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J Value Inquiry (2014) 48:177194
DOI 10.1007/s10790-014-9423-3
Elizabeth Tropman
Published online: 10 April 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Moral intuitionism is the view that we can know or justiably believe some moral facts directly, without inferring them from other evidence or proof. While intuitionism is frequently dismissed as implausible, the theory has received renewed interest in the literature.1 Several philosophers have defended updated intuitionistic theories and argue that the theory is not as objectionable as previously alleged.
Contemporary reformulations of moral intuitionism are being developed along multiple lines. These different varieties of intuitionism call for critical classication and comparison. I take up this task in this paper. In what follows, I tease out important points of contention among rival intuitionists and draw some preliminary conclusions about the relative merits of certain intuitionistic approaches. I pay special attention to the relatively recent suggestion that intuitive moral knowledge is based on how things appear to the judging subject.2 I refer to this view as appearance intuitionism, and a secondary aim of the paper is to situate this new variety of intuitionism vis--vis competing theories. Getting clear on these issues will not only move key intramural debates within intuitionism forward, but help us assess the prospects for a renewed intuitionism generally.
The paper begins by getting clear about intuitionisms central commitments in section 1. Sections 2, 3, and 4 then outline three distinct classes of intuitionism:
1 See Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism (London: Continuum, 2011); Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Sabine Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
2 See Huemer, op. cit.
E. Tropman (&)
Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781, USA e-mail: [email protected]
Varieties of Moral Intuitionism
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178 E. Tropman
rationalist intuitionism, response intuitionism, and appearance intuitionism. The papers second half focuses on appearance intuitionism in greater detail and considers the possible advantages this approach provides. One conclusion of this paper is that appeals to moral appearances may not be...