjera blagostanja ne rjesava sve nase probleme, kao nositelj transformativnog potencijala ono bi idealno trebalo predstavljati korak u pravom smjeru. S obzirom na vrstu njihova odnosa s temeljnim drustvenim strukturama i ishode koje stvaraju, Fraser (2000, 2003) razlikuje afirmativne i transformativne strategije. Cilj afirmativnih strategija jest ispraviti neravnopravne ishode bez remecenja temeljnih drustvenih struktura, dok su transformativne strategije usmjerene izravno na temeljni generativni okvir, sto ih o"ito "ini pozeljnijima. Medutim, njih je istovremeno teze provoditi buduci da su izuzetno osjetljive na probleme kolektivnog djelovanja. S obzirom na spomenuta obiljezja, Fraser (2003) smatra da je nacrtima prakti"nih strategija mjesto negdje duz kontinuuma izmedu spomenuta dva pola.

Imajuci sve sto je re"eno na umu, ako je nas cilj transformirati nase ekonomske i drustvene prakse do te mjere da ih se vise ne moze podvesti pod nazivnik "kapitalizma", mozda je konceptualizacija alternativnih mjerila blagostanja jedna od odgovarajucih strategija za postizanje tog cilja. Ona, u svakom slu"aju, nudi reorijentacije od mjerila dohotka i BDP-a prema konceptima dobrobiti i blagostanja, sto u svom objasnjenju koncepta odrzivog od-rasta spominje i Kallis (2011). Uspjesno odvajanje blagostanja od fiksacije na ekonomski razvoj moglo bibitivazan doprinos prihvacanju od-rasta kao odrzivepoliticke strategije. Kao sto su mnogi autori vec istaknuli, valja imati na umu da odrzivi od-rast nije isto sto i negativan rast BDP-a. Tupojavu, poznatukao recesija, proteklih smo godina, nazalost, ipredobro upoznali, kao i pripadajucu joj paletu negativnih drustvenih posljedica poput nezaposlenosti, ekonomske nesigurnosti i drustvenih prevrata. Nasuprot tome, odrzivi od-rast po"iva na ideji da je rast ekonomije moguce smanjiti putem institucionalnih promjena, kolektivnim upravljanjem"udobnog puta prema dolje" (Odum i Odum 2001) kroz politi"ke procese odlu"ivanja da se, primjerice, broj zrakoplova i automobila smanji u korist boljih socijalnih sluzbi, sirenja javnih prostora i povecavanja osobne autonomije.

Vladimir Cvijanovic

Grupa 22, Zagreb

Institucionalne inovacije za novu ekonomiju

Razumijevanje granica prevladavajuceg socio-ekonomskog sustava, pogotovo institucionalnih inovacija koje ispravljaju njegove glavne nedostatke, iziskuje poimanje sustava koje nije zajedni"ko svim skolama ekonomskog misljenja. Nadalje, buduci da se definicije "nove ekonomije" razlikuju, mi cemo spomenutu frazu koristiti u zna"enju ekonomije koja maksimalno uvecavablagostanje drustva cjelini, a ne tekpojedinih drustvenih skupina. Jedan od mogucih pristupa, poznat po svojoj institucionalnoj i strukturalnoj perspektivi te historicizmu, nudi francuska teorija régulation, na koju cemo se oslanjati u ovome radu.

Za Boyera, pristup régulation predstavlja istraziva"ki program prikupljanja povijesnih studija, medunarodnih usporedbi i makro-ekonomskih testova s ciljem identificiranja nekih tipi"nih konfiguracija razvojnih oblika i njihovih kriza. Smatra se da régulation nastaje u trenutku ublazavanja tih kriznih tendencija. (James 2009: 185)

Iako podroban opis pristupa régulation (eng. Régulation approach, skrac. RA) nadilazi okvire ovog rada, ovdje donosimo tek kraci pregled. U kontekstu tog pristupa, analiza se vrsi na tri razli"ite razine: 1. vid proizvodnje (primjerice, feudalizam ili kapitalizam), 2. rezim akumulacije (socio-ekonomski poredak koji je na snazi izmedu dvije strukturalne krize i koji poti"e akumulaciju) i 3. institucionalni ili strukturni oblici (monetarni rezim, odnos place i rada, oblici konkurencije, oblici uklju"ivanja u medunarodni rezim, oblici drzave) (Boyer i Saillard 2002). Oslanjajuci se na te temelje, istraziva"i su najvecim su djelom istrazivali fordizam, razdoblje koje obuhvaca oko trideset godina nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, ali i razdoblje koje ga slijedi i u kojem se sada nalazimo: postfordizam. Fordizam je u zapadnim zemljama bio obiljezen intenzivnom akumulacijom (Brand i Wissen 2011), stabilnim medunarodnim monetarnim sustavom i slabom izlozenoscu medunarodnoj konkurenciji, stabilnim radnim odnosima i socijalnom drzavom. Postfordizam obiljezavaju ekstenzivna akumulacija (Brand i Wissen 2011), propast stabilnog medunarodnog monetarnog sustava iz Bretton Woodsa, financijalizacija (u smislu porasta vaznosti financijskog sektora), tehnoloske promjene te slabljenje socijalne drzave.

O raskoraku izmedu pristupa régulation i pitanja ekologije djelomi"no je pisao Lipietz (vidi Whiteside 1996), a nesto eksplicitnije i Raza (1999), koji predlaze uvodenje sestog strukturalnog oblika: "veze prirode i drustva". U nedostatku potpuno razvijenog koncepta koji bi premostio taj jaz, posluzit cemo se konceptom socio-ekoloskog rezima koji socio-ekonomska obiljezja drustvenog sustavapovezuje s onim biofizickim, kao i s uporabom energije i materijala (Sieferle et al. 2006, takoder Spash i Schandl 2009: 50); to nam omogucava da uo"imo golemi porast potrosnje energije i materijala po glavi stanovnika i po zemljopisnom podru"ju, kao i emisije C02po glavi stanovnika u razdoblju izmedu povijesnog poljoprivrednog rezima i onog koji zapo"inje s pojavom industrijske revolucije: industrijskog rezima (Krausmann et al. 2008, takoder Spash i Schandl 2009: 53). Potrosnja energije i materijala u izravnoj je korelaciji s ekonomskim rastom, mjerenim porastom bruto domaceg proizvoda (BDP). Stoga, iako je teoretski moguce zamisliti ekonomski rast bez pretjeranog iskoristavanja prirodnih resursa, povijesni dokazi, "ini se, ne govore u prilog tome.

Kao sto naspodsjecaju Brand i Wissen (2011: 25), vezu izmedu ekonomskog rasta i pretjeranog iskoristavanja prirodnih resursa nije lako prekinuti:

[P]roizvodnja fosilnihgoriva i obrascipotrosnje (...) duboko su ukorijenjeni u odnosima drustvene moci, zdravom razumu i svakodnevnim praksama stanovnika globalnog Sjevera, a sve vise i globalnog Juga, bas kao sto su ukorijenjeni i u cjelokupnoj orijentaciji na ekonomski rast i kompetitivnost.

Dodamo li tome problem nejednakosti o kojem pise Domazet, kao i trajno visoke stope nezaposlenosti (mladih) prisutne u nekim zapadnim zemljama od po"etka takozvane Velike recesije, odnosno od 2007./2008. naovamo, lako bismo mogli zaklju"iti da je prevladavajuci ekonomski sustav dozivio neuspjeh. Medutim, ne postoje spremne i gotove institucionalne inovacije neopterecene vrijednosnim sudovima koje bi sustav mogle promijeniti nabolje: postoje samo opcije izmedu kojih moramo birati. Iako njegov teorijski aparat izrijekom ne obuhvaca ekoloski sustav, fokus pristupa régulation na povijesno stabilne socio-ekonomske konstelacije navodi nas na zaWjucak da su moguce brojne varijacije socio-ekonomskog sustava. Kako navodiJessop (2013: 13):

Pitanje da li potraga za rjesenjima ekonomske krize obnavlja prevladavajuci rezim akumulacije i njegov regulacijski modus, ne ovisi isklju"ivo o objektivnim obiljezjima krize i mogucnostima njenog rjesavanja unutar ovog okvira. Ono takoder ovisi o institucionalnim i organizacijskim, kao i kapacitetima u"enja drustvenih silnica koje nastoje iznaci rjesenje krize, kao i ishodu pokusaja definiranja naravi krize, tuma"enja njenih raznih objektivnih uzroka, svaljivanja krivice za njen razvoj, te identificiranja najadekvatnijih rjesenja.

Kao glavne uzroke opadanja udjela placa u posljednjih dvadeset i pet godina (koja zajedno pridonose porastu nejednakosti) Stockhammer (2013) navodi financijalizaciju, slabljenje socijalne drzave i globalizaciju. "tovise, i sama socio-ekonomska kriza kojoj trenutno svjedocimo uzrokovana je financijalizacijom i povecanjem nejednakosti (Stockhammer 2012). Stockammer (2012: 64) stogazakljucuje davalja:

zagovarati definancijalizaciju. To podrazumijeva smanjivanje financijskog sektora, osnazivanje dionika kao sto su radni"ki sindikati naustrb dionika u korporativnoj upravi. Nadalje, to bi za cilj imalo nadomjestanje logike maksimalnog povecanja profita (ili vrijednosti dionicarskih uloga) u brojnim drustvenim sferama demokratski odredenim strateskim prioritetima i principima solidarnosti.

Iako to ne izaziva polemike u kontekstu progresivne ekonomske politike koja je k tomu i demokratski i socio-ekonomski odrziva, navod iz Stockhammerovog zaklju"ka koji slijedi pisan je iz Perspektive ekonomskog rasta i kao takav ne nailazi na opce odobravanje ekoloski osvijestenih znanstvenika s podru"ja drustvenih znanosti (Stockhammer 2012: 64): "[Jjedan od uvjeta za ponovno uspostavljanje odrzivog rezima rasta jest veciporast placa. Porast placa mora u najmanju ruku pratiti porast proizvodnje". Ovaj tip reformisti"kog strateskog odgovora nastoji rijesiti pitanje ekonomske stabilnosti osiguravanjem nesmetanog ekonomskog rasta putem pravednije raspodjele dohodaka unutar ekonomije (progresivno oporezivanje ovdje se nadaje kao o"it izbor). No ukoliko nismo u stanju osigurati odvajanje ekonomskog rasta od prekomjernog iskoristavanja Zemljinih resursa i uporabe energije, tada ova strategija sama po sebi ne moze predstavljati odrzivu alternativu.

Radikalno rjesenje nudi koncept, kao i stratesku inicijativu (odrzivog) od-rasta kojemu je cilj smanjiti cjelokupnu koli"inu materijala i energije koje drustvo koristi, buduci da se pretpostavlja da se to ne moze postici s rastucim BDP-om. Medutim, to nije isto sto i teznja za negativnim stopama rasta BDP-a (Kallis 2011: 874). Tezitikodrzivom od-rastu zna"i tragati za institucionalnim inovacijama na brojnim problemati"nim podru"jima.

[M]oguci prijedlog jest uvodenje globalnih ograni"enja na klju"ne resurse poput nafte i emisije CO2, koje narodi ravnopravno dijele po principu potrosnje po glavi stanovnika ("ogranici i dijeli", Douthwaite 2011) i kojih je s vremenom sve manje. Osim toga, pobornici od-rasta iznose tri dodatna prijedloga kako se nositi s negativnim posljedicama ekonomskih rezova na podru"ju zaposlenosti i drustvene stabilnosti: podjela rada, ja"anje sustava socijalnog osiguranja i alternativni ekonomski prostori koji egzistiraju izvan granica trzisne ekonomije (Latouche 2009). (***) Nadalje, veza izmedu blagostanja i pristupa placenom radu u formalnoj ekonomiji moze oslabiti uslijed povecanog pristupa nenov"anim dobrima i uslugama. Unutar ove domene postoje brojne drustvene inovacije, uklju"ujuci urbane vrtove za uzgoj hrane za vlastite potrebe, "banke vremena" u kojima korisnici razmjenjuju usluge na temelju vremena potrebnog za njihovo obavljanje, te projekti zajedni"kog vanja (eng. u kojima sudionici zajedni"ki ulazu nenov"ana sredstva (tzv. sweat equity) u obnovu stambenogprostora (Oarlsson 2008; NEF 2009). (van den Bergh i Kallis 2012:912-913)

Na temelju opisanog okvira mogli bismo zaklju"iti da se institucionalne inovacije za novu ekonomiju ne bi smjele sastojati od jednostavnih "popravaka" postojeceg ekonomskog sustava, jer im je zadaca mijenjati njegove temelje. Umjesto da promi"emo konkretne institucionalne inovacije, predstavili smo neke moguce strategije koje bi drugdje valjalo dodatno elaborirati, imajuci na umu socio-ekonomske i ekoloske temelje nasih drustava.

Tomislav Tomasevic

Grupa 22, Zagreb

Odrzivi gradovi: Mi u gradovima koji se moraju mijenjati

Prvi put u povijesti "ovje"anstva vise ljudi zivi u slozenim, gusto naseljenim, pretezno nepoljoprivrednim okolisima koje je stvorio "ovjek i koje nazivamo gradovima, nego u ruralnim podru"jima. Tu prekretnicuu povijesti nase vrste doseglismo 2008. godine (UNFPA 2007). To je jos jedan dokaz koji govoriu prilog tezama o povijesno neusporedivom utjecaju ljudske vrste na planetu Zemlju, koje u svom tekstu iznosi Domazet, utjecaju koji je neke znanstvenike potaknuo da ovu "geolosku" eru nazovu "antropocen". Mozda svjedo"imo novoj unutrasnjoj geoloskoj podjeli ere antropocena; Burde& i Rode (2010), naime, najavljuju pocetak "urbanog doba", u kojem se o"ekuje da ce tri "etvrtine svjetskog stanovnistva do 2050. zivjeti u gradovima. To je vrhunac rastuceg procesa globalne urbanizacije, zapo"etog prije dva stoljeca i neraskidivo povezanog s procesima industrijalizacije, modernizacije i razvoja kapitalizma. Sve je jasnije da, ako se zelimo baviti problemom globalne odrzivosti suvremene civilizacije o kojem Domazet progovara u uvodnom tekstu, moramo uzeti u obzir pitanje odrzivosti ili neodrzivosti kao dominantnog oblika ljudskog stanista.

Prije nego istrazimo jesu li gradovi u vecoj mjeri dio problema globalne odrzivosti suvremene civilizacije ili njegovog rjesenja, valja se pozabaviti ranije otvorenim pitanjem vrijedi li civilizaciju spasavati, ili "ak, na koje temeljne sastavnice bi je se najlakse moglo svesti? Na postojeci globalni ekonomski sustav koji sirom svijeta proizvodi drustvenu i ekolosku nepravdu? Na "esto imperijalisti"ku zapadnja"ku kulturu i znanost? Na medunarodni poredak ili zajednicu nacionalnih drzava koje nisu u stanju upravljati globalnim i dugoro"nim prijetnjama "ovje"anstvu i milijunima drugih vrsta? Enciklopedija humane geogra&je "civilizaciju" définira kao "proces intelektualnog, duhovnog i estetskog razvoja u kojem ljudi napustaju napustaju stanje divljastva i hijerarhijski napreduju od niskih kultura prema visokoj kulturi" (Warf 2006: 323). U tekstuse dalje navodi da se spomenutaidejakritiziraikao linearni evolucijski proces koji opravdava dominaciju jedne skupine ljudi nad drugima, ali i kao negativni proces koji ljude udaljava od prirode, pretvarajuci time "niske kulture" u idealne civilizacije. U ovome se radu polazi od pretpostavke da globalnu civilizaciju kao globalno drustvo doista treba odrzati, ne zato sto bi ona predstavljala najbolji od svih mogucih svjetova koji je sam po sebi vrijedan spasavanja, vec stoga sto bi odabir neodrzivog puta materijalne potrosnje u kona"nici mogao dovesti do povratka globalnog drustva u manje pozeljno stanje. S druge strane, transformacija drustvenih struktura s ciljem nadilazenja i materijalnih ograni"enja i umnozavanja drustvenih nejednakosti mogla bi globalnom drustvu omoguciti pomak8 prema univerzalnoj ljudskoj emancipaciji. Misljenja smo da civilizacija doista jest napredovala, unato" svim svojim nesavrsenostima, a u buducnosti bi mogla ili nazadovati ili dalje napredovati, no pritom smatramo dapovrataku "tradicionalna", "primitivna" drustva ili "nize kulture" ne moze biti put ka vecoj odrzivosti okolisa. Potonji koncept nailazi na podrsku onih koji vjeruju da su predmoderna drustva zivjela u skladu s prirodom: u literaturi ta se ideja naziva mitom o "ekoloskomplemenitom divljaku" (Redford 1990). Etimoloski gledano, "civilizacija" (eng. civilisation) je bliska "gradu" (eng. city), a Bagby "civilizaciju" définira kao "kulturu u kojoj nalazimo gradove" (1959: 162). Prije negoli odgovorimo na pitanje jesu li gradovi problem ili rjesenje za ekolosku, drustvenu i ekonomsku odrzivost globalne civilizacije, treba rijesiti ove konceptualne pretpostavke.

Imamo li naumu ekoloske aspekte problema urbane odrzivosti, pokret za o"uvanje okolisa od samog je po"etka bio skepti"an prema industrijalizaciji i njenom nusproizvodu, urbanizaciji, sto je dovelo do jos uvijek aktualne rasprave o tome jesu li gradovi problem ili rjesenje za odrzivost globalnog okolisa. Na jednoj strani rasprave nalaze se modernijipristupi poput "pametnih gradova" (Seisdedos 2012), kojiu gradovima - uglavnom utemeljenima na paradigmi eko-u"inkovitosti prema kojoj visoka gustoca urbanih formi omogucava ucinkovitiji prijevoz, industrijsku proizvodnju i druge urbane sustave potpomognute sofisticiranom tehnologijom i drustveno inteligentnim dizajnom - vide rjesenje za odrzivost okolisa. Dakako, nije isto govorimo li, primjerice, o tipi"nom ameri"kom ili tipi"nom europskom gradu, o urbanom sprawlu (neplaniranom i nekontroliranom sirenju urbanog podru"ja; op.prev.) ili kompaktnom gradu. Istina je da gradovi mogu u znatnoj mjeri smanjiti otisak ljudskog stanista, sto mozemo apstraktno ilustrirati predodzbom jedinstvenog svjetskog grada. Kada bismo trenutnu svjetsku populaciju smjestili u jedan jedini grad, taj bi imao gustocu naseljenosti Pariza i zauzimao povrsinu priblizno jednaku povrsini Finske.9 Nazalost, stanisni otisak gradova sam po sebi nije jednak njihovom ukupnom ekoloskom otisku: naime, materijali i energija koje gradovi trose iziskuju mnogo vece zemljisne povrsine od podru"ja na kojima su izgradeni. Ideja eko-u"inkovitih gradova sugerira ne samo da gradovi unapreduju globalnu odrzivost, vec da veliki gradovi mogu povecati u"inkovitost po glavi stanovnika i kao takvi bi globalnoj odrzivosti mogli doprinijeti u vecoj mjeri nego manji gradovi.

Medutim, nedavna studija (Oliveira et al. 2014) pokazuje da, unato" ekonomiji razmjera koja povecava u"inkovitost, veliki gradovi imaju proporcionalno veciugljicni otisak od malih gradova. Kako je moguce da unato" vecoj u"inkovitosti transportnog i drugih sustava veliki gradovi i dalje imaju vecu emisiju CO2 po stanovniku nego mali gradovi? Oni jednostavno vise proizvode (u kona"nici u materijalnom smislu), sto zna"i da njihovi stanovnici ostvaruju veci dohodakper capita te vise i trose. To pokazuje da ce fokusiranje isklju"ivo na u"inkovitost gradova i zanemarivanje dostatnosti ili potrosnje materijala i energije u gradovima, u kona"nici biti nedostatno u smislu postizanja urbane odrzivosti. Gradovi teze ekonomskom rastu pod svaku cijenu, sto nuzno dovodi do porasta potrosnje; stoga bez restrukturiranja s ciljem od-rasta ili anti-rasta, u"inkovitost i tehnoloske inovacije nece biti dovoljne za postizanje odrzivosti urbanog okolisa.

Na drugoj strani rasprave nalaze se vise postmodernisti"ki okolisni pristupi gradovima, koji u njima vide problem za odrzivost okolisa buduci da neizbjezno vode u konzumerizam, otudenje od prirode i drustveni atomizam. Namjesto gradova, ti borci za okolis zalazu se za eko-sela u kojima bi se zadovoljavale jedino "prave" materijalne ljudske potrebe, i to niskom tehnologijom u vidu primitivne zemljoradnje i obrta, sto bi dovelo do obnavljanja osjecaja zajednistva (Kasper 2008). Taj pristup zagovara i pokret "Gradovi u tranziciji" (eng. Transition Towns) na "elu s Robom Hopkinsom (2008), utemeljiteljem prvog eko-sela u Irskoj. Usmjeren uglavnom na manje gradove, pokret "Gradovi u tranziciji" za cilj ima smanjenje uglji"nog otiska, uporabe fosilnih goriva i osjetljivosti na promjene u globalnim financijskim tokovima kroz lokalizaciju ekonomije i izgradnju zajednice. Takvi manji i tradicionalniji fizicki oblici ljudskih naselja ne bi uzivali dobrobiti ekonomije razmjera, niti prakticirali sofisticiranupodjelurada, sto zna"i da bi bili manje u"inkoviti, alivise (samo)odrzivi, zadovoljavajuci jedino osnovne materijalne ljudske potrebe. Medutim, postavlja se pitanje moze li svijet koji ce uskoro nastanjivati devet milijardi ljudi sebi priustiti takvu deindustrijalizaciju, demodernizaciju i dekoordinaciju, ako zeli zadovoljiti "ak najosnovnije potrebe svih tih ljudi.

Pristup eko-sela i eko-gradova u skladu je sa specificnim ekoloskim okvirom zvanim "malo je lijepo" (Schumacher 1993). Medutim, malo ponekad nije i tehnoloski optimalno, primjerice, u domeni pretvorbe energije koju Domazet u uvodnom tekstu isti"e kao klju"nu sastavnicu razvojnog projekta. Primjer energetske u"inkovitosti elektrana na biomasu pokazuje da vece elektrane mogu u elektri"nu energiju pretvoriti znatno veci postotak termalne energije iz biomase nego manje elektrane (Austin 2008). Ako se, kao sto tvrdi Domazet, "moramo promijeniti", tada se u ovome radu tvrdi da "moramo mijenjati gradove" koristeci kombinaciju spomenutih pristupa, odnosno hvatajuci se u kostac i s urbanom eko-ucinkovitos i s eko-dostatnoscu. Gradovi bi mogli biti dio rjesenja za odrzivost globalnog okolisa, no samo ako se drustvene strukture i upravlja"ki mehanizmi u njima promijene do te mjere da su u stanju zaustaviti porast besmislene potrosnje, te istodobno povecati koristenje u"inkovitih resursa. Koncept zajedni"kog dobra mogao bi popuniti tu prazninu buduci da bi istodobno mogao zahvatiti i u problematiku dostatnosti i u problematiku u"inkovitosti, unoseci drustvenu organizaciju eko-sela u urbani fizicki oblik na siroj razini. Primjerice, zajednicki urbani vrtovi u"inkovitije koriste prirodne resurse buduci da namjesto pojedinaca s vlastitim, privatnim parcelama, imamo zajednicu koja koristi jedan komad zemljista; zajednicka proizvodnja i potrosnja stvara drustveni kapital i osjecaj zajednistva; postoji pravedan pristup proizvedenoj hrani ne samo unutar pojedine urbane zajednice, vec i kroz trgovinu i preraspodjelu s drugim zajedni"kim vrtovima unutar istog grada.

Drustveni aspekt urbanizacije povezan je s raspravom o procesu modernizacije koji putem tehnoloskih i znanstvenih napredaka ruralno i tradicionalno drustvo transformira u urbano i moderno. Jedan dio pokreta za o"uvanje okolisa i drugih drustvenih pokreta modernizaciju vidi kao negativan proces buduci da tradicionalnu ruralnu kulturu zajednice i suradnje pretvara u modernisti"ku kulturu individualizma i nadmetanja. Drugi dio modernizaciju smatrapozitivnim drustvenim procesom koji ce dokinuti tradicionalne zajednice i drustvene odnose utemeljene na srodstvu, koje se uglavnom povezivalo s opresivnim drustvenim oblicima kao sto je patrijarhat. Vec smo istaknuli da se necemo zalagati za povratak tradicionalnom predmodernom drustvu kao arhetipu ekoloske odrzivosti, buduci da bi takva regresija mogla zna"iti opresije imanje slobode identiteta. Kako ondapomiriti osobne slobode i identitete s jedne strane, i kolektivnu skrb i osjecaj zajednistva s druge? Odgovor koji na to pitanje nudilris Marion Young (1990) lezi u gradu, u urbanom drustvenom zivotu. Za Young, gradovi predstavljaju savrseni model u kojem se spajaju raznolikost i zajednistvo, koji onemogucava uskogrudnost, iu kojem razli"iti identiteti mogu supostojati odrzavajuci drustveni kapital, solidarnost i toleranciju. Male zajednice vrse drustveni moralni pritisak na pojedinca da se uklopi, dok veliki gradovi istovremeno nude i anonimnost kao preduvjet individualne slobode i izravno iskustvo pripadanja vecoj zajednici ili zajednicama.

Ekonomski aspekt urbanizacije i urbane odrzivosti neraskidivo je povezan s razvojem kapitalizma. Domazet smatra da tehnolosko rjesenje nije odgovor na pitanje odrzivosti okolisa, no "prostorno rjesenje" ili globalna urbanizacija ipak jest rijesila problem odrzivosti kapitalistickog oblika razvojnog projekta (Harvey 2001 ). Njegova globalna urbanizacija stvara prostorne nejednakosti na globalnoj razini i ekonomske (a stoga i drustvene i politi"ke) nejednakosti u gradovima (Smith 2010). Neoliberalna urbanizacija u razvijenom kapitalizmu istovremeno stvara drustvene nejednakosti i crpi sve vece koli"ine prostora/resursa radi odrzavanja kapitalisti"kog sustava. To zna"i da neoliberalna urbanizacija daje jedan od najvecih doprinosa kombinaciji koju spominje Domazet, i koja vodi u potpuni slom civilizacije. Promjena na"ina na koji se gradovi reproduciraju stoga je povezana s promjenama urbanih ekonomskih sustava, odnosno drustvenih struktura proizvodnje, raspodjele i potrosnje. Ako ekonomija slobodnog trzista stvara izopa"ene ishode distribucije, ostaje pitanje kako onda osigurati u"inkovito koristenje prirodnih resursa. Drzavni mehanizmi ekonomske vlasti povijesno su se pokazali odvise sporima i neu"inkovitima te se stoga pravo rjesenje mozda krije u upravljanju zajedni"kim dobrima i ekonomskoj demokratizaciji. Kako bi se osiguralo u"inkovito upravljanje resursima, nakon drustvenih inovacija trebale bi doci one tehnoloske: naime, ranije spomenuta studija (Oliveira et al. 2014) pokazuje da veliki gradovi stvaraju vise tehnoloskih inovacija (mjerenih kao patenti po glavi stanovnika) u odnosu na manje gradove, vjerojatno zbog visokog stupnja dinamike i razmjene velikog broja ljudi i njihovih ideja. Empirijski podaci Elinor Ostrom (1990) nude brojne primjere uspjesnog zajedni"kog upravljanjaprirodnim i drugim resursima; medutim, te zajednice nikada ne prelaze nekoliko tisuca ljudi. Ako ce odrzivi grad ujedno biti "zajedni"ki grad", to zna"i desetke tisuca upravljackih sustava utemeljenih na zajedni"kim dobrima, koji zajedno "ine vrlo slozenu opcu strukturu vlasti koja im omogucava medusobnu koordinaciju i pregovore. Medutim, "ini se daje klimatskakriza na putu, a teorija sustava pokazuje da se slozeni prilagodljivi sustavi mogu prilagoditi svojim promjenjivim okolisima kako bi se odrzali.

Jeremy F. Walton

Sveuciliste Georg August, Göttingen

Prema kritici politicke ekonomije klimatskih promjena onkraj opozicije priroda/kultura: razmatranja jednog antropologa

Filozo' su samo, na razli"ite na"ine, tuma"ili svijet. Cilj je, medutim, promijeniti ga. (Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1998: 571)

Zelite spasiti slonove u parkovima Kenije tako sto cete im dati da pasu odvojeno od krava? Odli"no, ali kako cete doznati misljenje pripadnika naroda Masai koji su odsje"eni od krava, i krava kojima su oduzeti slonovi koji za njih kr"e zbunje, i slonova koji su odvojeni i od naroda Masai i od krava? (Bruno Latour 2004: 170)

Iz odredenog gledista antropologija se moze doimati kao neobi"na disciplinarna platforma za odasiljanje kritika na ra"un globalne politi"ke ekonomije klimatskih promjena. Prema poznatoj taksonomiji drustvenih znanosti, antropologiju se redovito prikazuje kao ogrezlu u partikularizmu i zaokupljenu idiografskim opisima, a ne nomoteti"kim objasnjenjima (usp. Wallerstein et al. 1996). Medutim, u ovom kratkom eseju tvrdim da antropologiji pripada klju"na, stovise sredisnja uloga u tuma"enju dilema povezanih s klimatskim promjenama i osmisljavanju strategija kojima ce se ublaziti njihove negativne posljedice. Potencijalni doprinos antropologije raspravi o izazovima koje pred nas postavljaju klimatske promjene proizlazi iz njenih konceptualnih temelja: vise od bilo koje druge znanstvene discipline, antropologija se intenzivno i kontinuirano hrva s problemati"nom vezom izmedu "prirode" i "kulture". Posljednjih desetljeca antropolozi su raniju, esencijalisti"ku distinkciju izmedu "prirode" i "kulture" zamijenili iznijansiranim, na praksi utemeljenim holizmom koji "prirodu" i "kulturu" poimakao uzajamne koncepte koji nuzno posreduju i uvjetuju jedan drugoga. Ta revizionisti"ka u sebi zacijelo sadrzi po(r)uke od klju"ne vaznosti za raspravu o klimatskim promjenama. Namjesto percepcije klimatskih promjena kao niza "kulturnih" utjecaja na "prirodu" (stajaliste koje na problemati"an na"in razdvaja ljudsko djelovanje od same "prirode") zalazem se za novi narativ klimatskih promjena, koji ce politi"ku ekonomiju neoliberalnog kapitalizma pretvoriti u glavni predmet kritike. Na taj se na"in odazivam na pozivMladena Domazeta da "pozornost "ovje"anstva [skrenemo] na procese koji se odvijaju na ne-ljudskim razinama" na emancipirajuci na"in kako bismo primijenili od-rast na civilizacijubezunistavanjanjenih dosadasnjih (tehnoloskih drustvenih) postignuca" (2014: 14).

Antropologija ranog dvadesetog stoljeca, naro"ito ona kakvu su prakticirali i zagovarali profesor sa Sveu"ilista u Kolumbiji Franz Boas i njegovi studenti u Sjevernoj Americi, svoj je disciplinarni legitimitet izgradila na granici izmedu sfera prirode i kulture (Boas 1989). Za Boasa i njegove sljedbenike, kultura, kao prostor jedinstveno ljudskih obiljezja i ponasanja, po"inje upravo tamo gdje priroda zavrsava. Kao sto je pokazao povjesni"ar antropologije George Stocking (1982), Boasova rana "kulturna" antropologija odigrala je presudnu ulogu u nadilazenju evolucijskih i rasisti"kih predrasuda antropologije devetnaestog stoljeca. Nakon Boasa, doslo je do temeljnog razilazenja izmedu bioloske antropologije (ukorijenjena u prou"avanju ljudskih bica kao prirodnih organizama i jos uvijek zaokupljena pitanjima evolucije) ikulturne antropologije (fokusirana na ljudska bica kao primarno drustvene ikulturne "imbenike). Sredinom dvadesetog stoljeca ameri"ka je antropologija idaljebilaukorijenjenau konceptu kulture, o "emu svjedo"i opus Cliíforda Geertza (1977). S druge strane Atlantskog oceana britanski etnolozi, nadahnuti funkcionalisti"kom durkheimovskom sociologijom, iscrtavali su podjednako stroge granice izmedu prirode i drustvene strukture (npr. Radcliffe-Brown 1965).

Unutar antropologije, strogi dualizmi prirode/kulture i prirode/drustva po"inju slabjeti tek s pojavom strukturalizma i kopernikanskim obratom u antropoloskoj misli koji je potaknut radom Claudea Lévi-Straussa. Poznata je Lévi-Straussova inauguracijakritike razlikovanja znanstvenog i drugih oblika ljudskog misljenja: "Znanstvenik nikada ne dijalogizira samo s prirodom, vec prije s osobitom vezom izmedu prirode i kulture koju je moguce definirati u kontekstu specificnog razdoblja i civilizacije u kojoj sam znanstvenik djeluje, te materijalnih sredstava koja su mu na raspolaganju" (1966: 19). Iz pozicije strukturalizma (a neizbjezno i poststrukturalizma), priroda vise nije apsolutni Drugi kulture; umjesto toga, sama opozicija priroda/kultura dio je sireg, holisti"kog procesa proizvodnje zna"enja. Odavde do argumenata Bruna Latoura (1993) kratak je put; njegov model studija znanosti i tehnologije (eng. science and technology studies, skrac. STS) odbacuje ne samo razlikovanje kulture i prirode, vec i ljudi i ne-ljudi, te subjekata i objekata.

Buduci da smo zakora"ili na potencijalno tanak konceptualni i politi"ki led, red je da izdamo upozorenje. Ovu kratku i djelomi"nu povijest antropoloskih nagadanja o dihotomiji prirode i kulture tekstu sam dodao kako bih razotkrio neke od zamki teoretiziranja o klimatskim promjenama. Konkretno, dvije zamke - jedna Scila i jedna Haribda - prijete nasoj analizi i politi"koj ambiciji: na jednoj strani anakronisti"ki, besramni esencijalizam koji reificira i prirodu i kulturu, uspostavljajuci pritom jedinstvenu privilegiranu poziciju znanstvenog razuma; na drugoj strani, karikirani postmodernisti"ki relativizam koji destabilizira osnove svog znanja bez razlike, i znanstvenog i drugog, osujecujuci time svako politi"ko djelovanje. Prva zamka, simplicisti"ki esencijalizam, ima pogubne posljedice mimo dvostruke reifikacije prirode i kulture. Ono sto jejos vaznije u kontekstu ove rasprave jest "injenica da opreka priroda/kultura nadzire vatrozid izmedu "prirodnih" i "drustvenih" znanosti, sto rezultira time da argumenti svake od dvaju skupina znanstvenih disciplina za onu drugu postaju nevazeci i neu"inkoviti. Kao sto Domazet uvjerljivo tvrdi, takav oblik akademske uskogrudnosti ima pogubne posljedice po priznavanje "injenice da "nasa vrsta sudjeluje u procesima na bitno razli"itim razinama koje su u pravilu oblasti odvojenih diskurzivnih disciplina" (2014: 7). Jedino nadilazenjem strogog razgrani"enja izmedu "prirodnih" i "drustvenih" znanosti mozemo se nadati da cemo "pronaci glas koji dopire iz Perspektive opkora"enja tih razli"itih razina" (ibid.). Ta "perspektiva opkora"enja" klju"na je i za izbjegavanje druge zamke: nihilistickog relativizma. Integrativna "perspektiva opkora"enja", koju zagovara Domazet, nuzno nas odvodi onkraj Latourove dekonstrukcije znanstvenog znanja kojeg se "esto proziva kao sukrivca skeptika prema klimatskim promjenama i drugih politi"ki reakcionarnih "imbenika (Sokal 1996; vidi takoder Demeri& 2006). U ostatku ovog eseja cilj mi je pridonijeti upravo toj vrsti "Perspektive opkora"enja" i borbi protiv epistemoloskog nihilizma povezanog s klimatskim promjenama, destabiliziranjem opreke priroda/kultura uz pomoc treceg termina (koji, treba reci, Domazet takoder propitkuje): neoliberalnog kapitalizma.

Kapitalizam iziskuje da ga pomno i kriti"ki propitkujemo upravo zato sto je, poput politicke ekonomije, bezbrizno ravnodusan prema opoziciji priroda/kultura. Kao sto je davnih dana izrazeno u poznatoj metafori Marxa i Engelsa, unutar rezima kapitalisti"ke komodifikacije "sve sto je "vrsto i postojano pretvara se u dim" (1948: 16), bez obzira na to je li rije" o "prirodnim" ili "kulturnim" tvarima. Antropolog politi"ke ekologije Arturo Escobar nedavno je istaknuo hitnost upisanu u ovu temeljnu ideju marksizma: "Priroda se vise ne définira i ne tretira kao izvanjska domena koju je moguce iskoristavati. Putem novog procesa kapitalizacije (...) prethodno 'nekapitalizirani' aspekti drustva i priro de postaju sastavni dijelovi kapitala" ( 1995: 199). Na za"udan na"in, kapitalizam pragmati"ki uspijeva tamo gdje su drustvene znanosti dozivjele teorijski neuspjeh: on razrjesava opoziciju priroda/kultura pohlepno apsorbirajuci i komodificirajuci i "prirodu" i "kulturu".

Koje su politi"ke posljedice izgradnje kritike klimatskih promjena na propitkivanju neoliberalnog kapitalizma, a ne na granici prirode i kulture? Najneposrednije, ovaj fokus na kapitalizam vraca pokret za zastitu okolisa i zeleni aktivizam u srediste interesa, i to kao predanost drustvenoj pravednosti, a ne "tekprirodne" orijentacije (usp. Butler 1997).Dragimrijecima, kritikaklimatskih promjenau jednakoj se mjeri ti"e ljudskih subjekatai neegalitarnih odnosa koje odrzavaju medu sobom, kao i "prirodnog" svijeta. Vrijedi i suprotno: drustvena pravednost nije samo pitanje ljudske nejednakosti. U razdoblju neoliberalnog kapitalizma, obveza prema drustvenoj pravdi nuzno nadilazi problemati"nu podjelu na prirodni i kulturni, ljudski i ne-ljudskisvijet.

No "ak i dok se zalazemo za ponovnu procjenu odnosa izmedu kapitalizma i klimatskih promjena, moramo biti oprezni kako jednu konkretizaciju ne bismo zamijenili drugom. pitalizam, u njegovoj neoliberalnoj ina"ici, nije esencija nista vise nego su to "priroda" ili "kultura". Posljedi"no, otpor u"incima neoliberalnog kapitalizma (klimatskim i/ ili inim) takoder mora nuzno biti mnogolik i izmjesten iz sredista. Kao sto nas podsjecaju Michael Hardt i Antonio Negri (2001), globalno "mnostvo" dvadeset prvog stoljeca nije isto sto i proletarijat devetnaestog stoljeca. Dakako, to ne zna"i da nam u borbi protiv klimatskih promjena nije hitno potrebna globalna politi"ka reorijentacija, "vrsto utemeljena na "razmisljanju za dvadeset drugo stoljece", kakvo strastveno zagovara Domazet. Jednostavno treba priznati da spomenuti proces otpora i reorijentacije nije i ne moze biti identi"an u svim svojim specificnim kontekstima. No to nije razlog za pesimizam. Kao sto antropologinja i borac za okolis Anna Tsing (2005) uvjerljivo pokazuje, "trenje" medu kontekstima i razinama politi"kog aktivizma u doba guste, visedimenzionalne medupovezanosti koju nazivamo globalizacijom je neizbjezno. Umjesto da o"ajava zbog tog trenja protiv kojega ne moze nista, globalni pokret protiv klimatskih promjena mora ga prepoznati i iz njega crpiti snagu.

ZaHjucno, zelio bih se kratko osvrnuti na dva citata (Marxov i Latourov) kojima sam uokvirio ovaj esej. Zajedno, oni djeluju kao smjernice za koordinaciju mojih argumenata i teznji. Po uzoru na Marxa, tog paradigmatskog aktivisti"kog intelektualca, valja istaknuti da je znanstvena spekulacija razdvojena od politi"kog djelovanja jedva nesto bolja od kola bez konja. Tuma"iti svijet klimatskih promjena, a ne mijenjati ga, zna"i perpetuirati drustvene i ekoloske nepravde ovoga svijeta. Latour nam, pak, nudi po(r)uku upozorenja. ,ak i dok nastojimo povezati vlastitu interpretaciju klimatskih promjena s pragmati"kim politi"kim djelovanjem, moramo voditi ra"una o trenju koje ce nas politi"ki projekt neizbjezno izazvati i uklju"ivati. Nisu sve ste"ene obaveze medusobno uskladive: interese slonova, krava i pripadnika naroda Masai ne mozemo tretirati kao medusobno posve razmjerne. Pomake na globalnoj razini borba protiv klimatskih promjena moze postici jedino uvazavanjem i hvatanjem u kostac s problemom brojnih vrsta trenja. Upravo u tom klju"nom trenutku antropologija, sa svojim kontinuiranim fokusom na pojedinosti konteksta, moze preuzeti vlastitu ulogu u borbi protiv klimatskih promjena. Dok su klimatolozi i politi"ki ekonomisti klju"ni za iscrtavanje obrisa i predvidanje posljedica klimatskih promjena na globalnoj razini, antropolozi su u idealnoj poziciji da slijede i uklanjaju trzavice do kojih ce projekt obrtanja klimatskih promjena nuzno dovesti.

Ovim kratkim razmatranjem pokusao sam dati malen doprinos ovom projektu nadvladavanja trenja istrazivanjem antropoloskog naslijeda opozicije priroda/kultura i njenog odnosa odnosa prema debati o klimatskim promjenama. Nadahnut Domazetovim esejom, ustvrdio sam da su odbacivanje esencijalisti"ke opreke priroda/kultura te popratni fokus na pitanja neoliberalnog kapitalizma i drustvene pravde klju"ni za unaprjedivanje politi"ke borbe protiv klimatskih promjena. Nadam se da su ove interpretacije i same izazvale nesto trenja: na koncu, trenje je izvor topline i energije te poticaj za djelovanje. A mogucnost ove vrste djelovanja (promijeniti svijet klimatskih promjena) ono je sto ujedinjuje nase raznolike intervencije unutar ovog foruma i, nadajmo se, foruma koji dolaze.

Karin Doolan

Grupa 22, Zagreb

Promjena klime, drustvena nepravda i patologija zivota u postindustrijskom kapitalizmu

Ton Domazetovog teksta prigodno je hitan. "Zivimo u izvanrednim vremenima", pise on, obiljezenim nezadovoljivom i stetnom teznjom kapitalizma za rastom i s njom povezanim promjenama globalnog okolisa i rastucim drustvenim nejednakostima. Domazet se poziva na niz stru"nih izvora, upozoravajuci nas da je nada u tehnolosko otkrice koje ce nas izbaviti iz klimatskih poteskoca naivna, te predlazuci da namjesto toga prigrlimo projekt odrzivog od-rasta. Cilj mojega odgovora na Domazetov tekst (2014) je trostruki: poblize sagledati teme predstavljene u njegovom radu kao i aspekte drustvene nepravde promjene klime te nadovezati se na njegov rad prosirivanjem njegove kritike kapitalizma iz Perspektive literature o afektivnim posljedicama zivota u potrosa"kom drustvu s jedne, te kratkim osvrtom na osobnu pristranost i sklonost statusu quo u smislu ekoloskog djelovanja, s druge strane. Na taj na"in zelim dati vlastiti doprinos onome sto vidim kao Domazetov kriti"ki projekt procjenjivanja "utvrdenog na"ina organizacije drustva" u odnosu na "druge mogucnosti, mogucnosti za koje se smatra da nude bolje izglede za olaksavanje "ovjekove borbe za egzistenciju" (Marcuse 1991 [1964]: 42) (iako bi, u kontekstu klimatskih promjena, Marcuseovu frazu "covjekova borba za egzistenciju" bilo primjereno zamijeniti izrazom "borba planeta za egzistenciju").

Barker, Scrieciu i Taylor (2008) klimatske promjene opisuju kao "sustinski pristrane i stoga nepravedne", jer "sistematski i nemilosrdno" pogadaju "ranjive, siromasne i ekstremno siromasne" (2008: 318). O dimenziji drustvene pravednosti promjene klime u stru"noj se literaturi raspravlja kao o nadnacionalnom i nacionalnom, medu- i unutargeneracijskom problemu. U nedavno objavljenoj studiji Preston et al. (2014) zaklju"uju da se teorijska literatura o klimatskoj pravednosti dosad naj"esce fokusirala na nejednaku raspodjelu odgovornosti za emisiju ugljika medu drzavama, odnosno izmedu Sjevera i Juga ili postindustrijskih i zemalja u razvoju. Iako autori priznaju da je vazno skrenuti pozornost na nadnacionalnu dimenziju klimatske pravednosti, takoder detaljno objasnjavaju njenu nacionalnu dimenziju: ugrozene skupine najmanje pridonose uzrocima klimatskih promjena, a ipak ce se te promjene upravo na njih najvise negativno odraziti; od svog dohotka najvise placaju implementaciju odredenih strategija, a ipak od njih imaju najmanje koristi; takoder imaju manju mogucnost sudjelovati u donosenju odluka o spomenutim strategijama. Prema Prestonu et al. (2014), ugrozene skupine uklju"uju starije osobe, osobe s niskim primanjima te podstanare (potonja se skupina preklapa sa skupinom osoba s niskim primanjima). Sluzeci se primje- rom poplava, autori pokazuju da oporavljanje od posljedica poplave moze biti teze ljudima koji zive u siromastvu, zbog nedovoljnog ili nepostojeceg osiguranja, troskova privremenog smjestaja, troskova prijevoza uzrokovanih preseljenjem i smanjenim pristupom kreditima. Oni zahtijevaju da nacionalna politika povezana s klimatskim promjenama vodi vise ra"una o drustvenim nejednakostima i pokazuje zabrinutost, primjerice, za posljedice na rizicima utemeljenog trzisnog pristupa osiguranju od poplava (premije osiguranja proporcionalne su razini rizika pojedinog kucanstva), koji je u opreci s pristupom utemeljenim na solidarnosti (manje rizi"ni pomazu visoko rizi"ne). Nedavne katastrofalne poplave u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji (svibanj 2014.) zorno pokazuju neposrednu vaznost takvog na"ina razmisljanja.

Vazno povezano pitanje ti"e se medupovezanosti ekonomskog rasta, okolisa i drustvene pravednosti. Kao sto isti"e Muraca (2012), postoji podjela na one koji u ekonomskom rastu vide preduvjet za pravednost u raspodjeli i brane njegov utjecaj na okolis, i one koji u njemu vide prijetnju pravednosti i okolisu. Za prvu skupinu, ekonomski rast povecava ukupnu kolicinu dobara za raspodjelu sto, pak, poboljsava zivotni standard u cjelini, poti"e drustvenu mobilnosti i povecava vladine prihode za socijalne sluzbe, sto unapreduje cjelokupni sustav socijalne pomoci. Prema tom argumentu, kontinuirani rast nuzan je za zaposljavanje i stimulira ulaganje u tehnologije za rjesavanje problema okolisa. Domazet (2014) o tome pise kao o "imperativ[u] rasta zaodjenut[om] u obecanje emancipacije", nazivajuci kapitalisti"ki imperativ rasta stetnim mehanizmom "koji se hrani rastucim nejednakostima".

Muracina (2012) kritika od-rasta usmjerena protiv tvrdnji onih koji zagovaraju rast je uvjerljiva: "efekt kapanja nadolje" (eng. trickle-down effect) je neodrziv. Bez preraspodjele, rast vodi u povecanje jaza izmedu bogatih i siromasnih, a postoji i snazna korelacija izmedu rasta BDP-a i unistavanja prirodnog okolisa, uklju"ujuci rastucu potrebu za novim resursima koja vodi u geopoliti"ke oblike dominacije kao sto je proizvodnja biomase za globalni Sjever ili neokolonijalno zagadenje vode i otimanje zemlje. Muraca (2012) dalje dovodi u pitanje imperativ rasta, ne samo iz Perspektive pravednosti raspodjele i okolisa vec i kroz povezanost s nasim afektivnim ja. Autorica isti"e da postoji negativna korelacija izmedu BDP-a po glavi stanovnika i subjektivnog dozivljaja srece.

O afektivnim dimenzijama zivota u kapitalizmu pisali su mnogi autori. Ono sto je svima zajedni"ko jest dijagnoza kasnog kapitalizma i potrosa"ke kulture kao pogubnih za blagostanje. "tetimo planeti potrosnjom koja steti nama i mimo argumenta drustvene pravednosti Martinez-Aliera, koji tvrdi da pretjerana potrosnja bogatih i pripadnika srednje klase "nije samo prijetnja drugim vrstama ibuducim generacijama ljudi (...) ona u sadasnjem trenutku siromasne lisava njihovog pravednog udjela u resursima i okolisnom prostoru" (2012: 62). Fromm (1956) koristi koncept "otudenja" kako bi opisao drustveni karakter zapadnja"ke "moderne osobnosti", "ovjeka otudenog od samoga sebe, koji stje"e jedino kako bi imao, i kojemu je beskorisno posjedovanje izvor zadovoljstva. Za ideologiju kasnog kapitalizma Salecl navodi dapovecava tjeskobu ljudi svojim inzistiranjem na samoprobita"nosti i samoispunjenju, zaklju"ujuci da "kako se "ini, slobodni konzumenti na ko neu konzumiraju sami sebe" (2008: 2340). Aprema Illouz, potrosnja se "gotovo isklju"ivo bazira na ideologiji osobne dobrobiti i samozadovoljstva (...) trziste poti"e potrosa"ke izbore koji pro izlaze izkultiviranja hiper-individualisti"kog identiteta" (2009: 386). Drugim rije"ima, osjecaj osobne vrijednosti u kapitalizmu kultivira se unutar kategorije individualnog, a ne putem solidarnosti, empatije iprepoznavanja meduovisnosti koja prema Prestonu et al. "lezi sredistukozmopolitskih poimanjaklimatske pravednosti" (2014: 21).

Cini se da se Domazet nada racionalnom odgovoru na problem klimatskih promjena: poziva nas da napravimo "temeljiti zaokret prema odrzivosti oslanjajuci se na nase kolektiv- no znanje", tvrdeci da oslanjajuci se "na opsezno znanje o prirodnim i drustveno povijesnim procesima, [mozemo] postici da globalna populacija ima koristi od ranije lokaliziranih alternativa". Salecl se, pak, fokusira na emocionalne reakcije na zabrinjavajuce ekoloske probleme: "ponasamo se kao da se nista zapravo ne treba promijeniti" (2012: 2280). Pisuci iz Perspektive socijalne psihologije, autori(ce) kao sto su Johnson i Levin (2009) upozoravaju na to da nas oblikuju razne vrste pristranosti koje djeluju protivno racionalnim reakcijama na klimatske promjene. Osjetilna pristranost tjera nas da izbjegavamo reakcije na prijetnje koje se javljaju izvan granica naseg izravnog iskustva: "Mehanizam mozga ne reagira u potpunosti na nesto sve dok to ne registriramo na tjelesnoj bazi" (Johnson i Levin 2009: 1595). Psiholoske pristranosti uklju"uju pozitivne iluzije (pretjerano pouzdanje povezano s vlastitom podloznosti riziku), kognitivnu disonancu (prilagodavanje proturje"nih informacija vlastitimuvjerenjima), temeljnu pogresku atribucije (pripisivanje vlastitog ponasanja ograni" ma situacije), teoriju o"ekivanog izbora ("riskiramo time sto ne radimo nista, u nadi da stvari nece ispastibas tako lose"), te medugrupnu iunutargrupnupristranost (svaljivanje krivice za uzroke iposljedice klimatskih promjena na druge) (ibid.: 1598). Kako primjecuju autori, svi navedeni oblici pristranosti navode ljude da umanjuju opasnost promjene okolisa i vlastitog udjela u njoj. Uz pristranosti na individualnoj bazi, Johnson i Levin (2009) ukazuju na to da i organizacijska i politi"ka pristranost osujecuju djelovanje usmjereno na o"uvanje okolisa. Organizacije opisuju kao birokratski inertne, obiljezene postojecim interesima, borbama oko budzeta i nadmetanjem za napredovanjima: to sve rezultira fokusom naproslost i sadasnjost, umjesto nabuducnost okolisa. O pitanjupoliticke pristranosti, autori navode sljedece: "Sve dok je prijetnja udaljena barem "etiri godine ili se krivnja za nju moze svaliti na vanjske uzroke ili suprotstavljene politi"ke stranke, prednost ce se davati drugim problemima" (ibid.: 1599). Prema Johnsonu i Levinu, tvorci politika i borci za okolis trebali bi premjestiti fokus s preciznih detalja klimatskih promjena na nase reakcije na njih. U ponesto pesimisti"nom tonu, autori zaklju"uju da je "radikalna promjena moguca tek nakon sto ljudi - uslijed dovoljnog broja katastrofa ili dovoljno velikih katastrofa - u dovoljnoj mjeri postanu svjesni opasnosti" (ibid.: 1601). Ovdje je, medutim, (uglavnom) rije" o analizi reakcija na klimatske promjene na razini pojedinaca, sto ne nudi dostatno objasnjenje za jos uvijek nisku razinu djelovanja protiv klimatskih promjena. Na makrorazini, Krugman (2014), primjerice, pise da je tesko djelovati protiv klimatske promjene u politi"ko-ekonomskom kontekstu koji se opire intervenciji vlade ("razmislite o globalnom zatopljenju iz pozicije nekoga tko je odrastajud shvacao Ayn Rand ozbiljno ivjerovao dase uvijek treba voditizavlastitim interesima, te da vlada uvijek predstavlja problem, nikada rjesenje") i neprijateljski je nastrojen prema znanosti.

U ovom odgovoru naglasak je na sljedecim tvrdnjama: promjena Mime problem je drustvene pravednosti; lazne potrebe koje stvara nase potrosa"ko drustvo, kao i iskrivljen kapitalisticki program kojemu je cilj natjerati nas da vise trosimo i vise se nadmecemo, pridonose propadanjuplaneta; pristranosti, postojeci interesi, ideologija i anti-intelektualizam osujec ju djelovanje naplanu Mimatskih promjena. Zeljela bih podrzati Domazetov poziv na projekt odrzivog od-razvoja, u duhu "nepristranog i demokratskog prijelaza na manje ekonomije s manje proizvodnje i potrosnje" o kojem pisu Boillat, Gerber i Funes-Monzote (2012: 600). "Klju" je u smanjivanju protoka energije i materijala te istovremenom zadovoljavanju temeljnih i rastucih ljudskih potreba kao sto su potreba za hranom, zdravstvenom zastitom, obrazovanjem i stanovanjem". Na koncu, vec svjedo"imo "katastrofama u neposrednoj blizini".

Mislav Zitko

Filozofski fakultet, Zagreb

Nova planetarna vulgata: slucaj krize okolisa

Proteklih je godina, a mozda i desetljeca, pitanje netimjerenosti postalo omiljena meta politickih skupina i aktivista civilnog drustva smjestenih na razli"itim dijelovima ljevicarskoliberalnog spektra. Neumjerena eksploatacija prirodnih resursa, neumjereni konzumerizam, neumjereni menadzerski bonusi, neumjerena nejednakost i drugi oblici drustveno nedoli"nog ponasanja "esto izazivaju pomutnju u javnim raspravama, a ipak je dosad relativno malo napora bilo usmjerno na pronalazenje odgovora na pitanje predstavlja li ta neumjerenost devijaciju u djelovanju suvremenog kapitalizma ili njegov sastavni dio. U ovom kratkom odgovoru na Domazetov tekst (u ovom broju) koji si za cilj zadaje postavljanje temelja "za holisti"ko poimanje ekonomskih nada i geofizickih pokreta"a u pozadini tema zelene ekonomije i od-rasta", ostavljam po strani golemo podru"je slaganja kako bih se usredoto"io na one to"ke za koje drzim da su prijeporne ili da ih treba druga"ije artikulirati.

Dakako da ukazivanje na neumjerenost kapitalizma samo po sebi nije lose, no vazno je to "initi na razumljiv i povijesno upucen na"in. Iako problemu granica ekonomskog rasta bez sumnje pridodaje filozofsku dubinu, ideja "civilizacij [e] koju su ljudi proteklih tisucljeca razvijali" (Domazet, u ovom broju) ne pridonosi boljem razumijevanju prirode terena na kojem se odvija borba oko problema okolisa. O kakvom se terenu radi? O spornom terenu, obiljezenom kontinuiranim naporima neoliberalnih sila da vlastiti marketinski program preobraze u zdrav razum i osiguraju implementaciju trzisnih rjesenja ekoloskih problema. To zna"i da situacija ne izgleda povoljno za dobronamjerne ali naivne pokusaje stvaranja politi"ki nedefiniranog globalnog subjekta koji ce djelovati u interesu "ovje"anstva u cjelini.

Za to postoji nekoliko razloga. Na ideoloskoj razini, neoliberali i pobornici marketinskih rjesenja opcenito ne mare za nejednakost. Za njih, nejednakost je, da parafraziram Gordona Gekka,10 dobra. Nejednakost funkcionira. Nejednakost rasvjetljuje, probija i pokazuje smisao evolucijskog duha. Isto opravdanje moglo bi se navesti i za druge oblike ekonomske i politi"ke neumjerenosti, naravno uz izuzetak neumjerenih prora"unskih deficita koje valja smanjiti svim raspolozivim sredstvima. Nadalje, neoliberalni akademici, javni komentatori te think-tank grupacije (tzv. trustovi mozgova; op.prev.) spremno se pozivaju i na znanstveni diskurs i na anti-intelektualizam kako bi opravdali vlastito poricanje klimatskih promjena i negodovali protiv koraka koje valja poduzeti da bi se sprije"ile najrazornije posljedice klimatske krize okolisa. Domazet ispravno isti"e da su ekonomska demokracija, promjene u drustvenoj raspodjeli dohodaka i "kultur[i] koja civilizacij ska postignuca povezuje s potrosackim ponasanjem" (u ovom broju), nuzni sastojci za odrzivi razvoj u dvadeset prvom stoljecu. Medutim, shvaceni kao cjelina ti su elementi nespojivi s kulturom poduzetnistva i institucionalnim okvirom koji se razvija i na globalnoj i na lokalnoj razini. Dovoljno je prisjetiti se da je posljednji deset godina doslovce potraceno na gomilu smijesnih pokusaja realizacije raznih shema trgovanja ugljikom, poput Europskog sustava trgovanja emisijama (EU ETS), koje ne samo da nisu uspjele smanjiti emisiju stakleni"kih plinova, vec su posluzile kao sredstvo subvencioniranja zagadiva"a koji ostvaruju neo"ekivane profite za energetske tvrtke diljem Europske unije (Hoífman 2011). Isti poduzetni"ki misterij nalazimo na europskoj poluperiferiji gdje se zajedni"ka poduzetni"ka djelatnost uzdize na razinu prijeko potrebne drustvene hermeneutike, i to u tolikoj mjeri da se bilo kakva javna specifikacija kapitalisti"kog razvojnog pokreta kao pokreta"ke sile u sadasnjem slomu okolisa smatra riskantnom i nepromisljenom. Kritika kapitalisti"kog razvoja prihvatljiva je u specijaliziranim "asopisima, dok se program djelovanja u stvarnom svijetu, kako se "ini, vrti oko iznalazenja na"ina da se takozvanu poslovnu zajednicu potakne da odustane od sudjelovanja u daljnjem unistavanju naseg ekosustava.

U ovom trenutku nije vazno jesu li su materijalni interesi poslovne zajednice ti koji pokrecu dominantan ideoloski okvir ili obratno. U trenutku kada se "nova vrsta organizacije znanja koja ce omoguciti tuma"enje slozenosti razli"itih omjera pokreta"a sloma" (Domazet, u ovom broju) prevede u skladu s novom planetarnom vulgatom (Bourdieu i Wacquant 2001), poziv na intelektualnu mobilizaciju svest ce se na neobavezni sapat. Novi Vokabular poslodavaca, visokopozicioniranih drzavnih sluzbenika i duznosnika u nevladinim organizacijama, prepun pomodnih rije"i kao sto su fleksibilnost, upravljanje, zaposljivost, fragmentacija, isklju"ivanje, nova ekonomija, zeleni rast, predstavlja, kako isti"u Bourdieu i Wacquant, glavno orude dvaju drustvenih aktera koji igraju istaknutu ulogu u trzisnom "ublazavanju" krize okolisa:

Jedan je stru"njak koji, u sjenovitim hodnicima ministarstava ili sjedista kompanija, ili u izolaciji think-tank grupacija, priprema izrazito tehni"ku dokumentaciju, po mogucnosti zaodjenutu u jezik ekonomije ili matematike, kojoj je cilj opravdati politi"ke izbore temeljene na izrazito ne-tehni"kim razlozima" drugi je carski savjetnik za komunikaciju - prebjeg iz akademskog svijeta koji je stupio u sluzbu dominantnih, a "ija je misijaunijeti dasakakademskog u politi"ke projekte novog drzavnog i poslovnog plemstva. (Bourdieu i Wacquant 2001:5)

Te se grupe bave proizvodnjom znanja, no u pravilu nisu dovoljno znatizeljne da ispitaju na koji na"in "i pojedina"no iskustvo i veliki povijesni narativi tvore vaznu smislenu cjelinu" koja pridonosi boljem razumijevanju "nase zajedni"ke buducnosti" (Domazet, u ovom broju). Ono sto ih zanima jest prikazivanje kapitalizma kao slozenog evolucijskog sustava koji najbolje funkcionira ako ga se ostavi na miru. Nadalje, osobito su dobro osposobljene za navodenje razloga zasto je demokracija opasna ako podrazumijeva prenosenje funkcije donosenjaodlukana«e«fce mase. Stogabitrebalo obratitipozornost nasadrzaj i na"in nakoji sraz trzista i prirode u novoj planetarnoj vulgati isklju"uje demokraciju i kolektivno djelovanje iz rasprave o drustvenim i ekonomskim aspektima krize okolisa.

Ako je, kako sugerira Domazet, nuzno definirati "globalni subjekt (mi)", to mora biti Subjekt (mi) kojem nije dojadilo postovati politi"ku obvezu prema ljevici i koji ne zazire od postavljanja teskih pitanja, poput onih koje u svojoj kritici ljevi"arske melankolije postavlja Wendy Brown (1999):

Kakvu bismo to politi"ku nadu mogli gajiti a da nije pogresno utemeljena na ideji da je "povijest na nasoj strani" ili da je pristajanje javnosti uz bilo koje vrijednosti koje bismo mogli razviti kao vrijednosti nove ljevi"arske vizije neizbjezno? Kakvu vrstu politi"kog i ekonomskog poretka mozemo zamisliti, a da nije ni pod drzavnom upravom ni utopijski, ni represivan ni libertarijanski, ni ekonomski osiromasen ni zaodjenut u kulturno sivilo? (Brown 1999: 27)

Ako zelimo otici korak dalje od pukog ukazivanja na o"itu neumjerenost kapitalisti"ke proizvodnje, tada moramo uzeti u obzir pitanja poput ovih. Pri suo"avanju sa sadasnjim vlastima, identifikacija slabijih ili proturje"nih to"aka neoliberalnog programa trebala bi biti usko povezana s razvojem emancipatorskog protunarativa koji ce ljevici omoguciti da izbjegne zamke koje postavljaju akademska zajednica i neoliberalne think-tank grupacije.

O SVRT NA KOMENTARE

Mladen Domazet

Zahvalan sam Danijeli Dolenec, Vladimiru Cvijanovicu, Tomislavu Tomasevicu, Jeremyju Waltonu, Karin Doolan i Mislavu Zitku na kriti"kim reakcijama na po"etni prijedlog i kontinuiranoj raspravi koja je oduvijek bila u sredistu razmisljanja o odrzivosti kakvo utjelovljuje Grupa 22. Ova rasprava ukorijenjena je u pozadinskoj refleksiji transformativnog djelovanja koje svatko od njih poduzima unutar nase zajednice i vrstan je primjer razvoja promisljanja o odrzivosti kako je tuma"e i iznova osmisljavaju periferna drustva Europe. To je prva stvar koja od diskusije koju ovdje vodimo poradi "itatelja ovog "asopisa, "ini nesto vise od pukih slova rasporedenih u akademsko promisljanje o zivotu, poslozeno oko pretvorbi energije, drustvenih struktura koje ih koriste i upravlja"kih mehanizama koji ih nadziru. Drugo nadtekstualno prisustvo u ovoj raspravi jesu ilustracije razli"itih diskursa, narativa, perspektiva i, sto je najvaznije, zdravorazumskih svjetonazora o tome sto bi refleksivno "ovje"anstvo trebalo nau"iti iz vlastite povijesti i sadasnje situacije. To uklju"uje i stalni podsjetnik na to da treba nastaviti propitkivati njegovo tuma"enje stvarnosti dok ga se istovremeno koristi za modifikaciju te iste stvarnosti. Upravo je potonji aspekt ove rasprave ono "emu se u ovom osvrtu najvise zelim posvetiti.

Iznesene odgovore i komentare ne vidim kao spor u kojem ce "pobijediti" najuporniji, te mogu smjesta i u potpunosti pristati na prosirivanje uvodnog teksta prilozima mojih kolega; vjerujem da tu zelju potvrduju i mnogi uvodni pasusi samih tekstova. Unato" tome, tekstovi iznose i ispravke, dodatke i prijedloge logi"nih strategija koje valja detaljnije ispitati, te zahtijevaju pojasnjenja i nove definicije konceptualnih alata koristenih pri rjesavanju problema. Neki od tekstova kombiniraju vise spomenutih aspekata. Zahtjevi za ponovnim definiranjem konceptualnih alata mozda su najzna"ajniji izazov upucen prijedlozima koje sam iznio u uvodnom "lanku. Oni takoder ilustriraju najvazniju razdjelnicu medu istraziva"ima- vistima, sudionicima programa koji izvodi Grupa 22, a mozda i zelena ljevica opcenito. To je ujedno i najveci intelektualni izazov za filozofe, nenaviknute na to da njihovi intelektualni pothvati nalaze prakti"nu primjenu. Stoga sam, unato" vlastitom pozivu na povijesnu hitnost, i sam u napasti da razmotrim Waltonov poziv na " [intelektualnu] frikciju" kao mogucnost djelovanja i kontinuirane rasprave; ipak, komentari ovdje iznesenih komentara morat ce ostatiu naznakama, kao indikatori buduceg razmisljanja.

No za po"etak, ponovo malo povijesti. Zazivanje (povijesno ili geofizicki) neizbjeznog sloma civilizacije nesumnjivo ima maltuzijanski prizvuk. Povijesni Malthus - "apóstol bogatih" (Shelley) i gresnik "protiv znanosti" (Marx) (usp. Shapin 2014) - obilno je klevetana figura koju obozavaju kao proroka i grde kao kvaritelja veselja razvojnog pokreta. Koji god stav zauzeli prema toj povijesnoj figuri (slobodno birajte medu akademskim komentarima svakiput kad razvojnakrizapostane dovoljno o"ita), Malthusovo naslijede korisna je ilustracija stranputica nase rasprave u prethodnim tekstovima. Neka od znanstvenih upozorenja o potencijalnom slomu civilizacije imaju eksplicitno maltuzijanske temelje: Ehrlich je, primjerice, predvidao maltuzijanski slom sustava prehrane sedamdesetih godina prosloga stoljeca, a debate o tome je li oskudnost pokazatelj kona"nog iscrpljivanja margina ili poticaj za "udo- tvorno ponovno osmisljavanje "ovje"anstva (ili samo kapitalizma, usp. tekstovi Tomasevica, Doolan i Zitka u ovom broju) nastavljaju se i u dvadeset prvom stoljecu (Mayhew 2014). No ovdje je vazan druga"iji pogled na povijesnu ostavstinu Malthusa, onaj koji se ti"e izbora metodologije za analizu razvojnog projekta koji nazivamo civilizacijom.

Opis interakcije "ovjeka i prirode koji nudi sam Malthus primjer je mehanisti"ke znanosti, konstruktivno objasnjenje11 procesa "drastvenog metabolizma" koji se, prema njegovom misljenju, sastoji od elementarnih koncepata hrane, organizama i fundamentalnih zakona kojiupravljaju njihovomvremenskom evolucijom: organizmitrebajuhranukako biprezivjeli, a streme razmnozavanju. Pritom je hrana ograni"eni resurs, a nagon za razmnozavanjem inherentno nezadovoljiv, sto dovodido geometrijske progresije uvelicinipopulacije te (ukonacnici) do oskudice hrane. U ovom nas kontekstu ne zanima je li tako postavljena ontologija to"na ili ne: ono sto nas zanima jest metoda anticipiranja i moguceg racionalnog utjecanja na buducnost. Ovisno o mehanizmu, nase djelovanje usmjereno na buducnost sastoji se od izdvajanja i "prtljanja" po sastavnicama njegova djelovanja ne bi li izmijenili njegova kona"na stanja. Osmisljavajuci strategiju djelovanja konceptualno zapo"injemo s odredenim hipotetskim elementima, elementarnim entitetima uz pomoc kojih konstruiramo mentalne modele slozenih fenomena za koje o"ekujemo da cemo ih promatrati ili izbjegavati. Za moju vlastitu analizu razvojnog projekta u smislu mehanizama pretvorbe energije, drustvenih struktura koje ih koriste i upravlja"kih mehanizama koji ih nadziru (u uvodnom tekstu) moglo bi se reci da slijedi taj pristup. U tom se otkrivam kao nepopravljivi fizicar koji slijedi Einsteinovu tvrdnju da razumjeti proces u kona"nici zna"i pronaci konstruktivnu teoriju12 koja obuhvaca problemati"ni (Einstein 1954).

Komentare Dolenec, Cvijanovica i Tomasevica - medu ostalim njihovim pronicljivim konceptima, teorijama i strategijama kojimapridonose raspravi - razumijem kao dio sli"nog svjetonazora. Oni uzimaju predlozen ili sli"an mehanizam i pitaju na koju se od njegovih komponenata moze naju"inkovitije utjecati da bi se buduce stanje kolapsa "itavog kompleksa modificiralo/izbjeglo. U tom smislu predstavljaju dio kriti"kog misljenja na ljevici, te glasno zagovaranog stava i unutar Grupe 22; ne zamaraju se sitnicama oko toga sto bi narav "ekica i srpa trebala biti, vec sto se, s obzirom na "hitnost zadatka koji je pred nama" (Dolenec, u ovom broju), sa svakim od njih sada moze u"initi. Dolenec izrijekom zagovara davanje "skromni[h] prakti"ni[h] prijedlo[ga]", dok istovremeno naumuimamo zadatak "divovskih razmjera" koji nas "eka. Prepoznajuci inherentnu vezu izmedu kapitalizma i rasta, te rasta i nejednakosti, "iju bi, pak, inherentnu povezanost s neodrzivoscu u postojecem razvojnom modelu i buducem slomu trebalo raskinuti, ona predlaze strategiju od-rasta "iji prvi korak lezi u ponovnoj procjeni onoga sto zapravo mjerimo kao napredak i civilizaciju. To je na"in da s vremenom postignemo promjene u pretvaranju energije potrebne za ublazavanje katastrofalnih klimatskih promjena pomocu sitnih zahvata u drustvene strukture i upravlja"ke mehanizme, i to u one elemente koje svatko moze lako razumjeti: blagostanje i dobrobit.

U jezgrovitom prikazu jedne transformativne (i potencijalno transdisciplinarne) skole ekonomskog misljenja, Vladimir Cvijanovic poziv na od-rast odvodi korak dalje, objasnjavajuci da njegova primjena iziskuje nesto vise od pukog obrtanja rasta stetnog BDP-a pod svaku cijenu. Sli"nosti i paralele s njegovim prepoznavanjem hitnosti usmjeravanja detaljnih objasnjenja djelovanja povijesno stabilnih socio-ekonomskih konstelacija koje nudi pristup régulation na nevolje dvadeset prvog stoljeca, nalazimo u Zitkovom pozivu na imenovanje politi"kih aktera odgovornih za status quo i Waltonovoj tvrdnji da istrazivanje drustvene dinamike mora ubrzati primjenu objasnidbenog modela koji nastaje kao njen rezultat. No Cvijanovic (s kojim se mogu tek skromno sloziti) tvrdi "da se institucionalne inovacije za novu ekonomiju ne bi smjele sastojati od jednostavnih 'popravaka' postojeceg ekonomskog sustava", zahtijevajuci kona"ne zna"ajne promjene u drustvenim strukturama i upravlja"kim mehanizmima koji grani"e s postojecom tehnologijom pretvorbe energije. Prepoznavanje mehanizmakoji djelujupomocuvlastitihkomponenatakrajnjije cilj temeljne reorganizacije.

Kako bi zna"ajne promjene mogle izgledati u praksi odli"no je objasnjeno u Tomasicevom tekstu, koji predstavlja reifikaciju sva tri osnovna elementa civilizacije u modernom gradu te povijesnu ulogu suvremenih gradova u odnosu na kulturu i potrosnju resursa. Tehnicko poimanje u"inkovitosti resursa i ekonomije razmjera ovdje je dobro ilustrirano slozenim fenomenomkojeg stvaraju ljudske populacije, teznje pojedinaca i strukture drustvene reprodukcije. Nisam mogao zamisliti bolju ilustraciju za usvajanje pozicije buduceg sloma i posljedicnog bavljenja mislju o (pretpostavljenim) proslim protu"injeni"nim mogucnostima, koje sam u uvodnom tekstu opisao kao "razmisljanje za dvadeset drugo stoljece". A ipak, bas kao i moj prijedlog, i te bi se ilustracije mogle percipirati kao utemeljene na konstruktivnoj metafizici buduce promjene. U tom bi se smislu metodoloski mogle povezati s poimanjem ekoloske ekonomije i njenom materijalisti"kom ontologijom energetske vrijednosti i "prirode" kao ontoloske osnove vrijednosti koja se definirá kao "uzivanje u zivotu" (Burke& 2006), te Malthusovim esencijalizmom interakcije izmedu "ovje"anstva i prirode kroz deterministicku evoluciju. Ovdje nas ne zanima je ti to to"no ili pogresno; zanima nas glasna kritika koju na ra"un oba stajalista upucuje marksisti"ka analiza struktura kapitalisti"kog pripisivanja vrijednosti, kao temelj za druga"ije reakcije na promisljanje o proslim protu"injeni"nim mogucnostima iz pozicije dvadeset drugog stoljeca.

Ako jos uvijek "itate, stigli ste do trenutka u kojem se ñas povijesni primjer ostvaruje. Malthusova mehanisti"ka evolucija rastuce populacije u situaciju "u kojoj broj ljudi nadmasuje sredstva njihova izdrzavanja" (usp. Shapin 2014) privukla je snazno protivljenje od strane marksisti"kih mislioca ikao znanstveno pogresna i kao pretjerano pesimisti"na po pitanju transformativnog potencijala "ovjeka. Na sli"an na"in, Burke&ova analiza kritizira ekolosku ekonomiju iz marksisti"ke (i stoga u biti radikalno kriti"ne prema kapitalizmu) Perspektive zbog pripisivanja pretjeranog ontoloskog zna"aja kapitalisti"kim obrascima vrednovanja (Burke& 2006). Ono sto je problemati"no iz Perspektive marksisti"ke ljevice13 nisu namjere ekoloske ekonomije, vec sama njena objasnidbena ontologija. Mozda je ono sto trebamo, mogli bi poru"iti s marksisti"ke ljevice, sasvim druga"iji objasnidbeni pristup, koji se ne temelji na postavljanju hipoteza o tome koji mehanizmi leze u pozadini kompleksa prirode i civilizacije, vec na jednostavnim na"elima koja nude generalizacije bez iznimaka o pozeljnim buducim ishodima: umjesto protu"injeni"ne igre u stilu sto-bi-bilo-da-je-bilo, sastavljanje popisa potrebnih uvjeta ili ograni"enja dogadaja na jednostavan i bjelodan na"in objasnjavaju kakav bi svijet morao biti da ne bi doslo do nezeljenih ishoda; umjesto konstruktivne ontologije mogucih na"ina izbjegavanja sloma, objasnidbena generalizacija na"ela ogranicavaju i definiraju zeljeni svijet bez kolapsa i s mogucnoscu odrzavanja civilizacije. To je vatreno "trenje"koje imapotencijala dapotakne stvaranje "glas[a] koji dopire iz [disciplinarne] Perspektive opkora"enja" (Domazet, u ovombroju).

Iako priznajem da se tesko moze reci da je maltuzijanski pesimizam povijesno empirijski opovrgnut, to jest da jos uvijek predstavlja primjenjivu metodu i ontoloski okvir (izuzevsi klasnu i "rasnu" neosjetljivost), uzimam za slobodu da preostala tri odgovora "itam u duhu kritike takve metode objasnjenja i predvidanja. U tom smislu, spomenuti odgovori nude jake argumente, pozivaju se na utjecajne povijesne prete"e te "itatelju nude dobre ilustracije dubine rasprave uzduz politi"kog spektra izmedu zelenih i ljevice. Jeremy Walton upozorava na opasnosti percepcije "klimatskih promjena kao niza 'kulturnih' utjecaja na 'prirodu'", nalik ontoloskom razdvajanju tehnologija pretvorbe energije (koje uklju"uju i koristenje zivih organizama) od drustvenih struktura njihove uporabe. Usprkos tomu, Walton je svjestan opasnosti nemocnog kolebanja izmedu "simplicisti"k[ [ontoloskog] esencijaliz[ma]" i njegovepotpune metodoloske negacije, "karikiran[og] postmodernisti"k[og] relativiz[ma]" (Walton, u ovom broju). Njegov poziv na fokusiranje naseg kriti"kog promisljanja na "propitkivanj [e] neoliberalnog kapitalizma" stoga uzimam kao primjer paradigmatskog metodoloskog zaokreta od entiteta prema principima, "otpor u"incima neoliberalnog kapitalizma" koji je "mnogolik i izmjesten iz sredista" kao okvir za ponovnu globalnu politi"ku orijentaciju u dvadeset prvom stoljecu, umjesto inzistiranja na modifikacijama pojedinih intelektualno postavljenih povijesnih mehanizama.

Na sli"an na"in, poziv Karin Doolan na upotpunjavanje racionalnih analiza prijetnji klimatskih promjena "emocionaln[im] reakcij[ama] na zabrinjavajuce ekoloske probleme" (Doolan, u ovom broju) takoder bi se mogao shvatiti kao poziv na razumijevanje promjena koje trebamo u dvadeset prvom stoljecu kao paradigmatsko omedivanje prostora djelovanja urodenim ljudskim afektivnim reakcijama na "katastrofe u neposrednoj blizini" (ibid.). Doolan trazi da se politi"ko-ekonomski kontekst i kulturno neprijateljstvo prema znanosti prepoznaju ne kao predmet akademskog istrazivanja, vec kao izravne prepreke djelovanju protiv klimatskih promjena i s njima povezanog sloma civilizacije. Znamo koji nam je oblik tranzicije potreban, intelektualna analiza trebala bi nam ponuditi alate potrebne za njegovu realizaciju, a ne uspostaviti istan"aniju razinu opisnih detalja. Najodlu"nije slaganje s analizom problema, ali iz potpuno druga"ije paradigme, nalazimo u tekstu Mislava Zitka koji ostro kritizirapovijesno neupuceno nabrajanje "neumjerenost[i] kapitalizma", zahtijevajuci sasvim druga"iji "teren [...] na kojem se odvija borba oko problema okolisa". Ako zelimo razumjeti promjenu potrebnu dvadeset prvom stoljecu o kojoj govorim u uvodnom tekstu, pise Zitko, tada u njoj moramo vidjeti borbu protiv "neoliberalnih sila",a ne intelektualnu potragu za "politi"ki nedefiniran[im]", ravnodusnim razvojnim mehanizmom. Imenujmo protivnike koje treba svladati ("sadasnj[ vlasti [...]"), navedimo koju "vrstu politi"kog i ekonomskog poretka" zelimo vidjeti u dvadeset drugom stoljecu i po"nimo ga uspostavljati sto je prije moguce. Time Zitkov v ko mentar zaklju"uje pregled diskusije i zabiljezenog diskurzivnog zdanja tekuce rasprave za crveno-zelenu politi"ku ekonomiju pod pritiskom sveobuhvatnog, materijalnog i mjerljivog sloma civilizacije.

Duboko sam zahvalan svim komentatorima i, uz isprike za nenamjerno pogresno uokvirivanje njihovih stajalista u mnozini vrijednih analiza i strategija posvecenih problemu granica rasta u dvadeset prvom stoljecu, zelio bih naglasiti da u znanosti i objasnjavanju opcenito, razlike u objasnidbenim paradigmama nisu ni paralizirajuce ni uzaludne. Kao sto povijesni primjer maltuzijanstva pokazuje, do potpunog kolapsa britanske populacije nije doslo 1825. godine, kao ni do kolapsa svjetske populacije 2000. godine. No maltuzijanska zabrinutost zbog rasta danas podjednako dolazi do izrazaja i u klimatskim prijetnjama i matemati"kim modelima nosivog kapaciteta, dok razvojni projekt uzrokuje brojne mini-slomove i dovodi do toga da se nekima bolno uskracuju oskudni resursi i da se eksternalije krijum"are gdje god je to moguce. Filozofskiprotuodgovorizpozicije objasnidbenogprocesa ontoloskog opkoracenjabitno razlicitihrazinamogao biistaknutidatemeljnajedinicarealisticke ontologije nije trenuta"no stanje hipoteti"ke strukture, vec opca stvar. Stvari, koje prepoznajemo kao invarijantne, neizbrisivi su temelji iskustva, a nase poimanje transformacija koje vode ka odrzivosti moglo bi se temeljiti na onome sto moramo odrzati kako bi mogli objasniti civilizirano, a zivuce, "ovje"anstvo kao zajedni"ki nazivnikrazlicitih politi"kih strategija.

Ukratko, prou"avanje onoga sto razumijemo pod pojmovima napretka, civilizacije, reprodukcije i kapitalizma nije niti akademsko vjezbanje "ljevi"arske melankolije", niti iznosenje politi"ki praznih rije"i upucenih utvrdenim strukturama moci (Zitko, u ovom broju). To je nuzan civilizacijski, kulturni preduvjet za suradni"ko, smisleno djelovanje, partitura koja je podjednako vazna za melodiju kao i napeta struna i "isti rog. To je objasnjenje koje tuma"i pustolovine koje dolaze, brzinom Grifonove opomene Alici da presko"i objasnjenja (koja "strasno dugo traju") i samo opise niz dogadaja (Lewis Carroll, Alica ti Zemlji ctidesa). Na koncu, Grifon je nagao, prezrivibahatlikkoji ne zavrsi dobro. Unato", ovdjeuglavnom nepobijenoj, afektivnoj hitnosti sadasnjeg geofizickog ipovijesnogpolozaja "ovje"anstva, postizanje suglasnosti oko zajedni"kog nazivnika politi"ke borbe kojoj je cilj "promijeniti svijet klimatskih promjena" (Walton, u ovom broju) prvi je koraku odabiru racionalnih i iradonalnih strategijakojima se s njome hvatamo u kostac (obje su nepromjenjiva obiljezja "ovje"anstva, de Sousa 2004). ,itajte, odlu"ite sami, organizirajte se, suradujte, pridruzite nam se.

1 Vise o djelovanju Grupe 22 pogledati na: http://vimw.grapa22.hr/pocetna/about-us/.

2 Mladen Stilinovic. Nobody wants to see ("Tri najbogatija "ovjeka na svijetu posjeduju koliko i 600 milijuna najsiromasnijih"); http://imiverses-in-imiverse.org/eng/bien/istanbul_biennial/2009/tour/antrepo/mladen_stilinovic.

3 Brojni drugi termini predlozeni su kao naziv za novo doba uzrokovano ljudskim djelovanjem, medu ostalima i: era katastrofozoika, homogenocen i myxocen (od gr"ke rije"i za sluz).

4 Podaci dostupni na: http://vimw.happyplanetindex.org/.

5 Podaci dostupni na: http://genuineprogress.net/.

6 Inicijativa za bolji zivot OECD-a: http://vi7Vi7Vi7.oecd.org/statistics/betterlifeinitiativemeasuringVi7ell-beingandprogress.htm.

7 Vidi npr. We need to Change (2012), te nekoliko tekstova u nedavno objavljenom zborniku Sustainability Perspectives from the European Semi-periphery (2014).

8 Odlu"io sam se za pojam "pomicanje" (eng. advance) a ne "napredovanje" (eng. progress), jer je potonji opterecen simboli"kim zna"enjima i povezan s teorijom modemizacije i zapadnja"kim poimanjem napretka kao linearnog deterministi"kog razvoja koji nazadna drustva moraju proci.

9 Prema podacima vazecim u trenutku pisanja, nasa ra"unica glasi ovako: ukupan broj svjetskog stanovnistva (7 170 000 000 ljudi) podijeljen s gustocom naseljenosti Pariza (21 289 stanovnika/km2); povrsina svjetskog grada (336 793 km.2) priblizno je jednaka povrsini Finske (337 030 km2).

10Lik u filmu Olivera Stonea Wall Street iz 1987.

11 Konstruktivnim i principnim objasnjenjima u prirodnim znanostima, popularnoj paradigmi metode, detaljno sam se bavio u Domazet (2012).

12 Nasuprot koje stoji jednostavnija, katkad i revolucionarna principna teorija (metoda) koju cemo predstaviti u nastavku teksta.

13 Isto ne vrijedi i za marksisti"ku kritiku Malthusa, kojega se ismijava kao bezobzirnog reakcionara koji zagovara "ekskluzivne interese postojecih klasa ili njihovih segmenata" (Karl Marx. Theories of Surplus Value 2: 136-137).

WE NEED TO CHANGE Ideas of Growth and Development in a Time of Crisis of Fossil Energy and Capitalism

Mladen Domazet

Group 22, Zagreb

The purpose of this paper is to lay the groundwork, and provoke others to dig it up, for the holistic understanding of the economic hopes and geophysical drivers behind the themes of green economy and degrowth. It first fights for the voice in which to frame the warning of global civilizational collapse, its physical and historic drivers and experiential instantiations. The paper surveys the opinions of scholars from environmental science, biology, history, leftist social theory and economics addressing the notion that the global civilisation as we know it is facing a collapse of human societies and practices sustaining it1. Whilst there are historical narratives that evoke hope for a technological overcoming of this problem, in the text I endeavour to show how such a gamble is based on ontological confusion about the fundamental elements of the modern developmental success. The paper elucidates how the key collapse-mitigating model is not a matter of small life-style changes rehant on technological transcence of physical constraints, but a matter of serious social restructuring that would replace the missing technological fix. But for that to become democratically acceptable, the societies must renegotiate the indicators and definitions of what wellbeing consists in, whlist humanity must rede"ne what its endurance is to consist of, not hope for the miracle of green economy.

Keywords: development, political economy, climate change, nature, civilisation, capitalism

Of late years a determined attempt has been made to rewrite history in economic terms. But this does not go deep enough. Man's thought and social life are built on his economic life; but this, in its turn, rests on biological foundations. Climate and geology between them decide where the raw materials of human industry are to be found, where manufactures can be established; and climate decides where the main springs of human energy shall be released. Changes of climate cause migrations, and migrations bring about not only wars, but the fertilizing intermingling of ideas necessary for rapid advance of civilization.

(Huxley 1953: 61)

[Critical rationalism owes its inspiration] to the entire Enlightenment ambition to create a historically grounded human science which would one day lead to the creation of a universal civilisation capable of making all individuals independent, autonomous, freed from above and below, self-knowing, and dependent solely on each other for survival. [... ] Much of what modern civilization has achieved we obviously owe to many factors, from increased medical knowledge to information technologies to vastly improved methods of transport, which although they are indirect legacy of the Enlightenment, and the revolutions in science and technology which both preceded and followed it, have no immediate or direct connection to its ideals. But our ability even to frame our understanding of the world in terms of something larger than our own small patch of ground, our own culture, family, or religion clearly does.

(Pagden 2013: 315, 350-351)

Introduction

Finding a voice in a text of this kind is a problem not only of academic abstraction but also a diagrammatic illustration ofthe nature obstacles before analysis and strategies addressing global civilizational collapse under transgression of limits to growth. Whilst the exploration and connecting of the topics is often solitary, as there is no established discipline in which to couch most of the discursive word-games and find a community, the analysis of causes and exploration of mitigation and adaptation strategies necessarily concerns a 'we' of'developed' societies or even the entire human population. And then within the grand 'we' there are necessarily divisions into those who debate, those who pollute, those who bene't, those who suffer, those who will suffer, and those who read this etc. Now add a layer of shifting time-scales to all that, from timescales of geological forces to timescales of individual lives against which analyses and strategies are made meaningful.

In explaining the reasons why this might be a special time for the whole human population alive and the cultural edifice it accumulated, the narrative must draw on large scales of geological and biological evolution, development history, but also on the everyday scale of the political and economic struggles within lives of the author and the readers (you and I). If you think that nothing meaningful can be said about 'tea' as a drink I had this morning and the important commodity in pre-industrial trade within the same text, then read no more. For this is a text with exactly that task, to show how both the individual experience and the grand historical narratives weave an important meaningful whole to understand something about our common future (again, mine and yours). This lengthy introduction serves to warn ofthe limitations oflanguage, traditionally disciplinarily partitioned, especially in academia, to address a real and present danger. It relies on an optimistic hope of linguistic adaptability in achieving understandingbetweenhumans, whilst dismissing simplistic hopes of'greening' of economic growth and 'technological fix' of the physical constraints ofthe capitalist growth model. Ifyou are still reading this, then you understand what I have said thus far; and soon...

In that vein the rest of the text will present the warnings of the combined social and natural drivers of the collapse of the production of bene'ts through the medium of civilisation (a common good of humanity as a whole), overview ofthe structures within the development process complementary to civilisation, and unsubstantiated promises of technological leap of the physical constraints and of inconsequential unlimited growth. It is only this vainly ambitious because the trans-disciplinary review convinces me that the extent and 'wickedness' of the problem requires ambitious solution attempts over and above tried and tested instruments of different academic and technological disciplines parcelling individual and collective experiences into manageable reductions. And, without further questioning, I write this from the position that civilisation is worth preserving. From that I try to show (a) that a new organization of knowledge able to interpret the complexity of different scale of collapse drivers is needed, (b) that a global subject ('we') of those interpretations has to be defined, and (c) that the concept of collapse has to be given serious thought as a consequence, a possibility and a future to be avoided at every possible juncture.

Development, Progress, History and Hopes of Fellow Humans

'We live in extraordinary times', is a long lasting saying usually employed to convey concerns regarding social change, big and dramatic events or challenges to everyday existence. But this time it really, really means exactly what it says, despite sounding like crying 'Wolfc' when finally the whole (global) village is no longer listening. First of all, 'We' is humans alive today, all seven billion of us, and this is by far the most humans simultaneously eking a living out of Earth's resources than at any time in history. But, 'we' is, more importantly, a smaller group of citizens of only 47, out of just under 200, countries with very high human development index (HDI) value (UNDP 2013). The lowercase 'we' comprises less than one fifth of humans alive today whose countries account for about a half of annual greenhouse gas pollution and economic activity, whilst commanding most of military and political power (UNDP 2013).

A survey of other inequalities on the planet, between and within individual countries, would present even more startling ratios of wealth, nutrition, protection from weather conditions and the like. Most of these are well known memes repeated through internet and other media, epitomised in artwork2 etc. What is interesting for our purposes is that from a historical perspective, as the command of materials and energy conversions has risen dramatically for the species as a whole, so have inequalities in access and control over them within the human species. Yet, we still see ourselves as part of the same potential, if not practical, community. This is not just an ideological smokescreen, almost all humans alive today do not just share the genetic makeup from a biological perspective, but are a part of the language community in a way Wittgenstein (1967) defined a family of language games we can all play with each other. However much some might feel kinship with their pets, there are communal enterprises each human being can undertake with another willing human being that one cannot with members of other species. But most people do not need to be told this obvious fact anyway; it is apart of majority's notional moral code. It is worth repeating here lest someone concludes from a special historical position that an evolutionary point has been reached where those who have are somehow fundamentally different and alienated from those who have not. They aren't, and they still live on the same planet with the same scarce resources. They just, for some historical and cultural reasons take a much, much larger share of those resources than ever before.

So first and foremost, times are really extraordinary given the number of people on the planet. But as that number has been growing exponentially over the last few centuries, famines, epidemics, wars and geophysical cataclysms notwithstanding, it must have been extraordinary, only a little less so, for at least a 150 years now. Something else must be making it really, really so. That is the second special condition. Paul Crutzen coined the name "Anthropocene"3 for the new geological era that humans have brought about in the life of the planet (cf. Zalasiewicz, Crutzen, and Steffen 2012 for overview). The name "Anthropocene" suggests that we are living in a special time in which our species, our societies and cultures, act with the power of a geophysical force (Archer 2010; Sager 2011). Geophysical forces usually involve physical process through which tectonic plates are shifted; major volcanic eruptions change the concentration of different compounds in air, sea and soil; or a large extra-terrestrial object (an asteroid) strikes the surface of the planet. Well, that should be extraordinary enough, but life overall, and some species or ecosystems in particular, have played a crucial role in shaping of the bio-physical conditions on the planet before; such as increase in the proportion of the highly corrosive oxygen in the atmosphere has been (Catling 2005). We consider these to have been unintended consequences of unreflexive agents though, drawn out over much greater time-spans.

Going back to Wittgensteinian language games, 'we' tend to consider our reflexive species to be at least partially collectively aware of the contemporary potential to perturb the everyday reality. And the most obvious such perturbation is the collapse of a complex interaction between the biophysical environment and humanity that underpins the everyday edifice of civilisation. Though almost every civilisation in recorded history has undergone a collapse at some point, often materially caused by overexploitation of the environment (Diamond 2005; Morris 2011; Montgomery 2012), these were local and regional phenomena in the past. In today's highly interconnected technological society, the threat of civilizational collapse is global - both in terms of consequences and in terms of causes (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2012). The globalized character of contemporary society is itself a historically special situation (Burke III 2009), so that almost no human groups today can consider themselves truly independent from civilisation however much they may protest their unwillingness to be its part. The globally dispersed humanity is interconnected in a web of civilisation where local shake-ups have global consequences (Goldin 2013). However, there is more to our predicament today than the mere domino effect of high economic and cultural interconnectedness. The global 'We' that effectively, if not politically, constitutes the civilisation is overall changing the material conditions on the planet with the power of a geophysical force whilst internally composed of structure characterised by vast inequalities of physical impact and political power.

One of the joys of reflexivity provided by language is the possibility to model and examine the counterfactual (past, future, invisible or abstract) situations and evaluate their desirability from the present experience. Whilst a model is never the perfect replacement for the real experience, it is precisely what should, from the evolutionary perspective, differentiate humans from over-reproducing gas-exhaling bacteria. Such simplifying models aided by mathematical rationalisation and computing power have for a few decades been warning of the consequences of overshoot of civilization's consumption over what the biophysical manifold on the planet can regenerate from the solar input. What is interesting in the more recent modelling (Motesharrei, Rivas and Kalnay 2014) is that a combination ofresource depletion and excessive inequality radically speeds up the total collapse of civilisation compared to letting each of those collapse-drivers act alone. What is more it seems that the socio-technological structure, in which resource depletion is mediated through the poor but bene'ts and is governed by the extraordinarily rich, acts as a veil hiding the warnings of rapid collapse from those best positioned to act on them. Through a toxic mix of excessive resource depletion and excessive inequality we lose our reflexive potential as a species, making us more akin to the oxygenating bacteria of a geologically very distant past. This is why we must cry 'Wolfc' for real this time, and truly accept that we live in really, really extraordinary times.

'Desparate, but not Serious' - An Academic Exposition

In everyday language away from abstract mathematical modelling of humanity-nature interactions we need to talk about material and labour-related bene'ts that contemporary civilisation provides for most of the populations in the developed North and West. That is houses, cars, and computers through which texts like this are exchanged, and the literacy dedicated time to exchange them. The availability of abundant cheap energy derived from fossil fuels has freed modern societies from massive physical labour in the sustenance of civilisation, enabled us to live more productive lives and reduced proportional levels ofphysical violence detrimental to individual wellbeing (Wills 2013). At the same time, it has overwhelmingly contributed to a global irreversible change in climates, ushering a potential collapse of contemporary human civilisations around the globe (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013). Notwithstanding this fundamental energy-culture paradox, 'developed' human societies also remain welded to the idea that their overall wellbeing lies in the ability to increase the global output of goods and services by at least 5c per year, despite clear signs that continuing down this path is destructive (Graeber 2011). So the important question of 21st century development becomes why populations of political units (states, more or less loose federations and the like) must be promised an increase in goods and services year on year for a hope of wellbeing.

The most plausible retort is that as presently not all members, with equal potentials and notionally equal rights have equal access to the bene'ts extracted from resources and energy, and converted into goods and services. The bene'ts are now scarce, and as they increase overall there will supposedly be more for everyone. But social structures distributing those bene'ts are such that they further exacerbate rather than reduce the inequality globally, only exacerbating the feeling of have-nots that more has to be created so that they could share in the spoils. It is important to note that the last sentence, from a global perspective, refers not so much to those without food, shelter and medication, but those without a whole other range of consumables. The debt-driven path of ever expanding production of consumables would in itself be problematic (Graeber 2011), but it is now coupled with the approaching tipping points of irreversible climate change. A more academic response would also point out that the structure of financing production in capitalism through borrowing with interest, whilst at the same time producing goods in constant competition with other producers, of necessity forces the rise in GDP and resource consumption simply to finance the original interest incurring debt. Is it possible to design sufficiently large and therefore sustainable societies not deriving their wellbeing from regular increase of production of goods and services?

Meta-assessments of research in physical and social sciences, such as those issued by the IPCC working groups (http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/index.shtml), warn that beyond 4°C of near-surface warming above the pre-industrial average temperature (which is where the current development model is heading), lie severe irreversible material changes for which we have no adaptation capacity. In other words, without mitigation of causes of global climate change, our civilisation will probably not be able to adapt to the ensuing climatic and biophysical changes. Given the scienti'c and cultural development over the last few millennia, we may say that the way the world works today leads to there being no 'world' in some near future. This is not to say that there will be no humans, but the civilisation that humans have been developing over the past few millennia, and through which we interpret our wellbeing and environment, will wither away with sudden disappearance of its biophysical foundation (crops, resources and weather patterns). Not only is its physical resource base depleting at a scale that is unmatched by innovative resource replacements, but the ecosystems that the human population depends on for nutrient circulation are collapsing as well.

A good illustration of adaptation capacities and collapse outcomes is provided by the seas, the primary habitat on the planet that we only peripherally inhabit (and thus are less aware of), but readily exploit for nutrition and biological resources. Many regions have in the last decades been devoid offish stocks, but swamped by ancient and effective, often stinging and unpalatable jelly'sh. Whilst our own population growth and technological prowess drive us to overextract the fisheries capital, ancient and resilient organisms such as the unpalatable medusa (a stage in life of the jelly'sh) thrive and create eutrophic dead zones eventually inhospitable to human utilisation. There are organisms, like the jelly'sh, that are perfectly capable of thriving in zones where ecosystems that humans have co-evolved with wobble and fall, but there is no room for humans, such as we are today, in those fallen zones.

These organisms, though, can also teach us a lesson through their ability to 'degrow' even individual bodies when their own ecosystem support is scarce (Gershwin 2013). In that manner they sustain self-in*icted growth reductions, but essentially endure unchanged as a species. The jelly'sh illustrate how life in general can prevail through sudden disturbances of slowly evolved ecosystems (as jelly'sh are also alive), but also how inhospitable to human flourishing these impoverished ecosystems can be. Not only do the medusa sting, but jellyfish on the whole drown out other life forms and clog up technological equipment used in seawater. They are highly resilient to human deterrents and most of the time act like another blind geophysical force, they simply dri+ on the currents.

Putting it simply, humanity can pursue business-as-usual hoping for the best whilst researchers in some disciplines know we are heading for a fall, or make a deep-rooted switch to sustainability using our collective knowledge in an attempt to restore and maintain a 'green equilibrium' (Wills 2013) that we depend on for individual wellbeing as much as we do on air or social cooperation (Wilson 2012). A lesson from this biological concept is that stable, vibrant, abundant, diverse and resilient ecosystems result from a wide variety of environmental pressures and biological components: conversion of Sun's energy into biological structures, predators and prey, parasites, geophysical events. None of the 'green equilibria' are permanent. As the pressures affecting relative frequencies of species' populations within an ecosystem change so do the ecological structures and genetic equilibria within it.

But many of the species within an ecosystem that have had the evolutionary time to reach an equilibrium role most often have a high ecological diversity and very high within-species genetic diversity. As a species and a piece of the 'green equilibrium' puzzle they have a stock of fall-back options in times of change. In biological terms, as the physical environment changes its biological species can draw on the said diversities to increase the chance that some member of the ecosystem will survive through the change. Diversity engenders the overall resilience of the system. But human Anthropocene forces have pushed many of the slowly evolved 'green equilibria' suddenly and far out of balance, whilst reducing diversity of the ecosystems we draw resources from. Beyond a certain point, they cannot recover the overall system stability out of their own stock of fall-back options, as they have not evolved to face the speci'c pressures of the very recent Anthropocene.

As researchers, educators and innovators (social or technological) we must be broadly aware of our species' straddling of processes of vastly different scales ordinarily relegated to separate disciplines of discourse: the dynamics of inanimate Earth system, history of life and human evolution, the history of globalised industrial civilisation, and the collective intellectual creativity of humans freed from muscular toil for everyday sustenance (McNeill and McNeill 2003). The task is to find a voice that speaks from this straddling perspective. Once the references are surveyed and texts have been written and read, human beings as a species of 7 billion equivalent individuals no longer have an option of backslide to the 'state of nature' where happy and ignorant bliss prevailed. Historic state of 7 billion of us on limited planet other than a painful collapse, is a civilisation - inevitably plural, dynamic and complex (Pagden 2013). Civilisation then and now involves some form of coordination and subjugation. It is a combination of awareness of physical and social limits of development with technological and political instruments to guide development within those limits. An obvious enough point, but what is the acceptable such form that reduces insecurity and promotes emancipation?

History of Development Components: Shortcomings of the Technological Fix

As literate humans we have been taught to pride ourselves in belonging to a species that not only produced a civilisation, but managed to do so through increasingly efficient use of natural resources thanks to the ingenuity of the technological invention. Such a narrative ignores other necessary components of the civilisation construction which coevolve with technology, and is the basis for the vain hope that the present predicament will also be altered through technological ingenuity - an efficient and clean source of energy.

Most of what produced our current civilisation resulted from the 'developmentalist project': state-building, sedentarization and intensification of the exploitation of available resources (Pomeranz 2009); a manifold on which the bene'ts of civilisation are constructed. It enabled increases in average life expectancy and general physical health, as well as rise in population, although not automatically an even distribution of these benefits. The comprehensive historical narratives suggest that basic ontological categories of the developmentalist project are (1) technological mechanisms of energy conversions, (2) social structures that utilise the said energy and maintain the technological mechanisms, and (3) the governance mechanisms that supervise and maintain the social structure energy utilisation.

These structures describe the time-protracted processes of the developmentalist project enactment, not the actual societies and civilisations embodying the contemporary outcome ofthe project at any given time. But again, this Meccano-style modelling is important here only to indicate that the potential for overall global equlibirum-restoration is not just through the modification in one of the components 1-3, as the present predicament has evolved through contingent changes in each of the components. With rise in population and material well-being, energy available for conversion for human needs was always everywhere eventually capped, resource limits have been reached. Within very recent history, which is the most relevant developmentalist lesson for contemporary societies, gambles on technological change (component 1), and imperatives ofgrowth and centralised state-power (component 1 and 3) have dominated in order to make the unpalatable deep social structural change (component 2) unnecessary even in the nominally socialist societies (Weiner 2009).

Long-term ecosystem stability and human populations were already at odds in dominant civilisations of East and West in early modern period, through shortage of biomass as energy and construction resource, and a depletion of fertility of the soils (Pomeranz 2000). It is often simplistically assumed that the steam engine was a miraculous breakthrough that enabled early modern European (Western) societies to escape this ecological bind of population-energy-food imbalance through intellectual ingenuity. Industrious humans applied Reason to uncover the secrets deliberately concealed in physical processes and that way they extracted more bene'ts from a seemingly depleted physical foundation. However, more elaborate analyses (for example De Vries 1993; Pomeranz 2000; Arrighi et al. 2003) reveal that Western developmentalist project was sustained, and headed for the present perilous predicament, along a decidedly contingent path of territorial expansion and more or less deliberate transformations in social structures and governance mechanisms alongside and even before technological breakthroughs. The East Asian path, eventually outcompeted by or incorporated into the aforementioned Western one, was no less efficient in energy conversion (1) or its rebalancing within the overall population-food constraints. A different combination of society (2), technology (1) and governance (3) was applied in the dominant early modern civilisations of the East, resulting in different resolution of ecosystem-population imbalance until the globalising spread of the fossil fuelled Western form of developmentalism.

Since the Industrial age in the West the developmental paradigm relied on the expansion of the capitalist mode of production, providing most of the material underpinning of what humans today call civilisation. Even 20th century experiments with alternative forms of economic organisation through state socialism, also unwaveringly pursued economic growth and technological intensification of energy conversion as drivers of hope for wellbeing (Weiner 2009). So today there are hopes for a technological fix along the lines of the aforementioned simplistic assumption of the revolution in energy conversion mechanisms ( 1 ) brought about by the technological utilisation of coal as a fossil fuel. But there is no historical evidence of successful state-wide reduction of climate-change-inducing greenhouse gas emissions except in the historical collapse of industrial society in the Russian Federation since 1990s. That was certainly not a technological breakthrough, but a technological regress accompanied by drastic changes in social structures (Hoffman 2011).

Historically also we have witnessed a large rebound effect where the resource efficiency gains have been made ('the energy is now pollution free so we can use that much more of it') and very small next to no reduction of environmental impact per unit of output along the whole energy conversion technology supply chain. A particular technological mechanism may, once it is installed, produce 'clean energy', but may not have been sufficiently clean in coming to that stage to warrant hopes for a technological revolution that on its own removes the climate change constraint. A novel energy conversion mechanism, free from the climatechange constraint, will not necessarily supply energy to the society in the form the current fossil fuels do. The distribution of energy through the social structures in the developmentalist process will change with it, as is the case with existing renewable solar and wind electricity sources which are weather- and geography- dependent and not transportable in the same way that fossil fuels have become.

Finally, supposing that the novel energy conversion mechanism was found, it would have to be distributed through the large and growing human population very quickly in order to have the desired global effect on climate change (Hoffman 2011). It is a challenge to answer whether such a distribution would be possible without significant modifications to the existing governance mechanisms and social structures of energy distribution. Though technologically more developed and politically more interconnected than ever before, can we bring the carbon intensity of the global human population to less than pre-industrial levels, whilst maintaining the population size at 10 times pre-industrial level, with only the change of the dominant technological mechanisms of energy conversion, and within half of a human individual's lifetime (30-40 years)?

[Technologies] developed to resolve one problem often end up creating myriad new, often unanticipated, problems. [... All of the proposed] types of technology-focused "fixes" are highly controversial, risky and bring with them the potential for serious environmental harm. An overemphasis on technology also tends to displace solutions to problems that are simple, yet effective, and reinforces the belief that [other structural changes] are not necessary in order to reduce humanity's impact on the planet. (Tienhaara 2009: 18)

Whilst energy is available in the physical environment of planet Earth, and needs to be converted to useful forms and transported through technological ingenuity, it is futile to hope that a sufficiently widespread and efficient mechanism will be 'discovered' in the time it takes to avoid a collapse. Perseverance of civilisations - plural, dynamic and complex - will require timely and ingenuous adjustments to social structures and governance mechanisms to make up for the shortfall from energy conversion mechanisms employed for their sustainability potential. What exactly might these look like on the ground? Let's start planning from knowing how drastically fossil fuel energy conversions must be limited, a global cap on GHG emissions.

Capitalism as the Evolving Social Structure?

Early modern ecosystem-populations imbalance in the East was addressed by the intensive project not focused on territorial expansion aided by technological transcendence of energy conversion constrictions (Wood 2002; Pomeranz 2000), as in the 'industrious' development of the East (Sugihara 2003). Whilst historians struggle to explain the contingencies that lead to divergence of development paths between East and West since early modern times, for our purposes here it is important to note that "these are not due to the fact that the progressive West discovered capitalism and the modern state and China did not" (Rowe 1990: 262). There are also examples of environmental resources governed through commons that meet the economic needs of the human population without being overexploited, or resulting in disproportional accumulation between the 'commoners'. Whilst these alternatives are not profit-maximising and are often purposefully localised rather than globalised, they combine material bene'ts with environmental sustainability and can thus begin to make sense in 'Western' terms too (Pomeranz 2009). One should expect that technological (1), social (2), but also governance (3) innovation can expand the scale ofpast communing practices. Could reliance on the extensive knowledge of natural and social historical processes help make the formerly localised alternatives bene't the global population?

Capitalism, as a contingent outcome of speci'c historical conditions, rests on the imperative of constant self-expansion rooted in wholesale transformation of the metabolic exchange with the rest of the biosphere and distribution of life's basic necessities within human societies (Wood 2002). Its growth imperative coupled well with the localised transcendence of the bio-physical limits through fossil-fuel innovation in technological mechanisms of energy conversion (Rundgren 2013). In other words, the steam engine and territorial expansion for essential resources reinforced each other. But the dubiously 'winning' formula was provided by the absence of governance (3) "hostility to any individual making himself "abnormally" rich" (Braudel 1982: 589). It is also characterised by regular stagnation and downturns, with associated reductions in environmental impact and increase in human existential misery - although this relationship has not always been linear due at least in part to 'extra-economic' interventions of the kind that societal and governance changes could impose in the current situation too (Wood 2002: 93). Now that the expansion cannot continue in territorial and material sense, a miraculous technological breakthrough in energy conversion is not provided whilst a lot of the collapse-inducing technology is locked in, democratization and strategic degrowth of economies, and changes in income-distribution remain the only avenue open in developmentalist project we base civilisation on.

Apart from the creative-destructive effects of capitalism on social structures, widespread dispossession, intense exploitation, and immoral disregard for human life in the interest of profit, it was the productivity-for-pro't rather than the structural novelty of technological mechanisms that was initially manifested in the irresponsible land use and reduction of biosphere's regenerative capacity (Wood 2002). Productivity-for-pro't rather than widespread widespread bene't distribution set the modern unsustainable train in motion, the imperative of growth cloaked as promise of emancipation. That in itself was a forceful, not simply evolutionary, change of social structures, which had to be imposed from above by those members of the society who benefited most from it (Hobsbawm 1952). Rather than simply occurring once the steam engine and financial capital became available, it had to be actively fought for by members of society who recognised their most immediate interest in it. And those were not simply citizens hungry for more variety in cotton cloth and earthenware, but more nefarious individuals (Rundgren 2013). It is still resisted when forced upon people in non-Western underdeveloped' societies. Even the 'developed' democratic populations aim to resist technologically risky economic growth policies, whilst over a certain threshold increase in wages will not compel those populations to work more (Barry 2012). Globally speaking capitalist growth imperative is a harmful mechanism fed off increasing inequalities hiding behind a promise of increase in education, health, communication and food production for people who need it most.

Far from arguing for the return to pre-modern agrarian social structures, which were themselves also an outcome of developmentalist project and not a benevolent 'state of nature', let's propose that the current threat of collapse can be addressed by purposeful re-or-ganisation of (2) social structures and (3) governance mechanisms. These two components of civilisation should be aimed at maintaining its bene'ts in combination with the multifaceted transformations of the energy conversion technology that are existing, simple and effective (Tienhaara 2009). Whilst it is made meaningful in communities and within political units, this is a change to be enacted globally. This wholesome requirement comes from the global nature of climate change, the global mechanisms that enforce the 'resource depletion + inequalities' collapse of civilisation described above (Motesharrei, Rivas and Kalnay2014) and the fact that developmentalist project globally is tied in a single global capitalist fossil fuel sustained society now (Arrighi et al. 2003).

Perhaps the most important lesson of historical appraisal of capitalism as a contingent outcome of the developmentalist project (Wood 2002; Pomeranz 2000; Sugihara 2003) is that once capitalism's mechanisms for social reproduction and development have been established at one locale it inevitably transforms all others. Its inherent logic of expansion eventually forces other human societies with which it is in interaction to resort to exploitation of humans and environment, which is another strong argument for why we must understand the current crisis as global in character. Apart from that, it also suggests that the transformation of social structure and governance mechanisms should be more substantive than the softening of the pro't ethic through 'social market' or 'market socialism' (Wood 2002: 195). The growth imperative spreads faster even than ideologies employed in its justification, and the hope for a 'green growth' brings much false hope and excuses for inaction in the crunch of extraordinary times (Hoffman 2011).

What Kind of Transformation is Needed to Avoid the Collapse?

While there is no universal and widely accessible energy source or technological efficiency breakthrough available to maintain current population and pro't growth within climate and ecosystem equilibrium limits (Li 2008; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2103), there is already a host of smaller scale technological mechanisms fit for a more sustainable energy extraction. While not implying a return to the pre-modern age, these strategies involve transformations in so- cial structure, governance mechanisms and a thorough re-evaluation of components that make up our understanding of human wellbeing. Democratization of economic practices, changes insocial distribution of incomes as tokens of access to energy conversions, and a culture decoupling civilizational attainment from consumption behaviour are the transformative directions for the developmentalism of the 21st century.

Standing at the end of a long line of analyses of what is unsustainable about our present existence and wherefrom these characteristics historically arose, this text and its role in the journal cannot be but a rallying call to intellectual mobilisation concerning the projected and as yet untrodden future. Historical analyses coupled with abstract modelling of interaction of basic ontological categories in society-ecosystems-resources nexus allow for projections in which collapse could be indefinitely avoided and human population brought into stable equilibrium with the rest of the global ecosystem if the per capita rate of resource extraction for energy conversion remains at the naturally renewable level, and if the bene'ts of this extraction are distributed in a reasonably equitable fashion (Motesharrei, Rivas and Kalnay 2014). On the other hand they also suggest that over-extraction and rise in inequalities most likely lead to a relatively swi+ collapse (Meadows, Meadows and Randers 1972; Motesharrei, Rivas, and Kalnay 2014), which is initially invisible to the top echelons shielded by their wealth until the ecosystem collapse brings about a visible collapse of the primary producers (Motesharrei, Rivas, and Kalnay 2014). By which point it is too late to change the course.

Whilst a collapse of the current global civilisation would stop the developmentalist project in its tracks, along with its ecologically detrimental but also humanly emancipatory outcome, humans' intellectual straddling of processes of vastly different scales allows us to design a sustainable degrowth project (Kallis 2011). The developmentalist project has hitherto not operated in the state of equilibrium, but there is nothing in principle preventing it from attainting that state, just as new species eventually reach a novel state of green equilibrium' with resilient ecosystems. This is a historic turn in the developmentalist path, a political project of transformation of global governance mechanism and a re-evaluating of individual wellbeing. It is a vision of a civilised society with leaner and stable overall energy conversion output, where wellbeing is structured through equality, interpersonal relations and simplicity. As weavers of narratives academics and researchers must bring to human understanding the processes unfolding on non-human scales, and this time round try to do it in emancipatory fashion in order to degrow but not destroy the civilizational accomplishments (technological and social) to date.

There are three important points to take home from this. Firstly it is important to train oneself to adopt a perspective where one can accept the possibility of the flow of history being dramatically upset (a collapse). The second is to realise that the path to this state has been a matter of contingent historical choices, however minute individuals' impact on them has been or is today. And finally, it is important to realise that material constraints of climate change and resource depletion, and social constraints of inequality inherent in the ideal of unlimited economic growth are "two sides of the same coin" (Beck 2010: 257). If we were to put ourselves seriously into the standpoint of a future collapse as if it were already experienced, knowing the contingencies of history and a necessary interaction of technological and social components of developmentalism's contribution to civilisation-building, we could consciously entertain the past counterfactual possibilities with an affective urgency. "If we had done this and that, the catastrophe we are in now would not have occurredc" (Zizek 2008: 461). From such a vision comes the real strength to break the bonds of individual insignificance: get up and act today for the collapse not to occur. Welcome to the thinking for the 22nd centuryc

Comments

Danijela Dolenec

Group 22, Zagreb

Attacking a Wicked Problem: Advancing Alternative Conceptions of Wellbeing En Route to Sustainable Degrowth

When Rittel and Webber first defined a "wicked problem" (1973), they did not have in mind our current struggle to find socially sustainable responses to global environmental challenges. They were developing a general argument about the limits of policy responses to important social issues and they wanted to draw attention to the fact that the classical science paradigm which lies at the foundation of modern conceptions of development is not applicable to societal problems. While problems in the natural sciences are "definable and separable and may have solutions that are findable", key social challenges of today are none of these things. Probably the crucial distinction among them is in that social problems do not have solutions; at best they get re-solved again and again given that they rely on outcomes of political struggles (ibid.).

This concept of a wicked problem was recently applied to climate change (Levin et al. 2012), ascribing it with four key features: time is running out; those who cause the problem also seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to address them is weak or non-existent, and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into the future. These features lead to the latest version of the good old tragedy of the commons: governments fail to respond even though it is well recognized that actions must take place soon to avoid catastrophic future impacts. The latest IPCC reports (2014) clearly state that without rapid and serious mitigation efforts human societies will not be able to adapt to the ensuing climatic and biophysical challenges.

Characterising climate change as a wicked problem is one of the entry points Domazet uses to focus our attention on the urgency of the task at hand, given that we agree with him that human civilisation as it stands today is worth preserving. I too start from that assumption, even though I acknowledge that, paradoxically, while we consider reflexivity as our distinctive feature in relation to Earth's other species, our impact on the planet has become akin to geophysical forces such as the shifting of tectonic plates or volcanic eruptions (Archer 2010). Since our physical impact on the planet has reached a point where we cannot continue our territorial and material expansion, we should abandon the naive hope in a technological fix. Instead we should recognise that the wickedness of this problem requires going far beyond technocratic tinkering parcellised into traditional academic disciplines and towards embracing a deeply ambitious political project of making a deep-rooted switch to sustainability (Wills 2013).

In other words, it requires recognising that the switch to sustainability is a profoundly social challenge, involving primarily changes to social practices, institutions and governance mechanisms by applying principles of democratisation, egalitarian redistribution and de- growth. Our task as "weavers of narratives" (cf. Domazet) is therefore absurdly ambitious - it consists of nothing short of re-imagining the developmentalist project so that it aligns human wellbeing with practices that ensure our material sustainability on the planet. Faced with such a Gargantuan task, the only way forward I can see is in dancing the double-step of big thinking while making small practical proposals. Levin et al. (2012) propose that we design policies which will "constrain our future collective selves", by which they mean intervening into our social and political practices in ways which are sticky in that they will become entrenched, expanding support over time. How do we start?

The elephant in the room which connects our physical impact on the planet with social constraints of inequality is capitalism, which is inextricably wedded to the principle of infinite economic growth (Wood 2002). Given that the growth imperative is a structural feature of capitalism in all its varieties (Harvey 2007), there is basically no way of reconciling the capitalist mode of production with a genuine switch to sustainable degrowth (Kallis 2011). Therefore, what lies ahead is a series of deep changes in our basic institutons governing land, labour and money, towards an economic system that will no longer be identi'able as capitalism (ibid.). However, given the current constellation ofpower, winning popular support for a transition of that magnitude is unlikely to say the least. Instead, we look for cracks in the system where we can insert policy proposals with potentially transformative effects. One such policy proposal is in decoupling concepts of wellbeing from consumption behaviour, primarily through replacing GDP as a measure of progress with alternative indicators of welfare.

Over time we have accepted GDP as a measure of welfare, though it was never designed to measure more than pure market economic activity (Kubiszewski et al. 2013). Not only that, GDP interprets every expense as positive and fails to distinguish welfare-enhancing from welfare-reducing activities (Talberth et al. 2007), so that an oil spill increases GDP because of associated costs of cleanup, while growing vegetables and cooking home meals does not get included in a country's GDP. In addition to that, GDP says nothing about within-society distribution of income, though this is one of the primary determinants of individual wellbeing (Wilkinson and Picke& 2009).

Ever since the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (2009) report, momentum has been growing around the design of alternative indicators of wellbeing and progress which would better integrate economic with environmental and social dimensions (Costanza et al. 2004). In recent years we have witnessed the development of a host of alternative measures that aim to capture aspects of human wellbeing, security and quality of life, such as the Happy Planet Index,4 5 the Genuine Progress Indicator5 or OECD's Better Life Initiative.6 Closer to home, Group 22 has published analyses7 which shed light on Croatia's development trajectory and future perspectives by using UN's Human Development Index, the Ecological Footprint index, as well as a host of indicators capturing levels of income inequality (GINI, risk-of poverty, material deprivation etc.). We have shown that societies on the European semi-periphery are poorer, which should according to theoretical expectations (Franzen and Mayer 2010) predispose them to be less likely to act towards environmental prerequisites for a sustainability switch (Domazet, Dolenec and An"ic 2012). However, despite a lower commitment to individual material sacri'ce, concerns on behalf of the environment and global empathy in these societies is higher than might be infered from their level of development, as measured by GDP. It is worth also adding that these are societies with a significantly lower environmental impact, globally and often even locally; societies which carry a comparatively lower historical imperative to initiate the global sustainability switch.

A crucial obstacle to wider action is in fact inequality, given that the bene'ts of economic growth and development over the last 20 years have not been equitably distributed. Decreasing inequality therefore becomes a priority, since this is a precondition for developing social relations of trust and cooperation. We cannot expect collective action when material conditions of life and resulting life chances are so disparate as to separate citizens into different socio-material realities (Sandel 2012). Without a basic sense of shared humanity we cannot engage in a democratic debate on the features of a just and sustainable society (Wright 2011).

Though the introduction of alternative measures ofwellbeing does not take us as far as we need to go, hopefully it represents a step in the right direction by carrying transformative potential. Fraser (2000, 2003) distinguishes between affirmative and transformative strategies with respect to how they relate to underlying social structures and outcomes they generate. Affirmative strategies aim to correct inequitable outcomes without disturbing the underlying social structures while transformative strategies aim directly at the underlying generative framework, which clearly makes them more desirable. However, they are at the same time more difficult to execute since they are highly vulnerable to collective action problems. Given these characteristics, Fraser (2003) suggests that practical policy proposals should fit somewhere along the continuum of these two identi'ed poles.

Taking this on board, if our aim is to transform our economic and social practices to the extent that they are no longer recongisable under the label of capitalism', perhaps the conceptualisation of alternative measures of wellbeing is one such strategy. It surely represents a reorientation from income and GDP measurements towards concepts ofwelfare and wellbeing, which is one of the descriptions that Kallis (2011) uses to explain the concept of sustainable degrowth. A succesfull decoupling ofwellbeing from a fixation on economic growth may be an important contribution to making degrowth a viable political strategy. As many authors have argued, it is important to realise that sustainable degrowth is not equivalent to negative GDP growth. That phenomenon already has a name, recession, and we have unfortunately grown to know it very well during the last years, together with its palle&e of negative social outcomes such as unemployment, economic insecurity and social upheaval. In contrast, sustainable degrowth rests on the idea that we can downshi+ the economy through institutional changes, by collectively managing a prosperous way down' (Odum and Odum 2001) through a political process of choosing to have, for instance, fewer airplanes and cars but better social services, more public space and greater personal autonomy.

Vladimir Cvijanovic

Group 22, Zagreb

Institutional Innovations for a New Economy

Understanding the confines of the prevailing socio-economic system, let alone institutional innovations that redress its main shortcomings, requires a system perspective that is not shared by all schools of economic thought. Furthermore, as definitions of "new economy" may differ we will use this phrase to denote an economy that maximizes societal wellbeing and not only that of certain societal groups. One of the possible approaches, renowned for its institutional and structural perspective as well as by its historicity, is offered by the French Regulation Theory that we will employ in this paper.

For Boyer, the Régulation approach presents itself as a research programme of gathering together historical studies, international comparisons and macro-economic tests with the goal of identifying some typical configurations of modes of development and their crises. When these crisis tendencies are mitigated, 'régulation' is said to occur. (James 2009: 185)

While a thorough description of The Régulation approach (RA) is beyond the scope of this paper here is only a brief outline. It conducts analysis on three different levels: 1. mode of production - such as feudalism or capitalism, 2. regime of accumulation - a socio-economic order that is in place between two structural crises and that spurs accumulation; and 3. institutional or structural forms (monetary regime, wage-labour nexus, forms of competition, forms of insertion into the international regime, forms of the state) (Boyer and Saillard 2002). Based on these foundations the researchers mostly studied Fordism, a period of some thirty years after the Second World War, but also post-Fordism, the current phase which succeeded the former. In the countries of the west Fordism was characterised by intensive accumulation (Brand and Wissen 2011), stable international monetary system and little exposure to international competition, stable work relationships and welfare states. Post Fordism has been marked by an extensive accumulation (ibid.), a demise of the stable Bretton Woods international monetary system, financialisation (as an increase in significance ofthe financial sector), technological changes as well as the diminution of the welfare state.

A gap between the Régulation approach and ecological considerations have partially been addressed by Lipietz (see Whiteside 1996) and more explicitly by Raza (1999), who calls for an introduction of the sixth structural form "nature-society relationship". In absence of the fully developed concept that would bridge this gap we can borrow the concept called socio-ecological regime which links socio-economic with biophysical characteristics of a societal system as well as the usage of energy and materials (Sieferle et al. 2006 as in Spash and Schandl 2009: 50) allowing us to observe an immense increase of energy and material use per capita and per area as well as CO2 emissions per capita between the historical agrarian regime and the one that followed with the onset of the industrial revolution - the industrial regime (Krausmann et al. 2008 as in Spash and Schandl 2009: 53). The energy and material use has been in direct correlation with the economic growth, measured by the increase in gross domestic product (GDP). Hence although it is theoretically possible to imagine economic growth without overutilisation of natural resources historical evidence does not seem to support this.

Indeed, the connection between economic growth and overutilisation of natural resources cannot be broken up as easily, as Brand and Wissen (2011: 25) remind us (own translation):

[T]he fossile production and consumption patterns... are anchored deeply in societal power relations, common sense and everyday practices of the peoples of the global North and increasingly also of the global South, just as they are anchored in overall orientation on economic growth and competitiveness.

When we add to it a problem of inequality that Domazet writes about in this Volume but also of persistently high (youth) unemployment rates that have been present in some western countries since the onset of the so called Great Recession from 2007/8 onwards, then we can easily come to the conclusion that the prevailing economic system has failed. However there are no value-free and ready made institutional innovations that would amend the system, but only options one may chose. Although not explicitly encompassing ecological system in its theoretical apparatus the Régulation approach's emphasis on historically stable socio-economic constellations lead us to the conclusion that many variations in socio-economic systems are possible. As Jessop (2013: 13) asserts:

Whether or not the search for solutions to economic crisis restores the prevailing accumulation regime and its mode of regulation does not depend solely on the objective features of the crisis and the feasibility of resolving it within this framework. It also depends on the institutional, organisational and learning capacities of the social forces seeking to resolve the crisis and on the outcome of the contest to define the nature of the crisis, to explain its various objective causes, to attribute blame for its development, and to identify the most appropriate solutions.

Stockhammer (2013) finds that financialisation, shrinking of the welfare state as well as globalisation are the main causes behind falling wage share in the past quarter of a century, all of which contributed to rising inequalities. Indeed, the current socio-economic crisis itself is caused by financialisation and an intensifying inequality (Stockhammer 2012). Hence, Stockhammer (2012: 64) concludes one should:

advocate definancialization. This would imply a shrinking of the financial sector, a stronger voice of stakeholders, such as labour unions, at the expense of shareholders in corporate governance; it would also aim at replacing the logic of pro't (or shareholder value) maximization in many social areas by a democratically determined policy priorities and principles of solidarity.

While that is uncontroversial in terms of progressive economic policy that is democratic and socio-economically viable the following part of his conclusion is written from the perspective of economic growth and will therefore not find wide support among environmentally conscious social scientists (Stockhammer 2012: 64):"[H]igher wage growth is one condition for re-establishing a viable growth regime. Wages have to increase at least with productivity growth". Indeed, such reformist policy solution seeks to resolve stability in the economy by ensuring unabated economic growth through more just distribution of income in the economy (progressive taxation is an obvious choice here). But if we cannot manage to ensure decoupling of economic growth from overutilisation of Earth's resources and energy use then this policy alone cannot be a viable alternative in itself.

A radical solution is represented by the concept as well as the policy initiative of (sustainable) degrowth that is intended to reduce society's overall use of material and energy, since it is believed that this cannot happen with increasing GDP. However, this is not the same as striving for negative GDP growth rates (Kallis 2011: 874). Pursuing sustainable degrowth means finding institutional innovations on many different issues.

[O]ne proposal is to introduce global caps on key resources such as oil and CO2 emissions that are shared equitably between nations on a per capita basis ("cap and share ," Douthwaite 2011), and are declining over time. In addition, degrowth proponents put forward three more propositions in order to respond to the negative effects of economic contraction on employment and social stability: namely, work-sharing, strengthened social-security system, and alternative economic spaces existing outside the market economy (Latouche 2009). (... ) Furthermore, the link between well-being and access to wage labor in the formal economy can be weakened by improved access to non-monetized goods and services. There are various social innovations in this domain, including urban food gardens for own consumption, time-banks where participants exchange services on the basis of their labor time, and co-housing projects where participants co-invest "sweat-equity" in house rehabilitation (Oarlsson 2008; NEF 2009). (van den Bergh and Kallis 2012: 912-913)

On the basis of the framework laid out above we may conclude that institutional innovations for a new economy should not be simple fixes of the current economic system, since they should change its very foundations. Rather then advocating a speci'c set of institutional innovations we have presented some policy options that should be further elaborated elsewhere, bearing in mind the socio-economic and ecological foundations of our societies.

Tomislav Tomasevic

Group22, Zagreb

Sustainable Cities: We in Cities That Need to Change

For the first time in human history there are more people living in complex, dense, predominantly non-agricultural, human-built environments called cities than in rural areas. This milestone in the history of our species was reached in 2008 (UNFPA 2007). This is another piece of evidence to claims in Domazet's article about unprecedented impact of humans on planet Earth that lead some scientists to call this "geological" era "Anthropocene". Perhaps we are witnessing a new geological subdivision of Anthropocene era because Burde& and Rode (2010) announced that the "Urban age" has began, with three quarters of the world population expected to live in cities by 2050. This is the pinnacle of the increasing global urbanization process that started two centuries ago and is inextricably linked with processes of industrialisation, modernisation and development of capitalism. It is more and more clear that in order to address the global sustainability challenge of the current civilisation that Domazet addressed in the introductory article, sustainability or non-sustainability of cities as a dominant form of human habitation has to be addressed.

Before exploring whether cities are more a part of the problem or a part of the solution for global sustainability of the existing civilisation, the first question already tabled is whether this civilisation is worth saving or even what essential component could it most readily be reduced to? Is it the current global economic system that reproduces social and environmental injustice around the world? Is it the often imperialistic Western culture and science? Is it the international polity or community of national states unable to govern global and long-term threats to humanity and millions of other species? Encyclopaedia of Human Geography defines "civilisation" as "a process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development in which people leave a state of savagery and progress through a hierarchy from low cultures to high culture" (Warf 2006: 323). It goes on by saying how this idea is both criti- cised as a linear evolutionary process that justi'es domination of one group of people over the other but also as a negative process that distances people from nature, thus making the "lower cultures" ideal civilisations. This paper follows the position that global civilisation as the global society should indeed be sustained not because it is the best possible world which is worth saving per se, but because the opting for the unsustainable path of material consumption might eventually lead to the global society regressing to a less desirable state. On the other hand transforming social structures to overcome both material limitations and reproduction of social inequalities might allow global society to advance8 towards universal human emancipation. This paper takes the position that the civilisation did advance despite all of its imperfections and that it could both regress or advance further. It also argues against regressing to "traditional", "primitive" societies or "lower cultures" as a path towards greater environmental sustainability. The latter is welcomed by those who believe that the pre-modern societies lived in harmony with nature, named "ecological noble savage" myth in the literature (Redford 1990). Etymologically, "civilisation" is closely related to "city" while Bagby defines "civilisation" as a "culture in which we can find cities" (1959: 162). These conceptual assumptions have to be resolved before answering whether cities are a problem or a solution for the environmental, social and economic sustainability of the global civilisation.

When one considers the environmental aspect of the urban sustainability challenge the environmentalist movement was from the outset sceptical of industrialisation and its by-product urbanisation, so there is an ongoing debate whether cities are a problem or a solution for the global environmental sustainability. At one side of the debate are the more modernist approaches like "smart cities" (Seisdedos 2012), which see cities as a solution for environmental sustainability and these are mostly based on eco-efficiency paradigm according to which high density of urban form allows for a more efficient transport, industrial production and other urban systems assisted by sophisticated technology and social intelligent design. Of course it is not the same when one talks of, for example, typical American city or a typical European city - an urban sprawl or a compact city. It is true that cities can significantly reduce human habitat footprint, illustrated in abstraction by imagining a single world city. Were we to put the current total world population into a single city that would have the population density of Paris, the surface ofthat city would be similar to the surface of Finland.9 Unfortunately, habitat footprint of cities alone does not equal their overall ecological footprint, as materials and energy that are consumed by the cities require a much bigger land surface area than the area on which they are built. The assumption of eco-efficient cities does not only mean that cities are improving global sustainability, but that large cities can leverage more efficiency per capita so that they could contribute to the global sustainability more than smaller cities.

However, a recent study (Oliveira et al. 2014) has shown how large cities, despite economy of scale which increases efficiency, have proportionally bigger carbon footprints than small cities. How is it possible that larger cities despite of improved efficiency in transport and other systems still produce more CO2 emissions per capita than smaller cities? They are simply more productive, eventually in the material sense, meaning that their citizens have bigger incomes per capita and consume more. This shows that addressing only the efficiency of cities without addressing the sufficiency or material and energy consumption by cities will eventually be insufficient in terms of achieving urban sustainability. Cities are pursuing economic growth at all costs which is necessarily generating consumption growth so without some de-growth or anti-growth restructuring, efficiency and technological innovations will not be enough for achieving urban environmental sustainability.

At the other side ofthe debate are the more post-modernist environmentalist approaches to cities which see them as a problem for environmental sustainability because they inherently lead to consumerism, alienation from nature and social atomism. Instead of cities these environmentalists advocate ecovillages where only the "real" human material needs would be met with low technology through subsistence farming and cra+s while sense of community would be re-invented (Kasper 2008). This approach is also shared by the movement of Transition Towns led by Rob Hopkins (2008) who established the first ecovillage in Ireland. The Transition Towns is movement aiming, mostly in small towns, to reduce carbon footprint, fossil fuel use and vulnerability to global financial flows through localisation of economy and building of community. These smaller and more traditional physical forms of human settlements would be without bene'ts of economy of scale and without sophisticated division of labour, hence less efficient, but would be more (self-)su) by satisfying only the basic material human needs. There is however a question ofwhether the world of soon to be 9 billion people can afford such de-industrialisation, de-modernisation and de-coordination if it wants to meet even the most basic needs of all these people.

The ecovillages and ecotowns approach is following a speci'c environmentalist work called is beautiful" (Schumacher 1993), but sometimes small is not technologically optimal. For example, in the domain of: of energy conversion, which Domazet stresses as the key compoenent of developmentalist project in the introductory article, the case of energy efficiency of biomass power plants shows that bigger power plants can turn signi'cantly higher percentage ofthe thermal energy from biomass into electricity than the smaller powerplants (Austin 2008). If"we need to change" as Domazet claims then this paper argues that "we need to transform cities" by using a combination of these approaches i.e. by tackling both urban eco-efficiency and eco-sufficiency. Cities could be apart ofthe solution for global environmental sustainability, but only if the social structures and governance mechanisms of cities are changed to stop the growth of meaningless consumption, and simultaneously increase the efficiency resource use. The concept of commons might fill-in this gap as it could at the same time addresses the issue of sufficiency and the issue of efficiency by bringing the social organisation of eco-villages into urban physical form on a large scale. For example urban community gardens are more efficient in use of natural resources, as the community uses a single piece of land, rather than individuals in their private allotments; collective production and consumption builds social capital and sense of community; there is a fair access to the food produced,not only within one particular urban community but through trade and redistribution with other community gardens within one city.

The social aspect of the urbanisation is linked to debate on modernisation process which through technological and scienti'c advancements transforms rural, traditional society into urban, modern society. One part of the environmentalist and other social movements considers modernisation as a negative process because the traditionalist rural culture of community and cooperation is transformed into a modernist culture of individualism and competition. The other part considers modernisation as a positive social processes which will dismantle traditional communities and social relations based on kinship, as they were usually linked with oppressive social forms like patriarchy. It was already stressed in this paper that regression to traditional pre-modern society as archetypes of ecological sustainability will will not be argued for, for such regression could mean more oppression and less identity freedoms. How then can we reconcile individual freedoms and identities on the one hand and collective care and sense of community on the other? Iris Marion Young's (1990) answer to this lies again in a city, in an urban social life. Young finds city as a perfect model in which diversity meets community, where parochialism is disabled and where different identities can coexist by maintaining the social capital, solidarity and tolerance. Small communities are creating social moral pressure for an individual to fit-in, while large cities give on one hand anonymity as precondition for individual freedom while in the same time direct experience of belonging to a large community or communities.

The economic aspect of urbanisation and urban sustainability is inextricably linked to the development of capitalism. Domazet argues that a technological fix will not solve the environmental sustainability problem, but a "spatial fix" or global urbanisation did however solve the problem of sustainability of the capitalist form of developmentalist project (Harvey 2001). Its global urbanisation on one side creates spatial inequalities at the global level and economic, and therefore social and political, inequalities within cities (Smith 2010). Neoliberal urbanisation in advanced capitalism both produces social inequalities and consumes ever-growing quantities of space/resources in order to sustain the capitalist system. This makes the neoliberal urbanisation one of the main contributors to the combination referred to by Domazet that leads to a total collapse of the civilisation. Changing how cities are reproduced is therefore linked with changing urban economic systems i.e. social structures of production, distribution and consumption. If the free-market economy creates perverse distribution outcomes the question remains how then to ensure the efficient use of natural resources. The state mechanisms of economic governance have historically been proven as too slow and inefficient so commons governance and economic democratisation might be the right way. In order to ensure efficient governance of resources, social innovations should be followed by the technological innovations and here the same study (Oliveira et al. 2014) shows that large cities create more technological innovations measured as patents per capita compared to smaller cities, possibly because ofhigh dynamics and exchange oflarge number of people and their ideas. Empirical data of Elinor Ostrom (1990) showed many examples of successful community governance of natural and other resources but these communities have never been bigger than several thousands of people. If a sustainable city will be a "common city", this would mean tens of thousands of commons-based governance systems making a highly complex overall governance structure so that these systems are able to mutually coordinate and negotiate. However, it seems that the climate crisis is on the way and systems theory indicates that complex adaptive systems can adapt to their changing environment in order to sustain themseleves.

Jeremy F. Walton

Georg August University of Göttingen

Toward a Critique of the Political Economy of Climate Change beyond the Nature/Culture Binary: An Anthropologist's Meditation

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it. (Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1998: 571)

You want to save the elephants in Kenya's parks by having them graze separately from cows? Excellent, but how are you going to get an opinion from the Masai who have been cut off from the cows, and from the cows deprived of elephants who clear the brush for them, and also from the elephants deprived of the Masai and the cows? (Bruno Latour 2004: 170)

From a certain vantage, anthropology might appear to be a peculiar disciplinary platform from which to launch a critique of the global political economy of climate change. According to the familiar taxonomy of the social sciences, anthropology is typically cast as obdurately particularistic, concerned with idiographic description rather than nomothetic explanation (cf. Wallerstein et. al. 1996). My contention in this brief essay, however, is that anthropology has a crucial, indeed central role to play in interpreting the dilemmas of climate change and forging strategies by which to alleviate its depredations. Anthropology's potential contribution to addressing the challenge of climate change stems from the conceptual underpinnings of the discipline: more so than any other human science, anthropology has grappled fiercely and continuously with the problematic relationship between "nature" and "culture." In recent decades, anthropologists have rejected the earlier, essentialist distinction between "nature" and "culture" in favor of a more nuanced, practice-based holism, which views "nature" and "culture" as mutual concepts that necessarily mediate and condition each other. This revisionist perspective surely holds key lessons for the debate over climate change. Rather than viewing climate change as a series of "cultural" effects on "nature"-a perspective that problematically severs human action from "nature" itself1I argue for a new narrative of climate change, one that locates the political economy of neoliberal capitalism as its central object of critique. In doing so, I take up Mladen Domazet's clarion call to "bring to human understanding the processes unfolding on non-human scales... in emancipatory fashion in order to degrowbut not destroy the civilizational accomplishments to date" (2014: 14).

Early 20th century anthropology, especially as practiced and propagated by Columbia University professor Franz Boas and his students in North America, staked its disciplinary legitimacy on the threshold between the domains of nature and culture (Boas 1989). For Boas and his disciples, culture, the locus of uniquely human traits and behavior, began precisely where nature ended1as the historian of anthropology George Stocking (1982) has demonstrated, Boas' incipient "cultural" anthropology was decisive in overcoming the evolutionary and racialist biases of 19th century anthropology. After Boas, biological anthropology-rooted in the study of human beings as natural organisms and still preoccupied with evolutionary concerns1and cultural anthropology1focused on human beings as, first and foremost, social and cultural actors1fundamentally parted ways. American anthropology throughout the mid-20th century remained rooted in the culture concept, as exempli'ed by the oeuvre of Clifford Geertz ( 1977); across the Atlantic, British ethnographers inspired by functionalist Durkheimian sociology drew an equally rigid distinction between nature and social structure (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1965).

Within anthropology, the rigid dualisms of nature/culture and nature/society only began to erode with the advent of structuralism and the Copernican Revolution in anthropological thought spurred by the work of Claude Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss famously inaugurated a critique of the distinction between scienti'c reason and other modes of human reasoning: "The scientist never carries on a dialogue with nature pure and simple but rather with a particular relationship between nature and culture definable in terms of his particular period and civilization and the material means at his disposal" (1966: 19). From the vantage of structuralism (and perforce post-structuralism), nature is no longer the absolute Other of culture; rather, the dichotomy of nature and culture is itself part of a broader, holistic process of meaning-making. From here, it is but a short distance to the arguments of Bruno Latour (1993), whose model of science and technology studies (STS) abandons not only the distinction between culture and nature, but those between humans and non-humans and subjects and objects as well.

A word of caution is in order here, as we have wandered onto potentially thin conceptual and political ice. I have adduced this brief, partial history of anthropological speculation on the nature/culture dichotomy in order to expose some of the treacherous pitfalls in theorizing climate change. In particular, two pitfalls, a Scylla and a Charybdis, threaten our analysis and our political ambition: on the one hand, an anachronistic, unrepentant essentialism that reifies both nature and culture, thereby establishing the unique privilege of scienti'c reason, and, on the other, a caricatured postmodern relativism that indiscriminately destabilizes the bases of all knowledge, scienti'c or otherwise, and thereby renders political action impossible. The first pitfall1simplistic essentialism1has deleterious consequences beyond the double reification of nature and culture. Most importantly in this context, the nature/culture binary polices the firewall between the "natural" and "social" sciences and renders the arguments of the each set of disciplines mute and impotent to the other. As Domazet cogently argues, such academic parochialism is detrimental to recognition "of our species' straddling of processes ofvastly different scales ordinarily relegated to separate disciplines of discourse" (2014: 7). Only by overcoming the rigid separation between "natural" and "social" sciences can we hope "to find a voice that speaks from this straddling perspective" (ibid.). Such a "straddling perspective" is also crucial to avoiding the second pitfall, that of nihilistic relativism. The integrative, "straddling perspective" that Domazet advocates necessarily takes us beyond Latour s deconstruction of scienti'c knowledge, which has frequently been accused of aiding and abetting climate change skeptics and other politically reactionary actors (Sokal 1996; see also Demeri& 2006). In the remainder of this essay, I hope to contribute to just this sort of "straddling perspective" and the struggle against epistemological nihilism in relation to climate change by destabilizing the nature/culture binary with a third term (which, I should note, Domazet also interrogates): neoliberal capitalism.

Capitalism demands our critical scrutiny precisely because, as a political economy, it is blithely indifferent to the nature/culture dichotomy. As Marx and Engels' famous metaphor established long ago, within the regime of capitalist commodification "all that is solid melts into air" (1948: 16)1whether the solidities in question here are "natural" or "cultural" is inconsequential. Arturo Escobar, an anthropologist of political ecology, has reiterated the urgency of this fundamental Marxian point more recently: "No longer is nature defined and treated as an external, exploitable domain. Through a new process of capitalization" previously uncapitalized' aspects of society and nature become internal to capital" (1995: 199). In a curious sense, capitalism succeeds pragmatically where social science has failed theo- retically: It resolves the nature/culture binary by voraciously absorbing and commodifying "nature" and "culture" both.

What are the political consequences of erecting a critique of climate change on an interrogation of neoliberal capitalism, rather than on the nature/culture split? Most immediately, this focus on capitalism recenters environmentalism and green activism as commitments to social justice, rather than "merely natural" engagements (cf. Butler 1997). In other words, the critique of climate change is as much about human subjects and the inegalitarian relationships that maintain among them as it is about the "natural" world. And the reverse is also true: social justice is not merely a matter of human inequalities. In the era of neoliberal capital, the commitment to social justice necessarily spans the problematic divide between natural and cultural, human and non-human worlds.

Even as we forward this reappraisal of the relationship between capitalism and climate change, however, we must also take care not to substitute one reification for another. Capitalism, especially in its neoliberal iteration, is no more of an essence than "nature" or "culture". Consequently, resistance to the effects of neoliberal capitalism1climatic or otherwise1 must necessarily be decentered and multiform as well. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001) remind us, the global "multitude" of the 21st century is not the proletariat of the 19th century. Of course, this is not to deny the urgent need for a global political reorientation, based firmly on "thinking for the 22nd century," in the struggle against climate change, as Domazet (this volume) so passionately argues. It is simply to acknowledge that this process of resistance and reorientation will not, and cannot, be identical in all of its speci'c contexts. Nor is this cause for pessimism. As the anthropologist and environmentalist Anna Tsing (2005) has persuasively argued, "friction" among contexts and levels of political activism is inevitable in the age of dense, multidimensional interconnection that we dub globalization. Rather than despair over this ineradicable friction, the global movement to combat climate change must recognize and draw strength from it.

Byway of a conclusion, I want to return brie*y to the two quotations with which I framed this essay, from Marx and Latour, respectively. Together, they function as coordinating signposts for my argument and aspiration. Following Marx1the paradigmatic activist intellectual-we must emphasize that scholarly speculation divorced from political action is little more than a cart without a horse. To interpret the world of climate change without changing it is to perpetuate the social and ecological injustices of this world. From Latour, on the other hand, we learn a cautionary lesson. Even as we struggle to link our interpretation of climate change to pragmatic political action, we must remain attentive to the frictions that ourpolitical project will inevitably provoke and involve. All vested commitments are not compatible; one cannot render the interests of the elephants, the cows, and the Masai entirely commensurate. The struggle against climate change can only achieve global traction by acknowledging and addressing these myriad frictions. And it is at this juncture that anthropology, with its continued focus on the particularities of contexts, can seize its role in combating climate change. While climate scientists and political economists are key to mapping the contours and predicting the consequences of climate change on a global level, anthropologists are ideally located to trace and rectify the frictions that the political project of reversing climate change will necessarily entail.

In this brief meditation, I have endeavored to make a small contribution to this project of overcoming friction by exploring the anthropological legacy of the nature/culture binary and its relationship to the climate change debate. Taking inspiration from Domazet s essay, I have argued that rejection of the essentialist nature/culture binary and a concomitant fo- cus on issues of neoliberal capitalism and social justice is imperative to the advancement of the political struggle against climate change. My hope is that these interpretations provoked some friction in their own right1friction is, after all, a source of heat and energy, and a spur to action. And the prospect of this action1to change the world of climate change1is what unites our various interventions in this forum, and, hopefully, in fora yet to come.

Karin Doolan

Group 22, Zagreb

Climate Change, Social Injustice and the Pathology of Life in Post-industrial Capitalism

The tone of Domazet s (this volume) piece is appropriately one of urgency. "We live in extraordinary times", he writes, marked by capitalism's insatiable and detrimental urge for growth, related global environmental change and deepening social inequalities. He draws on expert sources warning us that hoping for a technological breakthrough that will solve the climate predicament is naïve, and instead urges us to embrace a sustainable degrowth project. My aim in this response to Domazet (this volume) is three-fold: to take a slightly closer look at an existing theme in his essay, the social injustice aspects of climate change, and to add to his piece by, on the one hand, furthering his critique of capitalism from the perspective of literature on the affective consequences of life in a consumer society and, on the other, by touching upon personal biases that favour the status quo in terms of environmental action. By doing so I wish to contribute to what I see as his critical project of evaluating "the established way of organizing society" against "other possible ways, ways which are held to offerbetter chances for alleviating man's struggle for existence" (Marcuse 1991 [1964]: 42) (though it would be appropriate to exchange Marcuse's phrase "man's struggle for existence" with "the planet's struggle for existence" in the climate change context).

Barker, Scrieciu and Taylor (2008), characterise climate change as "inherently inequitable and therefore unjust", because it targets "systematically and mercilessly the vulnerable, the poor and the extremely poor" (2008: 318). The social justice dimension of climate change is discussed in the literature as a supra-national and national, inter- and intra-generational issue. Preston et al. (2014) conclude in a recent study that theoretical literature on climate justice has tended to focus on the unequal distribution of responsibility for carbon emissions between nations, i.e. North/South or post-industrial/developing. Although the authors acknowledge the importance of drawing attention to this supra-national dimension of climate justice, they also spell out its national dimension: disadvantaged groups contribute least to causing climate change yet are likely to be most negatively impacted by it; they pay, as a proportion of their income, the most towards the implementation of certain policy responses yet bene't least from them; and they are less able to participate in decision-making around policy responses. According to Preston et al. (2014), disadvantaged groups include older people, people on low incomes and, overlapping with the low income group, tenants. Drawing on the example of floods, the authors point out that recovering after a flood can be more difficult for people in poverty due to insufficient insurance or no insurance, the cost of temporary housing, transport costs related to relocation and lower access to credit. They call for national policy related to climate change to take more account of social inequalities, expressing concern over the consequences of, for example, a risk-based market approach to flood insurance (insurance premiums proportionate to the individual household's level of risk) as opposed to an approach grounded in solidarity (those of lower risk support those at higher risk). Recent severe flooding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia (May 2014) brings the importance of such thinking close to home.

An important, related issue is the interrelationship between economic growth, the environment and social justice. As Muraca (2012) points out, there is a split between those who see economic growth as a condition for distributive justice and defend its impact on the environment and those who see it as a threat to justice and the environment. For the former, economic growth increases the total amount of goods to be distributed which enhances overall standard of living, fosters social mobility, and boosts government revenues for social services thus improving the social welfare system. According to this argument, continuous growth is necessary for employment and spurs investment into technologies for coping with environmental problems. Domazet (this volume) labels this as "the imperative of growth cloaked as promise of emancipation" and refers to capitalism's growth imperative as a "harmful mechanism which feeds off increasing inequalities".

Muraca's (2012) degrowth critique against pro-growth claims is persuasive: the "trickle-down effect" does not hold - without redistribution growth leads to an increasing gap between rich and poor, and there is a tight correlation between GDP growth and the destruction of the natural environment, including the increasing need for new resources leading to geopolitical forms of domination, such as production of biomass for the Global North or neo-colonialist water pollution and land grabs. Muraca (2012) goes on to question the growth imperative not only from the perspective of distributive justice and the environment but also in relation to our affective selves. As she points out, there is a negative correlation between GDP per capita and subjectively perceived happiness.

The affective dimensions of life in capitalism have been addressed by many authors. What they have in common is a diagnosis of late capitalism and consumer culture as detrimental to wellbeing. We are harming the planet with consumption that harms us above and beyond Martinez-Alier's social justice argument that excessive consumption by the rich and middle-class people is "not only a menace for other species and for future generations of humans... it deprives poor people a fair share of resources and environmental space now" (2012: 62). Fromm (1956) uses the concept of "alienation" to describe the social character of Western "modern personality", people estranged from themselves who acquire just to have, satis'ed with useless possession. Salecl writes about late capitalist ideology as increasing people's anxiety with its insistence on self-making and self-ful'lment, concluding that "it looks as if free consumers end up consuming themselves" (2008: 2340). And according to Ilouz, consumption is based "almost exclusively on the ideology of personal well-being and self-satisfaction"the market encourages consumer choices based on the cultivation of a hyper-individualist identity" (2009: 386). In other words, a sense of self-worth in capitalism is cultivated on individualistic terms rather than through notions of solidarity, empathy and recognition of interdependence that for Preston et al. "sit at the heart of cosmopolitan notions of climate justice" (2014: 21).

Domazet (this volume) seems to hope for a rational response to climate change: he urges us to "make a deep-rooted switch to sustainability using our collective knowledge" and maintains that a "reliance on the extensive knowledge of natural and social historical processes can help make the formerly localised alternatives bene't the global population". Salecl, however, focuses on emotional responses to alarming ecological problems: "we are behaving as if nothing really has to change" (2012: 2280). Writing from a social psychology perspective, authors such as Johnson and Levin warn us that we are shaped by various biases which work against rational responses to climate change. Sensory biases direct us to avoiding reactions related to threats outside our direct realm of experience: "The machinery of the brain does not fully react to something until we detect it in the flesh" (Johnson and Levin 2009: 1595). Psychological biases include positive illusion (overconfidence about vulnerability to risk), cognitive dissonance (conflicting information made to fit preferred beliefs), fundamental attribution error (attributing one's own behaviour to situational constraints), prospect theory ("gambling on doing nothing in the hope that things will not be as bad as all that") and in-group/out-group bias (blaming the causes and consequences of climate change on others) (ibid.: 1598). As the authors note, all of these biases lead people to downplay the danger of environmental change and their contribution to it. Apart from these individual-level biases, Johnson and Levin (2009) also identify organizational and political biases as thwarting environmental action. They describe organisations as bureaucratically inert, marked by vested interests, turf wars over budgets and competition for promotions which all lead to a focus on the past and present rather than the environment s future. In terms of political bias, the authors write: "As long as the threat is at least four years away, or can be blamed on extraneous causes or opposing political parties, other concerns are likely to take precedence" (ibid.: 1599). For Johnson and Levin, policy makers and environmentalists should look beyond the facts and figures of climate change and take note of our responses to these, somewhat pessimistically concluding that "radical change may only come after people are woken up to the danger by enough - or big enough - disasters close to home" (ibid.: 1601). This is, however, (mostly) looking at responses to climate change at the level of individuals, which is an insufficient explanation for why we are not witnessing more action against climate change. On a more macro level, Krugman (2014), for example, writes that it is difficult to act against climate change in a political-economic context which is against government intervention ("think about global warming from the point of view of someone who grew up taking Ayn Rand seriously, believing that the untrammelled pursuit of self-interest is always good and that the government is always the problem, never the solution"), and which is hostile to science.

This response emphasises the following points: climate change is an issue of social justice; the false needs created by our consumer society, as well as capitalism's twisted agenda for us to consume more and compete more contribute to the planet s deterioration; and biases, vested interests, ideology and anti-intellectualism work against action on climate change. I would like to second Domazet s (this volume) call for a sustainable degrowth project along the lines of Boillat, Gerber and Funes-Monzote (2012: 600): "an equitable and democratic transition to a smaller economy with less production and consumption. It is about reducing the energy and material flows while still fulfilling basic and growing human needs such as food, health, education and housing". We are, after all, already witnessing "disasters close to home".

Mislav Zitko

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zagreb

New Planetary Vulgate: The Case of Environmental Crisis

In recent years or perhaps decades the theme of excessiveness has become a hobbyhorse for political groups and civil society activists situated on different parts of the left-liberal spectrum. Excessive exploitation of natural resources, excessive consumerism, excessive managers' bonuses, excessive inequality and other forms of socially indecent behaviour have often caused uproar in public debates, and yet there has been relatively little effort to investigate whether this excessiveness represents an aberration in the workings of contemporary capitalism or its constitutive feature. In this short response to Domazet's (this volume) paper that seeks to set the groundwork for "the holistic understanding of the economic hopes and geophysical drivers behind the themes of green economy and de-growth", I will focus only on points I find somewhat contestable or in need of a different articulation, leaving aside a vast area of common agreement.

There is, of course, nothing wrong in pointing out the excessiveness of capitalism, although it is important to do it in a comprehensible and a historically informed manner. The notion of "civilisation that humans have been developing for millennia" (Domazet, this volume), although it undoubtedly provides philosophical depth to the issue of limits to economic growth, doesn't do much to clarify the nature of the terrain on which the struggle over environmental issues is taking place. What kind of terrain is it? It is a contested terrain, marked by the continuous effort of the neoliberal forces to transform their market agenda into common sense and secure the implementation ofmarket solutions to the environmental problems. That means that the odds are stacked against well-intended but naïve attempts to construct a politically undefined global subject that will act in interest of humanity as a whole.

There are several reasons why this is so. On the ideological level, neoliberals and supporters of the market solutions in general do not care about inequality. For them, inequality is, to paraphrase Gordon Gekko,10 good. Inequality works. Inequality clari'es, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. The same justification could be given for the other forms of economic and political excessiveness, excluding, of course, excessive government deficits which must be reduced by any means necessary. Furthermore, neoliberal academics, public commentators and think-tanks are not afraid to simultaneously rely on scienti'c discourse and anti-intellectualism to support denialism about climate change and generate noise about the steps that need to be taken in order to avert the most devastating effects of environmental crisis. Domazet rightly points out that economic democracy, changes in social distribution of incomes, and "a culture coupling civilizational attainment with consumption behaviour" (this volume) are the necessary ingredients of sustainable development for the 21st century. However, these elements taken together are more or less irreconcilable with the entrepreneurial culture and the institutional setting developing both on the global and local level. It is enough to recall that the last ten years were literally wasted on the count of ludicrous attempts to implement various carbon trading schemes, such as the EU ETS, that failed to reduce GHG emissions and have in fact acted as a subsidy vehicle for the polluters generating windfall profits for the power companies across the EU (Hoffman 2011). The same entrepreneurial mystique can be observed in the European semi-periphery where common entrepreneurial activity is being elevated to the status of indispensable social hermeneutics, so much so that any public specification of capitalist developmentalism as the driving force of the present environmental collapse is considered to be risky and ill-advised. The critique of capitalist developmentalism is acceptable in specialized journals, while the agenda in the real world appears to revolve around finding a way to incentivize the so-called business community not to participate in further destruction of our eco-system.

It is not important, at this point, whether business community's material interests are driving the dominant ideological framework or vice versa. By the time "new organization of knowledge able to interpret the complexity of different scale of collapse drivers" (Domazet, this volume) is translated to fit the new planetary vulgate (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001), rallying call to intellectual mobilisation becomes no more than a careless whisper. This new vocabulary of employers, high-ranking civil servants, NGO-oflicials filled with buzzwords such as flexibility, governance, employability, fragmentation, exclusion, new economy, green growth is the main tool as Bourdieu and Wacquant point out, of the two social actors which play a prominent role in market "mitigation" of the environmental crisis:

One is the expert who, in the shadowy corridors of ministries or company headquarters, or in isolation of think-tanks, prepares highly technical documents, preferably couched in economic or mathematical language, used to justify policy choices made on decidedly non-technical grounds... the other is communication consultant to the prince - a defector from the academic world entered in the service of the dominant, whose mission is to give an academic veneer to the political projects of the new state and business nobility. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001: 5)

These groups are in the business of knowledge production, but are generally not curious enough to examine how "both the individual experience and the grand historical narratives weave an important meaningful whole" which can help us to "understand something about our common future" (Domazet, this volume). They are, however, interested in depicting capitalism as a complex evolutionary system which works best if le+ alone. Moreover, they are particularly well trained in giving reasons why democracy is dangerous if it implies giving decision making capabilities to the ignorant masses. Thus, one should pay attention to the content and manner in which the collision of market and nature in the new planetary vulgate proscribes democracy and collective action in dealing with social and economic aspects of the environmental crisis.

If "a global subject (we) has to be defined" as Domazet suggests, it will have to be a "we" which has not grown tired ofhonouring the political commitments of the left, nor is afraid to ask the difficult questions, such as those Wendy Brown (1999) posed in her critique of the le+ melancholy:

What political hope can we nurture that does not falsely ground itself in the notion that "history is on our side" or that there is some inevitability ofpopular attachment to whatever values we might develop as those of a new le+ vision? What kind of political and economic order can we imagine that is neither state-run nor utopian, neither repressive nor libertarian, neither economically impoverished nor culturally gray? (Brown 1999: 27)

It is questions like these that have to be taken on board if one wants to do more than simply address the apparent excessiveness of the capitalist production. In confronting the powers that be, the identification of weak or contradictory points in the neoliberal agenda should go hand in hand with the development of emancipatory counter-narrative which will allow the le+ to circumvent the pitfalls generated by the academic community and the neoliberal think-tanks.

Reply to comments

Mladen Domazet

I am grateful to Danijela Dolenec, Vladimir Cvijanovic, Tomislav Tomasevic, Jeremy Walton, Karin Doolan and Mislav Zitko for their critical responses to the opening proposition and for a continuing debate that has always been at the heart of sustainability thinking as embodied within Group 22. The debate is rooted in background reflexion of the transformative work each of them undertakes in our community, and is exemplary of the evolving sustainability thinking as interpreted and reinvented in the peripheral societies of Europe. That is the first thing that makes the discussion performed here for the sake of this journal's addressees more than just letters arranged into academic reflection of life; constituted as it might be of energy conversions, social structures utilising them and governance mechanisms supervising them. The other supra-textual spectre of this discussion is the illustration it provides of the different discourses, narratives, perspectives and, most importantly, wholesome worldviews as to what reflexive humanity ought to learn from its history and present position. This includes a permanent reminder to keep questioning its interpretation of reality at the same time as utilising it to modify that reality. It is this latter spectre of the discussion recorded here that I feel most drawn to reflect on in response.

I do not see the responses and comments above as disputes to be settled by the last woman/man standing, and could outright agree with expanding the opening piece with their additions; which I take many of these texts' opening paragraphs themselves attest. They do, nonetheless, present corrections, additions, calls for clarifications, proposals of consequential strategies to be further examined or calls for redefinition of the conceptual tools applied to the problem. Some combine several of those aspects. Calls for the redefinition of conceptual tools comprise perhaps the most substantial challenge to the proposals contained in my original article and illustrate the most important divide between the researchers-activists within the programme enacted in Group 22, and perhaps the green le+ in general. It is also the greatest intellectual challenge to a philosopher, one unaccustomed to find application of his/her intellectual endeavour. Despite calling for historical urgency, I am therefore tempted to heed Walton's invocation to '[intellectual] friction' as prospect for action and continued debate, but the comments on comments offered here will have to remain sketchy, indications of thinking yet to come.

But first for some history, again. Invocation of (historically or geophysically) imminent collapse of civilisation undoubtedly has a Malthusian ring to it. The historical Malthus is a much maligned figure revered as a prophet and berated as a developmental spoil-sport, 'the apostle of the rich' (Shelley) and the sinner 'against science' (Marx) (cf. Shapin 2014). Whichever view you want to take on a historical figure (and take your pick of academic commentary every time a development crisis becomes apparent enough), Malthus' legacy is a useful illustration of the vagaries of our discussion in the preceding pieces. Some of the scienti'c warnings of potential civilizational collapse have an explicit Malthusian underpinning, for example Ehrlich was predicting a Malthusian sustenance collapse in 1970s, and the debates over whether scarcity is an indication of the final exhaustion of margins or a spur to miraculous reinvention of humanity (or just capitalism, cf. Tomasevic, Doolan and Zitko's contributions, this volume) continue into 21st century (Mayhew 2014). But a different perspective on the historical legacy of Malthus is important here, one of choice of methodology for analysis of the developmentalist project we call civilisation.

Malthus' own description of the humanity-nature interaction is an example of a mechanistic science, a constructive explanation11 of the processes of social metabolism', which in his view consists of elemental concepts of food, organisms and the fundamental laws governing their temporal evolution, organisms need food to survive and strive to reproduce. In his view food is a limited resource and the reproduction drive is inherently insatiable leading to a geometric progression in the size of the population and eventual scarcity of food. Whether the ontology thus posited is correct or not is not of interest here, but the method for anticipation and possible rational influence on the future is. Given the mechanism, our actions concerning the future consist of unfolding the reel of mechanism's operation and tinkering with its components to alter its final states. When strategizing an action we conceptually begin with the certain hypothetical elements, the elementary entities in terms of which to construct mental models of the complex phenomena we expect to observe or avoid. My own analysis of the developmentalist project in terms of mechanisms of energy conversions, social structures that utilise them and the governance mechanisms that supervise them (in the opening piece) could be taken as following that approach. In that I am revealed as an incorrigible physicist following Einstein's dictum that understanding a process ultimately means finding a constructive theory12 that covers the process in question (Einstein 1954).

I understand Dolenec, Cvijanovic and Tomaseveic' comments, among other insightful concepts, theories and strategies they bring to the table, to be working with a similar world-view. They take the proposed or a similar mechanism and ask which of its components can be most effectively impacted on to modify/avoid the complex's future collapse state. In that they are an example of a part of critical thought on the left, and vociferous within Group 22 research and thinking, not quibbling with what the nature of a hammer or a sickle ought to be, but what can be done with each of them now, given "the urgency of the task at hand" (Dolenec, this volume). Dolenec explicitly advocates "making small practical proposals" whilst keeping an eye on the "Gargantuan task" ahead. In recognising capitalism's inherent connection to growth and its inherent connection to inequality, whose own inherent connection to unsustainability of the current development model and eventual collapse should be decoupled, she proposes a degrowth strategy whose first step is are-evaluation of what we actually measure as progress and civilisation. It is a way to achieve eventual energy conversion changes required to alleviate catastrophic climate change through tinkering with social structure and governance mechanisms in terms most readily understandable to everyone: wellbeing and welfare.

Vladimir Cvijanovic, in a succinct presentation of one transformative (and potentially trans-disciplinary) school of economic thinking, takes the call for degrowth one step further, explaining how its implementation requires more than simply reversing the harmful GDP growth at any cost. There are echoes and parallels of his recognition of urgency to orientate the Régulation Approache's detailed explanation of workings of the historically stable socioeconomic constellations on the woes of 21st century in Zitko's calls to name the political orchestrators of the status quo and Walton's requirements of the study of social dynamics to speed up the resultant explanatory model's application. Yet, and I can only humbly agree, Cvijanovic states that "institutional innovations for a new economy should not be simple fixes of the current economic system", requiring an eventual substantive change in social structures and governance mechanisms adjacent to current energy conversion technology. Recognition of mechanism, operating on its components, but an aim for a fundamental overhaul in the end.

What might the substantive changes be like on the ground is well elaborated in Tomasevic' piece presenting a reification of all three of civilisation's essential elements in the modern city and the historic role of contemporary cities with regards culture and resource consumption. Technical notions of resource efficiency and economies of scale are here well illustrated in the complex phenomenon arising out human populations, individuals' aspirations and structures of social reproduction. I could not have foreseen a better instantiation of the adoption of the standpoint of a future collapse and subsequent entertaining of the (supposedly) past counterfactual possibilities, which I characterised the "thinking for the 22nd century" by in the opening piece. And yet, like my own proposition, these could all be seen as resting on constructive metaphysics of future change. In that they could methodologically be likened to the view of ecological economics, with its energy-value materialist ontology and 'nature' as the ontological basis of value defined as 'enjoyment of life' (Burke& 2006); and Malthus' essentialism of humanity-nature interaction through deterministic evolution. How right or wrong this might be is not the issue here. What is interesting is the vociferous critique they both attract from the Marxist analysis of the structures of capitalist ascription of value, as a ground for a different response to entertaining the past counterfactual possibilities from the standpoint of 22nd century.

If you are still reading, this is where our historical example comes to fruition. Malthus' mechanistic evolution of increasing population into a situation 'when the number of men surpass their means of subsistence' (cf. Shapin 2014) drew staunch opposition from the Marxist thinkers as both scienti'cally wrong and unduly pessimistic of the human transformative potential. Likewise, ecological economics, in Burke&' analysis, is criticised from a Marxist (thus essentially radically critical of capitalism) perspective for giving undue ontological weight to capitalist forms of valuation (Burke& 2006). It is not the intentions of ecological economics, but its very explanatory ontology that is problematic from the perspective of Marxist left.13 Perhaps what we need, they might say, is a whole other explanatory approach, one based not on hypothesising what the mechanism behind nature-civilisation complex is, but on simple principles which provide unexceptionable generalizations of the desirable future outcomes. Not a game of counterfactual what-might-have-been, but a listing of the necessary conditions or constraints on events that describe simply and self-evidently what the world must be like for the unwanted outcomes not to take place. Not the constructive ontology of how collapse could be avoided, but an explanatory generalisation of the principles that constrain and define the desired, non-collapse and civilisation-sustaining world. This is a fiery 'friction' that has the potential to give rise to the "voice that speaks from [a disciplinarily] straddling perspective" (cf. Domazet, above).

Whilst acknowledging that a Malthusian pessimism has hardly been historically positively falsi'ed, i.e. that it still provides a viable method and ontological framework today (barring class and 'racial' insensitivities), I take the liberty to read the remaining three responses in the line of criticism of such an explanatory and predictive method. In that they make a strong point, connect to a powerful historical precedent and provide a good illustration for the read-13 er of the depth of the debate along the green-le+ political spectrum. Jeremy Walton warns of the dangers of "viewing climate change as a series of cultural' effects on 'nature'", redolent of the ontological separation of energy conversion technologies (which includes utilisation of living organisms) and social structures for its utilisation. He is nonetheless aware of the dangers of impotent yo-yoing between "simplistic [ontological] essentialism" and its utter methodological negation, "a caricatured postmodern relativism" (Walton, this volume). I therefore take his call for focusing our critical scrutiny on "an interrogation of neoliberal capitalism" as an example of a paradigm methodological shi+ from entities to principles, a "decentred and multiform (...) resistance to the effects of neoliberal capitalism" as a framework for global political reorientation in the 21st century, instead of seeking the modifications to some intellectually posited historical mechanism.

Likewise, Karin Doolan's invitation to complement the rational analysis of the climate change threat with "emotional responses to alarming ecological problems" (Doolan, this volume) could also be taken as an invitation to understand the change required in 21st century as paradigmatic demarcation of the space of action by the innately human affective responses to the "disasters close to home" (ibid.). Doolan calls for a recognition of the political-economic context and cultural hostility to science not as an object of academic research, but a direct obstacle to action against climate change, and its attendant civilizational collapse. We know the kind of transition we require, the intellectual analysis should give us the tools to achieve it, not furnish a finer level of descriptive detail. The most vociferous agreement with the analysis of ills, but from wholeheartedly different paradigm, is exempli'ed by Mislav Zitko's scathing criticism of a historically misinformed enumeration of the "excessiveness of capitalism" and invocation of a wholly different "terrain on which the struggle over environmental issues is taking place". If one wants to understand the change that the 21st century calls for in the opening piece, then one must see it as a struggle against "neoliberal forces" and not an intellectual search for a "politically undefined" disinterested development mechanism, he says (Zitko, this volume). Name the opponent tobe overcome ("the powers that be"), name the "political and economic order" you want to see in 22nd century (Zitko, this volume), and start putting it in place as soon as possible. With that, his comment concludes the snapshot of discussion and the recorded discursive edifice of an ongoing debate for a red and green political economy under the pressure ofwholescale, material and measurable collapse of civilisation.

With deep gratitude to all commentators and apologies for inadvertently erroneous framing of their positions within a sea of worthy analyses and strategies addressing 21st century limits to growth, I want to stress that differences in explanatory paradigms are neither paralysing nor futile in science and explanation in general. As a historical example of Malthusianism shows, absolute collapse of British population has not occurred in 1825, nor of global population in 2000; but Malthusian growth concerns are every bit as vivid in the climate threat and mathematical carrying capacity modelling today, and the developmentalist project has engendered numerous instances of mini-collapses, painful denial of scarce resources to some and bountiful smuggling of externalities wherever possible. A philosophical rejoinder from an explanatory ontology straddling processes of vastly different scales might stress that the fundamental unit of a realist ontology is not the instantaneous state of a hypothetical structure, but a generalised thing. Things, as something we recognise as invariant through change, are ineliminable fundamentals of experience, and our understanding of the transformations to sustainability could be built on what we must maintain to make sense of the civilised, yet living, humanity as a common denominator of different political strategies.

In short, studying what we mean by progress, civilisation, reproduction and capitalism is neither an academic exercise in 'le+ melancholy' nor political lip-service to entrenched power-structures (Zitko, this volume). It is a necessary civilizational, cultural precondition of cooperative meaningful action, a score that is as important for a melody as a taught string and a clean horn. It is the explanation that makes sense of the adventures to come, pace Gryphons admonitions to Alice to drop explanations for want of time and only provide a description of a sequence of events (Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland). Gryphon, after all, is hasty, dismissive and overbearing character who doesn't end well. Despite the, here largely unassailed, affective urgency of the present human geophysical and historical position, agreement on the common denominator for the political struggle "to change the world of climate change" (Walton, this volume) is the first step in choice of rational and irrational strategies to tackle it (both invariable traits of a humanity, de Sousa 2004). Read, decide for yourself, organise, cooperate, join us.

1 About Group 22 see more at: http://vimm7grupa22.hr/pocetna/about-us/.

2 Mladen Stilinovic, Nobody wants to see. ("3 richest men in the world own as much as six hundred million ofthe poorest people"); http :/ /universes-in universe.org/eng/bien/istanbul_biennial/2009/tour/antrepo/mladen_stilinovic. antrepo/mladen_stilinovic.

3 A number of other different names have been suggested for the new age that humans have ushered in: including the Catastrophozoic era, Homogenocene, Myxocene (from the Greek word for "slime").

4 Information available at http://www.happyplanetindex.org/.

5 Information available at: http://genuineprogress.net/.

6 OECD Better Life Initiative http://www.oecd.org/statistics/betterhfeinitiativemeasuringwell-beingandprogress.htm.

7 See for instance We need to Change (2012), as well as several texts in the recently published Sustainability Perspectives from the European Semi-periphery (2014).

8 Preferring the term "to advance" rather than "to progress" as the latter is loaded and conected with the modernisation theory and the Western concepts of progress as the linear deterministic development that backward societies have to pass.

9 With the data at the time of writing the calculation goes as following: total world population (7.170.000.000 people) divided by population density of Paris (21.289 people/km2) the surface of the world city (336.793 km.2) is similar to surface of Finland (337.030 km2).

10 A character in Oliver Stone's 1987 film Wall Street.

11I have dealt with constructive and principle explanations in natural science, a popular paradigm of method, at length in Domazet 2012. 12 Constructive, as opposed to a simpler and at times revolutionary principle theory (method) to be introduced below.

12The same can't be said of the Marxist criticism of Malthus, who was derided as the unapologetic reactionary speaking for "the exclusive interests of the existing ruling classes or sections of them" (Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, 2: 136-137).

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