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Introduction
This paper, based mainly upon previously classified United Nations documents, will seek to re-examine the events surrounding the Act of Free Choice which took place in West New Guinea in July and August 1969. In particular, I wish to look at the role of the United Nations and consider whether or not it fulfilled its responsibilities towards the Papuan people.
The origins of UN involvement in West New Guinea begin with the formation in 1949 of the UN Commission on Indonesia. This set up the "Round Table Conference" at The Hague which resulted in the agreement to transfer sovereignty from the Dutch to an Indonesian federation led by President Sukarno.
During the negotiations, the Netherlands had insisted on retaining sovereignty over West New Guinea, a position condemned by Indonesia as the continuance of Dutch colonialism and a "troublemaking anachronism."l The Hague argued the West
Papuans had little or no connection with the Asians of Indonesia. They also claimed that they had only administered West New Guinea from Java because they did not consider it practical to appoint a separate governor and administration for a territory with only a small Dutch presence. Nonetheless, Jakarta claimed that West New Guinea was an integral part of the Dutch East Indies and should therefore be part of Indonesia. Further talks were held on the issue in December 1950, but no agreement was reached.
By 1957, Indonesia had unsuccessfully submitted four resolutions on their claim to the UN General Assembly. They now turned to what John Reinhardt describes as the third and final phase of the West Irian dispute, a skillful mixture of diplomacy and threats of military force.2
In 1961 this campaign had become a matter of some concern to the newly elected President J. F. Kennedy. Although hostile to Sukarno, he was more prepared than his predecessor to seek a resolution to the dispute. Policy makers in Washington were concerned about Jakarta's massive Soviet-backed increase in military expenditure. Howard Jones, US Ambassador to Jakarta, later wrote:
Sukarno understood the tactics of realpolitik. He was a master of painting himself into a corner and waiting for someone to rescue him. In this situation, with the help of the Russians, he created a real threat of war. It was...