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How can a state communicate its resolve credibly and commit itself to a future action? A standard answer is tying hands,1 a signaling mechanism that applies across many domains, from crisis management and terrorism to international cooperation and central bank independence.2 Signalers tie their hands by issuing a signal that binds them to a future cost if they renege (Fearon 1997). An example of such costs is audience costs—the political losses a leader suffers for making a threat and then backing down (Fearon 1994).
A large literature in international relations (IR) has offered important insights into tying hands and audience costs. However, most studies assume an opponent that takes the tied hands and audience costs as given. Once the signaler ties its hands in a crisis, the opponent takes the tied hands as tied and is forced to face a strategic situation where the signaler now has less incentive to back down. In short, the opponent has become constrained by the signaler constraining itself.
But are tied hands truly tied? Or, can the opponent untie the tied hands to give freedom back to the signaler—the freedom to concede? These questions have important theoretical and policy implications, but they have not been directly addressed. Recent work has considered the agency of a signaler attempting to loosen its tied hands ex post, but the agency of the opponent remains unexplored. I focus on the opponent's agency and efficacy here.
Contrary to the conventional depiction of a static international audience, the story here is a dynamic one. I propose that opponents do not necessarily take the signaler's tied hands as given; crisis diplomacy may involve an iterative process, with the signaler tying hands and the opponent untying hands; and the opponent can successfully untie the signaler's hands with some specific strategies. If these premises are correct, then tied hands and audience costs are not static—they are dynamic.
I proceed as follows. First, I develop the theoretical premises and propose three strategies of untying hands. Then, I describe the design and report the results of an experiment, showing how particular actions by the opponent can change the domestic costs and reputational impact of backing down. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings, highlighting how they...