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Introduction
The modern version of the problem of free will is usually described as a collision between two beliefs: the belief that we are free to choose our actions and the belief that our actions are determined by prior necessary causes. Determinism-the view that events are determined by specific causes-makes most aspects of reality intelligible. It works quite well, for example, when explaining aspects of the natural world (quantum physics aside). When heat, fuel, and oxygen come together there is fire. There must be fire. To borrow a famous Buddhist simile, when a mango seed is given the right conditions, it will grow to become a mango tree. It cannot grow to be anything else. However, we do not usually think of agents as being caused in the same way. We tend to think that agents somehow transcend natural causation by their ability to choose freely. If we also think that agents are part of the natural order, we face a paradox. This is, in short, the problem of free will.
On the face of it this problem applies to Buddhism as well. Buddhist thought is very much dedicated to explaining reality as a series of causal relations between processes. This, together with the rejection of a transcendent soul, seems to contradict the Buddhist insistence on choice, personal responsibility, and retribution. Surprisingly, the subject of free will in Buddhism has remained somewhat marginalized in Buddhist scholarship. This has left a void that has attracted contradictory claims: either that Buddhism allows no free will or that it is a doctrine of free will per se.1 This article aims at counterbalancing this situation by comparing the Buddhist position, as preserved in Pa-li sources, with a recent proposal by the philosopher Daniel Dennett, who advocates a compatibilist solution to the traditional problem of free will. It argues that Dennett and the Buddha represent two similar conceptual shifts: from ultimate free will to compatible free will.2 Dennett criticizes the Cartesian notion of the soul as the ultimate inner controller of the body and replaces it with a dynamic notion of intention that is dependent on the agent's cognitive ability to reflect, plan, and control. Similarly, the Buddha rejects the Brahamanical concept of soul as the ultimate controller and replaces...