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Hanno Sauer, Debunking Arguments in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. xi + 244.
During the last two decades, a lot has been discovered experimentally about why, how, and when people make moral judgements such as ‘abortion is morally wrong’, ‘one ought to save five persons rather than one’, ‘one ought to take care of one's children’, and so on. The moral philosophical question of the day is when and how these findings ought to change our substantive moral views or our views about the status of morality. Should we, as some debunkers demand, give up characteristically deontological moral views, or, as other debunkers would have it, merely switch our metaethical stance? Alternatively, should we be staunch anti-debunkers and remain unfazed by novel experimental findings about morality altogether?
Hanno Sauer addresses these questions in an immensely rewarding, stimulating, and crystal clear book that aspires to offer the first systematic discussion of debunking arguments in ethics. The book provides a conceptual map of different debunking arguments in ethics and provocative discussions (and mostly rebuttals) of existing debunking arguments in the literature.
Sauer's central thesis is that, though empirical findings can debunk or vindicate normative beliefs in principle, the conclusions of existing debunking arguments are frequently overblown. His meticulous discussion of extant debunking arguments provides a strong defence for his thesis, broaching new territory with novel and creative solutions. In particular, his reflections about taking debunking arguments to metaethical, rather than normative, conclusions and the status of trolleyology are important additions to the debunking debate.
Philosophers interested in the prospects of these specific debunking arguments will have most to gain from Sauer's book. Before raising a critical point about the book's overall argument, I briefly summarize what I take to be each chapter's main points, along with some evaluative remarks. Given limited space, many nuances and arguments cannot, unfortunately, be discussed to the degree deserved.
The introduction nicely lays out the challenge posed by debunking arguments with the analogy of a gap between empirical findings and their alleged philosophical, normative consequences. Extreme reactions to the gap (to wit, claiming that all empirical findings ought to change our views or none) are patently absurd. So, the task is to explain when, exactly, an empirical claim...