WAR TERMINATION IN SOMALIA AND KENYA DEFENSE FORCES' (KDF) ROLE

Abstract

War causes and conduct have fascinated war planners, war executors and scholars for a long time because little attention has been given to how wars are ended. This oversight is apparent not only in historical accounts of warfare but, more importantly, in contemporary analyses and doctrinal formulations of deterrence and overall defense policies. Just as historians have focused on how wars begin and are fought, military analysts and planners have concentrated on influencing the initiation and conduct of warfare rather than on analyzing the process and requirements for terminating warfare on acceptable terms and at acceptable costs. Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict. Despite the volumes of research and literature on the subject, belligerents mismanage war termination. The major objective of wartime strategy is defeating enemy arms as quickly as possible with the least cost in friendly casualties. As long as hostilities endure, diplomacy is subordinated to military requirements. War termination planning, as it is currently accomplished, takes the form of civil affair planning on the details of how the vanquished will be managed following the capitulation of the enemy and cessation of hostilities. We argue that Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) prudently terminated its war with the terrorists group Al-Shabaab that merged with Al-Qaeda when they agreed to be integrated into the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) which is backed up by the United Nations. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Headnote

War causes and conduct have fascinated war planners, war executors and scholars for a long time because little attention has been given to how wars are ended. This oversight is apparent not only in historical accounts of warfare but, more importantly, in contemporary analyses and doctrinal formulations of deterrence and overall defense policies. Just as historians have focused on how wars begin and are fought, military analysts and planners have concentrated on influencing the initiation and conduct of warfare rather than on analyzing the process and requirements for terminating warfare on acceptable terms and at acceptable costs. Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict. Despite the volumes of research and literature on the subject, belligerents mismanage war termination. The major objective of wartime strategy is defeating enemy arms as quickly as possible with the least cost in friendly casualties. As long as hostilities endure, diplomacy is subordinated to military requirements. War termination planning, as it is currently accomplished, takes the form of civil affair planning on the details of how the vanquished will be managed following the capitulation of the enemy and cessation of hostilities. We argue that Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) prudently terminated its war with the terrorists group Al-Shabaab that merged with Al-Qaeda when they agreed to be integrated into the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) which is backed up by the United Nations.

Key words: termination, war, incursion, rehatting, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)

1. INTRODUCTION

A core tenet of war is that, it is an extension of politics, with the main objective of sustainable peace based on a pre-determined political and not just military end state. Wars have and continue to kill and maim millions, both combatants and non-combatants [1]. Despite the numerous researches on the inevitability of war and how they start and can be prevented, wars are still being waged [2]. Though the United Nations has put immense resources into war prevention, the military aspects of winning wars have always been emphasized by the countries engaged in wars [3].

War history alludes to the fact that the rise and fall of countries and civilizations have depended on their fortunes on the battlefield. Researches have been conducted on the military strategy in war; how to prepare, tactics, attack and win the war. War planners and executors always expect victory. War strategists rarely look at how war ends for the losing party and this confirms why there is scant literature on how and when to terminate a war [4]. In contrast to the field of war prevention and military strategy, war termination and how and when wars end, is a less explored field [5]. The advances in war technology have escalated the destructive nature of modern warfare. That makes it imperative for war as an enigma to be better understood in its entirety to hopefully limit its applications. A state should evaluate the various consequences of the alternatives and make the best decision to maximize its interests in the pursuit of national goals [6].

2. METHODOLOGY

Qualitative research methods were used in this study. Primary and secondary data were analyzed. The primary data was collected by interviewing soldiers and officers on their understanding of war termination. A total of 49 military officers, 29 in active service and 20 retired were interviewed and their views on war termination recorded and analyzed. The researchers studied literature dealing with war termination to gather secondary data on the subject. In this respect, the information was compiled from books, journals, news papers, conference proceedings, government/ corporate reports, theses and dissertations, Internet and magazines and critically analyzed. The findings and analyses are presented under the sub-headings: 'War Termination and the Political Context', 'War Termination and Reconstruction', 'Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) Incursion into Somalia', 'The KDF's Rehatting on the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)' and 'Precedence of poorly and prudently terminated wars'.

3. WAR TERMINATION AND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

War termination at the international and regional level is wrought with complexity and unintended consequences and outcomes by actors in the international system [7]. This level examines how the interaction and interdependencies between two or more states at war impact the success of war termination [8]. At the heart of this level are the "power relations" among "two or more warring states" [9] that can be shaped by factors such as alliances and coalitions, economics, globalization, geopolitics, international institutions, non-state actors, international law, conventional and transnational threats, as well as by societal perceptions, culture, and competing values [10]. For example, economic pressures can be useful as a basic political objective to reach a ceasefire with the aim of inducing war termination as was seen during the 1918 Paris negotiations [11].

"War is a continuation of politics by other means" is a dictum that underlines the fundamental political nature of waging wars. Wars are viewed as instruments of policy to achieve political goals. Therefore, before waging wars, clear pre-defined political goals should be set up and translated into war objectives [12]. It is important that war termination must be carefully considered as part of the war objectives. Even if final victory over the defeated party is assumed to be the final outcome, this victory must be considered militarily attainable right from the onset of hostilities [13].

Not all wars have started with well defined objectives. This is especially true of pre-emptive and preventive wars [14]. Assuming political leaders initiate wars with well-defined objectives, the process of terminating a war at the end of the day is primarily a political decision, made by the political leadership based on political considerations, as wars are started to achieve political objectives [15]. Only in cases of outright conquest, which is rare in this century, is war termination a military act. It is a political decision, as translating military conditions on the battlefield into war termination requires political agreement within the political leadership and also between the opposing sides. The political leadership must carefully weigh the present results obtained against the pre-war political objectives before deciding whether to escalate or deescalate the fighting, and modify the existing war objectives [16].

3.1. War termination and reconstruction

Termination of war is not only the cessation of hostilities; it should be treated from a long-term perspective to include the postwar reconstruction phase of peacebuilding. This broader approach will measure the ultimate success of war termination as opposed to the mere success of the ceasefire. Ending a war and addressing the background to the war will end the war and not just suspend hostilities [17]. For example, there was no sustainable peace in Europe at the end of World War I. The punitive economic measures enforced onto Germany as part of the Versailles Treaty in no way did they create a stable peace. On the contrary, they imposed hardships and stirred resentment among the German population which created a suitable environment for the rise of the autocratic leadership of Adolf Hitler, who waged war onto Europe again barely a generation later [18].

3.2. Military perspectives

The role of the democratic military establishment is to serve political goals. Therefore, it is important for political leadership to give due thought to the political objectives of a war and consequently its termination. While the decision to terminate a war is a political one, the military establishment is charged with the means of ending the war [19]. Military personnel possess a strong desire to ensure that assigned tasks are completed successfully and their confidence in their own solutions makes it harder for them to accept a war ending short of victory. From a tradition of past conflicts, the notion of victory has widely pervaded into the military as the only form of ending a war with honor [20].

This notion of victory and an unconditional surrender of the adversary as the only type of peace with honor that can be achieved is incorrect. Honor is a recognition that pertains to the conduct and ending of wars. It is a virtue that should be acknowledged based on the justification of the cause and the means used to achieve the objectives [21]. One philosopher felt that one should go to war in order to have peace and not the other way around. If one rightly believes in the logic of this statement, then war termination must be viewed in the context of the greater peace that follows for both adversaries [22].

A fallacious obsession with victory often perverts the political process of war termination as the military prolongs the battle to deliver the adversary a decisive defeat. Outright defeat of an adversary is going to be a rare occurrence. This is because of the increasing costs of any conflict in terms of destruction and human lives [23]. A strategy of enemy annihilation will often blind us to other means of achieving the pre-war objectives [24]. Besides its natural desire to be victorious, the military, as part of its culture of obedience to a legitimate authority, tends to obey orders unflinchingly with a 'can do' attitude. The military is reluctant to make excuses when the operation fails. Consequently, acting on the assumption that an operation will not fail creates a natural bias [25].

3.3. Military role in war termination

While war termination is a political decision, the role of the military in the process of war termination is less clear. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Moltke a military general urged the German Crown Prince, even after the fall of Paris, to allow the Prussian troops to fight and deliver the French a complete defeat so that they could dictate whatever peace terms they wished [26]. To relinquish the military of any role in war termination merely because war termination as a political decision is short-sighted, some argue that military strategy concerns itself with applying military means to achieve political ends, and these political ends go beyond the mere destruction of enemy forces [27]. The military can assist political decision-makers in war termination by relating military conditions to strategic objectives, for example in planning for the level of destruction of an adversary's forces if the objective was to neutralize the military threat [28].

4. KENYA DEFENCE FORCES' (KDF) INCURSION INTO SOMALIA

Somalia descended into anarchy in 1991 and has not had a government for more than 20 years. In mid October 2011, Kenya invoked Article 51 of the United Nations charter on 'the right to self defence' and began to pursue the Al-Shabaab terrorist group into Somalia [29]. Al-Shabaab incursions into Kenya territory especially in the North Eastern Counties and Coastal counties had been going on for some time and included the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), roadside bombs, landmines and raids by fighters using small arms and light weapons and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) against Kenyans [30]. The operations were prompted not by the incursions into the Kenyan territory on land and sea by Al-Shabaab and local 'pirates' but primarily because of the effect the British and French tourists' kidnapping from Kenyan resorts had on international tourism in Kenya [31].

4.1. Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) advancement to Kismayu

Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) operations began on three fronts: North from El-Wak towards Fafadun and Bardere; in the centre through Dhobley and on towards Bibi and Afmadhow; and in the South up the coast towards Kuday [32]. Since they crossed the border on October 14 2012, the Kenyans had pushed the militia from areas near the Kenyan border stretching up to Afmadhow representing 100,000 square kilometres or about one sixth the size of Somalia. All three prongs of the attack were due to converge (eventually) on the town of Kismayu on the coast as shown in Figure 1 [33].

The Star News Paper reported on 31 May 2012 that Kenyan troops were advancing toward Kismayu in a final push to defeat the militants after they had captured the key town of Afmadhow, considered the gateway to Kismayu [34].

4.2. Kenya Defence Forces' (KDF) rehatting on the African mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

On July 6 2012, Kenya Defence Forces, held a symbolic Rehatting ceremony in Nairobi [35]. The event marked the formal integration of KDF into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by the United Nation Resolution 2036 [36]. The Kenyan soldiers joined those from Burundi, Djibouti and Uganda to expand the AMISOM force [37]. Among the ceremony attendants there were: the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the United Nations, Ambassador Mahiga; Chief of the Defense Forces of the Republic of Kenya, General Karangi; AMISOM Force Commander, Lieutenant General Guti; Special Representative of the chairman of the African Union Commission for Somalia, Ambassador Diarra and other senior military officials from Africa [38].

The Minister of State for Defense Honourable Haji said that the event marks an important milestone in Kenya's contribution to regional peace and security concerns and to its fulfillment of the regional and international obligations. Special representative of the chairman of the African Union Commission for Somalia, Ambassador Diarra thanked Kenyans and the Government for joining AMISOM [39].

5. PRECEDENCE OF POORLY TERMINATED WARS

5.1. The Gulf War

The war termination process characterized by problems, unsynchronized military and political objectives, economic conditions, and public opinion contributes to an unsuccessful war termination. In 1991, the U.S. and coalition forces used military force to meet the basic political objective to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The war terminated when the U.S. unilaterally announced a cease-fire stating that the U.S. and the coalition forces had liberated Kuwait and defeated the Iraqi army [40]. One of the domestic problems was that the U.S. neglected to have a war termination strategy prior to the cease-fire [41]. Lack of strategy resulted in the U.S. being unable to turn a military victory into a political success story by forcing Iraq to accept defeat in the Gulf War [42]. The Bush administration viewed the diplomatic side of war termination as a separate civilian function, and the military side of war termination as a purely military function [43].

When these functions are pursued separately, it is easy to result in unsynchronized objectives that do not work in concert toward successful war termination goals. At the individual level of analysis, for Saddam Hussein to have used military force with neighboring Kuwait to influence regional interests coupled with the hindsight of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) years later, shows that nations under the control of autocratic leadership never accept defeat, regardless of the cost, and that perhaps only a regime change will set conditions for lasting peace. Worth reminding in this respect is that tyrannical leaders such as the late Saddam when leftin power are able to upset regional balance years later within an international system [44].

The 1991 Gulf War illustrates that a decisive military victory alone does not necessarily establish a sustainable peace following the end of military operations. It also suggests that leaving the region without implementing institutional reform only allowed Saddam to purchase armament to restart hostilities later [45]. While the U.S. achieved its stated military objectives, it failed to achieve more longer term political objectives to enhance regional stability using an appropriate application of diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments of power following the ceasefire that could have set better conditions for peace in that region. Instead, one of Clausewitz' fundamental problems with war termination holds true because Iraq's will to fight was still present and the outcome of the Gulf War was a 'transitory evil' as evidenced by Operation Iraqi Freedom [46].

5.2. Somalia

As the only super power, United States of America declares itself to be a country of ideals and strength. Whether it is called neocolonialism, narcissism or brotherly love, it feels obliged to take control of international situations in many instances, such as is the case with Somalia, and it trusts their military prowess [47].

Following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other organizations, sought to resolve the conflict. In 1991 the United Nations' Secretary-General dispatched an envoy supported by all faction leaders. The war had resulted in nearly 1 million refugees and almost 5 million people threatened by hunger and disease [48].

The Security Council in January 1992 imposed an arms embargo against Somalia. The Secretary- General organized talks between the parties, who agreed on a ceasefire, to be monitored by United Nations observers, and on the protection of humanitarian convoys by United Nations security personnel [49]. In April, the Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) as an operation aimed at providing relief. This mission was to be strictly humanitarian as a part of the function of the UN which is to "maintain international peace and security"[50]. UNOSOM I proved to be useless in the wake of Somalia's dead government. Without the backing of a strong government, international aid supplies were stolen and humanitarian workers were targets for robbers and the warlords they too often had been allied with [51].

On December 3 1992, Operation Restore Hope was in the makings. The Security Council, after agreeing that Somalia was in terrible trouble, voted in a resolution that it would "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia" [52]. A few days afterward, the United Task Force (UNITAF) stepped up to the plate. UNITAF, which was led by the United States, started Operation Restore Hope. The United States, with approval from the United Nations, sent 27,000 troops to Somalia [53]. The goals of Operation Restore Hope were to "deliver relief supplies, help distribute food and medicine, and help protect relief supplies the UN is sending to fight famine. Initial polls showed a 70% support increase" [54]. The media often inaccurately portrayed Operation Restore Hope as a resolution to make up for Somalia's lack of water and shortage of food. In truth, many of Somalia's problems were due to political greediness, not geographical hardships [55].

By March 1993 the United States had dramatically scaled down their number of forces in Somalia. They were ready to call it a day and let the United Nations take over. Thus UNOSOM II, which stressed building up the Somali nation, began. Law and order, roadways, and a government representing its people were the foundation for this mission [56].

UNOSOM II strove to lead Somalia onward to the path of Western civilization. That was one of the pitfalls that made the Somalis resist. Somalia is a nation based upon the politics of long-standing clans. To make matters more difficult for this mission Somalis did not trust Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was the UN Secretary General at that time because he was perceived as an advocate for Siad Barre [57].

UNOSOM II failed to take control of Somalia because there were many warlords armed with small and light weapons (courtesy of the United States during the Cold War years, when the U.S. supported Barre). The U.S. soldiers leftin Somalia were basically fighting for their lives instead of saving lives [58]. In Mogadishu, Somali civilians wanted U.S. forces out of their city and were not afraid to fight for what they wanted. After a horrendous deadly occurrence resulting in the deaths of 30 U.S. Marines and hundreds of Somalis, the United States finally evacuated its forces in March 1994. The United Nations followed a year later [59].

The operation cost the United States (through December 1994) an estimated $1.2 billion and the U.N. operation was estimated at an additional $1.5 billion. Thirty U.S. soldiers were killed in combat and 175 were wounded. There were an additional 13 noncombat deaths and one person remained missing. The United Nations lost more than 140 peacekeepers and thousands of Somali citizens died by violent means. Looking at these numbers while considering the current state of affairs in Somalia, it is difficult not to question the validity of the intervention and ask whether it was worth [60].

6. KENYA'S PRUDENT WAR TERMINATION AGAINST ALSHABAAB

The main objective of wartime strategy is defeating enemy armies as quickly as possible with the least cost in friendly casualties [61]. As long as hostilities last, diplomacy is subordinated to military requirements. War termination planning, such as how it is accomplished, takes the form of civil affairs planning in which the details of how the vanquished will be managed follow capitulation of the enemy and cessation of hostilities [62].

The single mission of KDF in Somalia was to fight the Shabaab, a group that had brutalized locals and extended its extremism campaign into Kenya. We argue that Kenya's acceptance to join AMISOM affirms that the country was well prepared for war termination because before a war is started the exit strategy must be taken into account.

A key component of war termination is to determine how the liberated areas will hold free and fair elections and have democratically elected leaders to govern them. Though the Kenya government has no financial capability to do this in Somalia, it has partnered with the international community to achieve this noble obligation. The high cost of keeping troops in an open-ended war is one of the reasons behind Kenya's decision to integrate into AMISOM [63]. It was estimated that Kenya's government is spending at least Sh200 million per month on the war, a staggering amount especially in a year of record Sh236 billion budget deficit [64]. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) has vanquished most of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. Moreover, because their proper war termination plan, Kenya with the help of international community are putting up infrastructure like hospitals, schools, roads and helping the locals set up a security apparatus and assisting them in the pacification of the captured towns. Hence, our argument that KDF war termination was prudently planned.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Wars have a political agenda and to effectively bring a conflict to termination, the political nature of the conflict must be addressed. The military as a professional establishment is charged with the means to achieve these political objectives. Decisive military advantage alone however does not necessarily confer an end to the war. The decision to terminate the war is primarily a political decision due to the underlying nature of war as an instrument of policy [65]. The military however has important roles to play in the war termination process in addition to the direct military objective of destroying adversary forces. It can also help the war termination process by recognizing the very characteristics of the military profession which may bring shades of grey to its perspectives on war termination. At the end of the day, we must recognize that war termination is only a bridge between the war phase and the posthostilities phase. War termination must therefore be viewed in the longer context of conflict resolution. In some cases, winning the war is also not necessarily followed by winning the peace [66]. It is important that the roles of the military are understood and its means effectively employed so that the political objectives of the war can be successfully met.

Conceptual thinking about end states and conflict termination needs to be a part of the planning process, and it is time to include post-hostility actions in the military mindset. However, exit strategies should not become the means to an end. Planning must account for shifts in the political process and deal with belligerents who are willing to wait out the intervention. In general, the planning must be flexible enough to accommodate changes in the national will [67].

The burden will remain with the military commanders to translate vague political objectives into a military strategy with workable end states and hope that the planning is as close to the actual anticipated events as possible. The commanders are integral to the political process and must be able to anticipate changes, advise political leaders about military capabilities as well as limitations and adjust the termination conditions as needed. The idea that the military should only focus on winning the conflict with minimum harm to its forces and maximum damage to the enemy while letting the political leaders worry about the rest does not have much credibility. In operations other than war, it is imperative that the various instruments of power be fully integrated for a synergistic effect [68].

References

REFERENCES

[1] Boule John R, (2002) "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination." Joint Force Quarterly. (Autumn 2001- Winter 2002): 97-102.

[2] Clausewitz Carl Von, (1989) On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 143.

[3] United Nations, (1994) Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July.

[4] Woodward Bob, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 282.

[5] Reed James W, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning." Parameters, Summer 1993, 41 - 52.

[6] Handel Michael I, War Termination-A Critical Survey. Israel: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978, pg 28-43.

[7] Nye J S, (2003) Understanding international conflicts: An introduction to theory and history, New York: Longman, p.45.

[8] Handel Michael I, War Termination-A Critical Survey. Israel: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978, pg 28-43.

[9] Smith James D D, Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Ceasefire. Oxford: Westview Press, 1995.

[10] Greenburg James R, (2008) National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive, AY09 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, October, 123.

[11] Handel Michael I, War Termination-A Critical Survey. Israel: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978, pg 28-43.

[12] Clausewitz Carl Von, (1989) On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 143.

[13] Summers Harry G, (1994) "Clinton Plays with Lives to Reach Political Goals." Air Force Times, 29 August.

[14] Odhiambo E O, Onkware K, Kassilly J, Maito L T, Oboka W A, Wakhungu J W & Ntabo O M, (2012) "Kenya's Pre - Emptive And Preventive Incursion Against Al - Shabaab In The Light Of International Law" Journal of Defense Resources Management Online (JoDRM) Volume 3, Issue no. 1 (4), April 2012 ISSN: 2068-9403, Romania, http://journal.dresmara.ro.

[15] Ikle Fred Charles, Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

[16] Massoud Tansa George, (1992) The Termination of Wars (PhD dissertation: New York University). Michigan: UMI Dissertation Services.

[17] Bade Bruce C, (1994) "War Termination: Why Don't We Plan for It." Essays on Strategy XII. Edited by John N. Petrie. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press.

[18] Lee Bradford A, (2008) "Winning the War but Losing the Peace? The United States and the Strategic Issues of War Termination," in Theory of War and Strategy, Volume II, AY 2009 (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, August 2008), 447.

[19] Weinberger Caspar C, (1984) TheUseofMilitaryPower. RemarkstotheNational Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November.

[20] Summers Harry G, (1986) "War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace," Naval War College Review, vol. 39, no. 1, January-February p. 19.

[21] Dannreuther Ronald, (1992) "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis," Adelphi Papers no. 264, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 57.

[22]Nicomachus Aristotle Stagiritis, (384-322BC) Rhetoric. http://rhetoric. eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-4.html.

[23] Tzu Sun, (1963) The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109-10.

[24] Bellamy Alex J, (2008) "The responsibilities of victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War." Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (October 1: 623 in Pro Quest (accessed January 19, 2009).

[25] Powell Colin L., General, with Persico, Joseph E, My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995.

[26] Moltke Count Helmuth von, (1980) Chief of Prussian General Staff. Described by David Chandler as "the ablest military mind since Napolean", Atlas of Military Strategy, (New York: The Free Press, p. 198.

[27] Reed James W, (1993) "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," Parameters, vol. 23, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 41-42.

[28] Rampy Michael R, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities." Military Review. October 1992, 42-54.

[29] Khalif A, Kenyan army in for "mother of all battles". Retrieved October 17, 2011, from http://www.nationmedia.com.

[30] Aluanga L, Al Shabaab militants aim softer targets. Retrieved October 16, 2011, from http://www.standardmedia. co.ke.

[31] Mkawale S, Kenya invokes right of self defence over Al-Shabaab. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from http:// www. standardmedia.co.ke.

[32] McKenzie David, Kenyan forces take Somali town from militants http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/30/ world/africa/kenya-somalia/index.html.

[33] Kenya Ministry of State for Defence, (2012) "Rehatting Ceremony of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to African Mission inside Somalia (Amisom)." http://www.mod.go.ke.

[34] Wamugo Macharia, (2012) KDFcaptures- afmadhow- Thursday, 31 May http://the-star.co.ke/classicnews/78203- kdf-captures-afmadhow.

[35] Kimutai Vitalis, (2012) Prayer most potent weapon for KDF in Somalia battle Updated Friday, June 22. http:// www.standardmedia.co.ke.

[36] United Nations, (2012) Council resolution 2036 on the 22nd February.

[37] Kenya Ministry of State for Defence, (2012) "Rehatting Ceremony of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to African Mission inside Somalia (Amisom)." http://www.mod.go.ke.

[38] Gisesa Nyambega, (2012) "Why Kismayu remains ultimate war prize" Posted Sunday, June 3. http:// www.trinityafer.com/en/index.php/ news/9944-why-kismayu-remainsultimate- war-prize.

[39] Kenya Ministry of State for Defence, (2012) "Rehatting Ceremony of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to African Mission inside Somalia (Amisom)." http://www.mod.go.ke.

[40] Mark Garrard, (2008) "War Termination in the Persian Gulf: Problems and Prospects." Aerospace Power Journal (October 1, 2001): 43 in ProQuest (accessed September 22.

[41] Dele Fred Charles, Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

[42] Fai Leow Meng, (1998) War Termination. Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces journal V24 N3, Jul - Sep. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ back/journals/1998/vol24_3/7.html.

[43] Fishel, John T. Liberation. Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

[44] Ikle Fred Charles, (1991) Every War Must End. New York : Columbia University Press.

[45] Cordesman Anthony H, (2003) Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerilla War? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11.

[46] Clausewitz Carl Von, (1989) On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 143.

[47] Volman Daniel, (1993) "Africa and the New World Order." The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1. Mar., pp. 1-30.

[48] Lewis I M, (993) "Misunderstanding the Somali crisis," Anthropology Today, Vol. 9, No.4, August 1993, p. 1. Cf. his classic works on Somali social organization: A Pastoral Democracy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982) and A Modern History of Somalia(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).

[49] Samatar Abdi Ismail, (1992) "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention," The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 p. 625.

[50] Thakur Ramesh, (1994) "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia." The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Sep., pp. 387-410).

[51] Semb Anne Julie, (2000) "The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference?" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 4. Special Issue on Ethics of War and Peace. July, pp. 469-488.

[52] Brodie Bernard, War and Politics. New York: Macmillian, 1973.

[53] Jentleson Bruce W & Rebecca L Britton, (1998) "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force." The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4. Aug., pp. 395-417.

[54] Pillar Paul R, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.

[55] Roberts Adam, (1993) "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3. July, pp. 429-449.

[56] Allard Kenneth, (1995) Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Fort NcNair, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press.

[57] Zunes Stephen, (2002) "Somalia as a Military Target." Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 11.

[58] Lorch Donatella, (1993) "Disunity Hampering U.N. Somalia Effort." The New York Times, 12 July.

[59] Zunes Stephen, (2002) "Somalia as a Military Target." Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 11.

[60] Sahnoun Mohamed, (1994) Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 25-27 and 37-40.

[61] Clausewitz Carl Von, (1989) On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 143.

[62] Cimbala Stephen J & Dunn Keith A. [EDS], Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

[63] Jamah Ally, (2011) Talks to end doctors' strike collapse. Thursday, December 8 2011, http://www. standardmedia.co.ke.

[64] Business Daily, (2011) Kenya shifts cost of Somalia war to the United Nations, http://yaskaarshe. wordpress.com/2011/12/07/kenyashifts- cost-of-somalia-war-to-the-united nations.

[65] Mutiga Murithi, (2012) "KDF uses carrot and stick to kick the Shabaab out of key town", http://dhanaan.com/ kdf-uses-carrot-and-stick-to-kick-theshabaab- out-of-key-town.

[66] Clarke Bruce G, "Conflict Termination: What Does it Mean to Win?." Military Review, Nov 1992, 86.

[67] Clardy Herman S, (2004) War Termination: Dreaming of the End and the Ultimate Triumph. Newport, RI, Naval War College, May 2004. p.19. http:// handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA425912

[68] Gilpin Michael, (1997) Exit Strategy: The New Dimension in Operational Planning. Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College, p.37.http:// handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA328399.